The Khmer Rouge Trial (KRT) and the Destiny of the Cambodian People.

This site was built: to honor those Cambodians and others who were slaughtered by the Khmer Rouge; to seek real and lasting justice for those who have survived but traumatized and; to give them a better chance for a normal life. Naranhkiri Tith Ph.D

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Sihanouk and his Tragic Role in Contemporary Cambodia

 

"For more than half a century, King Norodom Sihanouk has preened, postured, and pouted across the stage of Cambodian politics. He is perpetually described as "mercurial" and "unpredictable." For years he was central to Cambodia's survival. And he was just as surely central to her near-destruction.

 

To give him due credit: It is beyond question that Sihanouk deeply loved the Cambodian people. None of his successors has ever matched his genuine affection for his people. But Sihanouk had one critical flaw: as much as he loved the Cambodian people, he loved himself just slightly more. At a pivotal moment in Cambodian history, he chose his own interests above those of Cambodia, and millions of people paid with their lives."

 

Source: Sihanouk’s books reviewed; "My War with the CIA" and "War and Hope: The Case for Cambodia."

By Bruce Sharp  

Web site: Cambodia: Beauty and Darkness

Source: Page last updated: 07/16/2008 08:48:46  
http://www.mekong.net/cambodia/sihanouk.htm

PS. Please, also, go to this link, to read more about Sihanouk devastating impact on Cambodia and its people because of his egomaniac bahvior.

Sihanouk Paradox and his Win Win strategy

 


 

Source of the pictures posted in this web site:

Once more Sihanouk is NOT telling the truth to the Cambodian people:

  

(Comments: recently, Sihanouk has been sending out from his web site messages to say that photos as those shown here, are fake. The truth is that these photos came from an album titled; Prince Sihanouk, Head of State of Cambodia, in the Liberation Zone; (Published by People's Armed Forces of National Liberation of Cambodia, in 1973), a copy of which Sihanouk gave me, when we met in Beijing in early 1990's.

 

With all these photos as testimonies on how Sihanouk had betryed the Cambodian people by allying himself with the murderous Khmer Rouge, why is he not brought in ,at least, to testify in the Khmer Rouge Trial, if not as one who directly or indirectly, participated in the Cambodian genocide by lending his name and royal prestige to this mass murderous group of Cambodian communists? I know that one of the Khmer Rouge Trial judges, had alluded to this possibility. but Hun Sen had preventeed it to take place by passing a law by his controlled National Assembly which would forbid any tribunal to bring a former  Cambodia king to trial. Is this real justice according to international standard by the Khmer Rouge tribunal, or just a show trial, as the one orchestrated by the invading Vietnamese forces in 1979?

 

In addition, since one of Sihanouk's ancestors, Chey Chetha II conceded Prey Nokor (now Saigon or Ho Chi Minh city) to the Vietnamese, which in turn, had allowed them to start their colonization of Cambodia by taking over Kampuhea Krom., and now Cambodia porper.

 

 Sihnaouk never learned any lesson from this deadly experience, that whenever a Cambodian "leader" decides to ask for help from the Vietnamese, the one result is certain is the fact that Cambodia will loose some land to the Vietnamese for their "help." Sihanouk is, then and now, doing the same thing as his ancestors did, along with other so-called Cambodian leaders, including Pol Pot, Pen Sovann, Son Ngoc Thanh (Please, see an article titled "Casting the first stone,") Sam Sary (See an excerpt from a CIA secret report released in 2007, titled "Prince Sihanouk and the New Order in Southeast Asia" posted below) and of course now Hun Sen and his CPP, are repeating exactly the same tragic mistake, ver and over again. As long as the the Cambodians do not learn from this bitter lesson of nver to ask for help from Vietnam, the chance for Cambodia's survival is very slim indeed!  

 

Inspite if all these testimonies on Sihanouk treacherous behavior, it is sad to see that so many Cambodians, educated or not, still revere Sihanouk as the god-king. He was so smart as to have brought back the ending of all Cambodian kings during the Angkor period, the suffix "Varman," which means "shield" or "under the protection of" a particualr god, Vishnu, Shiva, for instance. The addition of this suffix to his name, as Norodom Sihanouk Varman, had elevated him to the level of a god-king, as in the Angkor time. And it works marvelously for him, but it is a disaster for the whle Cambodian people, as he never allowed any common Cambodian to ahve any identity or opinion, which in turn, ther is neither scholarship nor new leadership in Cambodia, since the Angkor time (802-1432)

 

Please see the pictures of the book cover and his portrait (with his signature in Khmer,) posted below. 

 

Naranhkiri Tith, Ph.D. Washington DC. September 7, 2005; Please, also see author and former Reuter reporter Bernard Hamel's article on this lie by Sihanouk, posted just below in this page)

 


 

A Picture is worth a thousand words: the cambodian tragedy is captured in one picture: Sihanouk Kowtowing the Vietnamese leader in Hanoi

 

http://ki-media.blogspot.com/2010/06/sihanouks-vietnam-visit-disappoints.html

 

Sihanouk, along with his wife Monique, and his son the current king, Sihamoni (The vassals) recently visited Hanoi (June 2010), to pay tribute to and to reassure the Vietnamese leader (Vietnamese president Nguyen Minh Triet, the suzerain), This picture clearly shows that Hun Sen is still Hanoi’s servant, and Sihanouk is still Hun Sen’s servant. The Vietnamese tributary system in now implanted on solid ground in Cambodia (On the tributary system, please, the link posted below).

                             Vietnam Tributary System with Deadly Twist

Notice, how respectful Sihanouk (Kowtow) is toward the Vietnamese leader. Is he as humbling and submissive toward the Cambodian people? The answer is, NO!

When will Sihanouk stop betraying Cambodia and its people? When will the Cambodian people have enough courage to start to let the ex-king and traitor know that he had done enough harm to Cambodia and its people, and should disappear from the political scene as soon as possible, in order to allow the Cambodian people to have a better chance to survive the Vietnamese onslaught.

Naranhkiri Tith Ph.D. Washington DC. August 26, 2010  

 

 

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Vietnam president praises Cambodia cooperation: state TV

AFP Asian Edition

Jun 22, 2010 12:04 EDT

http://www.royalty.nu/news/10/06/MocCamb.html

 

Vietnam's president praised cooperation with neighbouring Cambodia Tuesday during a private visit by former king Norodom Sihanouk and members of his royal family, state television reported.

Sihanouk arrived in the Vietnamese capital with his wife and his son, King Norodom Sihamoni, for a four-day stay.

The ex-monarch is sometimes known as the "king-father" of Cambodia, where anti-Vietnamese sentiment is rife, fuelled by resentment at Vietnam's expansion over centuries and the perception that Cambodia is losing territory.

But communist Vietnam's President Nguyen Minh Triet said the visit showed relations between the two are close and important, state television said.

Vietnam and Cambodia, as well as their fellow neighbour Laos, are determined to maintain solidarity, Triet added.

According to the report, Sihanouk thanked Vietnam for its support.

Vietnam invaded Cambodia in 1978, overthrew the murderous Khmer Rouge regime the following year, and occupied the country for 10 years.

"Being retired and no longer doing politics nor diplomacy, my journey and trip to the glorious Socialist Republic of Vietnam will have a strictly private character," Sihanouk said in a statement dated June 14.

He was to meet other current and retired leaders of Vietnam, and attend a performance at Hanoi's Opera House, a Vietnamese source said.

Sihanouk abruptly quit the throne in October 2004 in favour of his son, citing old age and health problems. He remains a prominent figure in Cambodia and often uses messages on his website to comment on matters of state.

Cambodia and Vietnam share a 1,270-kilometre (790-mile) border, which has remained vague since French colonial times, but in 2005 they signed a border accord that has helped calm tensions after decades of territorial disputes.

Vietnamese businesses are also investing in Cambodia.

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Cambodian History repeats itself: A historical record on How the Cambodian Royal Family betrayed the Cambodian People

 

Please, click the link pasted at the bottom of this introduction, to read an article written by a Vietnamese scholar David Lan Pham, on how the Cambodian royal family had betrayed the cambodian people, when Chhey Chetha II married a Vietnamese ptincess, and had ceded Prey Nokor (Saigon) to his new wife's father - the Vietnamese Emperor - to be used as  customs station which led to the beginning of the conquest of Kampuchea Krom ). Before the conquest of kampuchea Krom, Vietnam had also used sex to conquer and totally destroyed Champa.

 

The most remarkable aspect of "Nam Tien," as described in this article is the fact that this strategy was conceived as a way is to escape death of the Vienamese nation in the hands of the Chinese. (For more details,  please click on the link pasted below on how "Nam Tien" was conceived, organized, managed and implemented; to obliterate Champa, to take over kampuchea Krom, and now what is remained of Cambodia).

 

Revised Understanding Nam tien is a necessary condition.ppt

 

In order to escape this death threat, Vietnmese leaders had fought each other - the Trinh lords of the North against the Nguyen lords of the South, who triumphed - after more

than 200 years of civil war, which allowed the latter to reshape the Chinese tributary system adopted by the Trinh lords, to make it a more lethal one for those neighbouring countries, namely, Cambodia and Champa; and to rebuild a new and more capable and honest administration supported by a high quality of its civilian and military leaders,

based on scholarship, heroism (A general committed suicide because he felt he did not defend the newly acquired land that was under his responsibility) and honor, while incentives including military protection, were given to those Vietnamese convicts and former soldiers who would accept to venture into the newly conquered land of the Cham and the Khmer People.

 

Finally, the intellectual vigor of the Vietnnamese people was witnessed by the numerous new religions adopted and created by the Vietnamese, such as; Coa Daism, Hoa Hao, Catholicism, Protestantism. While the vast majority ot Cambodians remains stuck with Therevada Buddhism since the 12th century.  Theravada Buddhism is the perfect way for escape for most Cambodians who have extremely been oppressed by the monarchy since the founding of Angkor in 802 by Jayavarman II. 

 

Unlike Vietnam, Cambodia had never allowed anybody other than the kings and their family members to have any opinion or ideas in order to move the country forward and not backward.  The Cambodian kings had never allowed the pursuit of scholarship by the common people, nor did they look for it to move the country forward. Because, scholarship from any commoner would be considered as a competition with the king's power.  This, in turn, makes Cambodia going backward.

 

In Cambodia, the status-quo and standstill attitude is the norm rather than the exception. No wonder, Cambodia is moving backward and not froward.  Unless this whole attitude is changed and quickly, there is little chance that cambodia can survive the Vietnamese  formidable and deadly "Nam Tien."

Naranhkri Tith Ph.D. Washington DC. August 30, 2010

 

A brief history of Cochinchina.docx

  


 

Australia's Relationship With Cambodia

(A  Credible Testimony on How Sihanouk Brought Hun Sen Back to Power Using One Son 'Chakrapong'Against the Other 'Rannariddh.')

24 August 1998

http://www.ausaid.gov.au/media/release.cfm?BC=Speech&ID=4569_7825_1643_4442_7703

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The Hon Kathy Sullivan MP, Parliamentary Secretary to the Minister for Foreign Affairs. Foreign Affairs Sub-Committee of the Joint Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade

Monday 24 August 1998

Contents

Setting the scene: the history of Australia's involvement

Australia's response to the elections

The way ahead

The way ahead - Australian policies

Aid
Trade
Conclusion id, before UNTAC.

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(Comments: this testimony at the Australian parliament in 1998, by The Honorable Kathy Sullivan MP, Parliamentary Secretary to the Minister for Foreign Affairs. Foreign Affairs Sub-Committee of the Joint Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade, is an irrefutable proof and has once and for all shows how Sihanouk had sabotaged the 1991 Paris agreement by trying to hijack the power from UNTAC in 1993, just before the results of the 1993 election sponsored by the United Nations came out.

When he was unmasked by the United Nations, he started another deadly plot in collusion with Hun Sen during the state of Cambodia period, which consisted in using one of his sons Chakrapong (Please, read his biography in an article posted just below), who was then a Deputy Prime minister in the government presided by Hun Sen just before the period when UNTAC came to Cambodia, to start a movement of secession in the eastern zone comprising 6 provinces. This devilish plot organized by Sihanouk led to the creation by the former king of Cambodia, a unique regime of two-prime-ministers government in which Ranariddh was the First Prime Minister and Hun Sen the Second Prime Minister.

From that moment on, it was a matter of time, when Hun Sen finally get all the power back with a coup d’état against Ranariddh in 1997. Sihanouk did more harm to Cambodia than anybody, Cambodian or not. Washington DC. November 3, 2011)

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Setting the scene: the history of Australia's involvement

Cambodia has been a source of major instability in our region for much of the past half-century. Despite the granting of independence in the mid-1950s, the post-World War II period was marked by instability as Indochina became the theatre for great-power rivalry during the Cold War. Cambodia was a casualty of this rivalry during the Vietnam War until the Khmer Rouge, led by Pol Pot, seized power in 1975.

I visited Cambodia in November, 1979, seven months after the Vietnamese invasion that ousted Pol Pot and at the height of what was being called the 'Kampuchean Crisis'. The sight that met the eye in Phnom Penh was incredible - Phnom Penh had been physically destroyed, with virtually only the shells of once-grand buildings still standing and no infrastructure;  water, sewerage, roads, electricity - intact.

I heard how the countryside roads, rice paddies, irrigation - had been destroyed, and there were no resources in the country to meet the basic needs of the survivors. We saw extreme deprivation, disease and starvation.

The Khmer Rouge years - from 1975 until 1979 - are undoubtedly very much alive in the memories of most of us here today. Their destruction of social, political and economic institutions left a terrible legacy, and entrenched a culture of violence that still permeates life in Cambodia.

A Vietnamese-installed administration, in which Hun Sen was initially Foreign Minister, governed Cambodia for the next few years, but it was not until the internationally-brokered Paris Peace Accords were signed in October, 1991 that prospects for lasting internal stability appeared possible.

Australia played a role of which it is justifiably proud in bringing about the Peace Accord and the UNTAC administration which oversaw elections in Cambodia in 1993.

The 1993 elections were generally regarded a success, with more than 90% of the 4.5 million electors turning out to vote. FUNCINPEC gained more than 45% of the seats - insufficient to govern in its own right - and the CPP 38%.

As votes were being counted, King Sihanouk announced he had formed a new interim coalition government in which he would hold the posts of President, Prime Minister and military commander. He named Prince Ranariddh and Hun Sen as his Vice-Premiers, but abandoned his plan as opposition grew.

A week later, claiming large scale election fraud, members of the CPP announced the secession of 6 of Cambodia's eastern provinces. The 'secession' lasted 4 days but ensured the CPP's part in the provisional government that was then formed and led jointly by Ranariddh and Hun Sen.

This arrangement proved endemically unstable, and rivalry between the two culminated firstly in the paralysis of the Government, and then in direct military conflict in July last year.

After the July violence, Australia initiated with others the 'Friends of Cambodia' group - a grouping designed (in concert with the ASEAN Troika) to resolve the political impasse which threatened to undermine the UNTAC legacy, by working to put in place conditions in which credible elections could be held.

The ASEAN/'Friends' process stands as an example of how a demonstrated interest by key countries which make up Cambodia's key foreign relationships can have a practical, positive impact.

The Friends process was successful in achieving the Cambodian Government's commitment to the holding of national elections in 1998, as well as agreement to a number of political compromises necessary before political exiles including Ranariddh and Sam Rainsy could return to Cambodia to campaign actively in the election.

A very high number of registered voters turned up at polling stations to cast their ballot on 26 July, signalling as they had done in 1993 a determination to embrace the forms of democracy and decide their own political future.

While there is continuing dispute about irregularities in the election, the election process is now coming to an end. Final election results will be announced on 29 August.

There is some concern that parties disputing the election results might refuse to form a workable new coalition government and thus precipitate a constitutional crisis. But there is also a reasonable prospect of the formation of a new coalition government in early to mid-September.

The post-election political situation is likely to remain fluid for some time, with any combination of the three winning parties likely to be inherently unstable. It is not clear whether any coalition would be able to deliver long-term stability and, institutionally, the country will remain, at best, a fragile democracy.

Nevertheless, the 1998 elections mark the natural end of a period of concerted international activity to return Cambodia to the Cambodian people, and bring about Cambodia's integration into the wider regional and international community.

Australia's response to the elections

Australia, in partnership with other international donors, provided significant assistance for the organisation of the elections - our aid package totalled $1.85 million.

Australia allocated $200,000 for the UN's monitoring of the safe return of political exiles in the lead up to the election, a $750,000 package for the National Election Computer Centre and a $600,000 budget to fund an Australian observer team to monitor the elections. We also provided two long-term and 20 short-term observers to the UN-coordinated international observer contingent deployed to observe the elections at the invitation of the Cambodian Government.

The UN team was bolstered by thousands from Cambodian and international NGOs. As well as observing the polling process, observers were present during the transportation of ballot boxes to counting centres, the opening of ballot boxes, and the vote-counting.

Preliminary results for the 26 July elections indicate that the largest number of seats will go to the CPP (approximately 60), followed by FUNCINPEC (45) and the SRP (up to 17).

None of the smaller parties appear set to win a single seat in the 122-member National Assembly. This result dictates that the CPP will continue to lead a new Government, and that Hun Sen will be at its head.

There have been problems with the process - if nothing else, the extreme compression of the election timetable led to errors and omissions - as well as grave concerns regarding electoral intimidation and politically-motivated violence. These shortcomings should be kept in perspective: the 1993 UNTAC organised elections were also marred by allegations of fraud, and were certainly more violent than the 1998 elections. To date, reports received from the UN team do not support claims of widespread or systematic irregularities in the voting or vote-counting.

Cambodia's electoral law contains an appeal mechanism and an investigatory process, for claims of electoral fraud and abuse. Because of these provisions, the National Election Commission has been very slow to hand down a final election result. Once it is to hand, and after considering the final report of the JIOG, the Australian Government will be in a position to make a considered assessment about the entire election process, taking into account the campaign period, the conduct of the poll on the day, and the vote counting.

The way ahead

The 1998 elections were Cambodian-run elections - a major achievement, considering the time which has elapsed since the last multi-party Cambodian-run elections were held in the 1960s, and the destruction of government administration during the Pol Pot years.

The holding of a reasonably credible multi-party election, with the active participation of political leaders opposed to the dominant party in the country, was a significant achievement. Provided a coalition government can be formed, then Cambodia will find itself in a stronger and more stable position than it has been for many years.

Almost all parts of the country are now under government control. The internal insurgencies that continue do not present a significant security threat to the government. The Khmer Rouge is now a virtually spent force militarily and politically, and remnant Khmer Rouge forces - such as Ieng Sary's Democratic National Union Movement - remain unlikely to be capable of mounting an insurgency in their own right. Ranariddh retains a small military resistance near the Thai border but efforts are being made to reintegrate his soldiers into the Cambodian armed forces.

Cambodia is re-building the stability, reconciliation and compromises necessary for the international community to be able to step back and allow the Cambodians to take responsibility for their own destiny. The international community's future role should be one of providing support where it can  and, clearly, substantial support will be needed for some time. However the time is right for the Cambodian people to assume responsibility for their own affairs, to make the hard decisions necessary to put their economy back on track and achieve their full potential.

The way ahead - Australian Policy

The Australian Government has been a strong critic of the human rights situation in Cambodia and the need for the Cambodian authorities to end the culture of impunity that permeates Cambodian society and fosters the abuse of human rights. We were concerned by the climate of intimidation and fear evident in the lead up to the July, 1998 election, and publicly condemned the executions and detentions of FUNCINPEC supporters which followed the fighting of July 1997.

Australia has been - and will remain - very supportive of the work of the UN Secretary General's Special Representative on Human Rights in Cambodia. The valuable contribution of the previous Special Representative, Mr Justice Kirby, has been widely acknowledged both within Cambodia and by the wider international community. His successor, Ambassador Thomas Hammarberg, has continued to promote the cause of human rights in Cambodia.

Australia has welcomed the Cambodian Government's establishment of a Cambodian Human Rights Committee to investigate human rights abuses, including those identified in the reports of the UN Special Representative. However, we also believe it to be important that the UN High Commissioner on Human Rights continue to maintain a presence in Cambodia.

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Secession of Eastern zone in Cambodia by CPP with Chakrapong

Cambodian Leaders Biographies

by Judy Ledgerwood

http://www.seasite.niu.edu/khmer/ledgerwood/biographies.htm

 

Prince Norodom Chakrapong is a son of King Norodom Sihanouk. Prince Chakrapong entered the resistant movement with FUNCINPEC in the 1980s and became its military commander. Dissatisfied with FUNCINPEC’s new leader, Prince Norodom Ranariddh, whom he criticized for his pursuit of wealth by any means, Chakrapong defected from the party and joined the CPP in 1992, becoming a politburo member and deputy prime minister in Hun Sen’s government.

When the CPP lost the 1993 United Nations sponsored elections, Chakrapong along with Sin Song allegedly orchestrated a secessionist movement in Eastern Cambodia to put pressure on FUNCINPEC to share power with the CPP. The tactic worked, resulting in a power arrangement in which the new government was headed by two prime ministers, first and second, whereas the government portfolios at the central and provincial levels were divided among the three major parties—the CPP, FUNCINPEC and the BLDP. In 1994, Chakrapong, along with other senior CPP military and security officials, organized an aborted coup to overthrow the government of Hun Sen and Ranariddh. He was arrested and sent into exile. He returned to Cambodia after the 1998 political deal between the CPP and FUNCINPEC and now is engaging in private business.

 


 

The book cover on Sihanouk's visit to the liberated zone run by the Khmer Rouge in Northeastern of Cambodia, in 1973

 

 


 

Sihanouk official portrait that was in that book pasted above with his signature in Khmer

 

 


 

Sihanouk with his good friend, North Vietnamese Prime Minister Phan Van Dong  

At an Anti US imperialism meeting in Southern China, 1970

 

 


Sihanouk and Monique were greeted by North Vietnamese army Officers at the Hanoi airport, in 1973, on their way to the "liberated Zone" in Cambodia

 

 

 

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Sihanouk and Monique in North Vietnamese uniform with North Vietnamese officers along the Ho Chi Minh Trail, on their way to the 'liberated Zone" by the Khmer Rouge in Cambodia, in 1973

 

 

 

 

  

Sihanouk with North Vietnamese army officers  along the Ho Chi Minh trail, on his way to the liberated zone in Cambodia, 1973 

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North Vietnamese army convoy accompanied Sihanouk and Monique on the Glorious (as the magazine has categorized it) Ho Chi Minh trail, to the liberated zone in Cambodia, 1973

 

 

1973

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Working session with Senior Khmer Rouge leaders,1973, Northern Cambodia 

 

 

Sihanouk (Right end of the table) with Hou Yuon (Front left side of the table), Hou Nim, (Third right side of table) Khieu Samphan (Secong right side of the table), Ieng Sary (Second left side of the table), 1973

 

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Sihanouk and Monique  at a Public Rally with Khieu Samphan, and Hou Youn and otherKhmer Mouge leaders, 1973

 

 

Near Seamreap, Northwest of Cambodia, 1973

 

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Sihanouk with Monique, Khieu Ponary (Mrs Po Plot), 1973 at Angkor Wat

 

 

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Hou Youn (standing) delivered a speech at dinner in honor of Head of State Sihanouk, near Siemreap, 1973

 

 

Sihanouk delivered a speech at a dinner with Khmer Rouge senior leaders, 1973

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In this historic picture posted below, which was taken at Phnom Kulen, in 1973, when Sihanouk and his wife Monique, went to the liberated zone in cambodia to meet with the senior Khmer Rouge leaders, whose names (Khieu Samphan, Hou Youn, Hu Nim, Ieng Sary, Son Sen, Saloth Sar, Koy Thuoun, Nuon Chea) are written in the original caption of this picture, posted below. However, it sould be pointed out that the name of Pol Pot was mentioned by his original name, which  is, SALOTH SAR.

 

 

 

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Sihanouk (5th from right) surrounded by senior Khmer Rouge Leaders including Pol Pot (6th from left upper photo) at Phnom Koulen, near Siemreap, 1973

 

 

Sihanouk (3nd from left) with Monique (5th from right) and Mrs. Pol Pot (Khieu Ponary, 6th from left)) at Phnom Koulen, North of Siemreap, 1973 

 


 

 

“Dancing in shadows: Sihanouk, the Khmer Rouge and the United Nations in Cambodia"

By Benny Widyono

http://www.csis.or.id/events_past_view.asp?id=351&tab=0

 

CSIS hosted the launching of a book on Cambodian politics by Benny Widyono, entitled “Dancing in Shadows”. The book is a memoir of his five years in Cambodia. From 1992 until 1993 he was member of UNTAC (United Nations Transitional Authority on Cambodia) and from 1994 until 1997 he served as the United Nations Secretary-General’s Representative in Cambodia.

The author started his speech by reminiscing King Sihanouk’s comment about his own country as a country stuck between crocodile (Vietnam) and tiger (Thailand). The author continued by explaining the reason behind the title of the book. He saw King Sihanouk, Khmer Rouge and the United Nations (UN) were dancing in the shadows and prolonging the sufferings of the Cambodian people.

Cambodia had due to its geopolitical location, seen itself subjugated to the ongoing power struggles for hegemony in Southeast Asia. As a result, prior to the arrival of UNTAC in March 1992 Cambodia was, for more than twenty two years, plunged into chaos, turmoil, civil war and deep despair.

Khmer Rouge during its reign from April 17 1975 to January 7 1979 has massacred an estimated 1.7 million people or one third of the population. Khmer Rouge also effectively abolished private property, family life, religion, money, and urban life.

He described Sihanouk’s role as King that helped the meteoric rise of the Khmer Rouge from a small communist movement to a formidable force which ruled the country from 1975 to 1979. Such support was appreciated by China and aid was poured in. Khmer Rouge was cruel throughout the period, torturing and killing people, enforcing child soldiers from the poorest of the poor.

When Cambodia was liberated by Hun Sen with the help of the Vietnamese army in 1979, the UN still acknowledged the Khmer Rouge as the government. China and US conspired to continue recognizing the genocidal regime because they were anti-Vietnam.

Situation continued for 11 more years until 1991 when the Paris Agreements were signed. In New York where the author served in the United Nations, the flag of the Khmer Rouge continued to fly for eleven more years which was an insult to the Cambodian people who have suffered so much. Meanwhile in Phnom Penh, the PRK under Hun Sen, though de facto ruling the country, went unrecognized, received no aid and was politically isolated, thereby prolonging the suffering of the Cambodian people for eleven years after the Khmer Rouge was ousted.

The book differs from others in that it argues that the dancing in shadows among the three actors, Sihanouk, the Khmer Rouge and the United Nations continued during the UNTAC period.

He contended that the Paris Agreements carried original sins because it did not put Khmer Rouge as the enemy but the legitimate ruler of the country. Reference to “genocide” or any term related to the cruelty was taken out and changed to “situations in the past”.

The first of the coalition, pressed by the United States, China and their allies, was that the Democratic Kampuchean "faction" was to play a legitimate role in Cambodian politics as one of four factions with whom UNTAC had to deal.

The other three factions were the FUNCINPEC (Royalist party), the KPNLF (anti communist pro US faction) and the People's Republic of Kampuchea (PRK) headed by Premier Hun Sen which had ruled the country for eleven years.

UNTAC was given executive governance powers by the Supreme National Council, headed by Sihanouk, a symbolic entity consisting of the four factions with no real power. Although the UN did not recognize the PRK under Hun Sen, he was de facto the only real government. One can imagine the chaos which this caused for the UNTAC operations.

The Paris Agreements placed some heavy burdens on the UNTAC operation. UNTAC failed to disarm the four factional armies because the Khmer Rouge refused to be disarmed. The Bamboo pole incident is when UNTAC failed to control the four “existing “administrative structures”.

However UNTAC is not without successes. 360,000 refugees were returned from the Thai border and participated in the elections. UNTAC’s elections in 1993 were successful with more than 90% eligible voters participating. A new government was established with two prime ministers Prince Ranariddh and Hun Sen.

Sihanouk wanted to be the King that rules, not just reigned. Sihanouk had no faith in Ranariddh’s capacity and Hun Sen’s presence is a threat to him, until Khmer Rouge came. He saw Khmer Rouge’s attack to the capital as an opportunity to deal with the pebbles in his shoes. Then a coup d’état happened when Khmer Rouge was declared as outlaws.

Sihanouk continued to manipulate Cambodian politics, engaging in dancing in shadows with Hun Sen, gradually losing power until he abdicated in 2004 leaving Hun Sen as the new dominant power in the country or what the author called the salami approach. When Hun Sen and Ranariddh finally cooperated, they were named “whispering government” because though Ranariddh do the public speaking, Hun Sen did the whispering on the back telling him what to do. Coalition continued until Hun Sen kicked Ranariddh out of his seat. Hun Sen amended the Constitution that guaranteed his party’s position without having to continue with any coalition.

Many blamed the UN for not allowing Ranariddh to rule after he won in the election. “How do you allow Ranariddh to rule when the whole country is controlled by Hun Sen, who held the whole military?”

The story in the book ended in 1979 and Hadi Soesastro added the more recent history of Cambodia, surrounding the event of Cambodia being refused as member of ASEAN. All in all, especially for the last 10 years or so, Cambodia has actually consolidated its position as an autocratic regime with the dictatorship of Hun Sen.

With regard to the Khmer Rouge’s international tribunal, the author compared the trial with the Nuremberg trial. It will take long time and it will be different from the Serbian or other recent trials. Hun Sen insisted to have a Cambodian Court and have very little trust to UN after being manipulated in the past. The author maintains that such manipulation still continue. He mentioned the US’ refusal to contribute financially to the trial until all Khmer Rouge was put on trial. But it is complicated because King Sihanouk and Hun Sen were also Khmer Rouge.

Ali Alatas added some notes. After the Paris Agreement, the Khmer Rouge was excluded though not disarmed by the forces. At the behest of the negotiator, Ali Alatas had a secret meeting in Bangkok with Khmer Rouge leadership and asked them whether they were serious in their last minute refusal to join the Paris Accord. They said yes and Ali Alatas said that if they did not join, no one will support them including China. Khmer Rouge said they will take that risk. They were in pockets near borders and Phnom Penh, only UN troops can talk to them.

Ali Alatas agreed that there are two problems. When they were about to join ASEAN, they were supposed to enter together with Myanmar and Laos. But one week before or so, there was a coup d’etat by Hun Sen. ASEAN after a lot of debates, decided to postpone. Ali Alatas together with two other ASEAN member countries representatives were sent to solve the problem. Hun Sen was furious and refused to join ASEAN because ASEAN was seen to be interfering. Ali Alatas tried to be patience and explained that they do not want to interfere. But because Hun Sen wanted to join ASEAN, therefore they have the desire to talk to Hun Sen regarding the coup. The solution was that Ranariddh became Chairman of the Parliament and Hun Sen remain the sole Prime Minester.

Ali Alatas referred to the humanitarian intervention and mentioned the rejection of the Third countries. The first reason is the sovereignty issue. Second is that it was patently clear that it could only be applied to smaller countries. Chechnya was still a problem, but nobody talked about it because Russian is so big. This was patent discriminatory, that’s why the non-alliance countries refused to accept.

 


 

Murder In Aftermath Of Secretary Albright's Asia Tour
Hanoi-Backed Former Khmer Rouge Lead Cambodia Coup

U.S. Veteran Dispatch Staff Report
Sep./Oct./Nov. 1997

 

(Comments: these two articles, one on the Hun Sen 1997 coup d' etat, and the other on the grenade attack on the Sam Rainsy party also in 1997,  are evidence that that were collusion between the US Ambassador Ken Quinn and Sihanouk to hlep Hun Sen fully regain power, at the expense of the democracy and for the benefit of Vietnam.

 

Sihanouk was caught by his previous deep involvement with the Khmer Rouge during the Vietnamese invasion and occupation of Cambodia in from 1978 till 1989. if he does not support Hun Sen, Sihanouk may be brought to be judged at the Khmer Rouge Trial by Hun Sen.

 

His turn "coat behavior" is a constant of Sihanouk behavior. For Sihanouk, he justifies his "flip flop" behavior by convincing his followers that he has to survive first,  if he wants to save Cambodia.

 

But, one can ask the  philosophical question, did he ever think that by joining the Khmer Rouge, he wolld allow these murderers to massacre more than two million nnocent Cambodian people, and other nationalities? the same question could be asked about his supporting Hun Sen at the expense of his own son, Ranariddh?

 

Naranhkiri Tith Ph.D. Washington DC. April 20, 2010)

 

---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

 

On Sunday, July 6, 1997, democracy died in Cambodia. Shortly after sunrise over central Phnom Penh, troops loyal to Hanoi-installed former Khmer Rouge commander Hun Sen opened fire on the home of the elected Prime Minister Prince Norodom Ranariddh and government buildings. During attacks which Hun Sen initiated on Saturday, major thoroughfares were blocked by armored vehicles. As explosions and gunfire echoed across the capitol, panicked civilians fled the city while similar attacks were taking place against non-communist bases in at least three other major provinces. As the attacks began, a video tape of Hun Sen wearing camouflage fatigues (à la Saddam Hussein) accusing the non-communists of "treachery," repeatedly appeared on national television. The previous day, the Vietnamese Foreign Ministry informed the international press that Hun Sen was in Vietnam for a "holiday." Congress recently received reports that a convoy of ammunition and uniforms from Vietnam was greeted by Hun Sen shortly before the coup.

The United Nations Human Rights Commission in Cambodia, despite threats by Hun Sen, released an in-depth report on August 30 that verified that Hun Sen's forces murdered and tortured to death at least 41, and possibly 60, royalist military and police officers. U.N. investigators told the Far Eastern Economic review that at least 617 people had been detained in Phnom Penh and another 271 were known to have been arrested outside of the capitol. Some, such as General Chau Sambath, were viciously tortured to death in Hun Sen's personal compound. Sources told U.N. investigators that Sambath's fingernails and tongue were ripped out before he was killed by former Khmer Rouge General Him Bung Heang, chief of security for Hun Sen and head of his personal body guards.

 

On the Thai border, a Cambodian police official told Agence France Press that Hun Sen's troops also murdered royalist soldiers' wives and children. "Hun Sen's troops arrested my two children who were not more than 10 years old," said sobbing Captain Sot Mao, "and executed them in the Poipet Market." Members of Sam Rainsy's anti-communist Khmer Nation Party reported members being hunted and arrested by Hun Sen's forces throughout the country, with some 1,000 KNP members currently seeking refuge in Thailand.

 

The coup began less than one week after Madeline Albright, the self-proclaimed, "tell it like it is," U.S. Secretary of State, was squired across Vietnam by Ambassador Pete Peterson laying a symbolic brick in Ho Chi Minh City as the cornerstone for a new $40 million American consulate. Secretary Albright canceled a planned trip to Cambodia for fear of political instability. On the eve of her departure to Asia, the Washington Post published a hard-hitting expose of a classified FBI report on the Easter Sunday massacre in Phnom Penh that had been suppressed by the Clinton Administration.

 

In the report, FBI investigators who traveled to Phnom Penh pinned the responsibility for the massacre and assassination attempt on democratic anti-corruption leader Sam Rainsy on the personal bodyguard forces of Hun Sen. The incident involved grenades pitched into a crowd during a pro-democracy rally in front of the Parliament building which resulted in at least 20 deaths - including one of Sam Rainsy's bodyguards - and 150 injuries. Witnesses told United Nations officials that Hun Sen's soldiers urged suspected grenade throwers to "run faster" and sheltered them from pursuing crowds. After the incident, soldiers beat wounded civilians who pleaded for help and fired on taxi drivers who attempted to provide assistance to the severely injured.

 

U.S. ambassador to Cambodia Ken Quinn advised the FBI agents to leave Cambodia before they could complete interviews because of rumors that they were being targeted for assassination. Despite the known abuses by Hun Sen, including his financial backing by major international drug dealers, a senior Clinton Administration official told the Washington Post that the U.S. Government would have enormous difficulties ending its dealings with Hun Sen, "if you want to get something done in Cambodia."

 

Since 1991, the international community, primarily the United States, has spent more than $3 billion in Cambodia for peacekeeping and nation building operations. The royalist FUNCINPEC Party led by Ranariddh and their non-communist allies won a decisive victory in a 1993 national election. However, under the threat of a military coup by Hun Sen and his Hanoi-trained army, the United Nations made an unprecedented gesture of permitting Hun Sen to be the "co-Prime Minister," and did not challenge his former-communist forces from retaining control of the army, the security police, the courts and most provincial governments.

 

Tension built during recent months as the country began preparation for new national elections scheduled for 1998. Under threats and pressure from Hun Sen, the elected Parliament was reluctant to meet to draw up new election laws necessary to begin the electoral campaign process. International human rights organizations criticized the Cambodian government for assassinations, arrests and intimidation of journalists and pro-democracy advocates. Sam Rainsy, 48, leader of the democratic Khmer Nation Party, and his family received numerous death threats before the Easter Sunday assassination attempt. Former Foreign Minister and chairman of the FUNCINPEC Party Prince Norodom Sirivuth was arrested and exiled from Cambodia by Hun Sen, who threatened to "shoot down" any civilian airplane that carried Prince Sirivuth back to Phnom Penh.

 

During recent weeks, as Hun Sen's public statements became more threatening - including orders to arrest Prime Minister Ranariddh - and his forces increasing intimidation and gunfights with army and naval forces loyal to Prince Ranariddh, non-communists within the military began stockpiling ammunition and supplies. The coup events began with Hun Sen's forces surrounding and opening fire on a munitions warehouse at a base run by troops loyal to Ranariddh.

 

On Friday, July 4, with Hun Sen in Vietnam, Ranariddh flew to France to seek help to avoid a civil war. The desperate act was too little, too late. By Saturday, Hun Sen's armored personnel carriers were rumbling through the streets of Phnom Penh. The gruff voice of Hun Sen was heard over the radio and television airwaves in a repeated taped statement labeling Ranariddh a "traitor" who had to be deposed. While accusing Ranariddh of collaborating with the Khmer Rouge, the leasers of Hun Sen's shock troops who indiscriminately opened fire in residential neighborhoods, were themselves Khmer Rouge commanders until recent months. Mortar, rockets and machine gun fire caused thousands of civilians to flee the city. Hundreds more crowded along ferry boat docks on the banks of the Mekong and Tonle Sap rivers, desperate for transportation to safety.

 

As of midday on Sunday, local hospitals began reporting civilian casualties. During the fighting, a stray mortar shell damaged the French Embassy. The U.S. Embassy in Phnom Penh urged all Americans to take refuge in a relatively secure hotel on the Tonle Sap River, where walls were lined with mattresses to limit any damage caused by shelling.

 

The coup began amid the short lived euphoria over the demise of Pol Pot, Hun Sen's former supreme Khmer Rouge commander. During the past year, both Ranariddh and Hun Sen competed for the loyalty of Khmer Rouge soldiers and their families who had surrendered but had not given up their arms. An apparent 1996 accommodation between former-rivals China and Vietnam laid the foundation for Hun Sen and his Party to initiate their courting of the Chinese-backed Khmer Rouge forces and to isolate and attack the royalists and non-communists.

 

In China following the communist accord, an ailing King Sihanouk remained mostly silent about the fratricide in his kingdom. Sihanouk returned to Cambodia on August 29, by passing Phnom Penh and flying directly to his summer palace in Siem Reap. In a backhand gesture to Hun Sen and his puppet First Prime Minister Ung Huot, Sihanouk conferred the country's highest medals on the U.N. Human Rights Commission for their "courageous reporting" on government abuses. However, without material and humanitarian support from the United States and other free countries, Sihanouk did not have the ability to lead a credible military resistance.

 

One reason for the coup may have been the forging of a new alliance between Sam Rainsy, Prince Ranariddh, republican Son Sann's Buddhist Liberal Democratic Party and smaller pro-democracy parties.

Knowledge of Hun Sen's Easter massacre grew among the country's primarily rural population, strengthening the support for non-communist alliance. The fear of a galvanized electoral opposition and the fear of being held accountable by international jurists may have played a role in Hanoi advising Hun Sen to strike before the national election campaign had begun. More threatening, former communist Prime Minister Penn Sovann who was imprisoned in Hanoi in 1982 and replaced by Hun Sen who ceded vast amounts of Cambodian territory to Vietnam, began forming an opposition political party that was attracting numerous dissident members of Hun Sen's Cambodia People's Party.

 

In a total contradiction of Hun Sen's "Khmer Rouge threat" excuse for the coup, on August 22, the government radio broadcast a speech by Hun Sen to a gathering of former Khmer Rouge guerrilla leaders who had joined his forces during the past year. In the speech, Hun Sen ridiculed the U.S. embassy giving protection to former communist Prime Minister Pen Sovan to leave the country. Sovan had been in hiding since the coup in fear of being assassinated by Hun Sen's henchmen.

 

In the U.S. Congress, Congressman Dana Rohrabacher (R-CA) introduced a provision in the Foreign Assistance Appropriations Bill to cut off all direct U.S. aid to the Hun Sen regime through Fiscal Year 1998. Also, a bi-partisan resolution co-sponsored by Rohrabacher, Ben Gilman, Douglas Bereuter, Eni Faleomavaega, Howard Berman and Jay Kim called for the U.S. Government to release the FBI report on the Easter Sunday grenade attack and all recent U.S. Drug Enforcement Agency reports on Cambodia. In addition, Rohrabacher requested that the State Department make available all correspondence to and from the U.S. embassy in Phnom Penh.

 

Although Members of Congress have expressed concern about the denial of asylum to royalists and other non-communists during the July 5 violence in Phnom Penh, a more egregious issue is the attitude that the Clinton Administration has shown toward Asian communist leaders. Upon her arrival in Vietnam, U.S. Secretary of State Albright told reporters that during the Vietnam War she was uninvolved with its political turmoil. Throughout her visit to Vietnam she advocated that the U.S. and Vietnamese Communist government develop a new relationship, and that Americans view Vietnam (in the lingo of the public relations department of the U.S. -Vietnam Trade Council) "as a country and not a war." Tragically, the Vietnamese, Chinese and Cambodian Communists viewed the U.S. Government denial of Hanoi's role in Hun Sen's violent ambition as a license to destroy the very people who believe in American ideals of democracy.

 

As this issue goes to print, royalist forces loyal to the democratically elected government are waging a fierce defense of a mountain top base at O'Smach near the Thai border. For three weeks, the outgunned and poorly supplied non-communists have withstood human wave assaults and massive artillery bombardments. Hun Sen's forces and their 130mm artillery are being ferried to the front lines in the private Mi-26 helicopters owned by international drug baron Teng Bunma, who bragged that he spent $1 million of his own money to fund the coup. The helicopters are reportedly piloted by Russian mercenaries hired by Bunma. Thus far, the Administration has resisted releasing the embassy cables and the DEA reports requested by Congress.

 

American officials such as Ambassadors Peterson and Quinn and Secretary Albright expect the American people to believe that the Asian communist governments simply have no knowledge of what they did to American prisoners of war that were known to be in their gruesome hands. Or that "internationalist" communist regimes are our misunderstood friends, and are not really manipulating the affairs of their neighbors. It is apparent, however, that the life long revolutionary killers are holding fast to Chairman Mao's dictum, "political power comes through the barrel of a gun."

 

 

Cambodia: After 10 Years, No Justice for Grenade Attack on Opposition

No Action Despite FBI Investigations, Evidence of Government Involvement

March 29, 2007

The Cambodian authorities have never conducted a serious investigation into this attack, either despite or because of substantial evidence of government involvement.

Brad Adams, Asia Director of Human Rights Watch

(New York) - Ten years after a grisly grenade attack on an opposition party rally in Phnom Penh left at least 16 dead and more than 150 injured, the Cambodian government has made no progress in bringing the perpetrators to justice, Human Rights Watch said today.

Human Rights Watch urged the US Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) to reopen its investigation of the attack, which the US government deemed an “act of terrorism.”

On March 30, 1997, a crowd of approximately 200 supporters of the opposition Khmer Nation Party (KNP), led by former Finance Minister Sam Rainsy, gathered in a park across the street from the National Assembly to denounce the judiciary’s lack of independence and judicial corruption. In a well-planned attack, four grenades were thrown into the crowd, killing protestors and bystanders, including children, and blowing limbs off street vendors.

After the first grenade exploded, Rainsy’s bodyguard, Han Muny, threw himself on top of his leader. He took the full force of a subsequent grenade and died at the scene. Rainsy escaped with a minor leg injury.

“The Cambodian authorities have never conducted a serious investigation into this attack, either despite or because of substantial evidence of government involvement,” said Brad Adams, Asia director at Human Rights Watch. “This attack was intended to destroy serious political pluralism in Cambodia, and it partially succeeded. Politics in Cambodia has never fully recovered.”

On the day of the attack, for the first time co-Prime Minister Hun Sen’s personal bodyguard unit was deployed at a demonstration. Photographs show them there in full riot gear. The police force, which had previously maintained a high-profile presence at opposition demonstrations in an effort to discourage public participation, had an unusually low profile on this day, grouped around the corner from the park. Other police units, however, were in a nearby police station in full riot gear on high alert.

Also for the first time, the KNP had received official permission from both the Ministry of the Interior and the Phnom Penh municipality to hold a demonstration, fuelling speculation that the demonstration was authorized so it could be attacked.

Numerous witnesses reported that the people who had thrown the grenades subsequently ran toward Hun Sen’s bodyguards, who were deployed in a line at the west end of the park in front of a closed and guarded residential compound containing the homes of many senior Cambodian People’s Party (CPP) leaders. Witnesses told investigators from the United Nations and the FBI that the bodyguards opened the line to allow the grenade-throwers to pass into the compound, and that members of the crowd pursuing the grenade-throwers were stopped at gunpoint and threatened with being shot if they did not retreat.

In a June 1997 interview with the Phnom Penh Post, Hing Bun Heang, deputy commander of Hun Sen’s bodyguard unit, threatened to kill journalists who alleged that Hun Sen’s bodyguards were involved.

“The authorities have never offered a credible explanation for the deployment or behavior of Hun Sen’s bodyguards,” said Adams. “The actions speak for themselves, and may reach the highest levels of the Cambodian government.”

Instead of launching a serious investigation, Hun Sen immediately called for the arrest of the demonstration’s organizers and instructed police not to allow them to leave the country. (To read an Agence France Presse account published at the time, please see

http://hrw.org/english/docs/2006/03/28/cambod13086.htm.)

The attack took place at a time of extreme political tension. The coalition government between the royalist FUNCINPEC and Hun Sen’s CPP was unraveling after armed clashes in Battambang province the previous month. Rainsy’s KNP was seen as a threat in national elections scheduled for the following year. For more than a year, he and his party members had been the subject of attacks and threats from CPP officials and agents. A bloody coup by Hun Sen’s forces followed in July 1997, killing more than 100 and sending politicians and activists into exile in fear for their lives.

“This brazen attack carried out in broad daylight ingrained impunity in Cambodia more than any other single act in the country’s recent history,” said Adams. “A few months later, Hun Sen’s coup cemented his hold on power.”

At the time, the grenade attack made headlines and provoked outrage around the world. The Washington Post dispatched one of its senior investigative reporters to Phnom Penh. On June 29, 1997, R. Jeffrey Smith wrote:

In a classified report that could pose some awkward problems for US policymakers, the FBI tentatively has pinned responsibility for the blasts, and the subsequent interference, on personal bodyguard forces employed by Hun Sen, one of Cambodia’s two prime ministers, according to four US government sources familiar with its contents. The preliminary report was based on a two-month investigation by FBI agents sent here under a federal law giving the bureau jurisdiction whenever a US citizen is injured by terrorism ... The bureau says its investigation is continuing, but the agents involved reportedly have complained that additional informants here are too frightened to come forward.

The FBI investigated the attack because Ron Abney, a US citizen, was seriously injured in the blast. Abney had to be evacuated to Singapore to treat shrapnel wounds in his hip.

While the investigation made a promising start, the Cambodian authorities failed to cooperate sufficiently and it soon wound down. Although on January 9, 2000, CIA director George Tenet said the United States would never forget an act of terrorism against its citizens and would bring those responsible to justice “no matter how long it takes,” this investigation has effectively been abandoned.

“The FBI launched the only investigation into the attack, but the US has inexplicably dropped it,” said Adams. “Intentional amnesia has since set in, and no government or donor now says a word about the attack.”

In March 2006, the FBI awarded a medal to the Cambodian Chief of National Police, Hok Lundy, for his support of the US global campaign against terrorism. Hok Lundy was chief of the national police at the time of the grenade attack and has long been linked to political violence.

“Instead of awarding medals to known human rights abusers, the US government should insist that the FBI return to complete its investigation,” said Adams. “Family members of the victims are still waiting for justice.”

 


 

Bernard Hamel answers Sihanouk’ accusations and revealed Sihanouk complicity with the Khmer Rouge and the North Vietnamese 

In a text published on your site, on 01/ 09/ 05, you - once more - blamed me by describing me as "sihanoukophobe at 5000 %". This characterization, incompatible with the most elementary arithmetic, amused me much – and also many other people. I abstain from, in general, answering your diatribes when they relate to me, to avoid polemical futility. This time, however, I will take the trouble to answer you to explain in particular why I became your "enemy" (and undoubtedly also a "traitor") after the 18th of March, 1970. Below, are the details of my explanation:

  1. - I was unaware of, so far, that I was considered in Phnom-Penh, before 1970, like a "super-Minister". What an honor for my modest person!

  2. - I never used the ridiculous pseudonym "Bê Hâm" to sign articles in your reviews ("Realités Cambodgiennes" and "Kambuja"). I signed them my name or of my initial.

  3. - I never considered myself "Sangkumien", because I could not be it as a foreigner.

  4. - If you called upon my collaboration, like that of Messrs. Charles Meyer and Jean Barré, for your reviews and your particular secretariat, it is because of your deep mistrust towards your compatriots (which I deplore).

  5. - All the documents and photographs which I still have come, to a large extent, of your Ministry "sangkumien" for the Information of the time. They cannot thus in no case "to be faked" by me (or by other people).

  6. - If I became your "enemy" after the 18th of March, 1970, it is absolutely not for reasons of a personal nature. It is because your attitude after this date appeared to me revolting and odious. Your country - I was on the spot for my Agency (Reuter), I make a point of pointing it out - was attacked and invaded by the Vietnamese Communist forces on the 29th of March, 1970 without ultimatum nor declaration of war. Although it was a clear case and possessed all the characteristics of a foreign aggression, you still made common causes with the invaders of your own country. Moreover, you made worse still by throwing youself, in Beijing, in the arms of the Khmer Rouges, whom you called "Khmers dekhmerized" before 1970 when you fought them implacably (in 1967, 68 and 69). You thus opened the way for the genocide in Cambodia.

  7. - All your actions and your innumerable declarations after your dismissal were inspired only by your desire to avenge yourself, because you had been deposed by legal ways. You proclaimed yourself on several occasions in Beijing your intention to avenge against  the so-called "treacherous republicans". And this desire of revenge finally costs the Cambodian people two million dead. Then, in front of such a condemnable attitude, how can one not be "sihanoukophobe"? ...

Bernard HAMEL

______________________________________________________________

N.B.: Bernard HAMEL was among the first journalists and authors, after April 17, 1975, to alert the world of the genocide in progress in Kampuchea, while publishing, with Soth Polin, a book entitled "Testimonies on the genocide of Kampuchea" collected of the Kampuchean refugees at the border of Thailand. Certain Kampuchean "Leftist intellectuals" in the West initially described this work as "American propaganda"! Bernard Hamel is also the author of an important book on Sihanouk's autocratic rule entitled; Sihanouk et le drame Cambodgien; (Editions L'Harmattan, Paris, 1993)


 

The Khmer Issarak was anti-French

 

http://www.absoluteastronomy.com/topics/Khmer_Issarak

 

Encyclopedia

(Comments: The article titled “The Khmer Issarak was anti-French,” is rather unique in Cambodian long, turbulent, and most of time mysterious if not secretive history. The Khmer Issarak and the Khmer Serei are two of the most mysterious Khmer marquis fighters in all Cambodia's modern history with a tremendous negative impact on the present and future of Cambodia.

Why Mysterious? Because, until the present day,  not many Cambodians, especially the young ones, have not even heard of these two groups. Yet, they played a crucial role during the period leading to independence of Cambodia in 1953 and after that date. One name stands out of these groups is Son Ngoc Thanh whose association with both the Issaraks and the Khmer Serei. But, more  importantly, Son Ngoc Thanh name is also closely linked with the Fascist Japanese military regime and the Viet Minh.

 Other names mentioned in this article are Nuon Chea, Achar Mean (alias Son Ngoc Minh), and Tou Samouth, a Khmer Rouge and pro-Vietnamese leader, not to mention other infamous names such as Chantaraingsey, Poc Khun, and Dap Chhuon. Nuon Chea was the second man or the theoretician of the Khmer Rouge, now under incarceration for the crimes committed against Humanity. 

Perhaps the saddest part of this article is the fact that it pointed out very clearly how Cambodians are so dependent on foreigners, especially on the Vietnamese, to come and help them when they are fighting each other. His is the real factor that has been leading Cambodia to where it is now that a deep and dark hole, from which it cannot extricate itself from, so easily.

I hope, our young and old people would find it interesting about their won history, even the darkest period of Cambodia’s long, tragic,  and tortuous history.  Naranhkiri Tith Ph.D. Washington DC. March 18, 2010)

___________________________________________

 

Khmer nationalist  political movement formed in 1945 with the backing of the government of Thailand . It sought to expel the French colonial authorities  from Cambodia , and establish an independent Khmer state. The widely differing political ideologies within the movement led to its eventual break-up, with many of its figures going on to participate in the Cambodian Civil War.

 

Founding of the independence movement

The Khmer Issarak )”Independence”) movement was founded in 1940 by Poc Khun in Bagkok, Thailand, almost at the same time as Son Ngoc Thanh was petitioning the Japajese assistance in expelling the French.  Like Thanh, the Thai regime hoped to exploit French weakness in Cambodia, though its ultimate purpose was to bolster its own territorial ambitions. In November 1940, Thailand took control of Battambang  and Siem Reap  provinces, an action sanctioned by the Japanese four months later. The newly-formed Khmer Issarak organisation was used in legitimising these acquisitions by making Poc Khun the representative of Battambang in the Thai parliament.

 

The leftist Issaraks

The other major Issarak grouping was started by two ex-monks, Achar Mean and Achar Sok, who went on to become better-known as Son Ngoc Minh and Tou Samouth, respectively.


 These two men were essentially the founders of communism in Cambodia; by the end of 1945 they were both working together with the Indochinese Communist Party (ICP), in Vietnam , where the Viet Minh were leading the August Revolution. On August 19, 1945, the Vit Minh under H Chí Minh began the August General Uprising [Tng Khi Nghĩa], which was soon renamed the August Revolution, after the Japanese capitulation. The surrender of Japan in August 1945 brought World War II to a close. By August 1945, the Imperial Japanese Navy effectively ceased to exist, and an Allied invasion of Japan was imminent. They obtained many new recruits amongst the Khmer Krom  minority of southern Vietnam.

 

After the Second World War

Poc Khun's Thai-sponsored organisation had fallen apart as early as 1946 due to internal dissension: the concept of a Thai-funded Cambodian nationalist movement did not seem so compelling to people already tired of the exploitation of Cambodia by the French.

By December 1946, Thailand was forced to relinquish control over Battambang,
Siem Reap

 and Stung Treng; Thai officials were quick to sign a deal with another rebel leader, the regional warlord, offering their support for his anti-French guerrilla bands: this was in the unlikely hope that they could incite a rebellion in the region and then annexes it under the guise of calming the situation. Thailand also offered support to Prince Norodom Chantaraingsey and a number of other individuals controlling armed units, but the Thai-sponsored Issaraks were greatly weakened by the fall of the leftist Thai government in 1947.

 
Throughout the second half of the 1940s, Viet Minh groups continued to infiltrate into northern and eastern Cambodia, working alongside the growing leftist Issarak groups. The ICP continued to give support, education and instruction to native Khmers.


By this time the Viet Minh was leading a concerted attempt to foster Issarak anti-colonialism and to turn it into support for communism in general, and Vietnamese communism in particular. This was especially the case on the eastern side of the country, where guerrilla cells were often commanded by Vietnamese, and Cambodian recruits into them often attended ICP political schools. There they were taught Marxist-Leninism and the virtues of cooperating with Vietnam. On the other side of the country, Son Ngoc Minh had returned from Thailand with enough weapons to equip a fairly large company. In 1947 he established the Liberation Committee of South-West Kampuchea (this is particularly of note, because by the end of the civil war of 1970-75 the south-west had one of the most powerful and well organised communist armies in Cambodia, and which would form the main core of Pol Pot's support). By late 1948 many areas of the country were under the effective control of powerful Issarak organisations.

By 1949, however, the Issarak movement in this form was coming to an end: the French began to exploit the greed of some Issarak leaders by giving them colonial positions, while others went off to join more radical organisations. Chhuon's KPLC expelled Sieu Heng and the majority of the other leftists, and remodelled itself as the Khmer National Liberation Committee, with Prince Chantaraingsey as its military commander. Tou Samouth and the other leftist Issaraks formed the
United Issarak Front, which had heavy Vietnamese involvement. Chhuon went over to the French, while Chantaraingsey eventually left the KNLC and aligned with the right-wing, anti-monarchical Khmer nationalists, the Khmer Serei, under Son Ngoc Thanh. The United Issarak Front was a Cambodian anti-colonial movement 1950–1954. The UIF waged war against the French Union forces...

 

Legacy of the Issarak movement

The Issarak bands of the 1940s and 1950s, although not a single organised movement , were important in the nationalist and communist  movements not just because many later joined Norodom Sihanouk 's Sangkum or the communists, but also because of their aims, principles, and their use of guerrilla tactics and on occasion extreme violence.

Many of the component groups of the Khmer Issarak - particularly its more rightist elements - participated in government under Prince Norodom Sihanouk after independence. Leading Issarak Dap Chhuon, for example, was given considerable power as Royal Delegate and Governor of Siem Reap , though he was to be killed by Sihanouk's forces in 1959 after being alleged to be involved in a coup plot. The only major group not to be integrated with Sihanouk's government was Son Ngoc Thanh's Khmer Serei, who remained resolutely anti-monarchist.

 

Not only would the guerrilla tactics and organisation of the Issarak forces be mimicked by the communist forces during the Cambodian Civil War, but many later communists were first introduced to the concepts of Marxist-Leninism whilst involved with the Issaraks. In the eastern area of Cambodia, the leaders of those Viet Minh-influenced forces remained largely unchanged up to and beyond the establishment of Democratic Kampuchea. Until purged by Pol Pot in 1976, their forces not only wore differing uniforms to those of Pol Pot loyalists, but were noted to be exemplary in their treatment of the civilian population and to retain a certain degree of loyalty to Sihanouk.

 

The source:  http://www.absotuleastronomy.com/

 

 


 

Did Sihanouk or the United States help the Khmer Rouge rise to power?

 

(Comments: this historical question should be seen objectively by the album of pictures that are posted at the beginning of  this page and by the testimony form different sources, like the article titled "Caught in the crossfire,"  posted just below.

 

I leave to the visiors to this web site to decide for themselves what answer they should give to this very important issue affecting Cambodia's present and future.  Naranhkiri Tith Ph.D. Washington DC. March 17, 2010)

 

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Caught in the Crossfire

Please, click on any of the "restangles" to see other articles ranging from: "Cambodia walks a fine line"; "Terror and genocide"; Chronicle of survival"; and Moving ahead, looking back."




On March 18, 1969, American B-52s began carpet-bombing eastern Cambodia. "Operation Breakfast" was the first course in a four-year bombing campaign that drew Cambodia headlong into the Vietnam War. The Nixon Administration kept the bombings secret from Congress for several months, insisting they were directed against legitimate Vietnamese and Khmer Rouge targets. However, the raids exacted an enormous cost from the Cambodian people: the US dropped 540,000 tons of bombs , killing anywhere from 150,000 to 500,000 civilians.

 

Shortly after the bombing began, Sihanouk restored diplomatic relations with the US, expressing concern over the spread of communism in Southeast Asia. But his change of heart came too late. In March 1970, while Sihanouk was traveling abroad, he was deposed by a pro-American general, Lon Nol. The Nixon Administration, which viewed Sihanouk as an untrustworthy partner in the fight against communism , increased military support to the new regime.

In April 1970, without Lon Nol's knowledge, American and South Vietnamese forces crossed into Cambodia. There was already widespread domestic opposition to the war in Vietnam; news of the "secret invasion" of Cambodia sparked massive protests across the US, culminating in the deaths of six students shot by National Guardsmen at Kent State University and Jackson State University. Nixon withdrew American troops from Cambodia shortly afterwards. But the US bombing continued until August 1973.

Meanwhile, with assistance from North Vietnam and China, the guerrillas of the Khmer Rouge had grown into a formidable force. By 1974, they were beating the government on the battlefield and preparing for a final assault on Phnom Penh. And they had gained an unlikely new ally: Norodom Sihanouk, living in exile, who now hailed them as patriots fighting against an American puppet government.


Kent State University, 1970, Vietnam War protest

Sihanouk's support boosted the Khmer Rouge's popularity among rural Cambodians. But some observers have argued that the devastating American bombing also helped fuel the Khmer Rouge's growth. Former New York Times correspondent Sydney Schanberg said the Khmer Rouge "... would point... at the bombs falling from B-52s as something they had to oppose if they were going to have freedom. And it became a recruiting tool until they grew to a fierce, indefatigable guerrilla army." Former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger has dismissed the idea that the US bears any responsibility for the rise of the Khmer Rouge. As he argued in his memoir, "It was Hanoi-animated by an insatiable drive to dominate Indochina- that organized the Khmer Rouge long before any American bombs fell on Cambodian soil."

 


 

Casting the first stone: the ‘palace coup’ of August 1945

                                                                             http://padevat.info/ 

(Comments: This article tells the little known in Cambodian history about how Son Ngoc Thanh using his Japanese connection to try to allow the Viet Minh to enter Cambodia by starting the first coup against Sihanouk and by tring to disarm the Cambodian army, fight against the allied forces, in 1945. Naranhkiri Tith; Ph.D.)

By the middle of 1945, it was becoming clear to anyone who cared to pay attention that Imperial Japan was doomed. With it, the status of those Khmer nationalists who had colluded with the Japanese in disarming the Vichy French administration became increasingly uncertain. Son Ngoc Thanh, who had returned from Japan early in 1945 to become a minister in the new ‘independent’ administration, was in a particularly difficult position, having been closely associated with the Japanese, although he had also managed to cause some irritation to them by raising the issue of the return of Kampuchea Krom. Moreover, the young figurehead King, Norodom Sihanouk, was untested politically: there was no reason to suppose he would be any less compliant to foreign powers than his predecessor Sisowath Monivong. Desperate times, in the opinion of some of Thanh’s young supporters, seemed to call for desperate measures.

On the night of August 9-10, a group of students and government functionaries assembled outside the palace in Phnom Penh, backed by a crowd of monks. Seven pro-Thanh activists then forced their way into the palace: Mam Koun, Neth Laing Say, Kim An Dore, Hem Savang, Mey Pho, Mao Sarouth, and Thach Sary. Most of the men were low-level clerks; Sary, for example, was a secretary to Kubota, the Japanese consul – the degree of Japanese responsibility for events remains uncertain – while Mey Pho was a palace official, perhaps the group’s ‘inside man’.

Sihanouk was, however, absent: his mother had received some advance notice of events, and the King had safely hidden himself in a nearby pagoda. While the ‘coup’ was decidedly small in scale, there was some excited waving of pistols, and Sihanouk’s personal secretary Nong Kimny was wounded. By 3 a.m. the conspirators had rounded up the entire cabinet, with the exception of Thanh and Sisowath Monireth, and made clear their demands. The key point was the introduction of a ‘progressive government’, as opposed to the usual mixture of minor princes and dusty francophil civil servants: ‘Progressive’, in this context, meant Thanhist and nationalist.

Despite the favour shown to them by the conspirators, the wound sustained by Kimny alarmed Thanh and Monireth, and they ordered the release of the captive cabinet members; Monireth and the Queen Mother then negotiated personally with the group. It seemed, however, an exciting moment for Cambodian self-determination; Keng Vannsak, in an interview, described a group of students waiting up all night for news of the ‘coup’. By the morning of the 10th, Sihanouk had agreed to appoint Thanh as Prime Minister, fulfilling one of the demonstrators’ main demands.

At this point, Thanh made a curious decision: he ordered the arrest of the leading ‘coup’ conspirators. All were jailed, although several were to escape from prison within a short time. Moreover, although Thanh was able to appoint some allies in government posts, notably his old nationalist colleague Pach Chheoun, and began to make overtures in the direction of greater cooperation between Vietnam and Cambodia, much of the administration remained the same.

Within a matter of weeks, events were to turn against Thanh. The French and British colluded with Defence Minister Khim Tit and Monireth, and with the likely acquiescence of Sihanouk (who, as at so many crucial points in Cambodian history, managed to absent himself from the capital) arranged for the Prime Minister to be bundled unceremoniously into a car and driven off to face French justice. Cambodia was, once more, very firmly within the grasp of France.

While the 1945 ‘coup’ was in some ways an amateurish and small-scale event, in this respect it only reflected the small scale of Khmer political activity at the time. Its ultimate significance was much greater, however. This was the first time that nationalist demonstrations had taken on an actively modernist character, previous events (such as the 1942 ‘Umbrella War’) having centred on more traditional expressions of Khmer identity. Beyond this, it created a complex series of betrayals at the heart of the developing political system. Central to these was the betrayal of forward-thinking nationalist Khmers, stitched up by those who believed the French colonialist rhetoric of ‘civilisation’, or were simply determined to hang on to their priveleges. Thanh, in particular, was considered to have betrayed the activists who had placed such trust in his ability to stand up to the traditionalists, while simultaneously earning Sihanouk’s lasting hatred for associating with the plot: as long as Sihanouk remained in power, Thanh and his particular brand of nationalism would never be able to re-establish a foothold in the country. Monireth, passed over as King by the French for his independent-mindedness, would similarly prove a disappointment to those who saw him as an agent of change, and himself likely betrayed Thanh by colluding with the French. And outside storing up resentments for the future, the ‘coup’ was an important step in the radicalisation of sections of the small educated class. Some of those involved in the ‘coup’ reappeared in the Khmer Republic years: Sary joined the armed forces, drifted towards a right-wing brand of nationalism, and (by then a FANK brigadier-general) was to be executed after the Khmer Rouge entered Phnom Penh in 1975, while Kim An Dore also became a Lon Nol associate. The others, however, surfaced in the Issarak movement and some, such as Mey Pho, were among the first wave of Khmers to become members of the Indochinese Communist Party: Neth Laing Say was killed in action as a leftist insurgent in the late 1940s. And although his degree of involvement remains unproven, French intelligence sources believed that the radical Khmer Krom Achar, Mean – later to adopt the name Son Ngoc Minh – had been present among the many monastic supporters of the ‘coup’.


 

                                                          Dap Chhuon and Sam Sary

source: PRINCE SIHANOUK AND THE NEW ORDER IN SOUTHEAST ASIA

CIA top Secret Report on Sihanouk release May 2007 under the Freedom of Information Act Copy No. 20; to read more the content of this report please click on the link posted just below:

CIA report on Sihanouk and Son Ngoc Thanh.pdf

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When Sihanouk returned home -from the U.S., he already had an inkling of trouble on the domestic front. Sihanouk probably had an idea as to one of the troublemakers. Sam Sary, the erstwhile economic czar, had returned from a leader grant in the U.S. sufficiently pro-Western in outlook that Sihanouk named him as Ambassador to Great Britain. There Sary incurred unfavorable publicity when he defended in letters to London newspapers his action in beating his children's Cambodian governess, even after it was revealed that she was pregnant by Sary. Brought home in disgrace, Sary was rumored to have joined Dap Chhuon in opposition to Sihanouk's neutralism, and to certain of his domestic policies--notably the Prince's refusal to permit rice exports, on grounds that the Royal Astrologer had predicted a poor rice crop for 1959.

Although Sihanouk mistrusted Sary, he was curiously relaxed concerning Dap Chhuon, even though Chhuon made only nominal obeissance to Sihanouk and ran Siem Reap province according to his own whim. As early as March 1956, Chhuon-then chief of the palace guard--had told Ambassador Strom that he was "awaiting' a favorable opportunity" to frustrate Sihanouk's neutralism and to break relations with the bloc. On two other occasions Chhuon solicited US support for 8 coup, apparently without tipping his hand to Sihanouk. In Jn3y 1958, Chhuon sent word to the U,S. Ambassador that he was "deeply disturbed" by his country’s recognition of Communist China, adding that while he was loyal to Sihanouk that he "loved his country" more than the Prince.

In 1958 Chhuon had been promoted to brigadier general and been made governor of his home province of Siem Reap. There he commanded three battalions of the Cambodian army, and was regarded by some observers in Phnom Penh as having considerable influence also in the palace guard.

Undaunted by his rebuffs from the U.S. ambassador, Dap Chhuon solidified hold on western Cambodia and contemplated means of bringing off a coup.

Chhuon ’s plot might have remained an internal political problem had not Sihanouk, in November 1958, suspended diplomatic re1ations with Thailand. In Saigon, President Diem had long considered Sihanouk 8 menace to his country, the channel by which Peiping might achieve a foothold in Southeast Asia without recourse to arm. When on 24 November Cambodia temporarily suspended" its representation in Bangkok, Diem had little trouble in winning Thailand's Sarit to his view of Sihanouk. Sihanouk's action had indeed been precipitous, as the border incidents to which he alluded in justifying the break were of no particular consequence. The Thais' main sin appeared to be that a number of Bangkok newspapers had criticized Cambodia ‘s recognition of Communist China, rand the Thai police had tightened controls along the Cambodian border.

Prospects of Sihanouk 's ouster appeared to brighten in December, when Sam Sary--enticed by the Vietnamese--defected to Saigon, Sary not only was in full agreement with Diem concerning the desirability of removing Sihanouk, but was able to advise the Vietnamese concerning Chhuon's attitude, if they did not know of it already. In the first week of January 1959, Ngo Trong Hieu, the representative of Diem's special intelligence (SEPES) in Phnom Penh, traveled to Bangkok for a week of talks with senior members of the Thai ruling Junta, plus Sam Sary. In conversation with  General Prapat stated that the Thais had determined to support an anti-Sihanouk coup, but conceded that its success involved cooperation by Cambodian army chief of staff Lon Nol. The plotters, however, were not entirely without assets 02 their own. In addition to Dap Chhuon and his 3,000 men in Siem Reap province, an estimated 1,200 Cambodian dissidents under Son Ngoc Thanh were "training" on the Thai side of the border, and there appears to have been a smaller group of Cambodian dissidents in South Vietnam, Prapat, who claimed I that he was in "full control of the coup plotting, state coup would begin with the infiltration of Sam Sary into Cambodia for the purpose of disseminating propaganda and the organizing with the political opposition. After a time, there was to be an army coup, presumably led by Dap Chhuon with the connivance of Lon Nol. The circumstances in which Son Ngoc Thanh's force would be used were vague, but it was presumably available to reinforce Dap Chhuon should the need arise.

At about the time that Prapat was briefing concerning his plans, the Chinese and Soviet embassies in Phnom Penh were warning Sihanouk of a possible coup attempt. At some point, the French also passed a warning to the Prince. It appears likely that all three governments derived their information from the same source, insecure SEPES messages from Saigon to Bangkok. These and subsequent messages, including some to Chhuon's head- quarters at Siem Reap, were also being monitored by US agencies, but the threat to Sihanouk brought no word of warning from Washington.

As time went on, Prapat's plan gave way to improvisation. Sam Sary never did reenter Cambodia, If there were to be a coup, the main responsibility would fall on Chhuon. Even with outside assistance, however, Chhuon's even with outside assistance, however, Chhuon's three batallions were badly outnumbered by the 25,000 men in Cambodian army units outside his jurisdiction. For reasons not clear today, Lon No1 was felt by the plotters to be sympathetic to their cause. In the wake of the bloc and French warnings, however, security was tightened in Phnom Penh, and US Embassy personnel were among those placed under surveillance.  

Ironically, any suspicion which might have attached to Dap Chhuon appears to have been diverted by ary9sdefection.. Sihanouk actually assigned to Chhuon responsibility for investigating the coup reports, and for arresting Sary. if he could be located. In public speeches on 10 and 13 January, Sihanouk charged that Thailand and South Vietnam were plotting his overthrow, in collaboration with Sam Sary and Son Ngoc Thanh, He confirmed that his information had come from "foreignt1 sources, but the lack of specif- ics suggest that the Prince's friends had been properly vague concerning their sources of information.

On 24 January, Réalités published an interview with Sihanouk in which he stated that the, United States must know of Sary's plotting, and that the American’ failure to warn him "places their impartiality in doubt." Even as Sihanouk spoke, Son Ngoc Thanh's dissidents were unlimbering a mobile US.-made radio transmitter, provided by the Thais for propaganda support of the coup. Dap Chhuon, meanwhile, informed the Thais that his coup would take place in mid-February, and indicated that he would require military as well as propaganda support.

By early February Sihanouk had awakened to the danger from Dap Chhuon, who drew attention to himself by refusing to come to Phnom Penh for the wedding of one of Sihanouk's daughters. The Prince’s suspicions were confirmed when he was told that Cambodian army officers from Phnom Penh were not permitted to inspect Chhuon’s troops. Chhuon had long been recognized as independent-minded and disposed to run his own show in Siem Reap. Belatedly, however Sihanouk realized that Sam Sary was the least of his worries.

On 20 February, Chhuon precipitated a showdown by forwarding a "declaration of dissidence" to King Suramarit. Chhuon apparently hoped to exact concessions from the government rather than to remove Sihanouk by force, and in pursuit of this modest goal had become impatient for a confrontation. NQ negotiations were forthcoming, however, and the result was disaster for Dap Chhuon.

The only Western power which had assumed from the first that the plot would fail was France. Once Chhuon had burned his bridges, the French set out to assure that he did fail. French Ambassador Gorce flew to Siem Reap, ostensibly for another look at the monuments at Angkor. In Phnom Penh, the French military mission supervised the mobilization of an armored Column, and drove it with unprecedented efficiency to Siem Reap of the night of 21-22 February.  There was no resistance; Chhuon was taken so completely by surprise that he was barely able to make his escape. Even this was only a respite, and ten days later he was shot and killed while trying to reach the Thai border.

In the aftermath of his successful countercoup, Sihanouk chose to be cozy concerning the matter of U.S. involvement a (For all his "mercurial" temperament, Sihanouk has never been one to fly off the handle on important matters of state. Rather, he is prone to brood on real or imagined injuries until righteous indignation has fermented into implaccable hatred.) He contented himself with making it very clear that he was not fooled by U.S. denials of complicity, and this point he made not by formally accusing the U.S. but by letting the conspirators speak for themselves.

On 2 March, Sihanouk accepted the plaudits of the multitude at Siem Reap. In discussing outside support for Dap Chhuon he mentioned only the South Vietnamese by name: 'two Vietnamese radio operators, he said, had been captured in Chhuon's house along with six new radio sets.

According to Sihanouk, radio logs indicated that the sets had been used to establish contact with Son Ngoc Thanh's force in Thailand. The official Cambodian broadcast stated that Sihanouk also read the confession of Chhuon's brother, Kem Srey, and of his mistess. The broadcast stated that the testimony had "seriously implicate" the Vietnamese representative in Phnom Penh, Nguyen Van Nhieu, but mentioned no Americans.

In a speech before the Khmer Socialist Youth--a Sangkum affiliate--Sihanouk discussed the plot in greater detail on 4 larch. Basic to the plot, according to the Prince, was Cambodia's refusal to join SRATO, an action which provided Cambodia’s neighbors with the pretext for encroachments on its territory. After characterizing Dap Chhuon and his entourage as the rotten apples to be found in any barrel9 he expressed gratitude for the timely warnings he had received from three friendly governments, "two governments from the Socialist camp and one government from the Western camp." He hinted that more revelations would follow:

Finally, we should mention the declaration of another of Dap Chhuon's brothers, former National Assembly deputy Slat Pew, which revealed that he was responsible for regular contacts with the embassy of a great SEATO power.

No name was mentioned. Any chance that the Dap Chhuon case might be allowed to die a quiet death, however, was dispelled by the inauguration of anti-Sihanouk broadcasts by Son Ngoc Thanh's mobile transmitters. In March, Thanh began broadcasts in the name of the Khmer Serei (Free Khmers). Government forces were unable to locate and seize the transmitters, and as time went on the broadcasts became an obsession with Sihanouk.

In September, the background of the Dap Chhuon affair came out in the open when 18 of his followers, including two of his brothers, were tried for treason by a military court. The most sensational aspect of the trial was the testimony of one of the brothers, Slat Peou On February 11, Dap Chhuon told me that Ngo Trong Hieu had given him a quantity of gold worth 36)millions (sic).Peou went on to provide details of his1 network, which included B. The Aftermath Publication of Peou's testimony, which could have been taken privately, was symptomatic of Cambodia's deteriorating relations with the US and South Vietnam. Although the Dap Chhuon plot appeared to be the most' important factor influencing Sihanouk's outlook, it was not the only one.

Sihanouk vacationed in France during April and lay, and returned to Cambodia in a seemingly mellow mood. Far from preoccupying himself with Thai and Vietnamese intrigues, he appeared prepared to let bygones be bygones.

The Thai foreign minister visited Phnom Penh in mid-June, where he and Sihanouk reached agreement on a "press truce," and exchanged pledges of noninterference in one another's internal affairs. For the next three months, Thai and Cambodian papers refrained from personal attacks of the kind which had prompted Sihanouk to suspend diplomatic relations the Previous November.*

 


 

God & King The Devaraja Cult In South Asian Art & Architecture

IDH238


by Arputha Rani Sengupta


Regency Publications
ISBN 8189233262


(Comments: The reason why I post this review of a book on the God-King cult is the fact that as the article pointed out in Asia and especially in Cambodia “the king did become god.” In this context, it is interesting to point out that it was Sihanouk who had brought the word “varman,” to add to the ending of his name Norodom Sihanouk Varman. The word “varman means “protected or shielded” by a god.  This habit of ending of a Cambodian king’s name by the word “varman” had been abandoned since the fall of the Angkorean Empire in 1432. Why did Sihanouk do this? The answer is to make him a god-king, with all the benefit that goes with this name ending. (Please see an article on the meaning of the word "varman" in an excerpt posted just below.)

 

No wonder that it works for Sihanouk that most of the Cambodian people still think of Sihanouk as a living god, which in turn, had allowed him to dominate all the aspects of life in Cambodia until today, since he became king in 1941.

 

Naranhkiri Tith Ph.D. Washington DC. March 11, 2010)

 

 

Bottom of Form

 

About the Book

George Coedes and K. Ananda Coomaraswamy made astute observations on the cult of deified royalty in South Asia for the first time. The cult of Devaraja or God King was the Cambodian State religion, while it may have originated in Java under the great Shrivijaya at a time when it exercised some control over Cambodia and Siam. Of the thirteen temples attributed to the Khmer Kings in Cambodia six were certainly dedicated, between the ninth and eleventh centuries, to the royal linga. A seventh, Angkor Wat, became the mausoleum of its founder Suryavarman ll. And, finally, Bayon, built at the end of the twelfth century was installed with an image of Jayabuddha, named after jayavarman VII. The focus of the new cult instituted by jayavarman II was a deity known in Khmer language as 'the master of the world who is the king', the equivalent in Sanskrit being devaraja. The Cambodian version is similar to the Hindu cult of the World Ruler, the Chakravartin.

In Asia the king did become god. And all power, religious and secular, was centered in him, the task of tracing the Devaraja Cult is simplified in a series of Temple Mountains where the consecrated image is associated by its name with the kingly founder, thus revealing 'several devaraja' in a flourishing cult. In the cult, a unique image created in a particular era was passed on to the successor. The hypothesis of a single devaraja venerated as a deity throughout the centuries ought to raise some difficulties. The devaraja cult in India as elsewhere in Asia is unique when considered as a philosophical and religious conception that coincides with the veneration of ancestors and guardians of the soil. It seems that the originality of the devaraja cult lay in the integration of the personal cult of the king into a system in which the deification of the eternal principle of royalty was adopted to ensure stability, peace and prosperity.

On 27th and 28th March 2001 distinguished scholars gathered in the influence of the royal cult in Asian art and architecture, which merits greater attention. The proceedings published in this volume, it is hoped, is a fitting tribute to Dr. Grace Mac Cann Morley, who encouraged advancement of knowledge in order to place the material culture of India in its historical and cultural context.

About the Author

Arputha Rani Sengupta is Associate Professor in History of Art at the National Museum Institute (Deemed University), New Delhi, since 1996. she has coordinated several symposiums, including God & King: Devaraja Cult. She has lectured widely and published extensively her writings on diverse aspects of art and culture in journals and contributed to leading publications, including the IGNCA. Sengupta specialises in cross cultural studies and Globalisation during the early Buddhist period in India. She is currently writing on Symbols and Substitutes in Early Buddhist Art under ICHR grant. Her book on Art of Terracotta (2005) brings together extraordinary votive terracotta of India from early historic to late medieval period to trace their morphology, cult and cultural synthesis. In particular the phenomena of 'Interpretation Ramana' may be observed in early terracotta that reveals unprecedented assimilations. The internationalism and interculituralism evidenced by the material culture of the Early Buddhist Period in India is investigated further in her forthcoming book on Buddhist Jewellery.

Sengupta has been teaching Art History since 1977. She was Assistant Professor in History of fine Arts in Stella Maris College, Chennai and at Lasbrey Teachers' College in Imo State, Nigeria. A First Ranker in History of fine Arts from the University of Washington, Seattle, and obtained her Ph. D. in Art History from Rabindra Bharati University, Kolkata. As a practicing artist she has also exhibited extensively and has received awards for her paintings, several of which are in public and private collections.

CONTENTS

Foreword

iii

Tribute

v

Editors Note

vii

List of Illustrations

xiii

List of Participants

xv

The God-King and the Cloud-Maiden: Royal Ritual and Urban Form at Sigiriya

1

Senake Bandaranayake

A Plausible Explanation of the Origin of the "Devaraja" Cult in Ancient India

11

M.L. Nigam

Gods and Kings Who Would Be Gods

17

Muthusamy Varadarajan

Cultural Contacts of south India and South-East and Far-East Asia: An Exploration of the Phenomenon of the Devaraja Cult

25

Raju Poundurai

The Concept of Divine Theory of Sovereignty in West and Central Asia as Depicted in Literature and the Arts

41

Mansura Haidar

Apotheosis of the Indonesian King in Singasari Dynasty

51

Shashibala

Exploring the Idea of Divine Kingship through Bharatanatyam

61

Parul Pandya Dhar

Devaraja in Cambodian History

65

Lokesh Chandra

The Devaraja Cult and Khmer Architecture

83

Bachchan Kumar

Kingship and the Cult of Devaraja in Kampuchea

89

B. L. Nagarch

The Devaraja Cult: Inscriptional, Art and Architectural Evidences from Cambodia

101

Sachchidanand Sahai

Devaraja in the Pallava and Chola Times

119

R. Nagaswamy

The Devaraja Concept in Ancient Tamilakam: Numismatic and Art Historical Evidences

129

S. Suresh

Portraits of the Thanjavur Nayak Kings and Their Worship

139

Kudavayil Balasubramanian

The Devaraja Cult at the Crossroads of Cultures

145

Arputha Rani Sengupta

Suggested Readings

153

 


The use of Varman as an honorary suffix

From Laurence Palmer Briggs; “The Ancient Khmer Empire;” The American Philosophical Society, Philadelphia, February, 1951. P. 26.

“The suffix “varman”  attached to a name having a religious and political significance to form a name of a king or person of high rank appeared in Funan about this time (early third century A.D.). varman in sanskrit, means “armor,” and used in the sense indicated above can probably be translated as “protector’ and apparently “protégé.” Thus Jayavarman from Jaya “victory,” and “varman” means “protégé of victory.’

 

 


Reflections on Sihanouk's role in the Khmer Rouge's rise to power and the subsequent mass murdering of the Cambodian people:

 

Did Sihanouk really "save" Cambodia as he often claimed when he allied himself with the Khmer Rouge to fight against American "imperialism;" or did he sign a death warrant against the Cambodian people? In his own defense, Sihanouk always said in his own defense that it was the Khmer Rouge who came and joined him and not the other way around. What is the difference whether Sihanouk joined the Khmer Rouge or the Khmer Rouge joined Sihanouk as far as the impact of this deadly alliance on the Cambodian people is concerned?

 

One must also put this question in the historical perspective of the "Cold War". Which of the two systems of "imperialism" (US and Communist) had done more damage to the world at large, especially the developing world. The answer to this question is clearly the communist system of imperialism that has fallen apart since 1989. mainly from self implosion. (See an article posted below entitled "MPs vote to condemn 'evils of communism'")

 

The consequence of this disastrous alliance between Sihanouk and the Khmer Rouge, was to allow the Khmer Rouge to use Sihanouk's name who is still considered as a "god-king" in the peasants' eyes, to recruit more of them and among the intellectuals to join the deadly alliance, which in turn, allowed the Khmer Rouge to become politically and militarily powerful and to impose on the Cambodian people one of the most murderous regimes in the modern world, now widely known as the "Killing Fields".  The observations on the role of Sihanouk and that of the Vietnamese in the human tragedy in Cambodia made by two former US government officials, former Congressman  Steve Salarz and former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger are very appropriate and relevant:

"Answering those charges in his 1982 memoir, Years of Upheaval, Kissinger said American actions were intended solely to save Cambodia and Vietnam from communism. The party to blame, 'the master architect of [the Khmer Rouge] disaster," Kissinger contended, was North Vietnam. "It was Hanoi... if it was anyone, that brought the war to Cambodia and made possible the genocide by the Khmer Rouge.' " 24

"Others say the responsibility for the Khmer Rouge holocaust lies largely with the Khmer Rouge themselves. 'We have partial responsibility, but by no means exclusive responsibility,' said Rep. Solarz. 'The fact that Sihanouk joined forces with the Khmer Rouge gave Pol Pot an opportunity to recruit much more effectively among the peasantry because he could recruit in the name of the prince. My guess is that had as much if not more to do with the ultimate success of the Khmer Rouge than the American bombing.' "

(Source: Leepson, Mark, "Cambodia a Nation in Turmoil", in Editorial Research Reports, (Congressional Quarterly Inc., Washington, DC. April 5, 1985)

Washington DC. September 7, 2005

Naranhkiri Tith, Ph.D.

 


 

Sihanouk and his Comrades the North Vietnamese and the Khmer Rouge

 

(Comments: Very often Sihanouk in a convolute way claimed that he did not join the Khmer Rouge, but rather the opposite, that  it was the Khmer Rouge who had joined him. But, frankly, what is the difference between whether Sihanouk had joined the Khmer Rouge or the other way round? The result is the same which is the massacre of about one fourth of the population of Cambodia by the Khmer Rouge, and the subsequent invasion by Vietnam under the pretext of "saving" Cambodia.

 

Sihanouk definitely should not have collaborated with the Khmer Rouge in any form whatsoever to fight against "American Imperialism". Most objective observers would agree that without Sihanouk lending his prestige as the god-king in the eyes of the Cambodian peasants, the Khmer Rouge could not have recruited their followers among them. On this important point, let us listen to two former senior US government officials' observations:

 

"Answering those charges in his 1982 memoir, Years of Upheaval, Kissinger said American actions were intended solely to save Cambodia and Vietnam from communism. The party to blame, "the master architect of [the Khmer Rouge] disaster," Kissinger contended, was North Vietnam. "It was Hanoi... if it was anyone, that brought the war to Cambodia and made possible the genocide by the Khmer Rouge." 24

 

Others say the responsibility for the Khmer Rouge holocaust lies largely with the Khmer Rouge themselves. "We have partial responsibility, but by no means exclusive responsibility," said Rep. Solarz. "The fact that Sihanouk joined forces with the Khmer Rouge gave Pol Pot an opportunity to recruit much more effectively among the peasantry because he could recruit in the name of the prince. My guess is that had as much if not more to do with the ultimate success of the Khmer Rouge than the American bombing."

 

The key question  to better understand this complex issue, from the historical records, is which of the two imperialisms, (the American and the Vietnamese imperialism) was more dangerous and destructive for Cambodia? The answer is clearly the Vietnamese imperialism is more deadly for Cambodia than the American one. Vietnamese imperialism implies genocidal policy, while the American imperialism has no permanent territorial design on Cambodia. (For more interpretation of American imperialism see " Illusions of Empire: Defining the New American Order; G. John Ikenberry; from Foreign Affairs, March/April 2004; ." For Vietnamese genocidal policy see Bernard Fall's article below entitled "Vietnam Imperial March and Nationalism";  Bernard Fall, The Two Vietnams) ,and also "The Imperial March of Vietnam or Nam Tien as Perceived and Explained by a Vietnamese Scholar,"). For crimes committed by Communism, of which Vietnam is an integral part, see Stephane Courtois (editor); Black Book of Communism: Crimes, Terror, Repression; Harvard University Press, Cambridge Mass, 1997)

 

Naranhkiri Tith, Ph.D.

Washington, DC,. 2005

 


 

How Sihanouk had been betraying Cambodia and brought Hun Sen back to Power

By Dr. Naranhkiri Tith

Former Professor in International Economics and Finance at SAIS, The Johns Hopkins University

Washington, DC

March 1, 2010

Introduction:

The purpose of this paper is to explore the causes and sources of the continued suffering of the majority of the Cambodian people and the continued hold of power in Cambodia by the criminal regime of the Cambodian People's Party (CPP). At the same time, the international community appears to also capitulate to Hun Sen' s threats and manipulations. Cambodians are now in these death traps that are built by both the Vietnamese and our own people, and it will not be easy to get out of them.

It is hoped that by looking squarely into the causes and sources of this tragedy, future generations of Cambodians inside and outside Cambodia might be able to come up with new ideas in order to allow the Cambodian people to get out safely from these death traps.

Most Cambodians still blame the Vietnamese for all the disaster that befell on Cambodia since the  18th century. It is true that Vietnam has been trying to colonize Cambodia for almost three centuries. It is true that this colonialist policy of Vietnam continues until today. The invasion of Cambodia in 1978 was the most obvious and recent manifestation of that imperialist policy.

Despite the fact that the invasion of Cambodia was acknowledged by the international community as an act of aggression and Vietnam was overwhelmingly condemned for that action at the United Nations, Vietnam succeeded in installing a subservient government, the CPP before withdrawing.

More importantly, it has succeeded to turn the table around in its favor by judiciously playing the Khmer Rouge card, and by using and enhancing its own image as victim of foreign aggressions. Although, Cambodia has also been a victim of one of the worst holocausts in modem history, the Cambodian people are not viewed as victims of a foreign aggression but rather of their own making.

For instance, Vietnam fought against France, China and the United States and very successfully. While in Cambodia, Sihanouk gave permission to the US to carpet bombing the Eastern part of Cambodia without informing those who lived in that area, and while the CPP allowed the Vietnamese army to invade Cambodia in order to save their own skin. These events showed that Cambodians are insensitive to the well-being of their own people, and therefore, from the international community's point of view, they are not victims of any foreign aggressions. On the contrary, Vietnam has become not the invader of Cambodia, but its liberator.

At this point, it is interesting to ask the following questions

1.  Why did the international community remain almost indifferent to this Vietnamese imperialist policy?

2.  Why did the international community continue to bend backward to support the criminal regime of Hun Sen and the CPP, despite its continued gross violation of human rights and naked abuses of democratic principles and civil society?

3.  Why are Cambodians not able to behave more like victims rather than victimizers? Are cultural isolation and intellectual disconnection the main causes of this bad image of Cambodians?

4.  And if Cambodians have such a bad image, how are they going to do to changing it?

(See the web page  titled: Sino-centric tributary system)

I. The Vietnamese/Hun Sen-built Death Trap

There is little doubt that Vietnam continues to consolidate its imperialist grip on Cambodia and Laos. Vietnam has been building the death trap for Cambodians for the last three centuries.

Let us now examine the reasons why Vietnam has been successful in its colonialist policy. Contrary to the majority of Cambodians, this writer believes that the Vietnamese are not the only ones to be blamed for the demise of the Cambodian people. The blame must also be borne by the Cambodian people or at least by some of them, especially the Khmer Rouge, the Royalists, and the CPP. By sheer ignorance or callousness, these three groups of Cambodians also contributed to the building of the death trap for their own people.

Vietnam continued to maintain a close relationship proclaimed in 1979 as irreversible" with its wartime partners and friends, the Pathet Lao and the CPP. A most recent meeting which took place last October, in Vientiane between the former three wartime partners testified to that ongoing and still strong alliance between these three countries under Vietnam leadership. This meeting took place despite the fact that members of ASEAN are not supposed to have a sub-block within it.

The recent security problem created by some Loa resistance and anti communist movement prompted the government of Laos to request for Vietnam help. The visit to Vietnam by Hun Sen just Three days before the 1997 Hun Sen' s coup against FUNCINPEC, was also another manifestation of that irreversible policy and alliance, and of Vietnam's continued strong hold on its smaller former Indochina partners.

At this point it is important to warn those misguided group of Cambodians (the so-called Cambodian Freedom Fighters or CFF) who are advocating the use of armed resistance to fight against Hun Sen and the CPP. First of all, there will be no support for such an armed insurrection from any countries in the world including the United States, and especially the much-needed base in Thailand.

Let' s suppose that even if this group succeeds in having sufficient number of followers to be able to harass Hun Sen army; the international community would not tolerate this kind of armed insurrection against an "elected government" recognized by the UN in the 1998 elections.

On the contrary, the UN will allow Vietnam to re-enter Cambodia at the request of Hun Sen to eradicate this kind of armed resistance. This is so, because Sihanouk and Ranariddh are now fully supporting Hun Sen. Based on these premises, the international community (UN) would now be prepared to officially recognize Vietnam's right to intervene into Cambodian affairs. And this will be the end of Cambodia.

Since, there are so many other places in the troubled world that the UN is already involved in; there is not the slightest chance that it will again return to Cambodia to do the cleaning job as it did in 1991-93. Cambodia had its chance then. It lost it, it is almost certain that Cambodia won't have that opportunity again because the financial and human resources are just not there for the UN to do it again, anytime soon.

(For the background reading on this section, please refer to an article titled: History of Cambodia and Who is Khmer?)

II. The Khmer Rouge Built Death Trap

The Khmer Rouge not only killed two million individual Cambodians; but more tragically, they murdered the soul and the spirit of the Cambodian people, by destroying every aspect of the social, cultural, and institutional set up of Cambodia. Why did the Khmer rouge behave so differently from other totalitarian groups from the left or the right? According to Bruce Sharp (The Unique Revolution, 1997), a keen Cambodian observer of the Khmer Rouge movement, the following answer was given:

"The Cambodian revolution stands apart from other upheavals because the Khmer Rouge combined astonishing brutality with astonishing stupidity. "

They were so brutal that no rationale can be brought to explain why they had to kill their own kind with such inhumane manner. For instance, they emptied the cities in 48 hours including hospitals, and did not allow any time for the evacuees to bring any medicine or food with them. There were no places that were prepared to receive these masses of people from the cities.

The purpose for such sadistic and cruel way of treating people was to break down any kind of resistance against them. They were suspicious of anybody, including their own cadre. The Khmer Rouge enjoyed torturing people before killing them. The mass killings by the Khmer rouge were done in the most barbaric way by using axes or clubs to bludgeon to death innocent children, men and women, old and young, to spare using bullets. They were most of all very xenophobic. They are the ones who provide the lowest common denominator to judge any future Cambodian political and social behavior. It is because of this singular and brutal political and ideological background, that Hun Sen appears now to the international community as the lesser of the two evils. That is why the apparent insensitivity of the international community to Hun Sen' s constant abuses of democratic and civil society principles has become more understandable, although not acceptable. And that is why the Vietnamese encroachment into Cambodian affairs becomes benign when compared to the Khmer Rouge excesses.

Their stupidity resides in the fact that normally a country like Cambodia which never have a strong social and political organization to start with, particularly compared to Vietnam, the Khmer Rouge went ahead with the mass killing to weaken Cambodia further. They believed in the utopian world of scientific communism, where no money is needed, and where everybody wears the kind of same cloth and eats the same kind of food, and where big bother (Angkar) will watch over every act and gesture of each individual day and night. All individuality was erased and to be replaced by collective behavior and discipline.

There was no parallel of such demented behavior in the modem history of mankind; even during the harshest days of Leninism in Russia during the early 1920's. Is this a Khmer Rouge aberration or more dangerously a Cambodian trait of character? Some Cambodian Americans, especially those who are participants in the Soc. culture.com, web site, constantly blame the Vietnamese for all these bad things that have been taken place in Cambodia, since the 1993 elections. Similar ultra nationalistic behavior pushed these people to talk about eliminating all Vietnamese in Cambodia (Chau Bury). The same xenophobic behavior still prevails among these same Cambodian Americans, despite the fact that they are living in this great country does not have room for such bigotry.

The behavior of these groups of Cambodian Americans points to the depth of the image problem that All Cambodians are having. I am afraid that it will not be easy to go against this trend. Because Cambodians are afraid to face this kind of people. Most Cambodians tend to withdraw rather facing such kind of persons. This is tantamount to capitulate in front of the force of evil and to prolong the bad image of all Cambodians. The Khmer Rouge death trap is the most difficult one to deal with. However, the Royal trap is perhaps the most damaging in the long run, because of the traditional place of respect and power of the royal family in the Cambodian society.

III. The Royalty-built death trap

By tradition, the Cambodian identity is associated with the royal family or the cult of god-king, since the Angkor Era. Until today, the only alternative to communist ideology is the monarchy. And this is an old trap. During the last two elections (1993 and 1998), the only alternative to Hun Sen CPP was FUNCIINPEC, while SAM RAINSY Party was a poor third choice. It was clear that most Cambodians did not want to vote for Hun Sen CPP. In 1993, they clearly showed their displeasure of the CPP track records by overwhelmingly voting for FUNCINPEC. Again, in 1998, most people still continued to vote for FUNICINPEC, despite the fact that they knew full well that FUNCINPEC became as corrupt and as unlawful as the CPP.

What most people did not know, was the fact that Sihanouk, and especially his wife Monique had already formed a tacit alliance with Hun Sen since 1987. This is now clear to this writer, because soon after the meeting around Paris in 1987 between Sihanouk and Hun Sen, two of Sihanouk' s children, Chakrapong and Bopha Devi became vice premier and minister of Culture, respectively, in the then Hun Sen Government of the State of Cambodia (SOC). Knowing these royal family members, it was not possible to see two of Sihanouk’s children in the Hun Sen government without the tacit blessing of their royal father.

Right after the 1993 UN-sponsored elections, Sihanouk ignored the results of that elections with one of his sons Norodom Ranariddh as the winner, ignoring the result that election result, Sihanouk  immediately tried to take over the control of Cambodia, by forming a coalition government, in which both Hun Sen and Ranariddh  were appointed vice presidents. This is Sihanouk’s way of bringing Hun Sen back into power, at the expense of both his own son and the international community. Fortunately, the United Nations major members had refused to allow Sihanouk making a fool out of them.

Then immediately thereafter, Sihanouk tried again to bring Hun Sen back into power, this time by allowing one of his sons, Chakrapong to lead a secession movement in the eastern zone of Cambodia. This time Sihanouk had succeeded because Ranariddh had no choice but to accept his father plan of a unique from of government in the world with two prime ministers, Ranariddh as first Prime Minister, and Hun Sen as second Prime Minister (Please, see the two New York times articles by Philip Shedon, and Nate Thayer’s abstract, posted below).

As usual, Sihanouk was able to hide his sordid and evil scheme very well by playing the patriotic card. In doing so, he was able to fool his other own son, Norodom Ranariddh, and use him to advance his hidden support and cooperation with Hun Sen, in the hope that Hun Sen would favor Monique to be queen or her son a king, after his death.

This maneuvering became even clearer after the 1997 coup, when Sihanouk immediately endorsed Hun Sen's coup, against his own son. This kind of behavior is nothing surprising among royal family members since the Angkor time. Betrayal is the order of the day in the royal circle. And this in turn has been one of the main causes for the downfall of Cambodia.

When viewed from this royal deceitful behavior, it is clear that the international community did not have any choice but to support Hun Sen. Because, Sihanouk still has a tremendous prestige among foreigners. This fact must be taken seriously if one is to understand the real dilemma of today's Cambodia.

(Please, see the Rise and Fall of the Khmer Rouge by Armando Manalo)

Conclusion:

I have been trying to analyze the different causes and source of the current social and political problems in Cambodia (see: In the Years of Dying). I have shown that the Vietnamese are not the only cause for the decay of Cambodian society see: Exploring Cambodia's Evolution of Corruption, and also: Cambodia Plagued by Torture: Report). The Cambodian people must also share the blame. That Hun Sen is subservient to the Vietnamese should be no surprise to anybody. But, the hidden alliance between Hun Sen and Sihanouk is probably more understood by the international community than by most Cambodians (see Stephen Morris: Covering up the Killing Fields). There will be no possible Cambodian solution until Sihanouk disappears from the Cambodian political scene. But, time is not on the Cambodian side because of the influx of illegal Vietnamese immigrants, as there is, practically, no borders between Vietnam and Cambodia due to the existence of systemic and pervasive corruption in Cambodia.

But the main source of all the ills that the Cambodian people are enduring silently, but very painfully, stems from the legacy of stupidity and brutality which was left behind by the Khmer Rouge. This legacy allows the international community to accept more easily Hun Sen as the lesser of the two evils, especially with Sihanouk' s endorsement (see the interview of Ambassador Kent Wiederman on the Khmer Rouge trial). This policy was facilitated by the ineptitude of FUNCINPEC under the leadership of Norodom Ranariddh. He had the chance to pull Cambodia out of the disaster. He failed miserably because of his corrupt personality and of his well-known incompetence.

Where do we go from here? There are signs of hope inside Cambodia, because the civil society has started to take roots. Also, the world has evolved to a more open society, including China and Vietnam. The main problem for Cambodia is to find the right kind of leaders when that time will have arrived. This is where WCC can play a significant role, by sticking to our basic ethical and moral principles and respect for democracy and civil society, and to have the courage of speaking up on these vital issues concerning the Cambodian society. I do hope that this presentation will help to motivate younger Cambodian Americans toward this eventual possibility of seeing the light at the end of this long and suffocating tunnel.

________________________________________________________

 

Cambodian Prince Pits Sons Against Each Other in Bid for Power

By PHILIP SHENON,

The New York Times; Published: June 7, 1993

 

PHNOM PENH, Cambodia, June 6— Prince Norodom Sihanouk turned old family divisions into a weapon today in his campaign to return to power in Cambodia, pitting one of his sons against the other in hopes of forging a coalition government.

Although diplomats and United Nations peacekeepers say they believe that the Prince will eventually succeed in pulling together a coalition, the political climate of this war-shattered nation has been poisoned by feuding within the royal family.

One of the sons in question is Prince Norodom Ranariddh, who is president of the royalist party, which won last month's internationally supervised Cambodian elections. Prince Ranariddh has so far resisted joining a coalition despite the pleas -- and the wrath -- of his 70-year-old father, Prince Sihanouk. The elder Prince, Cambodia's ceremonial head of state and its former monarch, was ousted in a coup in 1970 and along with his family spent most of two decades in exile. No Brotherly Love

The other son is Prince Norodom Chakrapong, who is a ranking official in the Vietnamese-installed Government, and in its political arm, the Cambodian People's Party.

Prince Ranariddh, 49, loathes his half-brother. In a letter last week to Prince Sihanouk, Prince Ranariddh accused Prince Chakrapong of holding "no other thought than to destroy me or to kill me." He said that he could never join a government that included Prince Chakrapong.

Prince Ranariddh has long been considered the favorite son among Prince Sihanouk's offspring -- no small distinction given that the Prince is believed to have fathered scores of children from a variety of wives and concubines. Many Cambodians have thought of Prince Chakrapong as a black sheep of the royal family.

Because of the deep-seated hostility between the brothers, and with Prince Sihanouk and Prince Chakrapong thought to be estranged as well, there was astonishment today in Phnom Penh when Prince Chakrapong turned up on a balcony at the Royal Palace alongside his father. There, Prince Sihanouk gave a speech in which he denounced the royalist party, known by the acronym Funcinpec, saying that it stood in the way of a new government.

Prince Sihanouk's first attempt at forming a coalition collapsed last week because of objections from Prince Ranariddh. Prince Sihanouk said today that he would continue to press for a new government, although he noted that the new coalition may have to wait until later this year, when the heavens will be aligned properly. Like manyCambodians, Prince Sihanouk is superstitious, and he said that "astrologers have advised me not to pressure for a new government because I won't succeed until my birthday next October."

Prince Chakrapong, who is believed to be in his early 50's, said nothing to the crowd today. He sat quietly on the balcony, beaming as his father spoke. "Chakrapong didn't have to say anything because the message to Prince Ranariddh was pretty clear," said a senior United Nations official. "If Ranariddh stands in the way of a coalition, Prince Sihanouk throws in his lot with Chakrapong." Supporters Brought by Truck

After the Government's People's Party was defeated at the polls last month, Prime Minister Hun Sen became eager to join a coalition led by Prince Sihanouk. Mr. Hun Sen's Government trucked in hundreds of people to join the crowd in front of the palace today, to cheer the Prince in his denunciations of Funcinpec.

The Government added to the pressure on Prince Ranariddh by suggesting today that it might never accept the results of the United Nations-supervised elections. In a letter to the United Nations dated Friday but made public today, the People's Party said that it had detected "a great variety of irregularities" during the voting and asked the United Nations to investigate. The United Nations is almost certain to reject the request, since international monitors have certified the elections as free and fair.

Although hundreds of the people gathered outside the Royal Palace today had been trucked here on Government orders, many seemed sincere in their support for Prince Sihanouk.

"Funcinpec had success in the election," said Naim Som Mern, a 38-year-old rice farmer. "Now they want all the power. They don't want national reconciliation." He stood near a banner that read, "Only Prince Norodom Sihanouk Can Lead Cambodia To Peace."

A version of this article appeared in print on June 7, 1993, on page A3 of the New York edition.

 

________________________________________________________

 

Cambodian Prince Tells Troops to Prepare to Fight Over Secession

By PHILIP SHENON,

The New York Times; Published: June 14, 1993

http://www.nytimes.com/1993/06/14/world/cambodian-prince-tells-troops-to-prepare-to-fight-over-secession.html?pagewanted=1

 

 

PHNOM PENH, Cambodia, June 13— Cambodia's royal family feud threatened to dissolve into civil war today as Prince Norodom Ranariddh ordered his troops to prepare for battle against secessionist forces led by his estranged half-brother, Prince Norodom Chakrapong.

Both princes are sons of Prince Norodom Sihanouk, the 70-year-old former monarch who is now considered by many people to be the country's best hope for national reconciliation. While there was no sign today that Prince Sihanouk had moved to mediate the dispute, many diplomats say they believe that he will eventually forge a coalition government that may include both princes.

Prince Chakrapong, who is believed to be in his early 50's, is a Deputy Prime Minister in the incumbent, Vietnamese-installed Government, which lost last month's internationally supervised elections. He announced on Saturday that he and other so-called renegade elements of the Government had refused to accept the election results and would lead an "autonomous zone" of seven eastern provinces that he said had seceded from Cambodia.

Meeting with reporters in Phnom Penh today on the eve of the first meeting of the newly elected national assembly, Prince Ranariddh, 49, said he had ordered his troops to prepare for war with the secessionist forces that are apparently led by his half-brother. 'Cambodia Is Small Enough'

"We are ready to send our forces to fight and to liberate that part of Cambodia, and I hope we will be supported by the world community," said Prince Ranariddh, whose political party supports its own army of about 5,000 troops. "We are not going to accept any partition of Cambodia. Cambodia is small enough."

It is not clear how many soldiers are under the control of Prince Chakrapong, although at a rally Saturday he was flanked by a senior Cambodian Army general.

The royalist opposition party won 58 of the 120 seats in the national assembly, which will be responsible for writing a new constitution, while the Government's political party won 51 seats.

During the election campaign, Prince Ranariddh told voters repeatedly that a vote for the royalist party was a vote for his father, a view that was shared by many voters in their hopes for peace and an end to the country's 14-year civil war.

United Nations officials say the threat of secession appears to be a negotiating tactic by leaders of the incumbent Government who hope to preserve some power in a coalition with the royalist party.

United Nations peacekeepers and diplomats in Phnom Penh, the capital, say that while they are optimistic that the secessionist threat will prove to be a bluff, they are always concerned about threats from Prince Chakrapong, who is widely feared among Cambodians because of his association with some of the brutal elements of the authoritarian Government. The Government was installed by Vietnam after the Vietnamese Army invaded Cambodia in 1978 and ousted the Khmer Rouge leadership.

On Saturday, Prince Chakrapong issued a thinly veiled threat of violence against United Nations peacekeepers who remained in the provinces that make up the so-called autonomous zone: Svay Rieng, Kampong Cham, Prey Veng, Kracheh, Stoeng Treng, Ratanokiri and Mondol Kiri.

On Saturday, the United Nations ordered virtually all of its civilian peacekeepers to leave three eastern provinces where United Nations workers had been threatened at gunpoint in recent days.

The Government of Prime Minister Hun Sen has insisted that Prince Chakrapong is acting on his own, without authority from senior Government officials in Phnom Penh. Many diplomats say they find that assertion hard to believe given the close ties between Prince Chakrapong and senior officials like Mr. Hun Sen himself, who had been a leader of the Khmer Rouge.

The differences between Prince Ranariddh and Prince Chakrapong date back many years, certainly to the 1980's, when the royalist party was principally a rebel army seeking to overthrow the Government, and possibly to their childhoods, when they were seen a potential rivals to replace their father as Cambodia's national leader.

A version of this article appeared in print on June 14, 1993, on page A3 of the New York edition.

 

________________________________________________________________

Bloodied foreigners

http://www.faqs.org/abstracts/Business-international/Bloodied-foreigners-End-of-the-line-can-the-monarchy-survive-beyond-Sihanouk.html

Article Abstract:

The aftermath of Cambodia's election, held under UN auspices in late May 1993, is uncertain due to various factors. These factors include the unwillingness of the Phnom Penh government to abide by the result, Prince Norodom Sihanouk's unsuccessful effort at setting up a new government on Jun 3 and the interference of several foreign nations. Japan, France and Russia endorse Sihanouk's aspirations while the US, the UK, China and Australia oppose him. The royalist Funcinpec party, which won the election with 45% of the vote, will probably have to form a coalition government.

author: Thayer, Nate

Publisher: Review Publishing Company Ltd. (Hong Kong)
Publication Name:
Far Eastern Economic Review

Subject:
Business, international
ISSN:
0014-7591
Year: 1993

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Blood and irony: royal feud further complicates peace process

Article Abstract:

A rift between three members of Cambodia's royal family is exacerbating efforts to bring peace and orderly government to that country following UN-sponsored elections in May 1993. The dispute concerns Prince Norodom Sihanouk and two of his sons, Prince Norodom Ranariddh and Prince Norodom Chakrapong. Ranariddh's pro-royalist Funcinpec party won the elections while the Cambodian People's Party, backed by Chakrapong, lost. This defeat prompted Chakrapong to lead a short-lived attempt by seven provinces to secede. Sihanouk at times has supported and attacked both sons.

author: Thayer, Nate

Publisher: Review Publishing Company Ltd. (Hong Kong)
Publication Name:
Far Eastern Economic Review

Subject:
Business, international
ISSN:
0014-7591
Year: 1993

Ranariddh, Norodom, Chakrapong, Norodom

Read more: http://www.faqs.org/abstracts/Business-international/Bloodied-foreigners-End-of-the-line-can-the-monarchy-survive-beyond-Sihanouk.html#ixzz0gt95miFV

 

 

History of Cambodia

This is the History of Cambodia series.

http://www.economicexpert.com/a/History:of:Cambodia.html

History of Cambodia series.

Please, click on any title in this box to read the details of its content

Early history of Cambodia

Dark ages of Cambodia

Colonial Cambodia

Cambodia under Sihanouk (1954-1970)

Cambodian Civil War

Democratic Kampuchea

History of Cambodia (1979-present)

1 Early Kingdoms

Main article: Early history of Cambodia

The Khmer people were among the first in Southeast Asia to adopt religious ideas and political institutions from India and to establish centralized kingdoms encompassing large territories. The earliest known kingdom in the area, Funan, flourished from around the first to the sixth century A.D. It was succeeded by Chenla, which controlled large areas of modern Cambodia, Vietnam, Laos, and Thailand. The golden age of Khmer civilization, however, was the period from the ninth to the thirteenth centuries, when the kingdom of Kambuja, which gave Kampuchea, or Cambodia, its name, ruled large territories from its capital in the region of Angkor in western Cambodia.

Under Jayavarman VII (1181-ca. 1218), Kambuja reached its zenith of political power and cultural creativity. Following Jayavarman VII's death, Kambuja experienced gradual decline. Important factors were the aggressiveness of neighboring peoples (especially the Thai, or Siamese), chronic inter-dynastic strife, and the gradual deterioration of the complex irrigation system that had ensured rice surpluses. The Angkorian monarchy survived until 1431, when the Thai captured Angkor Thom and the Cambodian king fled to the southern part of his country.

2 The Dark Ages

Main article: Dark ages of Cambodia

The fifteenth to the nineteenth century was a period of continued decline and territorial loss. Cambodia enjoyed a brief period of prosperity during the sixteenth century because its kings, who built their capitals in the region southeast of the Tonlé Sap along the Mekong River, promoted trade with other parts of Asia. This was the period when Spanish and adventurers and missionaries first visited the country. But the Thai conquest of the new capital at Lovek in 1594 marked a downturn in the country's fortunes and Cambodia became a pawn in power struggles between its two increasingly powerful neighbors, Siam and Vietnam. Vietnam's settlement of the Mekong Delta led to its annexation of that area at the end of the seventeenth century. Cambodia thereby lost some of its richest territory and was cut off from the sea. Such foreign encroachments continued through the first half of the nineteenth century because Vietnam was determined to absorb Khmer land and to force the inhabitants to accept Vietnamese culture.

3 The French Colonial Period

 

Main article: Colonial Cambodia

In 1863 King Norodom signed an agreement with the French to establish a protectorate over his kingdom. The country gradually came under French colonial domination. During, World War II, the Japanese allowed the French government (Based at Vichy) that collaborated with the Nazis to continue administering Cambodia and the other Indochinese territories, but they also fostered Khmer nationalism. Cambodia enjoyed a brief period of independence in 1945 before Allied troops restored French control. King Norodom Sihanouk, who had been chosen by France to succeed King Monivong in 1941, rapidly assumed a central political role as he sought to neutralize leftist and republican opponents and attempted to negotiate acceptable terms for independence from the French. Sihanouk's "royal crusade for independence" resulted in grudging French acquiescence to his demands for a transfer of sovereignty. A partial agreement was struck in October 1953. Sihanouk then declared that independence had been achieved and returned in triumph to Phnom Penh.

 

 


 

 

 

Vietnam and Cambodian Communism

FRIDAY, APRIL 20, 2007

Stephen J. MORRIS in Public Forum on Khmer Rouge History From
Stalin to Pol Pot-Towards a Description of
the Khmer Rouge Regime 25-26 January 2007 Sunway Hotel,
Phnom Penh (Picture by: Prim Pilot)


By Stephen J. Morris
Source: The Cambodian Human Rights and Development Association
Posted at Khmer Rouge Trial Web Portal

(Comment: The claim by Vietnam and Hun Sen, now by Sihanouk that Vietnam did not invade but liberate Cambodia, is nothing but a total fabrication of their story, as Stephen Morris (A colleague of mine at SAIS, the Johns Hopkins University), an Australian scholar on Cambodian affairs, has brilliantly demonstrated, in a presentation in Phnom Penh, in January 2007.  It is comprehensible that Hun Sen, a Vietnamese puppet, would have endorsed this view to favor the Vietnamese.

However, it is more difficult for this writer to comprehend how Sihanouk would have taken this Vietnamese/Hun Sen stand, when he had taken the opposite position in the 1980's when he was the leader of the resistance movement fighting against the Vietnamese invasion. (See the article entitled "Sihanouk: I Will Support Samdech Hun Sen for My Whole Life; Hun Sen: Samdech Euv Sings Beautifully," immediately following this article.

 

Knowing Sihanouk well as I do, this is a normal Sihanouk's behavior, which is to shift his view whenever, it gives him advantage at the moment without thinking of what would really have  happened to Cambodia in doing so. In other words, for Sihanouk, if the interests of Cambodia coincide with his, there is no problem for Cambodia. However, whenever, there is conflict between his and those of Cambodia, it his that will prevail, regardless of what would have happened to Cambodia. This is the case when he shifted his position from accusing the Vietnamese as invaders to thanking them as liberators

In this presentation, Steve Morris has done a credible job by exposing the real intention and design of the Vietnamese, which was an invasion and not a liberation of Cambodia, on December 25, 1978, when he noted that;

"Hanoi's motives were never humanitarian but only self-interested. On the one hand we must not forget that the Vietnamese had a legitimate right to self defense, and the 1978 invasion was consistent with that. But the ten year military occupation, and Hanoi's simultaneous refusal to recognize the noncommunist forces or the resolutions of the United Nations, showed that they were also motivated by an imperial ambition."

The same view was also reflected in the opinion of a great Australian Historian and a true friend of the Cambodian people, Milton Osborne, when he correctly wrote in a recent book entitled 'Phnom Penh, A Cultural and Literary History' that:

"I declare my own position in judging that the Vietnamese invasion should be regarded as having liberated the Cambodian population from Pol Pot's tyrany. But, I am unprepared to see it and the subsequent role Vietnam played throughout the 1980s as essentially an excercise in altruistism."

Thank you Steve Morris and Milton Osborne, for this courage to say the truth about one of the most tragic chapters of the long Cambodian history on the brink of disintegration. Naranhkiri Tith Ph.D. Washington DC. February 10, 2009)

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INTRODUCTION
In the official mythology of the Khmers Rouges, their military victory in 1975, and the maintenance of their rule over Cambodia from 1975 until 1978 (the rule of Angka Padevat in the state of Democratic Kampuchea), was portrayed as a result of the efforts of Cambodians alone. This is the most ridiculous fantasy. Without the support of the Vietnamese and Chinese communists the regime known as Democratic Kampuchea would never have existed. Moreover, the leading Cambodian communists were deeply enmeshed in the activities of the communist world for most of their lives.

I will show how Vietnam played a vital role in the rise of the Khmers Rouges to power, and how the Vietnamese communist leaders were happy to let the Khmers Rouges do as they wished in power, so long as the regime created - Democratic Kampuchea - did not threaten or embarrass Vietnam. However the irrational belligerence of Pol Pot and his entourage in foreign policy soon became a source of concern for Hanoi, and Democratic Kampuchea's violent behaviour towards its more powerful neighbour pushed Vietnam towards a policy of armed retaliation, invasion and occupation.

VIETNAM AND THE RISE OF CAMBODIAN COMMUNISM


The Vietnamese communists were deeply involved in the inception and formation of the Cambodian communist movement. In 1930 the agent of the Communist International (Comintem) known as Nguyen Ai Quoc -- who in 1943 changed his alias to Ho Chi Minh -- founded the Vietnamese Communist Party at a meeting held in the British colony of Hong Kong. But after filing the founding documents with his employers in Moscow, Quoc was instructed by the Comintem to change the name of the party to the Indochinese Communist Party (ICP). The Comintem argued that "Not only does Indochina have a geographic, economic and political unity, but above all we have a need for unity of struggle, for a unique direction of all of the Indochinese proletariat opposed to all the forces of reaction in Indochina, to the policy of division of French imperialism." The Comintern's intention was clear: Emancipation of the three different nations of French Indochina was to be carried out not by the independent efforts of each of the three peoples, but rather under Vietnamese Communist tutelage.

As it happened there were no revolutionary movements in Cambodia at this time. And of the 211 founding members of the Indochinese Communist Party, not a single one was from Cambodia or Laos. One finds in the Comintem archives in Moscow, Quoc's actual correspondence about this with his leaders. In September 1930 Nguyen Ai Quoc claimed to have an ICP party membership of 124, of which 120 were Chinese and 4 were Annamites [Vietnamese]. The Party controlled labor union consisted of 300 ethnic Chinese. The French suppressed the communist structures throughout Indochina in 1935, and by March 1935 there were only 9 communists in all of Cambodia. But the ethnic situation in Cambodia remained much the same throughout the 1930s. In 1938 the Cambodian branch of the ICP had a mere 16 members, all of them ethnic Chinese.

After World War II the Vietnamese communists, operating through their front organization popularly known as the Viet Minh, began their offensive against the French colonialists. However they sought to rely heavily upon ethnic Vietnamese for their efforts. Two of the most important Viet Minh leaders during the 1940s were Sieu Heng and Son Ngoc Minh, both of mixed Vietnamese and Khmer ancestry. Armed units of the Viet Minh were stationed in Battambang, where all the units were ethnic Vietnamese, and in southeast Cambodia, where again ethnic Vietnamese were predominant in the revolutionary committees.

In March 1950, at a meeting of Viet Minh and Khmer Issarak leaders held in Ha Tien, Vietnam, Nguyen Than Son, head of the Viet Minh's committee for foreign affairs in southern Vietnam, spoke of the Vietnamese emigre population in Cambodia as a "driving force destined to set off the Revolutionary Movement in Cambodia." Later he seemed to be complaining when he stated that the ICP, which controlled the Cambodian Movement, was composed of mostly Vietnamese and "did not have deep roots among the Khmer people."

In 1951 the underground ICP resurfaced as the Vietnam Workers Party, and simultaneously announced the emergence of two "fraternal" parties for Laos and Cambodia. The latter was called the Revolutionary Cambodian People's Party. According to Bernard Fall the statutes of the Cambodian party had to be translated from Vietnamese into Cambodian, and ethnic Vietnamese dominated the leadership of the party. Over the next three years the Vietnamese tried to recruit ethnic Cambodians into the political and military structures of the party, but with limited success. For example, according to a French intelligence document of 1952, the Phnom Penh cell secretariat had a membership of 34, of whom 27 were Vietnamese, 3 were Chinese, and only four were Cambodians.

In November 1953 Cambodia under the royal government of Sihanouk was given complete independence by the French. After the signing of the Geneva Agreements in 1954, the Viet Minh Sees retreated from Cambodia, taking with them half of the cadres of the Revolutionary Cambodian Party. These cadres were to be given further training in Hanoi, and kept in reserve until history provided an opportune moment for their return.

During this period of the mid 1950s there was influx of younger communists back to Cambodia from a period of study France. Most notable of this group was Pol Pot (then known as Saloth Sar, Jeng Sary, Khieu Samphan, Hou Youn and Hu Nim. Some of these communists had come into contact with the ideas of Marx and Lenin before, they went to France. But they had all developed their communist ideology in France under the influence of the Stalinist French communist party. Some of them, like Pol Pot had fought in the last stages of the Viet Minh war against the French. But we should not make too much of the French experience of Pol Pot and long Sary. because other important members of the future Khmer Rouge inner circle -- notably Nuon Chea and Ta Mok -- never went to France. More important to note is that none of the younger communists exhibited any anti-Vietnamese sentiment at this time.

The returnees from France were able to seize control of the Cambodian communist movement by the ena of the 1950s Yet in 1960 the party's name was changed to Kampuchean Workers Party, to conform with the Vietnamese name, and in 1966 it was changed again to Kampuchean Communist Party In 1963 Pol Pot became secretary general of the party. Throughout the 1960s the Kampuchean communists remained friendly and deferential towards the Vietnamese. In July 1965 Pol Pot traveled to Hanoi and discussed with the Vietnamese politburo the appropriate policy for Cambodia.

It is not exactly clear when the Cambodian communists developed their attachment to Maoism. The imbibing of Maoist ideology by the Khmer Rouge seems to have been quite gradual. And the Vietnamese communists themselves must have played some direct role in assisting that process since they themselves had been under Chinese communist influence during the years 1950-56 and 1963-64, years when Vietnamese communist influence over Cambodian communists was still significant. Pol Pot made his first trip to China in late 1965 and stayed into 1966. This was the beginning o the Maoist terror and ideological campaign known as the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution. Pol Pot visited China again in 1970. Pol Pot's visits to China probably did not initiate, but most likely intensified, Maoist ideological influence upon the Khmer Rouge.

In January 1968 the Kampuchean Communist Party initiated an armed uprising against the royal government of Prince Sihanouk. This would seem to have been in contradiction with the Vietnamese communist policy of recognizing the royal Cambodian government, a government which had allowed the North Vietnamese and Viet Cong to use eastern Cambodia as a sanctuary and supply line in their war against the American-backed anticommunist government of South Vietnam. However this Khmers Rouges uprising was mostly confined to the hill dwellers (Khmer Loeu) of the mountainous of northeast Cambodia - Ratanakiri and Mondolkiri - and it did not pose any real threat to he survival of the government of Prince Sihanouk. Hence it did not really threaten the strategy of the North Vietnamese.

During the late 1960s many Cambodians, especially among the Cambodian political and military elites became unhappy with the Vietnamese communist occupation of Cambodian soil. They preferred Cambodia to have a closer relationship with the United States. Sihaniouk slowly and reluctantly changed his policy in this regard, and in 1970 he traveled to China and the Soviet Union to try and persuade the big communist powers to pressure Hanoi to remove its forces from Cambodia, Sihanouk was not successful, and on March 18, 1970, while Sihanouk was still in Moscow, Lon Nol led a bloodless palace coup d'etat. This totally changed Cambodia's situation.

Manv people think that the coup d'etat led by Lon Nol, was the work of the United States and its Central Intelligence Agency (ClA). At the time Hanoi, Beijing and Moscow, and their western friends with the help of Sihanouk, did everything to try to spread that myth. There is absolutely no evidence of that. No evidence has been found even by the most critical western writer, William Shawcross. Of course the Americans welcomed the coup.

Many people also think that it was the US and South Vietnamese invasion of eastern Cambodia on April 30, 1970, that brought Cambodia into the Vietnam war. That is also plainly false. It was me Vietnamese communists who spread the Vietnam war inside Cambodia. One of Lon Nol's first public proclamations was to demand that the Vietnamese communist forces leave Cambodia within 48 hours. They ignored his demand, and at the end of March 1970 North Vietnamese and Viet Cong forces moved out of their border sanctuaries and began to attack the armed forces and towns of the newly proclaimed Khmer Republic. At the same time approximately one thousand of the Khmer Viet Minh, who had been trained in Hanoi, were reinfiltrated back into Cambodia. Their task was to help supervise the areas that would be captured by the Vietnamese communist armies.

On April 30, 1970, exactly six weeks after the Lon Nol coup, and four weeks after the North Vietnamese began their attacks on the Khmer Republic, troops of the United States and South Vietnam began a major attack on the communist sanctuaries inside Cambodia. The Vietnamese communists, anticipating the attack, fled in advance of the allied sweep. However public protests and congressional opposition within the United States precluded the extended American military operations inside Cambodia that any successful pursuit of the communist armies would have required.

When American forces withdrew from the border areas after only two months inside Cambodia, they had successfully cleared most of the base areas that threatened the Mekong Delta region of South Vietnam. But they had hardly diminished the communist manpower available inside Cambodia as a whole. In the first four months of fighting the Vietnamese communists had seized control of half the territory of Cambodia, In spite of continued American bombing attacks upon them, North Vietnam's battle hardened veterans remained in a good position to deal with the highly motivated but poorly trained and equipped army of the Khmer Republic.

For the next two years of the struggle for Cambodia, it would be Hanoi that would determine the outcome of military events. By the end of 1970 there were four North Vietnamese combat divisions in Cambodia, with some ten thousand of these troops targeting the republican army, and others protecting the Ho Chi Minh Trail supply line to the South Vietnam battlefield.

At the beginning of the war it was obvious to both the Vietnamese communist leaders and Pol Pot's Khmer Rouge that the latter were not yet strong enough to seize Phnom Penh on their own. If Cambodia was to have a communist government, then the North Vietnamese and Viet Cong armies would have to play a role. The Hanoi leaders made explicit in their secret meetings that their party's policy was to "strengthen the revolutionary base in Cambodia and lead the country along the path to socialism." And despite their dismay with the general capabilities of the Cambodian insurgency the Vietnamese were optimistic about the prospects of a communist victory in Cambodia. As one captured communist document summarized the Hanoi view: "The Cambodian revolution is entering a new phase ... From a vacillating neutralist regime, Cambodia can now follow a steady policy. When the enemy is defeated, she will become a democratic and independent country and proceed toward socialism."

Between April 1970 and March 1972 it was the battle hardened Vietnamese army which crushed most of the best units of the army of the Khmer Republic. During this period Vietnamese and Cambodian communist forces, after seizing control of an area, set up a political administration controlled by the National United Front (FUNK) and nominally under the authority of Prince Sihanouk's Royal Government (GRUNK) which was based in exile in Beijing. There were three elements in the political coalition opposed to the Khmer Republic. First, the Khmer Viet Minh communists, trained in Hanoi since 1954, and backed by Vietnamese communist army units. Second, the Pol Pot led Khmers Rouges guerrillas. Third, the followers of Prince Sihanouk, who were militarily weak.

FUNK propaganda appeals emphasizing Sihanouk's leadership role in the insurgency were important in the first year of the war, and reflected the influence of the North Vietnamese upon Cambodian insurgent propaganda. It undoubtedly helped the communists to recruit Cambodian peasant support. However sometime in the middle of 1971, as Pol Pot's Khmers Rouges leaders began to consolidate their control within FUNK, they began the process of removing the pro-Sihanouk elements from positions of power in insurgent-controlled areas. Two years later the Khmers Rouges began an intensive propaganda campaign to discredit the Prince in the eyes of the Cambodian peasants.

The Hanoi-trained communists never attained leadership positions within the Cambodian Revolutionary Organization itself. All the top military and political position within FUNK were held by the Pol Pot forces, who identified themselves as members of Angka Padevat (Revolutionary Organization). During 1970 and 1971, in some areas under Vietnamese military control Khmer Viet Minh political cadres held positions of local state power from the village to the tambon (sector) level. As for the Khmer Viet Minh military cadres, upon their return to Cambodia they were given low ranking positions within the insurgency. Eventually they, together with the political cadres, would be liquidated by Pol Pot's security forces.

By late 1971 the Pol Pot leadership of the KCP had become frustrated with Vietnamese attempts to control the insurgency. They decided to try to expel the Vietnamese communists from Cambodia, even though the Khmer Republic was at that time not yet defeated. Fighting broke out between the Pol Pot led guerillas and some Vietnamese units in late 1971 and especially in 1972.

However it was not the actions of Pol Pot's forces, but rather events pertaining to the struggle for South Vietnam, especially the launching of the Easter Offensive in March 1972, that led Hanoi to remove the bulk of its combat forces from Cambodia. The terrible losses suffered by Hanoi in that offensive, and the signing of the Paris Peace Agreements in January 1973, meant that Hanoi could no longer afford to be deeply involved in the struggle for control of Cambodia thereafter. Yet they did allow Chinese military supplies through to the Khmers Rouges until the war ended.

The Hanoi leaders had already laid the foundation for a Khmers Rouges victory. During the two years from March 1970 the North Vietnamese army had severely mauled the army of the Khmer Republic, and Hanoi sponsored cadres had recruited thousands of peasants under the deceptive banner of the politically impotent Sihanouk. Hanoi's actions by themselves did not determine the outcome of the war. But they greatly helped place Pol Pot's forces in a position to seize power in April 1975.

VIETNAM AND DEMOCRATIC KAMPUCHEA


When Phnom Penh surrendered to insurgent forces on April 30, 1975, the Khmers Rouges victors were enthusiastically congratulated by the Vietnamese communists. By the time the North Vietnamese army had marched into Saigon some two weeks later, Phnom Penh and most of the major towns of Cambodia had been emptied of their former inhabitants. Cambodia, now renamed Democratic Kampuchea, had begun its long march towards the hyper Maoist Utopia. But in spite of real differences between the Vietnamese and Cambodian approaches to revolution, there were few public signs of Vietnamese communist dissatisfaction with their neighbour's social experiment.. However, concealed from international view, the tensions that had surfaced during the war years had been exacerbated. The ostensible issue of the dispute was the border between Vietnam and Cambodia.

Between 1870 and 1914 the French had redrawn the borders between Cambodia and Vietnam, by amputating large chunks of Cambodian territory and making them administratively part of their Vietnamese colonial entities. In June 1948, in the Along Bay Agreement, the French recognised their colony of Cochinchina -what had formerly been southern Cambodia (Kampuchea Krom to the Khmers Rouges) - as part of Vietnam. The resentment felt by most Cambodians at this humiliation, combined with the spirit of triumphalism that permeated the Khmers Rouges, fed into an ambition for forceful recovery of lost territories. Sihanouk reports that in 1975 the Khmers Rouge had told him "we are going to recover Kampuchea Krom." Yet such ambition of the Khmers Rouges should have been restrained by military realities. The Vietnamese army was ten times the size of the Khmers Rouges army. Vietnam also had a significant air force and navy, which the DK did not.

Nevertheless in early May 1975 the Khmers Rouges attacked Vietnamese islands in the Gulf of Thailand, claiming the islands that the French had assigned to their Vietnamese colony, and which had been inherited by South Vietnam. The Vietnamese, though surprised, responded decisively. By the end of May the Vietnamese had recaptured the islands by force, taking 300 prisoners. In early In early June the Vietnamese retaliated further by attacking and occupying the Cambodian island of Puolo Wai. These actions seemed to restrain for a time the Khmers Rouges enthusiasm for military challenges to Vietnam.

On June 2 Pol Pot received Nguyen Van Linh, who was representing the Vietnamese Workers Party (as the Vietnamese communist party was still called). Pol Pot told Linh that the fighting had been due to "ignorance of the local geography by Kampuchean troops." In June 1975 Pol Pot, leng Sary and Nuon Chea led a KCP delegation that secretly travelled to Hanoi for negotiations. In July 1975 a high powered delegation from Vietnam, headed by Communist Party first secretary Le Duan, undertook what was described as a "friendly visit" to Cambodia. In August the Cambodian island that Vietnam had occupied was returned.

Publicly the Vietnamese gave no hint of any problems. The September issue of the official Vietnamese monthly Vietnamese Courier spoke of the talks being held in a "cordial atmosphere full of brotherly spirit." The article went further when it praised Cambodia's new social order without qualification. "Liberated Cambodia is living in a new and healthy atmosphere."

The Vietnamese had retained some of their military forces on Cambodian soil after the joint communist victories of 1975. It took some political effort by the Chinese to convince the Hanoi leaders that the troops should be returned to Vietnam.

Throughout 1976 there were public greetings exchanged on special occasions. For example in April 1976 the first anniversary of the Khmers Rouges victory was hailed by Vietnamese party and government leaders. The Vietnamese media spoke glowingly of the "achievements" of the "Cambodian workers, peasants, and revolutionary army." Various official delegations from Vietnam visited Cambodia in 1976. In July an agreement was signed to open an air link between Hanoi and Phnom Penh. In September 1976 that air service was begun.

Thus, by the end of 1976 the outward signs suggested close relations between the communist parties and governments of Vietnam and Cambodia. Yet these outward signs concealed the real feelings of both parties. The Vietnamese leaders hoped that some pro-Vietnamese elements would appear within the leadership of the Kampuchean Communist Party. At the same time the leaders of Democratic Kampuchea were possessed by a seething hatred and fear of the rulers of Vietnam - a hatred and fear that threatened to boil over into armed confrontation.

The Vietnamese leaders had a poor grasp of the real political situation within the leadership of Democratic Kampuchea. They felt that Pol Pot and leng Sary were pro-Chinese and therefore bad people but that Nuon Chea was different. On November 6 1976, Pham Van Dong told the Soviet ambassador to Vietnam that "with Nuon Chea we are able to work better. We know him better than the other leaders of Kampuchea." At a meeting with the Soviet Ambassador on November 16, 1976. The Vietnamese Communist Party first secretary Le Duan stated that he was glad that Pol Pot and leng Sary had (apparently) been removed from the leadership, because they constituted "a pro-Chinese sect conducting a crude and severe policy." Le Duan also asserted that Nuon Chea, a member of the Standing Committee and Secretariat of the Kampuchean Communist Party, who had replaced Pol Pot as Prime Minister of Democratic Kampuchea in September, was a person of pro-Vietnamese orientation. Le Duan added that "he is our man and my personal friend." Le Duan was to repeat this opinion in private conversations with Soviet diplomats over the next two years. .

The Cambodian communists had good reason to fear the ambitions of the Vietnamese communists in the long term. But the question arises as to how imminent a threat to the power of the Khmers Rouges the Vietnamese posed. The Vietnamese had devised a strategy for controlling the communist movements of Laos and Cambodia. A key element had been inflitrating the communist parties of these countries with people that Hanoi had trained and indoctrinated. In the case of Cambodia Hanoi had trained and supported the so-called Khmer Viet Minh, whom it assumed would act as its agents. So the Khmers Rouges leaders did have real enemies in Hanoi. But Pol Pot and his supporters had anticipated the Vietnamese strategy, and had preempted it by arresting all the Khmer Viet Minh soon after they returned from Hanoi with the Vietnamese army in the early 1970s, and again after the victory of 1975. Nevertheless Pol Pot and his inner circle still feared that Soviet or Vietnamese agents might still be hidden within the party. Thus Pol Pot conducted a series of bloody purges of the party, guided in his choice of victims by paranoid fears rather than real evidence of disloyalty or conspiracy. Not only did Pol Pot carry out bloody internal purges to crush what he thought were enemies within. He also directed the regime's violence against its neighbours.

In April 1977, on the second anniversary of the "liberation" of Phnom Penh, the government and government controlled media in Hanoi offered their congratulations and praise for the Democratic Kampuchea regime. But this goodwill gesture reaped no beneficial consequences for Vietnam. The Khmers Rouges chose the second anniversary of the communist conquest of South Vietnam to leave a bloody message to their former "elder brothers." On April 30, 1977 DK units attacked several villages and towns in An Giang and Chau Doc provinces of South Vietnam, burning houses and killing hundreds of civilians. The Vietnamese leaders were shocked by this unprovoked attack and could not understand any strategic rationale. Nevertheless they decided upon military retaliation. Throughout 1977 armed clashes occurred between Vietnam and Democratic Kampuchea in the border area. Yet when in September 1977 Pol Pot publicly announced that what had previously been known as the Revolutionary Organisation (Angkar Padevat) was in fact the Kampuchean Communist Party, the Vietnamese Communist Party Central Committee sent a message of congratulations, publicly expressing its joy. Interestingly, this message was sent after hundreds of Vietnamese civilians had been killed in Khmers Rouges raids on September 24.

In a conversation with the Soviet ambassador in Hanoi in November 1977 Le Duan indicated that he thought that the anti-Vietnamese behaviour of the DK leaders was because of the outlooks of the “Troskyist” Pol Pot and the “fierce nationalist and pro-Chinese” Ieng Sary. But Le Duan thought that Nuon Chea and Son Sen “have a positive attitude towards Vietnam.” Apparently Le Duan and the other Vietnamese leaders were hoping that the foreign policies of Democratic Kampuchea could be changed by a coup within the Khmers Rouges leadership circles.

In December 1977 the fighting between Vietnam and Democratic Kampuchea escalated. Hanoi used warplanes, artillery and about 20,000 men in an attack inside the Parrot's Beak region of Svay Rieng. After inflicting a serious defeat on the army of Democratic Kampuchea, the Vietnamese withdrew, taking with them thousands of prisoners as well as civilian refugees. They might have been in a position to seize Phnom Penh at that point. But they were concerned about what China’s reaction might be, and hoped that their strong but limited military blows would force the leaders of Democratic Kampuchea to negotiate a settlement. Instead the leaders of DK hardened their attitudes. The DK broke diplomatic regions on December 31, 1977. And they declared the Vietnamese withdrawal a major victory for “the Kampuchean revolution.” Despite their losses, and despite the massive disparity between the Vietnamese and Cambodian armies, with the Vietnamese superiority in both numbers (more than eight one) and quality of military equipment, the army of Democratic Kampuchea persisted in launching attacks inside Vietnamese territory.
Phnom Penh radio broadcasts exhorted Cambodians to fight and win total victory over Vietnam, with the deranged assertion that one Kampuchean soldier was equal to thirty Vietnamese. The DK leadership was living in a fantasy world.

Upon realising that the leadership of Democratic Kampuchea was utterly implacable, Hanoi decided upon a new strategy for changing the DK regime. After two and a half years of pretending that Democratic Kampuchea was a nice regime for Cambodians to live under, they began for the first time to denounce the domestic terror of the DK. Between January and June they slowly changed their description of the DK leadership from :the Kampuchean authorities” to the “Pol Pot-Ieng Sary clique.” Hanoi radio called for the need to save the Cambodian people from genocide at the hands of the “Pol Pot-leng Sary clique.”

Vietnam began building a “liberation army" from among the refugees and other civilians that they had brought back from Cambodia. Pol Pot also inadvertently helped the Vietnamese to build their army by conducting his internal terror and purges of the party and army. The brutal terror resulted in many cadres and even units of the DK army fleeing for their lives to Vietnam. These defectors, mostly from the Eastern Zone of Democratic Kampuchea, joined the forces being assembled by Vietnam. But The Vietnamese leaders realised that an insurgency based upon the "liberation army" of Cambodians would not be strong enough to prevail. Sometime in the middle of 1978 the Vietnamese leaders decided that they had to launch a full scale invasion of Cambodia, and install a new regime that would not only not be hostile, but also one that would be friendly to Vietnam.

The Soviets were encouraged to increase their military aid to Vietnam, with the pretense that China was threatening Vietnam’s independence. Throughout the latter half of 1978 the Vietnamese prepared their military forces, and the psychological climate of revulsion for the DK regime. They hoped to achieve an easy victory over their former comrades and face few negative consequences.

On December 25 1978 Vietnam launched an all out invasion of Cambodia, As anticipated, resistance to the invasion collapsed quickly. But that invasion, and especially the Vietnamese refusal to withdraw, turned international public opinion and international political leaders strongly against Vietnam. China countered the Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia by launching its own invasion of north Vietnam in February 1979. That attack was not in itself a military success for China. But it forced Vietnam to concentrate troops on its northern border and gave ASEAN confidence to be able to provide support for a coalition of Cambodian forces, including the Khmers Rouges, who were resisting Vietnam's occupation.

After more than a decade of Vietnamese military occupation of Cambodia, the pressures from United Nations Chinese American and Southeast Asian nations, and the cut off of Soviet and Eastern European aid, meant that by 1989 the Vietnamese occupation of Cambodia had become untenable. The United Nations Secure Council Permanent Five agreed on a plan whereby the UN would undertake a temporary administration of Cambodia, with the purpose of bringing freedom and a just peace to the Cambodian people.

CONCLUSIONS


For approximately sixty years since the formation of the Indochinese Communist Party in 1930, the Vietnamese communists had always considered Cambodia part of an Indochinese Federation of socialist states, under the domination of the more numerous and powerful Vietnamese "elder brothers." The Vietnamese communist strategy was initially to infiltrate the communist movements of the neighbouring countries with ethnic Vietnamese. By the 1950s, the Vietnamese strategy was to infiltrate the Cambodian movement with ethnic Khmer whom Vietnam had trained and indoctrinated. It was certain that those Khmer whom Vietnam had trained would be loyal to Vietnam. This was the first of many misjudgments by the Vietnamese communist leaders. Many of those whom the Vietnamese communists had trained and indoctrinated turned into their enemies.

Nevertheless, based on their misperceptions of the situation, the Vietnamese communists supported the Khmers Rouges revolution. The reasons for the Khmers Rouges coming to power in 1975 were numerous and complex. However we can see from the history of Vietnamese and Cambodian communism that Vietnam played a vital role in laying the foundations for the establishment of Democratic Kampuchea.

After the establishment of Democratic Kampuchea by the Pol Pot led Khmers Rouges, the Vietnamese communists attempted to establish friendly relations with their weaker neighbour. They celebrated what they described as the "liberation" of Cambodia by the Khmers Rouges. However Pol Pot was driven by a self-destructive combination of paranoia and delusions of grandeur. He provoked the Vietnamese into an unfriendly stance by his attacks upon Vietnamese territory and civilians. And Pol Pot also provided the Vietnamese with recruits for their imperial ambition by terrorising and massacring many of his own political and military cadres. Many Khmers Rouges fled for their lives to Vietnam in 1977 and 1978, and provided the personnel for the governments that Hanoi established in Cambodia from 1979 onwards.

Hanoi's motives were never humanitarian but only self-interested. On the one hand we must not forget that the Vietnamese had a legitimate right to self defence, and the 1978 invasion was consistent with that. But the ten year military occupation, and Hanoi's simultaneous refusal to recognise the noncommunist forces or the resolutions of the United Nations, showed that they were also motivated by an imperial ambition.

Forces beyond the control of Vietnam, especially the collapse of the Soviet Union and its communist bloc, as well as the pressures of China and ASEAN, eventually caused the Vietnamese to withdraw their forces from Cambodia. But some of Vietnam's political influence upon Cambodia still remains.

Extracted from:


- Stephen J. MORRIS : Speech On the Occasion of Public Forum on Khmer Rouge History at Sunway Hotel, Phnom Penh, 25-26 January 2007

Naranhkiri TITH; All Rights Reserved

 

Sihanouk: I Will Support Samdech Hun Sen for My Whole Life; Hun Sen: Samdech Euv Sings Beautifully

Comments: Now, it is official and in the Open that Sihanouk is Hun Sen's Man!

 

There was a joyful party last Saturday night [3 June 2006] at the Royal Palace, hosted by the Great Heroic King, the former King of the Kingdom of Cambodia. Mr. Hun Sen and Madame Bun Rany and hundreds of officials from the Council of Ministers attended the party. The leader of the government praised Samdech Preah Norodom Sihanouk for singing beautifully and the Great Heroic King said that he will support Samdech Hun Sen for as long as the premier lives.

 

During the joyful party, Samdech Preah Norodom Sihanouk sung 21 songs, which added to the joy. The former King sang 21 songs, but this did not seem to satisfy his foster son [Hun Sen], so he requested a song entitled ‘Monika,’ which is Samdech Mae’s souvenir. Samdech Euv [the Father King] sang this as his present. Khmer people who were unable to listen to the songs should wait for CDs and VCDs that will be available soon. 4 Jun e 2006 - 10 June 2006, THE MIRROR 3.

 

During the joyful party, Samdech Preah Norodom Sihanouk said that Samdech Hun Sen is the only person developing Cambodia and helping Khmer people. The former King said that he will back Samdech Hun Sen for his whole life.

 

Mr. Hun Sen and Samdech Norodom Sihanouk mentioned their good memories of when they first met each other, and decided to be foster father and foster son. Mr. Hun Sen considers King Samdech Preah Baromneath Norodom Sihamoni as his foster brother, part of his family, though he is the King.

 

During the party, Mr. Hun Sen and Samdech Euv showed their close friendship for the first time since the two had severely criticized each other over the 1985 supplemental [border] treaties last year. Their differences forced Samdech Euv to live abroad for nearly one year while he underwent treatment. Samdech Euv had frequently issued messages in Khmer saying that he would not return to Cambodia, and if he did return to Cambodia, that would mean that he recognized the illegal 1985 supplemental [border] treaties. Samdech Euv also confirmed that he would have to stay abroad until he died as Prince Norodom Yukanthor did.

 

A few days before returning to Cambodia, Samdech Preah Norodom Sihanouk said that it was just an informal return, so there was no need to have any welcoming ceremony. The retired King also stated that he would not grant an audience to anyone. He needed peace and quietness in the royal family.

 

Khmer people also appealed to Mr. Hun Sen not to play tricks with Samdech Euv, because it is noted that the Strongman [Hun Sen] always does this with his partner [Prince Norodom Ranariddh]. Obviously, the former King’s great son, Prince Norodom Ranariddh, once hugged Mr. Hun Sen many times, but now he does not dare to return to the country because the Strongman’s tricks.”

 

Sralanh Khmer, Vol.2, #129, 5.5.2006, The Mirror, June 13, 2006

________________________________________________________________

 

(Comments: As predicted, Sihanouk is again publicly opposing the trial of the Khmer Rouge on the ground that the money could be used for better purposes such as to feed the Cambodian poor.  This Sihanouk 's decision, very clearly, shows that the former king does not understand the need for, nor does he believe in giving the long awaited justice and the return to the rule of law to the Cambodian people.

 

However, if history is any guide to the understanding of the tragic problem of Cambodia; here are some observations to keep in mind when analyzing this Khmer Rouge trial issue;

 

First, most Cambodians are fully aware that any financial assistance given to Cambodia by the international community would go to fill the Hun Sen and Funcinpec supporters' pockets, and not to feed the poor, as suggested by Sihanouk.

 

Second, Sihanouk, Hun Sen, and the Vietnamese have no reason to let the Khmer Rouge trial be taken place, as the trial may reveal the implicating details on the collusion between the former king, Hun Sen, and the Vietnamese, on the one hand, and between Sihanouk, the Chinese, and the Khmer Rouge on the other hand. 

 

Dear visitors, please, use the related documents posted below to form your own judgment on this vital and deadly issue for the Cambodian people.

 

Washington DC. July 10, 2006, Naranhkiri Tith, Ph.D.)

______________________________________________________________

 

To the editor, The New York Times

(Submitted for publication)

July 6, 2006

 

RE: “The Killing Fields,” Editorial, July 6, 2006.

 

The editor is perfectly correct in pointing out that the (Cambodian) tribunal has a responsibility not only to those survivors but to a world that has yet to learn how to deal with crimes against humanity.”

 

I am not very optimistic about the realization of this trial without strong US backing. If the recent past is any guide to the future, the international community knows that Hun Sen has been stalling for the last six years by invoking national sovereignty in order to gain full control of any Khmer Rouge trial.

 

In this context, I do not see how the Hun Sen regime and his supporters will allow this trial to go ahead as long as the current remaining Khmer Rouge leaders are still alive. Hun Sen - now with the full support of Sihanouk - stands to lose more than to gain from this trial. After all, Hun Sen was a former Khmer Rouge commander.

 

Only by defecting to the Vietnamese was Hun Sen able to become the dictator and ruler of Cambodia.  In this context, the Khmer Rouge trial may surface some undesired and implicating revelations regarding the Vietnamese and Hun Sen relations with the Khmer Rouge. Only by comparing his regime to that of the Khmer Rouge can Hun Sen claim any credit for being the leader of Cambodia.

 

Claiming that the trial cannot meet the international standard of justice, the Bush Administration has chosen not to play a prominent role. As the most powerful democratic country in the world, and as a former active participant in the Indochina war when it carried out secret carpet bombings of the Viet Cong sanctuary in Eastern Cambodia during the late 1960’s, the United States should be more deliberately committed to this trial. It is its duty if not its moral obligation.

 

If the Khmer Rouge trial is to have any chance of succeeding, the United States, as the main promoter of democracy and human rights in the world, must put all its political weight behind this crucial trial and not allow Hun Sen to manipulate the situation to perpetuate his corrupt regime. The positive impact of doing so would far outweigh the negative one. Only then will long awaited justice be given to not only the Cambodian people but also to victims in other parts of the world.

 

Naranhkiri Tith, Ph.D.

Former Adjunct Professor in International Economics

The School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS)

The Johns Hopkins University

Wahington DC.

__________________________________________________________________________________

 

Sihanouk Says He Opposes KR Tribunal
The Cambodia Daily

Monday, July 10, 2006
Douglas Gillison
Additional Reporting by Yun Samean



Retried King Norodom Sihanouk announced Saturday that he opposes the newly inaugurated Khmer Rouge tribunal, saying it will only try a handful of those responsible for the regime and that its budget would be better spent on alleviating poverty.

While the tribunal is intended to try a handful of "old, sickly unrepentant individuals," the true number of those responsible was in the hundreds if not the thousands, the former King wrote in a five-page message dated Thursday and posted to his Web site.

"To be frank and call a spade a spade, I am against the special Tribunal that has been established in Cambodia to try five or six Khmer Rouge individuals," he wrote.

The budget for the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia, which stands at over $56 million, would be best used developing Cambodia, he added.

"With the tens of millions of US [dollars] reserved for the "trial,"" he said, "one could provide immensely beneficial services to the Little People by offering them mechanical devices for their 'Water Policy,' machines for agriculture, land of which they are dispossessed, decent living quarters, plows, cattle... and other things to take them from their misery."

Tribunal spokesman Reach Sambath noted that the tribunal's budget was far less than those of either the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda or the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia.

Both of those tribunals have spent hundreds of millions of dollars since they were established in the 1990s.

"We do not have any official reaction to His Majesty's comments: He has the absolute right to express what he thinks he should say," Reach Sambath said. "We all respect him."

The Cambodian tribunal is expected to indict between five and 10
individuals, although prosecutors and investigating judges would be able to bring charges against more, Reach Sambath said.

Youk Chhang, director of the Documentation Center of Cambodia, said the tribunal's budget was not excessive. "If we fail to prosecute the crimes committed by the Khmer Rouge, who killed two million people, it's a serious failure," he said.

He added that prosecuting the Khmer Rouge would help end a climate of impunity in Cambodia.

In his opinion, it is wrong to assume that the tribunal would charge only a handful of suspects. "We don't know who will be indicted," he said.

Co-investigating judge You Bun Leng declined to comment, while pre-trial chamber Judge Ney Thol could not be reached.

Norodom Sihanouk has previously offered mixed views on the tribunal.

In April 2004, he announced via his Web site that if the trials were not
held at the International Court of Justice at the Hague in the Netherlands, they would not be credible.

But a week later, Norodom Sihanouk announced his desire to testify at the joint UN-Cambodian tribunal, and said that the trials should be broadcast on television.

In January 2005, the former King, who in 2001 signed the law creating the tribunal, called the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia a "comedy and a hypocrisy."

__________________________________________________________________

 

Finally, the World Bank starts to see the real threat to the Cambodian people's well-being by telling Hun Sen that his regime is totally corrupt one

 

World Bank cuts more Cambodian projects, citing fraud
Last Updated Thu, 22 Jun 2006 11:30:11 EDT

http://www.cbc.ca/story/world/national/2006/06/22/cambodia-bank.html

 

The World Bank has cancelled another 13 contracts in Cambodia, expanding allegations of fraud and corruption in development projects.

The bank has now suspended a total of 43 contracts in the country, which was ravaged by years of rule by the Khmer Rouge, Vietnamese occupation and civil war.

The value of the contracts cancelled on Thursday is $11.9 million US, the bank said. It will demand repayment of money already spent once the amounts are calculated.

The bank has been looking into projects in Cambodia. Earlier in June, it said investigations over a year "have uncovered sufficient evidence to substantiate allegations of fraud and corruption" in certain contracts.

The Cambodian government has blamed the bank for hiring corrupt foreign consultants to administer the projects.

  'If Cambodian officials are corrupt, then foreign consultants are even more corrupt because they are the decision-makers.'-Cambodian Prime Minister Hun Sen "If Cambodian officials are corrupt, then foreign consultants are even more corrupt because they are the decision-makers," Prime Minister Hun Sen said last week.

The bank rejected the accusation.

Since 1992, shortly before the UN-sponsored election in 1993 that helped provide more stability, the World Bank has provided Cambodia with more than $645 million US in loans and grants as well as technical advice and trust funds.

The bank works to improve the education system, set up national parks, prevent diseases from spreading and raise the productivity of small farmers.

 

Copyright © CBC 2006

 

 

             

 

An Antidote to Moral Blindness


By ADAM KIRSCH - Special to the Sun
June 14, 2006

 

http://www.nysun.com/article/34399

 

                                     June 14, 2006 Edition - Section:  Arts and Letters

 

(Comments: Contrary to Alex Hinton's assertion in his book" why Did they Kill?" that the Khmer Rouge genocide was due to a purely Cambodian character, this article and the following Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe's resolution clearly showed that the Khmer Rouge's crime against Humanity could not have been committed without the devious and misrepresentation of humanism in the ideology of Communism.   Naranhkiri Tith Ph.D. Washington DC November 11, 2009) 


------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------


                  In Cuba, a completely sane 16-year-old student named Jose Alvarado Delgado is committed to a mental hospital, given electroshock therapy, and force-fed psychotropic drugs. In the Soviet Union, Evgenia Ginzburg is interrogated by the secret police for seven days straight, without sleep or food. In Vietnam, Doan Van Toai sees a fellow prisoner commit suicide by biting off his own tongue and choking on it. In Cambodia, Haing Ngor witnesses a Khmer Rouge soldier suffocate a pregnant woman with a plastic bag, then rip out the fetus with a bayonet.

                  As I read these accounts of victims of communism collected in "From the Gulag to the Killing Fields" (ISI Books, 760 pages, $35) - an anthology of memoirs from around the world and across the century, including famous writers and anonymous prisoners, ardent revolutionaries and innocent bystanders - I kept thinking of a phrase from Antonio Negri and Michael Hardt's influential 2000 book, "Empire": "the irrepressible lightness and
joy of being communist." Substitute the word "fascist" in that sentence, and you would have a sentiment that every civilized person would instantly condemn as not just evil, but insane. Yet "Empire," with its eleventh hour attempt to rehabilitate communism as a source of political hope, was widely hailed in the academy as a great achievement. Decades after Stalin's purges, Mao's Cultural Revolution, and Pol Pot's genocide, it is still possible for educated people to associate communism with lightness and joy, and to be praised for doing so.

                  The momentary celebrity of Messrs. Negri and Hardt is a trivial matter. But the moral blindness of which that celebrity is a minor symptom is anything but trivial. It is, in fact, the reason Paul Hollander,
the eminent scholar of Soviet communism, spent the last decade assembling this large, frightening, and important book. In his brilliant introduction, "The Distinctive Features of Repression in Communist States" - the best brief summary of the nature and crimes of communism that I have read - Mr. Hollander notes:

                  While there is a vast literature on the Holocaust ... and while it has justifiably stimulated a huge and continued outpouring of research, moral outrage, and soul searching, the mass murders and other atrocities committed in the Soviet Union under (and after) Stalin have inspired little corresponding concern and interest.

                  Stalin, however, is at least recognized as a figure of almost unparalleled evil and cruelty; outside the lunatic fringe, he has as few admirers as Hitler. More perplexing is the continued willingness of Western intellectuals to make cult heroes of other communist despots. It is still not uncommon to find admirers of Lenin, seen as the pristine embodiment of communist virtue, or of Fidel Castro, seen as the daring patriarch of Third World liberation. Other communist regimes are simply missing from our moral radar. For all that has been written about the Vietnam War, most Americans know next to nothing about what happened in South Vietnam after the communist victory. The famine that struck Ethiopia in the 1980s is remembered here as a humanitarian crisis, not as the criminal result of Mengistu's collectivization policies. Finally, and most ominously, there is the People's Republic of China - usually portrayed in the news media these days as an emerging capitalist dynamo, but still governed by the Communist Party that gave its people famine and forced labor, the Cultural Revolution and Tiananmen Square.

                  In short, while it is common to speak of the defeat of communism in the Cold War, that defeat has not been total, especially in the way communism is remembered and understood. It is still possible for Western intellectuals to deny the crucial lesson of the 20th century, that utopian politics are shortest route to dystopia. And this denial is all too easy to understand. After all, if the rhetoric and the declared intentions of communism are so good - universal liberation, perfect equality, an end to want - how can the reality be so bad?

                  That is the question raised, again and again, in "From the Gulag to the Killing Fields." It is one of the common themes running through these eyewitness accounts of every communist regime in the 20th century, from Russia to Cuba, China to Nicaragua, Bulgaria to North Korea. Naturally, the details of what each author experienced - the methods of torture, the inflections of propaganda - vary according to time, place, and cultural background. Witnesses from Vietnam are especially shocked by the communist cadres' rudeness to their elders; in Ethiopia, Mengistu's refusal to allow his victims to be buried is seen as the worst possible outrage.

                  But the disbelief remains constant. Everywhere, the victim of communism initially finds it impossible to believe that a revolution in the name of the people could oppress and destroy the people. How could it be that, in the words of the Bulgarian writer Georgi Markov, "no other political religion ... has ... a stronger impact on the baser human instincts and passions ... [and] has given such encouragement to human vice generally, as the Communist ideology"?

                  The shock is especially great for true believers, who so often fall victim to their own revolution. Evgenia Ginzburg, an old Bolshevik and wife of a high-ranking Soviet official, was shocked that an NKVD interrogator would manipulate her answers: "Why don't we have a stenographer to put them down?" she asks, only to be met with "peals of laughter." Anna Larina was shocked at the fantastic accusations brought by Stalin against her husband, the Soviet leader Nikolai Bukharin: "The sheer mass of crimes ... could not possibly have been committed by one criminal in his entire lifetime." Inevitably, given the audacity of the regime's persecution, the prisoner begins to wonder if he is guilty in some way he never suspected. "Was I a criminal?" Harry Wu wonders after being sent to a forced labor camp. "Perhaps my ideas had brought harm to the majority of the Chinese people."

                 
The psychological and material techniques of communist oppression are not, of course, a secret. They have been plain, for those willing to see, at least since Stalin's show trials of the 1930s. But for scope, comprehensiveness, and direct emotional power, no document of those techniques surpasses "From the Gulag to the Killing Fields." Any reader who begins reading the book with some lingering sympathy for communism will close it with the words of Teeda Butt Mam, a victim of the Khmer Rouge, echoing in his ears: "Silently, I berated myself, tortured myself, for being so gullible. Why had I allowed myself to believe the lies? Would I never learn?"

            105 Chambers Street, New York, NY 10007
            © 2006 The New York Sun, One SL, LLC. All rights reserved

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MPs vote to condemn 'evils of communism'


· Swedish member calls for victims' memorial day
· Left says Council of Europe motion 'neo McCarthyism'


Jon Henley in Paris

 

The Guardian
London
Thursday January 26, 2006



For some it was a vile capitalist plot aimed at rewriting the recent history of half of Europe, transforming wartime resistance heroes into villains, and denying the laudable ideals and legitimacy of a great political movement.

For others it was a long-overdue denunciation of a couple of dozen thoroughly evil regimes who wrecked their nations' economies, tortured their citizens, and between them were responsible for up to 100 million deaths.

But, by a clear majority, the parliamentary assembly of the Council of Europe yesterday backed a controversial motion demanding that the continent's 46-member human rights watchdog formally condemns "the crimes of totalitarian communist regimes".

More than 60 members of the body's 315-seat assembly, made up of MPs from Europe's parliaments, were due to speak in a debate on a report by the conservative Swedish MP Goran Lindblad, which argued that 15 years after the collapse of the eastern bloc international condemnation of its governments' activities was "urgently necessary".

Mr Lindblad's motion also called for an international conference on the issue and urged former communist states to "revise school books to reflect what happened, establish museums documenting these crimes, and introduce a memorial day for the victims of communism".

The MP adopted the 100 million victim figure arrived at by Stéphane Courtois in his 1997 Black Book of Communism. The count includes 65m in China, 20m in the Soviet Union, 2m in North Korea, 2m in Cambodia, 1.7m in Africa, 1.5m in Afghanistan, 1m in Vietnam, 1m in east Europe and 150,000 in Latin America. (Mr Courtois puts the number of deaths due to Nazism at about 25m.)

Mr Lindblad listed communist regimes' crimes as "assassinations and executions, concentration camp deaths, starvation, deportation, torture, slave labour and other mass physical terror", saying they should be condemned like Nazis' crimes.

Council officials said 99 of the MPs present voted in favour of the motion, 42 opposed it and 12 abstained. Communist parties, mainly in western Europe, had reacted fiercely, saying the report deliberately failed to distinguish between the ideals of communism and its application by totalitarian regimes.

The Belgian Communist party, the PCB, called the motion "a violent attack on history, present and future of communism". The Greek KKE called it "a declaration of war and persecution against all communist parties", and Germany's PDS said it was "neo McCarthyism".

Mikis Theodorakis, the Greek composer, said: "In the name of our dead comrades, of those who passed through the hands of the Gestapo and the death camps ... shame on those who want to turn victims into executioners, heroes into criminals and communists into Nazis."

French communists said the motion "banalises the Holocaust" and "ignores the communist role in fighting fascism".

André Guerin, a Lyon MP, told Le Figaro that the council's idea was to "definitively bury the values of communism" and "make believe they are outmoded and that the only alternative is Capitalism".

Protests were vigorous in Russia, where a survey found 50% of Russians felt Stalin had played a "positive role" in their history and 42% thought "somebody like him" would be helpful in Russia today.[End]

 

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In Cambodia, most everything is for sale, lease

Full story: http://seattletimes.nwsource.com/html/nationworld/2002606772_cambo06.html
By SETH MYDANS
The New York Times

November 6, 2005

CHEUNG EK, Cambodia -- There is little to see here but gaping pits in the ground and a glass-fronted tower that holds some of the 8,000 skulls of people who were slaughtered here.

This is the most venerated of the hundreds of killing fields in Cambodia, and over the decades it has become a place to remember the 1.7 million people who died during the brutal rule of the communist Khmer Rouge from 1975 to 1979.

So, many Cambodians were shocked when the government announced last spring that it had leased the Cheung Ek killing field to a Japanese company to manage for a profit. "It is commercializing the memories," said Youk Chhang, director the leading archive of Khmer Rouge materials. "Memories cannot be sold, cannot be contracted."

But the deal should have come as no surprise. The market is hot now for government assets and prime real estate -- universities, courts, hospitals, police stations, ministry buildings -- which are being sold or bartered as if Cambodia were going out of business.

It is the latest wave in the corruption that, hand in hand with lawlessness and impunity, has thwarted the country's emergence from the Khmer Rouge years.

This is a land where just about everything seems to be for sale or lease: forests, fisheries, mining concessions, air routes, ship registrations, toxic dumps, weapons, women, girls, boys, babies.

Land values in the capital, Phnom Penh, are estimated to have tripled in the past five years.

"There seems to be a frenzy, a momentum to grab up anything you can," said Miloon Kothari, the special rapporteur on adequate housing for the United Nations, on a visit here at the end of August. "The decisions seem to be dictated by money and political expediency."

The most prominent deals are being accomplished in a stream of land-swap agreements with a small number of private companies.

In these swaps, the developer promises to build a replacement on the outskirts or suburbs of the city where land is less valuable but most details remain secret.

In one deal, the Royal University of Fine Arts is being swapped for a building to be completed on reclaimed land at a far edge of the city.

In another, the municipal police headquarters has been traded for a new building on the outskirts.

The Cambodia Daily reported that one developer had acquired the Ministry of Justice, the Supreme Court, the Appeals Court and the Phnom Penh Municipal Court, and was building suburban replacements.

"The government sells schools, a hospital, and now a lake," Kek Galabru, who heads Licadho, said last spring. "One day they're going to sell the Mekong -- they're going to sell the whole of Phnom Penh."

The Cheung Ek killing field was the main execution site for prisoners from Tuol Sleng prison in Phnom Penh, almost seven miles away.

The lease gives the Japanese company, JC Royal Co., a 30-year contract starting at $15,000 a year, with graduated increases.

Based on figures provided by an official here, the company stands eventually to earn about $18,000 a month in entrance fees. The profits are to go to a fund that is half owned by Cambodian government officials. The company has agreed to clean up and organize the site. Some fear that will dull the raw immediacy that gives the area its haunted feel.

_______________________________________________________________

Cambodia's king approves controversial treaty with Vietnam

First posted 02:26am (Mla time) Dec 01, 2005

Associated Press

PHNOM PENH -- Cambodia's king said Wednesday he has approved a border treaty that Prime Minister Hun Sen signed with Vietnamese leaders in October, and that critics say handed Cambodian land to its communist neighbor.

King Norodom Sihamoni said in a statement that he signed off on the agreement for the sake of maintaining the "peace and stability of our nation."

Sihamoni said he had been paid visits by Hun Sen as well as Prince Norodom Ranariddh, who is president of the National Assembly, and other high-ranking Cambodian politicians, who convinced him the treaty was legal.

Hun Sen also assured Sihamoni that the kingdom had suffered no loss of territory with the agreement.

A heated political controversy erupted after Hun Sen signed the pact during his visit to Vietnam in October. Many critics have alleged that, under the agreement, Hun Sen relinquished to Vietnam land that should have belonged to Cambodia.

The prime minister has dismissed the allegations, and has sued at least six Cambodians for criminal defamation, saying they falsely accused him and his government.

Two of them -- a radio station director and a union leader -- are in jail pending trial. Four others have fled the country.

Retired King Norodom Sihanouk, Sihamoni's father, has called the treaty "illegal."

The former monarch, in a statement posted on his official Web site Monday, tried to shield his son from any responsibility over the issue, saying that it was the government and legislature -- which has voted in approval of the treaty -- that are "100 percent responsible" for the country's territorial state.

Border issues are a passionate subject for many Cambodians, who have seen the vast territory once ruled by their ancient Angkor Empire swallowed up over the centuries by larger neighbors Vietnam and Thailand.

The Vietnam border is especially contentious, since Hanoi's troops occupied Cambodia for a decade after toppling the Khmer Rouge regime in 1979. Hun Sen was foreign minister under the Vietnamese-installed communist government in the 1980s, and then prime minister.

Copyright 2005 Associated Press. All rights reserved. This material may not be published, broadcast, rewritten or redistributed.

_____________________________________________________________

Cambodian King signs Complementary Treaty

(VietNamNews Publication Date : 2005-12-03)

Cambodia’s King Norodom Sihamoni has promulgated the Complementary Treaty to the 1985 Treaty for the delimitation of his country’s border with Viet Nam.

He had signed the Royal Decree on Wednesday (Nov 30) after an audience with Prime Minister Hun Sen, National Assembly President Norodom Ranariddh and Royal representatives – the Senate’s First Vice President, Norodom Sisowath Monirak, Deputy Prime Minister Norodom Sirivudh, and advisor to the Royal Government Prince Norodom Chakrapong – he told the Cambodian people in a telecast by State television the same day.

All had affirmed that the signing was proper and accorded with Cambodia’s Constitution and laws, he said.

Cambodia’s National Assembly ratified the treaty on Friday, November 11 and its Senate on Friday, November 25.

It was approved by Viet Nam’s National Assembly last Tuesday (Nov 29) after having been signed by the Cambodian Prime Minister Hun Sen and Viet Nam Prime Minister Phan Van Khai in Ha Noi on October 10.

Cambodian television showed pledges of support for the complementary treaty by Cambodia’s armed forces, police, numerous government departments and organisations immediately the royal decree was announced.

Hun Sen emphasised that the signing was to build a border of transparency, friendship, peace, co-operation and development with Viet Nam when he spoke at the National Educational Institute in Phnom Penh last Tuesday.

The planting of border markers would be completed by 2008, he said.

_______________________________________________________________

Governing parties cement their reign

(CPP and Funcinpec Alliance officially sealed)

By Vong Sokheng



The two congresses held last month by the Kingdom's governing political parties ended with strategies for upcoming elections and resolutions to forge even closer coalition ties at all levels government.

According to their respective agendas, the ruling Cambodian People's Party (CPP) and Funcinpec aimed at building solidarity and cooperation in the government, legislature and other state institutions in the spirit of national reconciliation.

"We highly value the fruitful cooperation between the CPP and Funcinpec, our inseparable partner," CPP President Chea Sim wrote on the party's Web site on November 30.

Hun Sen, Prime Minister and vice president of the CPP, avoided reporters after the party's November 23 extraordinary congress. However, on the CPP's Web site he wrote that the continued cooperation between CPP and Funcinpec is considered to be Cambodia's prime opportunity to preserve peace and stability and would heal the scars left behind by the decades-long war.


"Concession and stability are invaluable, but it is not easy to obtain and safeguard them. Peace is key to ensuring co-existence and cooperation to prevent internal disintegration and hostility," said Hun Sen.

CPP forces defeated Funcinpec troops and deposed then-first Prime Minister Prince Ranariddh in 1997. This has been cited as a key political event that has shaped past elections.

The CPP and Funcinpec broke down the political deadlock a year after the 2003 national elections. This current era of political cooperation has been a major test for politicians and the major political parties in Cambodia.

"I have said time and again that the two parties should consider their partner's firmness being their most important interest, while making all out efforts in the spirit of faithful partner on the basis of legal principle and democracy aimed at strengthening and promoting one another," said Hun Sen.

Hun Sen and Funcinpec President Prince Norodom Ranariddh will be the only prime ministerial candidates in the 2008 elections. This was established at the conclusion of the respective congresses as the two parties promised to uphold their political guidelines.

"Just now Samdech Krom Preah Norodom Ranariddh, President of Funcinpec, on its behalf, declares the Funcinpec's support to me-Hun Sen-for the post of Prime Minister in case the Cambodian People's Party wins. I declare the CPP's support for Samdech Krom Preah for the post of Prime Minister in case Funcinpec wins the election," Hun Sen said in his speech on November 14 to the Funcinpec congress at the Olympic Stadium.

He said that over the last decade Funcinpec and CPP have endured many challenges and gained much political experience together.

"Our rich experiences indicate clearly the indispensability in the leading role of the two parties in the political process of Cambodian society," Hun Sen told about 4,000 members of Funcinpec. "Whenever our two parties are strong and reconciling in their leadership of the state and national construction, the country and its people will certainly be enjoying peace, stability, social order and harmonized progress."

At the groundbreaking ceremony of the national road between Siem Reap and Poipet on November 19, Hun Sen said the two parties have a common objective and that either party's success would be the success of the coalition.

"We-CPP and FUNCINPEC-would furthermore collaborate from bottom to top in getting things done," said Hun Sen.

High level CPP officials such as Deputy Prime Minister Sok An, CPP secretary-general Say Chhum and other CPP parliamentarians Ek Sam Ol, Pen Panha, and Cheam Yeap, attended the Funcinpec congress. No Funcinpec officials, however, were invited to the CPP congress.

The CPP appointed 121 new members to the CPP's powerful Central Committee, adding to the existing 153 members, the party's central committee now having a total 268 members.

One political analyst said, on condition of anonymity, that a majority of the new CPP members were loyal to Hun Sen and that this will ensure that there are no other party members to challenge the prime minister's candidacy.

The analyst added that there has long been a rumor that a faction led by Chea Sim and Deputy Prime Minister Sar Kheng would mount a challenge inside the CPP that would lead to a division in the party.

"During one period between sessions a development arose which was complicated but we managed to normalize the situation," said Chea Sim, who attributed the resolution to experiences, patience and responsibility stemming from the party's strong internal unity and solidarity.

Ranariddh told party supporters at Olympic Stadium that to succeed in a long term political alliance with the CPP, the parties must not make defamatory statements against each other during the election campaign.

"The two main parties will make a joint political program for the forthcoming election campaign," Ranariddh said.

However, at the party celebrating the 10th anniversary of the opposition Sam Rainsy Party (SRP) on November 29, the party leader Sam Rainsy spoke to his several thousand participants by long distance telephone from Paris. The self-exiled leader said that he will return to Cambodia in the near future to lead the party and promised to change the party's name when Cambodia has a real democracy and the fair judicial system.

He told his supporters that the current party name will return to its original Khmer Nation Party (KNP).

"I admire all the colleagues who do not surrender [to CPP and Funcinpec] and still struggle for the benefit of the nation. I am proud to have brilliant supporters. Our party will grow bigger every day even if there is intimidation," said Rainsy. "There is no one who can break our party."

Rainsy has been in France for months. He fled Cambodia when his parliamentary immunity was withdrawn earlier in the year.

On November 22, the Phnom Penh Municipal Court issued a third summons for Sam Rainsy to testify in his ongoing defamation lawsuit by Hun Sen and Prince Ranariddh.

Rainsy accused Ranariddh of being involved in bribe-taking during the formation of the coalition government after the political deadlock following the 2003 elections.

Kong Kom, acting president of the SRP, said that the alliance between CPP and Funcinpec will die when the parties are not be able to reform the judicial system, administer good governance or reduce poverty because of the corruption within their ruling parties.

Phnom Penh Post, Issue 14/24, December 2 - 15, 2005
© Michael Hayes, 2005. All rights revert to authors and artists on publication.
For permission to publish any part of this publication, contact
Michael Hayes, Editor-in-Chief
http://www.PhnomPenhPost.com - Any comments on the website to Webmaster

_______________________________________________________________

National Assembly Approves Border Treaty

By Vong Sokheng

(The Phnom Penh Post; November, 2005)

-----------------------------------------------------------------

Members of parliament from the two main political parties voted on November 11 to approve a supplemental border treaty with Vietnam after discussion on the issue that spanned seven hours and which saw SRP members walk out of the Assembly in protest before the final vote.

The remaining 97 parliamentarians from the ruling Cambodian People's Party (CPP) and Funcinpec voted unanimously to approve the supplemental treaty by a raised-hand vote.

King Norodom Sihamoni is expected to sign the treaty, although he is being lobbied from several quarters not to do so. Sources say that both Prime Minister Hun Sen and Deputy Prime Minister Sok An spent around four hours at the Palace on November 6 briefing the King on the details of the treaty.

Previously, in a speech delivered on October 17, Hun Sen had warned that the monarchy might be abolished if it was "difficult to sign" the treaty.

The treaty will become effective when the ratified documents are officially exchanged between the two parties at a ceremony in Phnom Penh at an as yet undisclosed date.

Yim Sovann, an opposition parliamentarian, said the Sam Rainsy Party (SRP) would appeal to King Sihamoni not to sign the controversial supplemental border treaty because of doubts over its Constitutional validity.

"The supplemental border treaty violates the Constitution and many technical issues need to be clarified," Sovann said.

Hun Sen promised the National Assembly that the government was committed to maintaining Cambodia's existing territorial integrity and said he was working to build an exact and peaceful border between Cambodia and Vietnam.

"On behalf of the government, I would like to promise to the National Assembly that we would like to work hard from the bottom of our heart and do everything in order to carry out all the treaties to be effective," Hun Sen said.

He said the government will continue its work on border demarcation, including the installation of border markers, and continue to negotiate with Vietnam over the outstanding issues on both land and sea borders.

"I hope that history will not condemn me as a traitor while I have been working hard to resolve the border issues," Hun Sen said.

Sok An said the supplemental border treaty is designed to build an exact border line that will be verifiable both on the ground and from maps.

"Our target is to build a clear border [with Vietnam] and a treaty that would not result in ceding Cambodian territory," he said.

He explained to the National Assembly that negotiations on the border issue with Vietnam have been based on 26 separate maps printed in 1964, which he said were recognized by more than 30 countries.

He said the border negotiations have been based on maps with a scale of 1:100,000 and 1:50,000, but Sovann said this was contrary to Article 2 of the Cambodian Constitution.

According to Sovann, Article 2 of the Constitution says the territorial integrity of the Kingdom of Cambodia is inviolable, with the border defined using 1:100,000 scale maps made between the years 1933 and1953 and internationally recognized between the years 1963 and1969.

However, Sok An said that Cambodia and Vietnam had not used maps during the negotiations that would cause Cambodia to lose territory, and that the maps used to negotiate the treaty signed in 1983 between the then People's Republic of Kampuchea (PRK) and Vietnam were the same as those made in 1964.

"I think that there is nothing strange about verifying and negotiating over the border issues; we need to define the precise border with Vietnam, and then the border issue can no longer be used for political purposes," said Sok An.

Funcinpec had previously called the PRK-era treaties signed with Vietnam "illegal." With its opposition to the treaties dropped, Funcinpec MPs were now fully on board with the ruling CPP during the Assembly vote.

Hun Sen said in his speech to the National Assembly that Cambodia's land border with Vietnam ran for 383.5 kilometers: 191 of which was in Ratanakiri, Mondolkiri and Kratie; 173 kilometers in Kampong Cham, Svay Rieng, Prey Veng, Kandal and Takeo; and an additional 19.50 kilometers on river areas in Prey Veng and Kandal.

The supplemental agreement resolves six out of seven disputed border areas with Vietnam. One outstanding area of contention is a 50-square-kilometer piece of territory in Dak Dam commune, Orang district, Mondulkiri province. The treaty stipulates that both countries will continue to discuss the disputed area in an effort to find a solution to the disagreement.

In a press release issued on November 11, opposition lawmakers mourned the supplemental border treaty, saying that "Cambodia lost its sovereignty to Vietnam."

Radio journalist Mam Sonando and teachers' union leader Rong Chhun are being held in prison, and arrest warrants have been issued for others who allegedly accused Hun Sen of ceding land to Vietnam via the border treaty.

"We have taken action against those who tried to use the border issue for political purposes in order to create chaos and topple the government, and make the country unstable," Sok An said.

______________________________________________________________

 

Cambodia: Prime Minister Moves to Crush Dissent

Oct 2005 22:20:23 GMT; Source: Human Rights Watch

Reuter-- (New York, October 18, 2005)-The government of Cambodian Prime Minister Hun Sen should release recently arrested critics of the government, withdraw all arrest warrants against activists, and end the climate of fear that he has created in recent days, Human Rights Watch said today. In response to criticism over a new border pact with Vietnam, Hun Sen has launched a sharp and sudden crackdown on dissent. Authorities have arrested the president of an independent teachers association and the director of Cambodia's only independent national radio station, and they have ordered the arrests of other civil society leaders.

Many of Cambodia's leading human rights advocates, trade union activists, and opposition party members have now fled the country or gone into hiding.

"This is the most severe assault on dissent in Cambodia since the aftermath of Hun Sen's coup in 1997," said Brad Adams, Asia director of Human Rights Watch.

"International donors and embassies must make it clear to Hun Sen that they will not tolerate the reversal of the important strides made in basic human rights during the last decade."

The crackdown started with Hun Sen's visit on October 10-12 to Vietnam, where he signed a controversial border treaty. On October 10, dozens of armed police officers surrounded the Phnom Penh home of Mom Sonando, director of Beehive Radio FM 105. He was arrested the next morning on charges of defamation after having aired an interview with a Cambodian activist in France who is highly critical of the border treaty.

Upon return to Cambodia, Hun Sen announced that he would prosecute anyone who alleged that he, or the Cambodian government, had "sold land" to Vietnam. Such statements are an "act of treason," he said.

In a meeting with international investors on October 14, Hun Sen announced that legal action was being taken against four members of the Cambodia Watchdog Council, a nongovernmental organization that had issued a statement on October 11 criticizing the border agreement.

On October 15, police arrested Cambodia Watchdog Council member Rong Chhun, who is also president of the Cambodian Independent Teachers Association, as he was attempting to cross the border to Thailand to seek asylum. No arrest warrant was produced, but he was charged with defamation and incitement under articles 60 and 63 of the Cambodian penal code, which carry prison terms of five years for incitement and one year for defamation and a fine up to $2,500. Charges have also been brought against other members of the Cambodia Watchdog Council, including Chea Mony, President of the Free Trade Union Workers of the Kingdom of Cambodia; Ea Channa, representative of the Student's Movement for Democracy; and Men Nath, president of the Civil Servants Association.

"Legal action should not be used as a tool of repression to silence the political opposition and government critics in Cambodia," said Adams. "Hun Sen needs to accept that in a democracy leaders will be criticized when they make controversial decisions."

In a speech broadcast on Cambodian television on October 17, Hun Sen threatened to abolish the monarchy and sack military chief Ke Kim Yan and other officials if they did not abide by his orders. He warned international organizations and foreign governments not to interfere. He called on the Thai government to extradite Cambodians suspected of fleeing to Bangkok over the weekend to seek asylum. (See appendix below).

The Cambodian government is now pressuring the Thai government to return individuals who have fled to Thailand for sanctuary. Returning persons to a place where they face persecution would violate the strict international legal prohibition against non-refoulement.

"The Thai government should not even discuss the return of individuals who are facing persecution for the peaceful expression of their political beliefs," said Adams. "To do so would make Thailand complicit in this assault on free expression."

_____________________________________________________________

Army best friends with China and Vietnam

 The Phnom Penh Post, Issue 14/21, October 21 - November 3, 2005

By Sam Rith and Liam Cochrane

(Comments: this article how veitnam is thinking longterm, for the purpose of reaching its Long term Vietnamization of Cambodia: The endoctrination of a  new generation of "Pen Sovan- likes" for the full control of Cambodia. While has been having longterm plan to oblitetrate cambodia, Cambodia not only does have longterm or even shortterm one,the Cambodian so-called leaders, like Sihanouk, Hun Sen, are happy to accommodate Veitnam's lngterm plan to conquer Cambodia.

As I have often said before, don't blame only the Veitnamese, Cambodians are doing as much to allow the Vietnamese to take over their land and destiny> Sad but true. Naranhkiri Tith Ph.D. Washington DC. November 1, 2005)

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China is the biggest source of military aid to Cambodia, contributing more than $5 million a year, although Vietnam helps train more Cambodian soldiers, senior defense officials said.

Tea Banh, Co-minister of the Ministry of Defense and a deputy prime minister, said China gives the most military assistance but the exact amount depends on the demands of the Royal Cambodian Armed Forces (RCAF) each year.

"China sometimes helps Cambodia with more than $5 million a year," Banh said.

A senior official at the Ministry of Defense, who asked not to be named because of the current political climate, said China started helping the RCAF in 1999.

"At that time, Cambodia had completely finished with the war, had stable armed forces and peace - that was a good chance for China to start planning projects to help the RCAF," the official said.

Over the past three years, China had spent approximately 40 million yuan (or about $5 million) a year, the official said.

Projects have included building the High Command Headquarters on National Highway 4, developing the Combined Arms Officer School Thlok Tasek near the town of Pich Nil in Kampong Speu province and constructing a five-story building at Preah Ket Melea military hospital, which was recently completed.

China sponsors an average of 40 Cambodian soldiers every year to study military strategy in China, and this year supplied parachutes to Cambodian paratroopers.

Despite the generous military aid, the official said there were no strings attached.

"So far I have not seen that China needs anything from our country," the official said. "It is a fantasy that [if] China helps Cambodia, China must want something from Cambodia."

Despite repeated requests to the Chinese embassy over the past month, Chinese officials declined to comment on this story.

For defense experts posted to foreign embassies in Phnom Penh, China's role in developing Cambodia's military comes as no surprise.

"I think the Chinese have the same kind of influence in the military as in [Cambodia's] economy and elsewhere," said Colonel Patrick Chanoine, the French embassy defense attaché.

Vietnam is the second biggest benefactor to the RCAF, according to the Ministry of Defense official and embassy sources.

Nguyen Van Mai, deputy defense attaché at the Vietnamese embassy in Phnom Penh, said that since 2003, Vietnam has helped train at least 200 RCAF soldiers a year in Vietnam.

"We help [the RCAF] only on training ... and we help depending on Cambodia's demands," Van Mai said. "On average, we spend about $300 on the accommodation, food and stipends for each Cambodian soldier training in Vietnam."

Tea Banh said: "Now, Vietnam takes up to 500 Cambodian soldiers a year to study in Vietnam," but added that this figure included those studying long term in Vietnam, some up to six years.

The past decade has seen a shift in the provision of military aid to the RCAF. Prior to the coup in July 1997, the United States had been the biggest supplier of military aid to Cambodia, the official said, but defense assistance has been prohibited by the US since then.

On August 2, the White House announced it would overturn its ban on military aid to Cambodia, in return for Cambodia signing the so-called "Article 98" agreement not to send US citizens in Cambodia to the International Criminal Court in the Hague. Since then, however, embassy officials in Phnom Penh have stressed that the move does not assure Cambodia of actually receiving defense assistance.

Nowadays, two of Cambodia's other major military donors are Australia and France.

Australia spends approximately $750,000 a year developing the English language skills of RCAF troops, training mid-to-high-ranking officers and assisting with the maintenance, curriculum and uniforms for officers at the Pich Nil officer school, according to embassy sources. They are looking for cooperation projects between the two navies.

France focuses much of its military aid on the 7,800-strong gendarmerie, or military police, said Chanoine, who declined to quantify the amount of money spent on defense cooperation.

However, their military presence in Cambodia represents the largest commitment of French military aid in Asia, Chanoine said.

Around 40 RCAF soldiers travel to France each year for training.

Japan, the biggest donor of aid to civilian development projects, provides scholarships to three Cambodian soldiers to study engineering and officer training in Japan each year, said the Ministry of Defense official.

The future of military cooperation and reform of the RCAF will be outlined in a five-year strategic "white paper," which is being fine-tuned by a committee and is expected to be released in early 2006, after it is approved by the National Assembly.

© Michael Hayes, 2005. All rights revert to authors and artists on publication.

For permission to publish any part of this publication, contact Michael Hayes, Editor-in-Chief

________________________________________________________________

Hun Sen; Great Cambodian Dictator,  Vietnam's Pupil , Expert in Sophistry ,  Defends Border Agreement, Issues Threats to Critics

Report on Speech of Prime Minister Hun Sen on October 17, 2005

(Source: BBC Monitoring of Television Kampuchea, Phnom Penh, in Cambodian, 0500 GMT, October 17, 2005)

Cambodian Prime Minister Hun Sen has warned those who criticize his stance on the border issue ("a serious one, one of treason") will be dealt with "legally" in a speech during the inauguration of a monastic building which was broadcast on Television Kampuchea (TVK) on 17 October. Referring to two activists who are understood to have fled to Thailand, he threatened to invoke an extradition treaty to bring them home to face defamation charges.

He warned various unnamed groups and individuals that he "has been patient for too long" and referred to the ex-king's record on border issues - proposing playing tapes of himself correcting the former king on Cambodia's size for example.

The recorded speech, made at the Phnum Pros monastery in Kampong Siem District in the premier's home province of Kampong Cham, took up almost two hours of an extended programme shown after the 0500 GMT newscast. The programme started by showing a government anti-terrorist unit practicing a hostage rescue drill. The prime minister was visibly irritated during his speech, raising his voice many times. The following is a chronological report on the speech.

Beginning his speech Hun Sen recalled the US war in South Vietnam and the preparations for the US departure and then the "Khmerization of the war, that is Cambodians fighting Cambodians". Hun Sen also recalled some events from and prior to the Pol Pot era of the Khmer Rouge regime, in which monks were maltreated. Hun Sen said: "At that time Pol Pot was not prominent yet.

The ones who were prominent were Samdech Preah Norodom Sihanouk and Samdech Pen Nout. This was how it was. Had [I] known that it was already Pol Pot then, [I] would not have followed you [Sihanouk]. It was just that the president of the front was Samdech Preah Norodom Sihanouk and the prime minister was Samdech Pen Nout. That's why I and others responded. That was the story. You cannot change history. In Jakarta [during the informal talks between warring Cambodian factions] the king [Sihanouk] asked me to be his equal. This is still on tape [chuckle]. He asked me to be his equal in Jakarta in 1988."

Hun Sen also said that in 1989 Sihanouk accused him of being a Khmer Rouge and then retorted: "No, I refused to be equals. No, it cannot be. There are three factors that this cannot be so. First, you [Sihanouk] are the chief and I am a subordinate. I was only 18 years old then; you appealed for people to join in the jungle; I had to follow. So, you were the chief and I was the subordinate. If there were rewards, you would receive the biggest reward while I, a simple soldier, would only get the clapping. If there were rewards. However, if there were punishment, you would be severely punished while I would go free." [brief applause from the audience].

Hun Sen said the second reason for him to refuse to be Sihanouk's equal was that "when I was leading the struggle against Pol Pot, you [Sihanouk] were the head of Democratic Kampuchea, head of state of Democratic Kampuchea. Even though you had resigned, you were still with the Khmer Rouge." For his third reason Hun Sen said: "Today, we are sitting here together, you as the head of the tripartite coalition government with the Khmer Rouge in it, and I, the head of the government opposing the Khmer Rouge."

Hun Sen then talked about progress in Kampong Cham Province and praised the local officials and people for their efforts to develop the locality and urged further efforts to fight drought and flooding and achieve more progress. Turning to the current Cambodia's border problem, Hun Sen said: "I would like to take this opportunity to thank the clergy, the people, and all sections of the armed forces for supporting the royal government and myself in solving the border problem with neighboring countries. I would like to express thanks for all the support in the form of petitions, contributions to radio talk shows."

And for the next almost one hour of his speech Hun Sen talked about the border problems, laced with anecdotes, and strongly criticized his detractors saying "these people cannot be forgiven" and that "they have to be dealt will legally." He said: "Now, two of them are already in prison. There are three others; one of them in France. No, another four, one of them in France; another one in Holland; while the other two are said to have fled to Thailand. And the court has issued warrants. In this case we can contact Thailand for the arrest because we have extradition treaty with Thailand."

Hun Sen added: "Now we are considering suing Sisowath Thomico who is the cousin of the current king. Even a royal family member is sued. I have already said this." Hun Sen accused Sisowath Thomico of issuing a statement through Voice of America radio adding that "His Majesty the King [Sihamoni], Samdech Euv [Sihanouk], and Samdech Mae [Queen Mother Monineath] who have a nephew, and the king who has a cousin, please leave this to the tribunal. You [Sisowath Thomico] have no immunity."

Hun Sen also talked about preparing a document for publicly disseminating [showing] what happened up to 1999, and "if you [Sisowath Thomico] could not answer, you, prince go to Prey Sar [prison]. I'd like to stress this. I cannot take this. I am willing to lower myself, not just stepping down from my post but also submitting myself to the tribunal in the event it was found that I was the one causing the loss of the Kingdom of Cambodia's territory. Let the court try me, be it a national or international tribunal." Continuing, Hun Sen said: "Who did this? It is the same group, the one that sentenced the king [Sihanouk] to death. Those people in fact wanted to insult the king. They, however, dared not do it."

Hun Sen said the royal government and the National Assembly work together on this border issue and retorted to non-governmental organizations saying that "non-governmental organizations are set up by even five persons; there is nothing difficult about setting up non-governmental organizations." Hun Sen added: "Even the king [Sihanouk] dared to issue a statement, on 9 or 10 [October], defending the royal family, and all former kings since the Angkor period, no matter how bad those kings. So, why not give Hun Sen the chance to defend himself? Who does not know history, Chey Chetha II [a Cambodian king who married a Vietnamese and allowed Vietnamese to settle in former Cambodian territory]."

Hun Sen provided details on a member of the Cambodian royal family in France saying: "In 1949, the French parliament met and Cambodia's representative was Prince Yukanthor, who cast an abstention vote on his own territory. He not only did not claim the land back but also voted abstention. And then I was accused of causing the territory loss. Now, let's have a talk, regardless of who I have to face. I am lowering myself, not just stepping down from my position. I will remove myself and also remove my immunity myself; because it is easy to remove immunity. Resigning from being a parliament member will remove the immunity. I will go to court to be tried.

However, this is not different from the story the other day. Swearing in front of all the Buddha statues: those who violated their words will be struck by lighting [a very offending curse for Cambodians] [applause]. I am not putting a curse."

Hun Sen added: "And do not say [Sisowath Thomico] is the former king's nephew and the current king's cousin. Just watch." Continuing, Hun Sen said: "I have been too patient for too long. This is the limit of my patience. In any case, my loss of patience will go as far as the law allows. If I did not abide by law, the armed forces are in my hands, no one can object. If [armed forces commander in chief] Ke Kimyan did not do it, I will use Kun Kim [a senior army general close to Hun Sen].

However, Ke Kimyan has to do it, if not he will be removed. Do not think because you are a four-star general; even if you have the moon [and not star on your shoulder], you will be removed." Hun Sen also stressed: "I am not Samdech Preah Norodom Sihanouk. Samdech Preah Norodom Sihanouk let others stage a coup. Hun Sen will not. Do not gamble on trying this. You do it, you die. You are told in advance. And let this be passed on to the one who appealed at the end of 1993 [changes thought] 2003 to the armed forces to turn their weapons against the government. Consider yourself lucky, lucky in the sense that Hun Sen did not sue you then. Why? Hun Sen wanted to see whether your appeal was heeded? And if people responded to your appeal, only five persons would open fire on Hun Sen, and you died. I wanted to tell you this. Hun Sen did not sue you because he wanted to see your real strength. Now it is passed the time suing you, the chairman of something. I am not naming you, but do not use this language again. Using the language appealing to the armed forces to revolt against the government does not have to pass through the tribunal, you will be arrested in your house. You will be arrested first, followed by the discussion with the tribunal later. This is a coup d'état crime, and not one of instigation. It is a crime of ordering coup d'état. You will be arrested in your house. Let's talk clearly about this for once."

Hun Sen then talked about the "weak point" of article 2 of the Cambodian constitution on using only the "100,000 maps printed between 1933 and 1953" produced by the French authorities in negotiating Cambodia's border issues with neighbouring countries. Hun Sen argued that Cambodia should have talked only about maps printed "before 1953" which would allow Cambodia to make use of older maps "from 1928, or 1897". Hun Sen added that this was not because "the government or the prime minister did not know about this, but the prime minister did not expose his own constitution to others, to neighbouring countries".

Referring to comments that "the government is launching a campaign to repress democracy, democracy activists," Hun Sen said: "If you did not say something wrong, I have no need to sue you. I have not closed down your radio or newspaper. I only arrested individuals. I have not closed down your non-governmental organizations."

Saying that the issue of selling territory is "a serious one, one of treason", Hun Sen said: "Even though the king wanted to defend his family members, no matter what [king] Chey Chetha II remained a traitor. The king has the right to defend royal family members from the Angkor period down to Norodom Sihanouk, but who does not about this story. It is since the 1600s, at which time all of us were still monkeys, and not yet reborn as humans. This is history."

Referring to the "vast territory" of Cambodia now shrunk to the size of the palm of a hand, Hun Sen asked "Why did you not claim the territory back then" but "blamed the young generation instead". Continuing, Hun Sen said: "Let's be clear about this. It was just that I did not want to talk about it earlier. Now it is time Hun Sen talks about it. Hun Sen will talk about it when the time comes." Hun Sen also talked about playing back "the tape recorded in Fere-en-Tardenois [town in France where secret talks were held between Sihanouk and Hun Sen] on 2 December 1987" in which Hun Sen corrected Sihanouk on the area of Cambodia when Sihanouk said Cambodia covers 181,000 sq kilometres and Hun Sen injected that it is "181,035".

Towards the end of his lengthy speech Hun Sen also briefly talked about the US war in Iraq, saying "even when the United States sent troops to fight in Iraq, the American people never insulted President Bush of being traitors. At most they said the father and the son are the same. The senior Bush attacked Iraq, and the junior Bush again attacked Iraq."

Hun Sen also warned: "Those supporters in the background who whisper things, regardless of they are, watch it, I may implicate you." Concluding his comment on the border demarcation with Vietnam Hun Sen said: "The big issue is which maps to use, which ones; the ones that the king deposited at the United Nations. I followed what the father said. If the father said this was wrong, then the father was also wrong. This is the only conclusion."

Hun Sen added: "After the withdrawal of Vietnamese troops [from Cambodia] in 1989 after toppling the Pol Pot genocidal regime, there were no Vietnamese troops along the border like in the 1960s. No, there were not any; they were on their side on the border, we were on ours. Whatever problems we have the authorities along the border have made efforts to solve them." He also reiterated what he said earlier in his address about praying that those who violated their words be struck by lightning.

Raising the tone of his voice almost throughout the following passage of his speech Hun Sen said: "Right now I am the one administering the country. I should have the right to defend myself, defend the royal government, and forward the matter to parliament. In a parliamentary system, the royal government is set up by parliament. If the government did not do it correctly, parliament should not ratify it. If parliament ratified it, it is the end of it. Even the Senate has no right to oppose the decision by parliament, only the right to return it [to parliament]. However, if parliament maintained that decision, it [pause for nearly 10 seconds] it [the Senate] has to go along with parliament's decision. Even though the number of Senate members is half that of the National Assembly, the constitution does not allow the Senate to have the right to reject the National Assembly's decision, let alone the head of state, or the king, because the power rests with the people.

"I heard it said that the signing [of the border treaty] will have to be done by the acting head of state. I do not know who will sign it. All I know is that once parliament adopted it, that is the end of it. This time around, I talked about it in advance. I have already said this to the samdech krom preah [National Assembly President] Ranariddh. I said prince [changes thought] I already said to Excellencies Sun Chanthol, Kol Pheng, Ung Kantha-phavi, and Sisowath Panara in the aircraft [returning from Vietnam], and I also told the samdech krom preah in the telephone conversation that if this time around it is difficult to sign it, we should reconsider whether we should keep the monarchy or change to a republic with a president instead. Or at least include into the constitution an article stipulating that it [the border treaty] should be signed within a number of days, failing which it will take effect.

[Hun Sen at this point turned to talk about the Thai monarchy and the Thai government] Even the Thai king has to provide a reasonable reason. The law declaring the state of emergency in the south faces many problems. When it was submitted, the Thai king did not sign it; it seemed like for three days. The Thaksin government then asked why it was not signed. One reason given was that there were too many orthographic mistakes in it. This law was very contentious. So, the royal palace and the royal government set up a joint group to correct the orthography. The king then signed it, because once parliament has adopted, it will go forward, there is nothing else.

[Turning to the Cambodian situation] This is because the ones with responsibility are the National Assembly and the government elected by the people. If there were one person to go to prison for this, it would be this one, here, and not the king or the head of state. This is an issue that should be clearly said. Saying this is not putting pressure on the king or the acting head of state. However, we should be clear on the parliamentary and presidential systems; it is one or the other. We are now in the parliamentary system with a reigning king as head of state. In the other system, which is the US system, a president is elected. However, the price to pay is the abolishment of the monarchy and the throne, and no more king.

All of us, however, strive to maintain the constitutional monarchy and defend the throne. A number of persons, however, like to cheat the young generation. This is a violation. And let's wait for this evening; there will be many comments saying that this guy [Hun Sen] is talking as though he is on fire. I have put up with this for a long time. Non-governmental organizations, please carry on doing your work; and foreigners, please do not interfere.

"[Referring to those he recently sued for defamation] The other day, he almost crossed the border. However, young brother, Prey Sar prison was waiting for you; while the [UN]HCR [High Commission of Refugees] was waiting on the other side. As far as we know, the HCR is keeping two persons. Now that warrants have been issued, we should contact Thailand. Let the HCR took the two to board the Thai aircraft, then arrest them and send them to Cambodia. That would end the matter since there is an extradition agreement."

As he ended his speech Hun Sen again talked about the prospect of having to choose between the presidential and the parliamentary system. He said: "I apologized for using this platform [a monastery] to talk about agriculture, farming production at the end of the rainy season and in the dry season, and the National Route 7 on the one hand, and on the other, the border issue, which is related to a big subject that could lead to a clear social reorganization. What regime is needed: a presidential or parliamentary system? There should be a price for the two in order to resolve some issues. Otherwise, the same things would go on; history would repeat itself, and this is unacceptable."

Immediately after this two-hour long report with Hun Sen's speech, TVK aired an announcer-read message, dated 27 September 1999, from Sihanouk to Vietnamese leader Pham Van Dong on the border issue in which Sihanouk proposed the "recognition of the Brevié line" to demarcate the Cambodian-Vietnamese maritime border. The rest of this extended TVK programme consisted of petitions, read by a male announcer, from people in Kampong Cham Province voicing support for the government's handling of the border problem with Vietnam.

 


 

Bloodied foreigners

http://www.faqs.org/abstracts/Business-international/Bloodied-foreigners-End-of-the-line-can-the-monarchy-survive-beyond-Sihanouk.html

Article Abstract:

The aftermath of Cambodia's election, held under UN auspices in late May 1993, is uncertain due to various factors. These factors include the unwillingness of the Phnom Penh government to abide by the result, Prince Norodom Sihanouk's unsuccessful effort at setting up a new government on Jun 3 and the interference of several foreign nations. Japan, France and Russia endorse Sihanouk's aspirations while the US, the UK, China and Australia oppose him. The royalist Funcinpec party, which won the election with 45% of the vote, will probably have to form a coalition government.

author: Thayer, Nate

Publisher: Review Publishing Company Ltd. (Hong Kong)
Publication Name:
Far Eastern Economic Review

Subject:
Business, international
ISSN:
0014-7591
Year: 1993

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Blood and irony: royal feud further complicates peace process

Article Abstract:

A rift between three members of Cambodia's royal family is exacerbating efforts to bring peace and orderly government to that country following UN-sponsored elections in May 1993. The dispute concerns Prince Norodom Sihanouk and two of his sons, Prince Norodom Ranariddh and Prince Norodom Chakrapong. Ranariddh's pro-royalist Funcinpec party won the elections while the Cambodian People's Party, backed by Chakrapong, lost. This defeat prompted Chakrapong to lead a short-lived attempt by seven provinces to secede. Sihanouk at times has supported and attacked both sons.

author: Thayer, Nate

Publisher: Review Publishing Company Ltd. (Hong Kong)
Publication Name:
Far Eastern Economic Review

Subject:
Business, international
ISSN:
0014-7591
Year: 1993

Ranariddh, Norodom, Chakrapong, Norodom

Read more: http://www.faqs.org/abstracts/Business-international/Bloodied-foreigners-End-of-the-line-can-the-monarchy-survive-beyond-Sihanouk.html#ixzz0gt95miFV

 

 

History of Cambodia

This is the History of Cambodia series.

http://www.economicexpert.com/a/History:of:Cambodia.html

History of Cambodia series.

Please, click on any title in this box to read the details of its content

Early history of Cambodia

Dark ages of Cambodia

Colonial Cambodia

Cambodia under Sihanouk (1954-1970)

Cambodian Civil War

Democratic Kampuchea

History of Cambodia (1979-present)

1 Early Kingdoms

Main article: Early history of Cambodia

The Khmer people were among the first in Southeast Asia to adopt religious ideas and political institutions from India and to establish centralized kingdoms encompassing large territories. The earliest known kingdom in the area, Funan, flourished from around the first to the sixth century A.D. It was succeeded by Chenla, which controlled large areas of modern Cambodia, Vietnam, Laos, and Thailand. The golden age of Khmer civilization, however, was the period from the ninth to the thirteenth centuries, when the kingdom of Kambuja, which gave Kampuchea, or Cambodia, its name, ruled large territories from its capital in the region of Angkor in western Cambodia.

Under Jayavarman VII (1181-ca. 1218), Kambuja reached its zenith of political power and cultural creativity. Following Jayavarman VII's death, Kambuja experienced gradual decline. Important factors were the aggressiveness of neighboring peoples (especially the Thai, or Siamese), chronic inter-dynastic strife, and the gradual deterioration of the complex irrigation system that had ensured rice surpluses. The Angkorian monarchy survived until 1431, when the Thai captured Angkor Thom and the Cambodian king fled to the southern part of his country.

2 The Dark Ages

Main article: Dark ages of Cambodia

The fifteenth to the nineteenth century was a period of continued decline and territorial loss. Cambodia enjoyed a brief period of prosperity during the sixteenth century because its kings, who built their capitals in the region southeast of the Tonlé Sap along the Mekong River, promoted trade with other parts of Asia. This was the period when Spanish and adventurers and missionaries first visited the country. But the Thai conquest of the new capital at Lovek in 1594 marked a downturn in the country's fortunes and Cambodia became a pawn in power struggles between its two increasingly powerful neighbors, Siam and Vietnam. Vietnam's settlement of the Mekong Delta led to its annexation of that area at the end of the seventeenth century. Cambodia thereby lost some of its richest territory and was cut off from the sea. Such foreign encroachments continued through the first half of the nineteenth century because Vietnam was determined to absorb Khmer land and to force the inhabitants to accept Vietnamese culture.

3 The French Colonial Period

 

Main article: Colonial Cambodia

In 1863 King Norodom signed an agreement with the French to establish a protectorate over his kingdom. The country gradually came under French colonial domination. During, World War II, the Japanese allowed the French government (Based at Vichy) that collaborated with the Nazis to continue administering Cambodia and the other Indochinese territories, but they also fostered Khmer nationalism. Cambodia enjoyed a brief period of independence in 1945 before Allied troops restored French control. King Norodom Sihanouk, who had been chosen by France to succeed King Monivong in 1941, rapidly assumed a central political role as he sought to neutralize leftist and republican opponents and attempted to negotiate acceptable terms for independence from the French. Sihanouk's "royal crusade for independence" resulted in grudging French acquiescence to his demands for a transfer of sovereignty. A partial agreement was struck in October 1953. Sihanouk then declared that independence had been achieved and returned in triumph to Phnom Penh.

 

 


 

 

 

Vietnam and Cambodian Communism

FRIDAY, APRIL 20, 2007

Stephen J. MORRIS in Public Forum on Khmer Rouge History From
Stalin to Pol Pot-Towards a Description of
the Khmer Rouge Regime 25-26 January 2007 Sunway Hotel,
Phnom Penh (Picture by: Prim Pilot)


By Stephen J. Morris
Source: The Cambodian Human Rights and Development Association
Posted at Khmer Rouge Trial Web Portal

(Comment: The claim by Vietnam and Hun Sen, now by Sihanouk that Vietnam did not invade but liberate Cambodia, is nothing but a total fabrication of their story, as Stephen Morris (A colleague of mine at SAIS, the Johns Hopkins University), an Australian scholar on Cambodian affairs, has brilliantly demonstrated, in a presentation in Phnom Penh, in January 2007.  It is comprehensible that Hun Sen, a Vietnamese puppet, would have endorsed this view to favor the Vietnamese.

However, it is more difficult for this writer to comprehend how Sihanouk would have taken this Vietnamese/Hun Sen stand, when he had taken the opposite position in the 1980's when he was the leader of the resistance movement fighting against the Vietnamese invasion. (See the article entitled "Sihanouk: I Will Support Samdech Hun Sen for My Whole Life; Hun Sen: Samdech Euv Sings Beautifully," immediately following this article.

 

Knowing Sihanouk well as I do, this is a normal Sihanouk's behavior, which is to shift his view whenever, it gives him advantage at the moment without thinking of what would really have  happened to Cambodia in doing so. In other words, for Sihanouk, if the interests of Cambodia coincide with his, there is no problem for Cambodia. However, whenever, there is conflict between his and those of Cambodia, it his that will prevail, regardless of what would have happened to Cambodia. This is the case when he shifted his position from accusing the Vietnamese as invaders to thanking them as liberators

In this presentation, Steve Morris has done a credible job by exposing the real intention and design of the Vietnamese, which was an invasion and not a liberation of Cambodia, on December 25, 1978, when he noted that;

"Hanoi's motives were never humanitarian but only self-interested. On the one hand we must not forget that the Vietnamese had a legitimate right to self defense, and the 1978 invasion was consistent with that. But the ten year military occupation, and Hanoi's simultaneous refusal to recognize the noncommunist forces or the resolutions of the United Nations, showed that they were also motivated by an imperial ambition."

The same view was also reflected in the opinion of a great Australian Historian and a true friend of the Cambodian people, Milton Osborne, when he correctly wrote in a recent book entitled 'Phnom Penh, A Cultural and Literary History' that:

"I declare my own position in judging that the Vietnamese invasion should be regarded as having liberated the Cambodian population from Pol Pot's tyrany. But, I am unprepared to see it and the subsequent role Vietnam played throughout the 1980s as essentially an excercise in altruistism."

Thank you Steve Morris and Milton Osborne, for this courage to say the truth about one of the most tragic chapters of the long Cambodian history on the brink of disintegration. Naranhkiri Tith Ph.D. Washington DC. February 10, 2009)

____________________________________________________________

 

INTRODUCTION
In the official mythology of the Khmers Rouges, their military victory in 1975, and the maintenance of their rule over Cambodia from 1975 until 1978 (the rule of Angka Padevat in the state of Democratic Kampuchea), was portrayed as a result of the efforts of Cambodians alone. This is the most ridiculous fantasy. Without the support of the Vietnamese and Chinese communists the regime known as Democratic Kampuchea would never have existed. Moreover, the leading Cambodian communists were deeply enmeshed in the activities of the communist world for most of their lives.

I will show how Vietnam played a vital role in the rise of the Khmers Rouges to power, and how the Vietnamese communist leaders were happy to let the Khmers Rouges do as they wished in power, so long as the regime created - Democratic Kampuchea - did not threaten or embarrass Vietnam. However the irrational belligerence of Pol Pot and his entourage in foreign policy soon became a source of concern for Hanoi, and Democratic Kampuchea's violent behaviour towards its more powerful neighbour pushed Vietnam towards a policy of armed retaliation, invasion and occupation.

VIETNAM AND THE RISE OF CAMBODIAN COMMUNISM


The Vietnamese communists were deeply involved in the inception and formation of the Cambodian communist movement. In 1930 the agent of the Communist International (Comintem) known as Nguyen Ai Quoc -- who in 1943 changed his alias to Ho Chi Minh -- founded the Vietnamese Communist Party at a meeting held in the British colony of Hong Kong. But after filing the founding documents with his employers in Moscow, Quoc was instructed by the Comintem to change the name of the party to the Indochinese Communist Party (ICP). The Comintem argued that "Not only does Indochina have a geographic, economic and political unity, but above all we have a need for unity of struggle, for a unique direction of all of the Indochinese proletariat opposed to all the forces of reaction in Indochina, to the policy of division of French imperialism." The Comintern's intention was clear: Emancipation of the three different nations of French Indochina was to be carried out not by the independent efforts of each of the three peoples, but rather under Vietnamese Communist tutelage.

As it happened there were no revolutionary movements in Cambodia at this time. And of the 211 founding members of the Indochinese Communist Party, not a single one was from Cambodia or Laos. One finds in the Comintem archives in Moscow, Quoc's actual correspondence about this with his leaders. In September 1930 Nguyen Ai Quoc claimed to have an ICP party membership of 124, of which 120 were Chinese and 4 were Annamites [Vietnamese]. The Party controlled labor union consisted of 300 ethnic Chinese. The French suppressed the communist structures throughout Indochina in 1935, and by March 1935 there were only 9 communists in all of Cambodia. But the ethnic situation in Cambodia remained much the same throughout the 1930s. In 1938 the Cambodian branch of the ICP had a mere 16 members, all of them ethnic Chinese.

After World War II the Vietnamese communists, operating through their front organization popularly known as the Viet Minh, began their offensive against the French colonialists. However they sought to rely heavily upon ethnic Vietnamese for their efforts. Two of the most important Viet Minh leaders during the 1940s were Sieu Heng and Son Ngoc Minh, both of mixed Vietnamese and Khmer ancestry. Armed units of the Viet Minh were stationed in Battambang, where all the units were ethnic Vietnamese, and in southeast Cambodia, where again ethnic Vietnamese were predominant in the revolutionary committees.

In March 1950, at a meeting of Viet Minh and Khmer Issarak leaders held in Ha Tien, Vietnam, Nguyen Than Son, head of the Viet Minh's committee for foreign affairs in southern Vietnam, spoke of the Vietnamese emigre population in Cambodia as a "driving force destined to set off the Revolutionary Movement in Cambodia." Later he seemed to be complaining when he stated that the ICP, which controlled the Cambodian Movement, was composed of mostly Vietnamese and "did not have deep roots among the Khmer people."

In 1951 the underground ICP resurfaced as the Vietnam Workers Party, and simultaneously announced the emergence of two "fraternal" parties for Laos and Cambodia. The latter was called the Revolutionary Cambodian People's Party. According to Bernard Fall the statutes of the Cambodian party had to be translated from Vietnamese into Cambodian, and ethnic Vietnamese dominated the leadership of the party. Over the next three years the Vietnamese tried to recruit ethnic Cambodians into the political and military structures of the party, but with limited success. For example, according to a French intelligence document of 1952, the Phnom Penh cell secretariat had a membership of 34, of whom 27 were Vietnamese, 3 were Chinese, and only four were Cambodians.

In November 1953 Cambodia under the royal government of Sihanouk was given complete independence by the French. After the signing of the Geneva Agreements in 1954, the Viet Minh Sees retreated from Cambodia, taking with them half of the cadres of the Revolutionary Cambodian Party. These cadres were to be given further training in Hanoi, and kept in reserve until history provided an opportune moment for their return.

During this period of the mid 1950s there was influx of younger communists back to Cambodia from a period of study France. Most notable of this group was Pol Pot (then known as Saloth Sar, Jeng Sary, Khieu Samphan, Hou Youn and Hu Nim. Some of these communists had come into contact with the ideas of Marx and Lenin before, they went to France. But they had all developed their communist ideology in France under the influence of the Stalinist French communist party. Some of them, like Pol Pot had fought in the last stages of the Viet Minh war against the French. But we should not make too much of the French experience of Pol Pot and long Sary. because other important members of the future Khmer Rouge inner circle -- notably Nuon Chea and Ta Mok -- never went to France. More important to note is that none of the younger communists exhibited any anti-Vietnamese sentiment at this time.

The returnees from France were able to seize control of the Cambodian communist movement by the ena of the 1950s Yet in 1960 the party's name was changed to Kampuchean Workers Party, to conform with the Vietnamese name, and in 1966 it was changed again to Kampuchean Communist Party In 1963 Pol Pot became secretary general of the party. Throughout the 1960s the Kampuchean communists remained friendly and deferential towards the Vietnamese. In July 1965 Pol Pot traveled to Hanoi and discussed with the Vietnamese politburo the appropriate policy for Cambodia.

It is not exactly clear when the Cambodian communists developed their attachment to Maoism. The imbibing of Maoist ideology by the Khmer Rouge seems to have been quite gradual. And the Vietnamese communists themselves must have played some direct role in assisting that process since they themselves had been under Chinese communist influence during the years 1950-56 and 1963-64, years when Vietnamese communist influence over Cambodian communists was still significant. Pol Pot made his first trip to China in late 1965 and stayed into 1966. This was the beginning o the Maoist terror and ideological campaign known as the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution. Pol Pot visited China again in 1970. Pol Pot's visits to China probably did not initiate, but most likely intensified, Maoist ideological influence upon the Khmer Rouge.

In January 1968 the Kampuchean Communist Party initiated an armed uprising against the royal government of Prince Sihanouk. This would seem to have been in contradiction with the Vietnamese communist policy of recognizing the royal Cambodian government, a government which had allowed the North Vietnamese and Viet Cong to use eastern Cambodia as a sanctuary and supply line in their war against the American-backed anticommunist government of South Vietnam. However this Khmers Rouges uprising was mostly confined to the hill dwellers (Khmer Loeu) of the mountainous of northeast Cambodia - Ratanakiri and Mondolkiri - and it did not pose any real threat to he survival of the government of Prince Sihanouk. Hence it did not really threaten the strategy of the North Vietnamese.

During the late 1960s many Cambodians, especially among the Cambodian political and military elites became unhappy with the Vietnamese communist occupation of Cambodian soil. They preferred Cambodia to have a closer relationship with the United States. Sihaniouk slowly and reluctantly changed his policy in this regard, and in 1970 he traveled to China and the Soviet Union to try and persuade the big communist powers to pressure Hanoi to remove its forces from Cambodia, Sihanouk was not successful, and on March 18, 1970, while Sihanouk was still in Moscow, Lon Nol led a bloodless palace coup d'etat. This totally changed Cambodia's situation.

Manv people think that the coup d'etat led by Lon Nol, was the work of the United States and its Central Intelligence Agency (ClA). At the time Hanoi, Beijing and Moscow, and their western friends with the help of Sihanouk, did everything to try to spread that myth. There is absolutely no evidence of that. No evidence has been found even by the most critical western writer, William Shawcross. Of course the Americans welcomed the coup.

Many people also think that it was the US and South Vietnamese invasion of eastern Cambodia on April 30, 1970, that brought Cambodia into the Vietnam war. That is also plainly false. It was me Vietnamese communists who spread the Vietnam war inside Cambodia. One of Lon Nol's first public proclamations was to demand that the Vietnamese communist forces leave Cambodia within 48 hours. They ignored his demand, and at the end of March 1970 North Vietnamese and Viet Cong forces moved out of their border sanctuaries and began to attack the armed forces and towns of the newly proclaimed Khmer Republic. At the same time approximately one thousand of the Khmer Viet Minh, who had been trained in Hanoi, were reinfiltrated back into Cambodia. Their task was to help supervise the areas that would be captured by the Vietnamese communist armies.

On April 30, 1970, exactly six weeks after the Lon Nol coup, and four weeks after the North Vietnamese began their attacks on the Khmer Republic, troops of the United States and South Vietnam began a major attack on the communist sanctuaries inside Cambodia. The Vietnamese communists, anticipating the attack, fled in advance of the allied sweep. However public protests and congressional opposition within the United States precluded the extended American military operations inside Cambodia that any successful pursuit of the communist armies would have required.

When American forces withdrew from the border areas after only two months inside Cambodia, they had successfully cleared most of the base areas that threatened the Mekong Delta region of South Vietnam. But they had hardly diminished the communist manpower available inside Cambodia as a whole. In the first four months of fighting the Vietnamese communists had seized control of half the territory of Cambodia, In spite of continued American bombing attacks upon them, North Vietnam's battle hardened veterans remained in a good position to deal with the highly motivated but poorly trained and equipped army of the Khmer Republic.

For the next two years of the struggle for Cambodia, it would be Hanoi that would determine the outcome of military events. By the end of 1970 there were four North Vietnamese combat divisions in Cambodia, with some ten thousand of these troops targeting the republican army, and others protecting the Ho Chi Minh Trail supply line to the South Vietnam battlefield.

At the beginning of the war it was obvious to both the Vietnamese communist leaders and Pol Pot's Khmer Rouge that the latter were not yet strong enough to seize Phnom Penh on their own. If Cambodia was to have a communist government, then the North Vietnamese and Viet Cong armies would have to play a role. The Hanoi leaders made explicit in their secret meetings that their party's policy was to "strengthen the revolutionary base in Cambodia and lead the country along the path to socialism." And despite their dismay with the general capabilities of the Cambodian insurgency the Vietnamese were optimistic about the prospects of a communist victory in Cambodia. As one captured communist document summarized the Hanoi view: "The Cambodian revolution is entering a new phase ... From a vacillating neutralist regime, Cambodia can now follow a steady policy. When the enemy is defeated, she will become a democratic and independent country and proceed toward socialism."

Between April 1970 and March 1972 it was the battle hardened Vietnamese army which crushed most of the best units of the army of the Khmer Republic. During this period Vietnamese and Cambodian communist forces, after seizing control of an area, set up a political administration controlled by the National United Front (FUNK) and nominally under the authority of Prince Sihanouk's Royal Government (GRUNK) which was based in exile in Beijing. There were three elements in the political coalition opposed to the Khmer Republic. First, the Khmer Viet Minh communists, trained in Hanoi since 1954, and backed by Vietnamese communist army units. Second, the Pol Pot led Khmers Rouges guerrillas. Third, the followers of Prince Sihanouk, who were militarily weak.

FUNK propaganda appeals emphasizing Sihanouk's leadership role in the insurgency were important in the first year of the war, and reflected the influence of the North Vietnamese upon Cambodian insurgent propaganda. It undoubtedly helped the communists to recruit Cambodian peasant support. However sometime in the middle of 1971, as Pol Pot's Khmers Rouges leaders began to consolidate their control within FUNK, they began the process of removing the pro-Sihanouk elements from positions of power in insurgent-controlled areas. Two years later the Khmers Rouges began an intensive propaganda campaign to discredit the Prince in the eyes of the Cambodian peasants.

The Hanoi-trained communists never attained leadership positions within the Cambodian Revolutionary Organization itself. All the top military and political position within FUNK were held by the Pol Pot forces, who identified themselves as members of Angka Padevat (Revolutionary Organization). During 1970 and 1971, in some areas under Vietnamese military control Khmer Viet Minh political cadres held positions of local state power from the village to the tambon (sector) level. As for the Khmer Viet Minh military cadres, upon their return to Cambodia they were given low ranking positions within the insurgency. Eventually they, together with the political cadres, would be liquidated by Pol Pot's security forces.

By late 1971 the Pol Pot leadership of the KCP had become frustrated with Vietnamese attempts to control the insurgency. They decided to try to expel the Vietnamese communists from Cambodia, even though the Khmer Republic was at that time not yet defeated. Fighting broke out between the Pol Pot led guerillas and some Vietnamese units in late 1971 and especially in 1972.

However it was not the actions of Pol Pot's forces, but rather events pertaining to the struggle for South Vietnam, especially the launching of the Easter Offensive in March 1972, that led Hanoi to remove the bulk of its combat forces from Cambodia. The terrible losses suffered by Hanoi in that offensive, and the signing of the Paris Peace Agreements in January 1973, meant that Hanoi could no longer afford to be deeply involved in the struggle for control of Cambodia thereafter. Yet they did allow Chinese military supplies through to the Khmers Rouges until the war ended.

The Hanoi leaders had already laid the foundation for a Khmers Rouges victory. During the two years from March 1970 the North Vietnamese army had severely mauled the army of the Khmer Republic, and Hanoi sponsored cadres had recruited thousands of peasants under the deceptive banner of the politically impotent Sihanouk. Hanoi's actions by themselves did not determine the outcome of the war. But they greatly helped place Pol Pot's forces in a position to seize power in April 1975.

VIETNAM AND DEMOCRATIC KAMPUCHEA


When Phnom Penh surrendered to insurgent forces on April 30, 1975, the Khmers Rouges victors were enthusiastically congratulated by the Vietnamese communists. By the time the North Vietnamese army had marched into Saigon some two weeks later, Phnom Penh and most of the major towns of Cambodia had been emptied of their former inhabitants. Cambodia, now renamed Democratic Kampuchea, had begun its long march towards the hyper Maoist Utopia. But in spite of real differences between the Vietnamese and Cambodian approaches to revolution, there were few public signs of Vietnamese communist dissatisfaction with their neighbour's social experiment.. However, concealed from international view, the tensions that had surfaced during the war years had been exacerbated. The ostensible issue of the dispute was the border between Vietnam and Cambodia.

Between 1870 and 1914 the French had redrawn the borders between Cambodia and Vietnam, by amputating large chunks of Cambodian territory and making them administratively part of their Vietnamese colonial entities. In June 1948, in the Along Bay Agreement, the French recognised their colony of Cochinchina -what had formerly been southern Cambodia (Kampuchea Krom to the Khmers Rouges) - as part of Vietnam. The resentment felt by most Cambodians at this humiliation, combined with the spirit of triumphalism that permeated the Khmers Rouges, fed into an ambition for forceful recovery of lost territories. Sihanouk reports that in 1975 the Khmers Rouge had told him "we are going to recover Kampuchea Krom." Yet such ambition of the Khmers Rouges should have been restrained by military realities. The Vietnamese army was ten times the size of the Khmers Rouges army. Vietnam also had a significant air force and navy, which the DK did not.

Nevertheless in early May 1975 the Khmers Rouges attacked Vietnamese islands in the Gulf of Thailand, claiming the islands that the French had assigned to their Vietnamese colony, and which had been inherited by South Vietnam. The Vietnamese, though surprised, responded decisively. By the end of May the Vietnamese had recaptured the islands by force, taking 300 prisoners. In early In early June the Vietnamese retaliated further by attacking and occupying the Cambodian island of Puolo Wai. These actions seemed to restrain for a time the Khmers Rouges enthusiasm for military challenges to Vietnam.

On June 2 Pol Pot received Nguyen Van Linh, who was representing the Vietnamese Workers Party (as the Vietnamese communist party was still called). Pol Pot told Linh that the fighting had been due to "ignorance of the local geography by Kampuchean troops." In June 1975 Pol Pot, leng Sary and Nuon Chea led a KCP delegation that secretly travelled to Hanoi for negotiations. In July 1975 a high powered delegation from Vietnam, headed by Communist Party first secretary Le Duan, undertook what was described as a "friendly visit" to Cambodia. In August the Cambodian island that Vietnam had occupied was returned.

Publicly the Vietnamese gave no hint of any problems. The September issue of the official Vietnamese monthly Vietnamese Courier spoke of the talks being held in a "cordial atmosphere full of brotherly spirit." The article went further when it praised Cambodia's new social order without qualification. "Liberated Cambodia is living in a new and healthy atmosphere."

The Vietnamese had retained some of their military forces on Cambodian soil after the joint communist victories of 1975. It took some political effort by the Chinese to convince the Hanoi leaders that the troops should be returned to Vietnam.

Throughout 1976 there were public greetings exchanged on special occasions. For example in April 1976 the first anniversary of the Khmers Rouges victory was hailed by Vietnamese party and government leaders. The Vietnamese media spoke glowingly of the "achievements" of the "Cambodian workers, peasants, and revolutionary army." Various official delegations from Vietnam visited Cambodia in 1976. In July an agreement was signed to open an air link between Hanoi and Phnom Penh. In September 1976 that air service was begun.

Thus, by the end of 1976 the outward signs suggested close relations between the communist parties and governments of Vietnam and Cambodia. Yet these outward signs concealed the real feelings of both parties. The Vietnamese leaders hoped that some pro-Vietnamese elements would appear within the leadership of the Kampuchean Communist Party. At the same time the leaders of Democratic Kampuchea were possessed by a seething hatred and fear of the rulers of Vietnam - a hatred and fear that threatened to boil over into armed confrontation.

The Vietnamese leaders had a poor grasp of the real political situation within the leadership of Democratic Kampuchea. They felt that Pol Pot and leng Sary were pro-Chinese and therefore bad people but that Nuon Chea was different. On November 6 1976, Pham Van Dong told the Soviet ambassador to Vietnam that "with Nuon Chea we are able to work better. We know him better than the other leaders of Kampuchea." At a meeting with the Soviet Ambassador on November 16, 1976. The Vietnamese Communist Party first secretary Le Duan stated that he was glad that Pol Pot and leng Sary had (apparently) been removed from the leadership, because they constituted "a pro-Chinese sect conducting a crude and severe policy." Le Duan also asserted that Nuon Chea, a member of the Standing Committee and Secretariat of the Kampuchean Communist Party, who had replaced Pol Pot as Prime Minister of Democratic Kampuchea in September, was a person of pro-Vietnamese orientation. Le Duan added that "he is our man and my personal friend." Le Duan was to repeat this opinion in private conversations with Soviet diplomats over the next two years. .

The Cambodian communists had good reason to fear the ambitions of the Vietnamese communists in the long term. But the question arises as to how imminent a threat to the power of the Khmers Rouges the Vietnamese posed. The Vietnamese had devised a strategy for controlling the communist movements of Laos and Cambodia. A key element had been inflitrating the communist parties of these countries with people that Hanoi had trained and indoctrinated. In the case of Cambodia Hanoi had trained and supported the so-called Khmer Viet Minh, whom it assumed would act as its agents. So the Khmers Rouges leaders did have real enemies in Hanoi. But Pol Pot and his supporters had anticipated the Vietnamese strategy, and had preempted it by arresting all the Khmer Viet Minh soon after they returned from Hanoi with the Vietnamese army in the early 1970s, and again after the victory of 1975. Nevertheless Pol Pot and his inner circle still feared that Soviet or Vietnamese agents might still be hidden within the party. Thus Pol Pot conducted a series of bloody purges of the party, guided in his choice of victims by paranoid fears rather than real evidence of disloyalty or conspiracy. Not only did Pol Pot carry out bloody internal purges to crush what he thought were enemies within. He also directed the regime's violence against its neighbours.

In April 1977, on the second anniversary of the "liberation" of Phnom Penh, the government and government controlled media in Hanoi offered their congratulations and praise for the Democratic Kampuchea regime. But this goodwill gesture reaped no beneficial consequences for Vietnam. The Khmers Rouges chose the second anniversary of the communist conquest of South Vietnam to leave a bloody message to their former "elder brothers." On April 30, 1977 DK units attacked several villages and towns in An Giang and Chau Doc provinces of South Vietnam, burning houses and killing hundreds of civilians. The Vietnamese leaders were shocked by this unprovoked attack and could not understand any strategic rationale. Nevertheless they decided upon military retaliation. Throughout 1977 armed clashes occurred between Vietnam and Democratic Kampuchea in the border area. Yet when in September 1977 Pol Pot publicly announced that what had previously been known as the Revolutionary Organisation (Angkar Padevat) was in fact the Kampuchean Communist Party, the Vietnamese Communist Party Central Committee sent a message of congratulations, publicly expressing its joy. Interestingly, this message was sent after hundreds of Vietnamese civilians had been killed in Khmers Rouges raids on September 24.

In a conversation with the Soviet ambassador in Hanoi in November 1977 Le Duan indicated that he thought that the anti-Vietnamese behaviour of the DK leaders was because of the outlooks of the “Troskyist” Pol Pot and the “fierce nationalist and pro-Chinese” Ieng Sary. But Le Duan thought that Nuon Chea and Son Sen “have a positive attitude towards Vietnam.” Apparently Le Duan and the other Vietnamese leaders were hoping that the foreign policies of Democratic Kampuchea could be changed by a coup within the Khmers Rouges leadership circles.

In December 1977 the fighting between Vietnam and Democratic Kampuchea escalated. Hanoi used warplanes, artillery and about 20,000 men in an attack inside the Parrot's Beak region of Svay Rieng. After inflicting a serious defeat on the army of Democratic Kampuchea, the Vietnamese withdrew, taking with them thousands of prisoners as well as civilian refugees. They might have been in a position to seize Phnom Penh at that point. But they were concerned about what China’s reaction might be, and hoped that their strong but limited military blows would force the leaders of Democratic Kampuchea to negotiate a settlement. Instead the leaders of DK hardened their attitudes. The DK broke diplomatic regions on December 31, 1977. And they declared the Vietnamese withdrawal a major victory for “the Kampuchean revolution.” Despite their losses, and despite the massive disparity between the Vietnamese and Cambodian armies, with the Vietnamese superiority in both numbers (more than eight one) and quality of military equipment, the army of Democratic Kampuchea persisted in launching attacks inside Vietnamese territory.
Phnom Penh radio broadcasts exhorted Cambodians to fight and win total victory over Vietnam, with the deranged assertion that one Kampuchean soldier was equal to thirty Vietnamese. The DK leadership was living in a fantasy world.

Upon realising that the leadership of Democratic Kampuchea was utterly implacable, Hanoi decided upon a new strategy for changing the DK regime. After two and a half years of pretending that Democratic Kampuchea was a nice regime for Cambodians to live under, they began for the first time to denounce the domestic terror of the DK. Between January and June they slowly changed their description of the DK leadership from :the Kampuchean authorities” to the “Pol Pot-Ieng Sary clique.” Hanoi radio called for the need to save the Cambodian people from genocide at the hands of the “Pol Pot-leng Sary clique.”

Vietnam began building a “liberation army" from among the refugees and other civilians that they had brought back from Cambodia. Pol Pot also inadvertently helped the Vietnamese to build their army by conducting his internal terror and purges of the party and army. The brutal terror resulted in many cadres and even units of the DK army fleeing for their lives to Vietnam. These defectors, mostly from the Eastern Zone of Democratic Kampuchea, joined the forces being assembled by Vietnam. But The Vietnamese leaders realised that an insurgency based upon the "liberation army" of Cambodians would not be strong enough to prevail. Sometime in the middle of 1978 the Vietnamese leaders decided that they had to launch a full scale invasion of Cambodia, and install a new regime that would not only not be hostile, but also one that would be friendly to Vietnam.

The Soviets were encouraged to increase their military aid to Vietnam, with the pretense that China was threatening Vietnam’s independence. Throughout the latter half of 1978 the Vietnamese prepared their military forces, and the psychological climate of revulsion for the DK regime. They hoped to achieve an easy victory over their former comrades and face few negative consequences.

On December 25 1978 Vietnam launched an all out invasion of Cambodia, As anticipated, resistance to the invasion collapsed quickly. But that invasion, and especially the Vietnamese refusal to withdraw, turned international public opinion and international political leaders strongly against Vietnam. China countered the Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia by launching its own invasion of north Vietnam in February 1979. That attack was not in itself a military success for China. But it forced Vietnam to concentrate troops on its northern border and gave ASEAN confidence to be able to provide support for a coalition of Cambodian forces, including the Khmers Rouges, who were resisting Vietnam's occupation.

After more than a decade of Vietnamese military occupation of Cambodia, the pressures from United Nations Chinese American and Southeast Asian nations, and the cut off of Soviet and Eastern European aid, meant that by 1989 the Vietnamese occupation of Cambodia had become untenable. The United Nations Secure Council Permanent Five agreed on a plan whereby the UN would undertake a temporary administration of Cambodia, with the purpose of bringing freedom and a just peace to the Cambodian people.

CONCLUSIONS


For approximately sixty years since the formation of the Indochinese Communist Party in 1930, the Vietnamese communists had always considered Cambodia part of an Indochinese Federation of socialist states, under the domination of the more numerous and powerful Vietnamese "elder brothers." The Vietnamese communist strategy was initially to infiltrate the communist movements of the neighbouring countries with ethnic Vietnamese. By the 1950s, the Vietnamese strategy was to infiltrate the Cambodian movement with ethnic Khmer whom Vietnam had trained and indoctrinated. It was certain that those Khmer whom Vietnam had trained would be loyal to Vietnam. This was the first of many misjudgments by the Vietnamese communist leaders. Many of those whom the Vietnamese communists had trained and indoctrinated turned into their enemies.

Nevertheless, based on their misperceptions of the situation, the Vietnamese communists supported the Khmers Rouges revolution. The reasons for the Khmers Rouges coming to power in 1975 were numerous and complex. However we can see from the history of Vietnamese and Cambodian communism that Vietnam played a vital role in laying the foundations for the establishment of Democratic Kampuchea.

After the establishment of Democratic Kampuchea by the Pol Pot led Khmers Rouges, the Vietnamese communists attempted to establish friendly relations with their weaker neighbour. They celebrated what they described as the "liberation" of Cambodia by the Khmers Rouges. However Pol Pot was driven by a self-destructive combination of paranoia and delusions of grandeur. He provoked the Vietnamese into an unfriendly stance by his attacks upon Vietnamese territory and civilians. And Pol Pot also provided the Vietnamese with recruits for their imperial ambition by terrorising and massacring many of his own political and military cadres. Many Khmers Rouges fled for their lives to Vietnam in 1977 and 1978, and provided the personnel for the governments that Hanoi established in Cambodia from 1979 onwards.

Hanoi's motives were never humanitarian but only self-interested. On the one hand we must not forget that the Vietnamese had a legitimate right to self defence, and the 1978 invasion was consistent with that. But the ten year military occupation, and Hanoi's simultaneous refusal to recognise the noncommunist forces or the resolutions of the United Nations, showed that they were also motivated by an imperial ambition.

Forces beyond the control of Vietnam, especially the collapse of the Soviet Union and its communist bloc, as well as the pressures of China and ASEAN, eventually caused the Vietnamese to withdraw their forces from Cambodia. But some of Vietnam's political influence upon Cambodia still remains.

Extracted from:


- Stephen J. MORRIS : Speech On the Occasion of Public Forum on Khmer Rouge History at Sunway Hotel, Phnom Penh, 25-26 January 2007

Naranhkiri TITH; All Rights Reserved