The Khmer Rouge Trial (KRT) and the Destiny of the Cambodian People.

Sihanouk 'Win/Win' strategy benefits only him, but not Cambodia

Introduction:

Sihanouk is well known for his ability to survive and to be mercurial or "flip Flop". But, what is less known is the reason why he was able to survive with the political upheavals in Cambodia during the last 30 years. The other question is while Sihanouk was able to survive but at what cost to the Cambodian people.

For instance, Sihanouk had allied himself with the murderous Khmer Rouge thus allowing these Cambodian communists to commit one of the worst atrocities in human history. Although he had always denied that he was the one who legitimized the Khmer Rouge by shifting the blame to others, especially to the United States bombing in Cambodia in the late 1960s, his collaboration with China on the one hand, and the Khmer Rouge close alliance with China on the other hand make it difficult to support Sihanouk's denial, as former US Congressman Steve Solarz has rightly pointed out that while the US bombing of Cambodia was a factor in the success of the Khmer Rouge in taking power in Cambodia, Sihanouk giving support to this group of mass murderers was a powerful signal to the rally of Cambodian peasants to the Khmer Rouge. The late House Of Representatives of the US Congress, and a true friend of Cambodia, Steve Solarz correctly said that:

"The fact that Sihanouk joined forces with the Khmer Rouge gave Pol Pot an opportunity to recruit much more effectively among the peasantry because he could recruit in the name of the prince. My guess is that had as much if not more to do with the ultimate success of the Khmer Rouge than the American bombing."

More recently, he again allied himself with another group of pro-Vietnamese communists under Hun Sen and the CPP, thereby legitimizing this Vietnamese-puppet regime and allowing them to plunder the natural resources of Cambodia. This, in turn, makes Cambodians as one of the poorest people in the world, despite an enormous amount of assistance amounting to an average of US$ six hundreds millions per year generously given to Cambodia by the international community since 1991, and to open the door for Vietnamese illegal immigration with the collusion and support of Hun Sen and his CPP.

The question is why did Sihanouk act in this manner, which may have saved Sihanouk's prestige or political power, but at a high cost to the Cambodian people. The answer can be given by looking at Sihanouk's motivation behind these apparent contradictory alliances.

Sihanouk always thinks that, as a god-king (Don't forget, it was Sihanouk who had brought back the suffix 'varman' to add to his name, which makes him a direct of the Angkor era good-kings), he and he alone can protect Cambodia's interests and independence. At the same time, he never separates his personal interests and those of Cambodia. Because, he  always considers Cambodia as his private domain.

In addition, from carefully studying Sihanouk's practice of political maneuvers, one can observe that Sihanouk always believes in his own ability to out-smart his opponents. In so doing, he believes that he has a "win/win" strategy. For instance, he did not hesitate to ally himself with his worst enemies like Pol Pot or Hun Sen, and the Vietnamese, because he was certain that he would be able to out-maneuver them.

However, if for some reason, he could not out-maneuver them, Sihanouk had a back-up strategy, which was to make sure that no other politicians in power were allowed to succeed, so that he can say, "Now You can see, my children (Cambodian people), you think I am bad. But, wait until you see those who are now in power by usurping the power from me. They are much worse." 

By so doing, he thought he could show the Cambodian peopeo and the world that he is the only one who could solve the Cambodian problem.

I hope the following excerpts from a selected group of experts in Cambodian affairs would explain what I was trying to analyze in this introduction Sihanouk's mercurial behavior and chameleon-like personality and politics and its deadly impact on the life of the vast majority of the Cambodian people.

Naranhkiri Tith, Ph.D.

Washington DC, 2005 

The Sihanouk Paradox:

It is not an easy task to assess Sihanouk as a person and as a political leader. He is the most important, enduring, and dominant political leader in post independent modern Cambodia. But, judging him we must, as he has been the only Cambodian leader that has had full control of Cambodia for nearly sixty years. Cambodia has been going through a number of fatal crises under his long tenure of power. Yet, Sihanouk always claimed that whatever he did, it was always in the interests of preserving Cambodia's independence. For instance, he said that he had never joined the Khmer Rouge in the 1970's. But, it was the Khmer Rouge who joined him. He totally and conveniently forgot to say that it was he who allowed the Khmer Rouge to use his name to attract new recruits among Cambodian peasants to join their army and party. Ultimately, Sihanouk will do whatever is best for his interest and survival, regardless of what happens to Cambodia and the Cambodian people. (See two book reviews posted below titled "A brilliant Sort of Madness." amd also "Dancing in Shadows," (See an article posted below titled "Debating Responsibility for Khmer Rouge").

Even today, although less powerful, he still has a tremendous influence in all aspects of Cambodian life; unfortunately, mostly in a negative and disastrous way for the Cambodian people. He is always the one that creates problems, and then positions himself to be the sole person who can solve that problem. In this context, as recently as in February 2005, he suggested a "solution" to settle the political dispute between Sam Rainsy and Hun Sen/Ranariddh regarding a lawsuit that Sam Rainsy made against the great Cambodian dictator and his shadow puppet, the president of the National Assembly.

What did Sihanouk do in that proposal was to suggest a status quo, that Sam Rainsy should drop his lawsuit and that Hun Sen/Ranariddh should also drop their lawsuit against Sam Rainsy. In other words, Hun Sen and Ranariddh can continue to ignore the law and to loot and plunder the country, at will (See an analysis posted below titled "Once More, Sihanouk's Deceitfulness is revealed".

Sihanouk is a contradiction personified. He is bright and yet narrow minded, affable and yet vindictive, International and yet very Cambodian to the core. I think the Australian historian, Milton Osborne, has come up with the best and most fitting description of Sihanouk which is also the title of one of his books:

"The Prince Light and the Prince of Darkness"

Perhaps, the most devastating trait of Sihanouk's character is his suppression of the potential of all Cambodians not belonging to the royal family to be fully successful in any fields of endeavor. Like his ancestors, Sihanouk would interpret any achievement by a Cambodian commoner as a threat to his fame and absolute power. The following excerpt from a manuscript written by Sihanouk entitled "From the Cup to the Dregs" perfectly illustrated how Sihanouk's complete monopoly of achievement and power could make or break any common Cambodian at will, as follows:

"I could not understand how the "grandees of the Kingdom", who owed everything, not to their merit or their talent, but to my protection, and that of the monarchy, could dare to do without me to help their fragile bark navigate amongst the mortal reefs of the American-Vietnamese war (while awaiting the conclusion of an agreement which would, I was firmly convinced, put an end to this war)."

(Norodom Sihanouk; From the Cup to the Dregs; Undated manuscript given to me by Sihanouk with his dedication)

The suppression of the identity of the vast majority of Cambodian people is well reflected in an excerpt from a book titled "Civilization of Angkor" written by an English Archeologist, Charles Highman, as follows:

"It is very difficult to pin down the status of the workers. Some could be bought and sold, some were war captives, while others may well have been in the service of the noble family for generations and were assigned to develop a new foundation. Tied labour is not unusual in South-East Asia. As recently as the Ayutthaya period in Thailand, which ended in the eighteenth century, workers were tattooed to record their assigned place of work and to maintain a stable workforce. There are reminders of this in the inscription from Phnom Kanva, Battambang, which describes how Viruna, a worker who had escaped from the estate where he was born, had his eyes gouged out and his nose cut off. It was also customary in listing workers to include their children and even grandchildren. Workers are often listed as being responsible for either the fifteen dark or the fifteen light days of each month on a rota system, and could work on land assigned to them, according to one text, in their own time."

One important implication form this quote is the fact that one of the many titles of the Cambodian god-kings, is "Machas Phean Dey," meaning "Owner of all the Land." This wholesale ownership of the all the land in Cambodia by the god-king, in an essentially hydraulic-agricuultural society, as Angkor was, in turn,  made all those commoners who lived and worked on  the god-king-owned land, servants of the god-king or those whom the god-king gave his land as a gift for their fidelity to him. This fact explains why the word "Kgnom" means both "I"  or "Servant" in English.

More importantly, the loss of identity, in turn, has suppressed any development of future leaders outside the royal family in sufficient number from which Cambodia must and can rely upon to better defend itself and to allow it to survive, especially in time of major crises, as Cambodia has been facing since the early 1960's.

(For the negative legacy of history on the present day Cambodia, please see An Uncertain Legacy: the Khmer Paradox by B P Groslier in "Special articles section") Naranhkiri Tith

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A Picture is worth a thousand words:

The Cambodian tragedy is captured in  this picture

(Comments: Sihanouk, along with his wife Monique, and his son the current king, Sihamoni (The vassals) recently visited Hanoi (June 2010), to pay tribute to and to reassure the Vietnamese leader (Vietnamese president Nguyen Minh Triet, the suzerain), This picture clearly shows that Hun Sen is still Hanoi’s servant, and Sihanouk is still Hun Sen’s servant. The Vietnamese tributary system in now implanted on solid ground in Cambodia (On the tributary system, please, the link posted below).

Vietnam Tributary System with Deadly Twist

For a comprehensive archive on Cambodia-Vietnam relations, please, click on this link:

http://janecadhlanews.blog4ever.com/blog/articles-cat-462157-503850-cambodia_vietnam.html

Notice, how submissive Sihanouk (Kowtow) is toward the Vietnamese leader. Is he as humbling and submissive toward the Cambodian people? The answer is, NO!

When will Sihanouk stop betraying Cambodia and its people? When will the Cambodian people have enough courage to start to let the ex-king and traitor know that he had done enough harm to Cambodia and its people, and should disappear from the political scene as soon as possible, in order to allow the Cambodian people to have a better chance to survive the Vietnamese-made-genocide. Naranhkiri Tith Ph.D. Washington DC. August 26, 2010)

Vietnam president praises Cambodia cooperation: state TV

AFP Asian Edition: Jun 22, 2010 12:04 EDT

http://www.royalty.nu/news/10/06/MocCamb.html

Vietnam's president praised cooperation with neighbouring Cambodia Tuesday during a private visit by former king Norodom Sihanouk and members of his royal family, state television reported.

Sihanouk arrived in the Vietnamese capital with his wife and his son, King Norodom Sihamoni, for a four-day stay.

The ex-monarch is sometimes known as the "king-father" of Cambodia, where anti-Vietnamese sentiment is rife, fuelled by resentment at Vietnam's expansion over centuries and the perception that Cambodia is losing territory.

But communist Vietnam's President Nguyen Minh Triet said the visit showed relations between the two are close and important, state television said.

Vietnam and Cambodia, as well as their fellow neighbour Laos, are determined to maintain solidarity, Triet added.

According to the report, Sihanouk thanked Vietnam for its support.

Vietnam invaded Cambodia in 1978, overthrew the murderous Khmer Rouge regime the following year, and occupied the country for 10 years.

"Being retired and no longer doing politics nor diplomacy, my journey and trip to the glorious Socialist Republic of Vietnam will have a strictly private character," Sihanouk said in a statement dated June 14. He was to meet other current and retired leaders of Vietnam, and attend a performance at Hanoi's Opera House, a Vietnamese source said.

Sihanouk abruptly quit the throne in October 2004 in favour of his son, citing old age and health problems. He remains a prominent figure in Cambodia and often uses messages on his website to comment on matters of state.

Cambodia and Vietnam share a 1,270-kilometre (790-mile) border, which has remained vague since French colonial times, but in 2005 they signed a border accord that has helped calm tensions after decades of territorial disputes.

Vietnamese businesses are also investing in Cambodia.

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Sihanouk with his good friend, North Vietnamese Prime Minister Phan Van Dong

At an Anti US imperialism meeting in Southern China, 1970

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Sihanouk with North Vietnamese army officers along the Ho Chi Minh trail, on his way to the liberated zone in Cambodia, 1973

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Sihanouk inWorking session with Senior Khmer Rouge leaders (Hou Youn, Hou Nim, Ieng Say, Khieu Samphan), in 1973, Northern Cambodia

A Brilliant Sort of Madness

My War with the CIA

http://www.mekong.net/cambodia/sihanouk.htm

The Memoirs of Prince Norodom Sihanouk as related to Wilfred Burchett

Pantheon Books, 1972, 1973

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War and Hope: The Case for Cambodia

Norodom Sihanouk

Pantheon Books, 1980

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(Comments: this review of Sihanouk’s books titled, “My War with the CIA,” and "War and Hope: The Case for Cambodia," is one of the most  accurate and comprehensive look at Sihanouk’s disastrous role for more than 50 years, as an unchallenged leader of Cambodia’s destiny.

This review also provides a very important assessment of the mentality of the Khmer Rouge leaders, namely, Khieu Samphan and Pol Pot, and their role in the Cambodian tragedy. In this context, it confirms my suspicion about how the Khmer Rouge leaders were so far away from reality that they believed they could beat the Chinese in becoming the first pure Communist society in the world, and in the shortest time.  

It is important to note that this Khmer Rouge’s rush to become the first pure Communist society in the world, provides an explanation as to why they were committing mass murder against the Cambodian people. As Khieu Samphan and Pol Pot were purported to have said that it is better to have only one million of pure Cambodian Communists than seven million Cambodians, the  majority of which is made up of impure bourgeois, capitalists, and reactionaries.

Communism is now considered by many scholars, including who were members of the Communist party, to be a utopia. But, the Khmer Rouge has brought this utopia to even a higher level, some says surrealist.

This utopia stems from the fact that the Khmer Rouge believe in the Cambodian conventional wisdom, which says that “if Cambodians can build Angkor, they can do anything in this world, better and faster than anybody else.”

For the Cambodian people, this Khmer Rouge dementia is a major contribution to their endless tragedy, and may be to their disappearance from the face of the earth, sooner rather than later.

The other main piece of formation from this book review is the confirmation about how the late US president Richard Nixon had callously and deliberately used Cambodia as a terrain to push the Viet Cong deep into Cambodia, so as to minimize the casualties for the American troop withdrawal from Vietnam. That, in turn, shows how naive and uninformed Lon Nol and Sarik Matak were, when they believed in Nixon’s words, that America came to save the Cambodian people. Perhaps more devastating for the future of Cambodia, the coup by Lon Nol/Sarik Matak had allowed Sihanouk to get away from the self made trap as he was cornered by his pro-Chinese policy, and annegative implication for Cambodia in this review is the fact that, unlike Vietnam, Cambodia always anti-American policy. Sihanouk went on the lend his name to the Khmer Rouge to recruit new members, among the Cambodian peasants. Although the American bombing also contributed to the Khmer Rouge increased ability to get new recruits, from the Cambodian peasants.

The most debilitating aspect of this review is the fact that unlike the vietnamese who never ask foreigners for help; the  Cambodian leaders always asked foreigners for help, including from the Vietnamese, thier worst enemies. Unless Cambodia can produce good leaders who would stop its independency on foreign "help," Cambodia cannot expect to defend itself against a well-conceived, well-managed, well-motivated and well-implemented "Nam Tien," the most deadly form of all colonialism.

Naranhkiri Tith Ph.D. Washington DC. May 24, 2010)

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For more than half a century, King Norodom Sihanouk has preened, postured, and pouted across the stage of Cambodian politics. He is perpetually described as "mercurial" and "unpredictable." For years he was central to Cambodia's survival. And he was just as surely central to her near-destruction.

To give him due credit: It is beyond question that Sihanouk deeply loved the Cambodian people. None of his successors has ever matched his genuine affection for his people. But Sihanouk had one critical flaw: as much as he loved the Cambodian people, he loved himself just slightly more. At a pivotal moment in Cambodian history, he chose his own interests above those of Cambodia, and millions of people paid with their lives.

Born on October 31, 1922, Norodom Sihanouk was appointed to the Cambodian throne by the country's French colonial masters at the age of 18. The French probably chose Sihanouk for at least two reasons: first, he was descended from both of Cambodia's two competing royal families; and second, they believed that the young playboy would be easily manipulated. This second belief turned out to be very wrong: Sihanouk quickly demonstrated surprising political savvy, and by 1953 he had skillfully orchestrated his country's independence from France. In 1955, he shrewdly abdicated in favor of his father, then ran for the office of Prime Minister as the head of his own political party. Against the backdrop of a widening war in Indochina, Sihanouk remained the unquestioned leader of the country for the next fifteen years. In 1970, however, Sihanouk was overthrown in a coup led by two of his lieutenants, General Lon Nol and Prince Sirik Matak.

It is hard to imagine how different history might have been if Sihanouk had responded differently to the coup. Perhaps it would not have mattered; perhaps the forces at war in Indochina would have devastated Cambodia, with or without Sihanouk. But we will never know, for at that critical moment, Sihanouk chose to support the Khmer Rouge. Sihanouk's support was the engine that sparked the explosive growth of the Khmer Rouge. And it would be the Khmer Rouge who would drive Cambodia to the brink of annihilation.

Sihanouk wrote two books which allow us to glimpse history from his perspective. Both books are flawed and sometimes frustrating, but they are worth reading nonetheless.

My War with the CIA is Sihanouk's first memoir. It is essentially a propaganda tract. At times, Sihanouk's disingenuousness is almost embarrassingly transparent, as when he refers to the repression of the left during his own regime as the work of "Lon Nol's raiding expeditions." He is similarly unconvincing when he attempts to explain away his public statements regarding the leftists: "To throw my own dissenters - rightists such as Lon Nol - off the track, I occasionally made speeches attacking the Vietminh, Vietcong and Khmers Rouges. The first two realized that the main thing was my unswerving political, diplomatic and material support of their resistance struggle. But I did not know at the time that the Khmers Rouges had also understood this. The proof was their immediate acceptance of the alliance for resistance in 1970."

Clearly, the real reason the Khmer Rouge immediately accepted his "alliance" was that they, like the Prince, understood the value of a marriage of expediency. The Prince's name gave their movement a legitimacy that it would otherwise have lacked.

Still, although My War is very obviously a book with an agenda, there are times when Sihanouk's comments seem precisely on-target, as when he discusses Richard Nixon's comments on the invasion of Cambodia:

"President Nixon has explained that the 341 million dollars spent annually in the officially-approved slaughter of Cambodians is 'the best investment in foreign assistance that the United States has made in my political life'. Because of the 'success' of the Cambodian operation, 'US casualties have been cut by two thirds, a hundred thousand Americans have come home and more are doing so'. In other words, Lon Nol and Sirik Matak, by allowing Nixon to export the fighting from South Vietnam to Cambodia - to substitute Cambodian for American and South Vietnamese corpses - have rendered a valuable service, for which 341 million dollars is a reasonable annual reimbursement!"

Sihanouk goes on to quote George McGovern's rather astute assessment of the so-called "Nixon Doctrine": "We pay them for killing each other while we reduce our own forces."

From time to time there are telling glimpses into Sihanouk's true beliefs. Sihanouk notes that during the early Fifties he feared that "the Vietminh were fighting only to replace the French as masters in Cambodia." Having aligned himself with the Communists at the time of the book's publication, he naturally disavows this belief. That fear that would resurface in his second book.

There is disappointingly little of the Prince's personality in the bland prose of this book. It is as though the demands of ideology have smothered his very spirit. There is, however, one very memorable passage, in which the Prince relates an incident during the ceremony which marked the Cambodia's independence from the French:

"When it came to the formal handing-over of powers, it was with my respected former cavalry instructor, General de Langlade, that I had to deal.

'Sire,' he said, 'You have whipped me.'

'Mon general, it is not true,' I replied. 'But I had to show myself worthy of General de Langlade's education. My success is yours, as it is you who taught me what I know of military science.'

'You are not very kind to your professor,' he continued.

'Mon general,' I said, 'I had to prove myself, as one of your pupils. I could not lose so vital a battle, with my country at stake.'

On the eve of the French departure, one of his staff officers whispered to de Langlade: 'The King is mad! He expels us from Cambodia, but without us he will be crushed by the Vietminh!'

De Langlade turned to him and other officers and replied: 'Gentlemen, the King may be mad, but it is a brilliant sort of madness!'"

Brilliant madness: a wily monarch, tragically flawed. An undercurrent of Sihanouk's critical failing - his vanity - shows through on many occasions. One comes away from My War with the sense that Sihanouk was obsessed with his own stature. Again and again he rails against "humiliating discourtesies" (p. 86), "bad manners" (p.87), "humiliations that had lasted so long" (p. 128), "shame and frustration" (p. 129), "being punished, humiliated, and prepared for the chopping block" (p. 130), "national humiliation" (p.133), "indignities and humiliations" (p. 148), "the humiliation" (p. 222) "We have suffered too much; we have been humiliated too long." (p. 234).

With the disastrous reign of the Khmer Rouge long ago relegated to "the ash heap of history", it is almost painful to review the book's final chapter. Its title is "The Future," and it outlines the supposed future policies of rebel regime. To read these words today is to feel a horrible sadness. One can only imagine how it must feel to be the person who wrote them.

"In its relations with the outside world, Cambodia will thus remain much as it was before; friendly with all countries that respect our independence and sovereignty...

"Our internal policy will be socialist and progressive, but not communist. State, state-private, and private enterprise will coexist..."

"I do not know about Europe, with its own traditions and concepts, but I feel that, for Asia, the commune is a real discovery..."

These and other similar statements leave the reader longing for the safety of the old, familiar delusions about the utopian future. The true nature of Khmer Rouge policies - the xenophobia, the extremism, the labor brigades, the executions, the starvation - would soon be beyond dispute.

In My War Sihanouk reminds us of a statement that he made in 1955, at the time of his abdication: "I categorically refuse to return to the throne no matter what the turn of events." This statement, like so many of Sihanouk's pronouncements, would be reversed by time and fate and whim. What the Khmer Rouge called "the Wheel of History" would soon crush Lon Nol. Then, just as surely, it crushed the Khmer Rouge as well. And yet Sihanouk himself somehow escaped. Effectively imprisoned in his palace throughout most the Khmer Rouge reign, Sihanouk was spirited out of the country just ahead of the Vietnamese invasion. Written in the aftermath of disaster, Sihanouk's second memoir, War and Hope: The Case for Cambodia bears little resemblance to its predecessor. By 1979, when the book was written, Cambodia was in ruins.

It would be a stretch to describe War and Hope as a completely honest memoir, but it is at least more realistic than the volume that preceded it. One wonders if Sihanouk's experience with the Khmer Rouge left him somewhat chastised. It's doubtful if he ever believed the Khmer Rouge propaganda about their aims, and with the benefit of hindsight he seems to have come to understand the futility of his earlier charade. "Time will inevitably uncover dishonesty and lies; history has no place for them," he writes.

It is in the name of this honesty that Sihanouk discusses the role of the Vietnamese in fighting the Lon Nol regime. The Vietnamese, he notes, were the architects of some of the most spectacular acts of sabotage that crippled the Khmer Republic: the destruction of much of Pochentong airport, the oil refinery at Kompong Som, and the Chroy Chungwa bridge in Phnom Penh. The Khmer Rouge, by contrast, had no effective artillery at all; they relied heavily on rockets, and "they did not hit one of their military objectives. Instead, residential neighborhoods of no military interest were bombed, markets and schools were destroyed, children and innocent adults were killed or hideously wounded - all for nothing." Still, Sihanouk notes, the Khmer Rouge did in fact assemble a fierce and formidable army. He notes in particular their use of children, ideal fodder for the Khmer Rouge, given the relative ease with which they could be indoctrinated. These young soldiers, Sihanouk claims, were trained in "cruel games" with the goal that "they would end up as soldiers with a love of killing and consequently of war... During the three years I spent with the Khmer Rouge under house arrest in Phnom Penh, I saw the yotheas in charge of guarding my 'camp' constantly take pleasure in tormenting animals (dogs, cats, monkeys, geckos)."

Sihanouk's analyses of the factors that determined the outcome of the civil war seems generally accurate, but there is one notable omission. In a chapter called "Why Did the U.S. Lose the War in Cambodia?" Sihanouk elaborates several reasons, among them: the US underestimated support for Sihanouk himself, and underestimated the determination of the Vietnamese to maintain a presence in Cambodia; they underestimated the effects of corruption in the Lon Nol regime; and the US overestimated the effectiveness of the bombing campaign. But Sihanouk does not mention what is arguably one of the most important reasons for Lon Nol's defeat: sheer American indifference. The fate of Cambodia was always a secondary concern to US policymakers. Vietnam was the real arena. Behind most American decisions, one senses that the real question was not, "How will this affect our allies in Cambodia?" but rather "How will this affect our ability to get out of Vietnam?" It is doubtful that any US action - even a massive US ground force - could have altered the outcome once the full fury of Cambodia's civil war had been unleashed. But American indifference to the fate of the Cambodians made it a foregone conclusion that no dramatic initiatives would ever be undertaken.

At times, Sihanouk demonstrates a very convenient blindness. Or perhaps he is demonstrating pragmatism. One notes that Sihanouk compares Pol Pot and Ieng Sary to Hitler and Goebbels... but never to Mao, which would be a much more accurate comparison. Perhaps this is recognition of the fact that Cambodia in 1979 needed the Chinese if they were to avoid being swallowed whole by Vietnam.

This, in fact, is one factor that distinguished Sihanouk from Lon Nol and Pol Pot. Only Sihanouk seemed to view the Vietnamese realistically. Both Lon Nol and Pol Pot believed that they could, if necessary, physically overpower the more numerous, better-armed Vietnamese. It was an absurd belief, and it doomed both regimes.

For his own part, Sihanouk notes that during his rule he "...closed his eyes to the installation of Viet 'rest camps,' hospitals, provision centers in Cambodia. Secondly, he authorized the Chinese, Russians, Czechoslovakians, etc., to use the port of Sihanoukville (Kompong Som) as an unloading point for the military and other supplies to the Vietminh and Vietcong." It was all part of the delicate balancing act: Sihanouk himself may not have liked the communists, but he believed that they were destined to win the war in Vietnam, and when the war was over, it would be better to be regarded as an ally, rather than an enemy.

Such pragmatism was entirely alien to the Khmer Rouge. They had unquestioning faith in their own destiny. The doctrinaire belief that sheer will, would overcome lack of education and training, for instance, sometimes led to surreal incidents. Sihanouk notes in particular an anecdote relating to American helicopters that the Khmer Rouge had inherited:

"Shortly after the April, 1975 victory, the Khmer Rouge army decided to try out a few of the American helicopters Lon Nol had abandoned in Phnom Penh. They reasoned that if they had been able to teach themselves to drive, they would be able to figure out helicopters, too. A group of young yotheas told Mme. Penn Nouth (wife of the former GRUNK Prime Minister) that one mechanically gifted comrade of theirs had indeed been able to get a helicopter off the ground, but he could not manage to land it. The would-be pilot finally met a far-from-heroic death when his craft ran out of fuel and crashed.

After this bizarre accident, the high command was forced to call on Capt. Pech Lim Khuon, a former pilot in Lon Nol's army who had joined the resistance movement at the beginning of the 1970-1975 war. The captain had no trouble getting airborne, and proceeded to make a happy landing in Thailand. He was subsequently granted asylum in France."

Sihanouk cites other interesting examples of the twisted world view of the Khmer Rouge. Khieu Samphan was fond of telling Sihanouk that the North Koreans were on "the wrong track". "'Now," Samphan told Sihanouk, "'the North Koreans have fine houses and cars, nice cities. The people are too attached to their new life.' he said. 'They will never want to start or even fight in a new war, their only hope of liberating South Korea and reuniting their country.'" Even more telling was Samphan's reaction to advice from the ailing Zhou Enlai, who advised the Khieu Samphan not to try to achieve Communism too quickly:

"The great Chinese statesman counseled the Khmer Rouge leaders: 'Don't follow the bad example of our "great leap forward." Take things slowly: that is the best way to guide Kampuchea and its people to growth, prosperity, and happiness.' By way of response to this splendid and moving piece of almost fatherly advice, Khieu Samphan and Ieng Thirith just smiled an incredulous and superior smile...

"Not long after we got back to Phnom Penh, Khieu Samphan and Son Sen told me that their Kampuchea was going to show the world that pure communism could indeed be achieved at one fell swoop. This was no doubt their indirect reply to Zhou Enlai. 'Our country's place in history will be assured,' they said. 'We will be the first nation to create a completely communist society without wasting time on intermediate steps.'"

Still, the Khmer Rouge belief in the communist cause did not create any fraternal affection for their Vietnamese communist neighbors. The Vietnamese were scorned with a hatred previously reserved for the Americans. Sihanouk asked Khieu Samphan to explain the Khmer Rouge's hatred of Vietnam. "He unabashedly told me that 'to unite our compatriots through the party, to bring our workers up to their highest level of productivity, and to make the yotheas' ardor and valor in combat even greater, the best thing we could do was to incite them to hate the Yuons more and more every day.' Khieu Samphan added: 'Our bang-phaaun [literally, older and younger brothers and sisters] are willing to make any sacrifice the minute we wave the 'Hate Vietnam' flag in front of them.'"

Samphan was wrong. However much the Khmer mistrusted and despised the Vietnamese, they hated the Khmer Rouge even more. The anti-Viet stance of the Khmer Rouge did not increase the regime's popularity; instead, it set in motion a self-fulfilling prophecy. Goaded by a series of brutal border attacks, the Vietnamese finally invaded Cambodia, toppled the Khmer Rouge, and installed their own puppet government. The Khmer Rouge retreated into the mountains, where they continued to wage a guerrilla struggle against the Vietnamese.

After the Vietnamese invasion, many activists denounced the role of the Thais in "resurrecting" the battered remnants of the Khmer Rouge. Discussing his meetings with Deng Xiaoping in 1979, Sihanouk addresses this issue, with what seems like ambivalence: "It remained to be seen how China would make arms shipments to Pol Pot's guerrilla fighters. Deng told me it was 'no problem, Thailand is helping us.' When I asked Thailand's leaders about this, they called me a liar and said I was trying to compromise Thailand's 'strict neutrality' in the Vietnam-Kampuchea dispute. My guess is that the whole matter will be settled privately, without the Thai government being implicated..."

Still, despite his anger and fear over the Vietnamese invasion of his country, Sihanouk gives them their due: "History may judge me as it sees fit for asserting that no matter how distasteful and humiliating we Khmer find the current Vietnamese presence in our country, it is the people's only protection against being massacred by the Khmer Rouge (and inadequate protection at that)."

At the time the book was published, a few meager forces had taken up the royalist banner, vowing to fight the Vietnamese occupation. They were no match for the Vietnamese, and Sihanouk quickly came under pressure to align his forces in a coalition to fight against the Vietnamese. In War and Hope he describes this proposal as "tantamount to putting a starving and bloodthirsty wolf in with a lamb." But here, too, the Prince would later reverse himself, and he ultimately joined an uneasy triumvirate with the Khmer Rouge and another faction led by Son Sann.

With a keen understanding of the difficult decisions faced by the Khmer, Sihanouk reserves his highest praise not for his comrades-in-arms, but for those displaced by the continuing conflicts: "The common people of Cambodia have given us a magnificent example of farsightedness and genuine patriotism: they go along neither with the Khmer Rouge nor the outsiders. They prefer to flee to Thailand, exposing themselves to the greatest dangers in the process, or else hide deep in Cambodia's forests, risking death from starvation, sickness, snakebite - or being eaten by tigers and wolves. That is what I call real courage and patriotism."

Surrounded by warring combatants, at risk from death and disease; in a sense, the choices faced by the Khmer people were akin to the choices faced by the country itself. Whatever one's opinion of Sihanouk, one must recognize this: By 1970, in a game of global politics, Cambodia was dealt an almost impossible hand. Bordered by stronger, hostile neighbors, trod upon by an uncaring superpower, violated by foreign armies, mired in poverty; there were no good options: there were only differing degrees of bad ones.

Once More, Sihanouk’s deceitfulness is revealed

February 20, 2005

(Comments: I am sending this email to let you see how the so-called Sihanouk's "solution" to the recent Sam Rainsy' s stripping of his parliamentary immunity by Hun Sen and Ranariddh, compared to the solution proposed by the international community comprising resolutions by the US Senate, the Australian Senate, and a motion by the European Parliament.

It is clear that the so-called Sihanouk's "solution" is to favor a status quo that is to allow Hun Sen and Ranariddh to continue to plunder the Cambodian people and to suppress the opposition with impunity. Sihanouk's proposal for this crisis is the same as those he had proposed for the Khmer Rouge trial. That is not to have any trial at all. He first invoked the reason that the trial is a waste of money. Then, he came up with the idea that the trial will push to remnant of the Khmer Rouge to go back into the jungle to start a war against the government of Cambodia. This is what Sihanouk is all about. He has no respect for any law or moral principle. His only interest is to save himself and his family.

Below are the documents to backed up for what I have just analyzed.

Naranhkiri Tith, Ph.D. )

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The International Community Response to Hun Sen and Ranariddh’s Persecution of Sam Rainsy and his party

I. US Senate Resolution on Cambodia (1)

On 17 February 2005, Senators Sam Brownback and Mitch McConnel introduced a Resolution on Cambodia (S. Res. 65) "Calling for the Government of Cambodia to release Cheam Channy from prison, and for other purposes".

The Resolution also - "Calls upon the Cambodian National Assembly to reverse its recent action to strip the immunity of opposition parliamentarians Sam Rainsy, Cheam Channy, and Chea Poch; - Urges the Secretary of State, the Secretary-General of the United Nations, international financial institutions, and democracies around the world to continue to publicly and forcefully condemn the Cambodian National Assembly vote;

- Urges international donors to consider imposing appropriate sanctions against the National Assembly and the Government of Cambodia unless and until it reverses its recent action;

- Calls upon the Secretary of State to impose visa restrictions on members of the Cambodian National Assembly and their families who voted to strip the immunity of Sam Rainsy, Cheam Channy, and Chea Pok, consistent with the President's Proclamation of January 12, 2004, regarding the denial of visas to corrupt public officials and their families; and

- Calls upon Prime Minister Hun Sen and Cambodian National Assembly President Norodom Ranariddh to cease and desist their efforts to undermine democracy, human rights, and the rule of law in Cambodia."

• 
  See full text of Resolution at

• 
  http://www.khmerintelligence.org/US%20Senate%20Resolution.pdf
  
  http://www.khmerintelligence.org/Announcements-KI.html

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II. European Union expresses concern about lifting of parliamentary immunity (1)

On 10 February 2005, the Presidency of the European Union – Luxemburg on behalf of 25 European nations – issued the following Declaration:

"The European Union, friend and partner of the Kingdom of Cambodia, expresses concern about the actual political situation characterised notably by the multiplication of actions brought before justice by the political leaders against each other, by the recent suspension of the parliamentarian immunity of three opposition members and the arrest of one of these parliamentarians.

This situation does not seem favourable to a balanced functioning of the institutions, to the respect of the democratic opposition's rights, to the national reconciliation and to the recovery of the country engaged in the construction of a state of law.
The European Union makes an appeal to the leaders of all political parties to work together in a spirit of responsibility and concord in the interest of all Cambodian people. The European Union will continue to follow the situation."

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