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| Recent News and Analysis - 2011 part I Table of content 1. Split personalities revealed in Cambodia 2. Cambodia shrugs off aid curb 3. Scope of land evictions is revealed 4. What hapenned to Obama? 5. Anti government group imprisoned 6. Opposition high and low 7. Cambodian awarded "Nobel Prize" of Asia 8. Khmers Helping Khmers and how they are doing it 9. Khmer Spy blog 10. Top 10 tycoons 11. America's nuclear Vietnam 12. Wikkileaks: Sam Rainsy's strategy; push Hun Sen and beat him at the polls 13. Plan to shut down tribunal monitor 14. Shares needed as Cambodia gets a stock exchange 15. Govt hails Thai election 16. As number one, China to face hour of choice 17. Reflection on Cambodian history 18. The Legacy of Angkor 19. Monk, publisher win awards 20. Vietnam's Dr. Strangelove at war with the Mandarins 19. China runs gauntlet in South China Sea 20. Waters roil in the South China Sea 21. The KPRP 22. Vietnam seeks US support in China dispute 23. Democracy spreads roots in Southeast Asia 24. Kem Sokha denies cooperating with CPP 25. Dissident Plans a More Active role in Myanmar 26. Cambodia's king is seen as "a prisoner" in his palace 27. Wydiono; a witness to turbulent era 28. NGOs concerned about KRT 29. Vietnam stays the nuclear course 30. Credibility of Khmer Rouge Tribunal under threat 31. Cambodia' s curse; The modern History of a Troubled Land 32. Domestic issues fuel Thai-Cambodian spats 33 Thailand, Cambodia edge toward war 34. Silent Cultural and Racial Genocide against the Khmer Race 35. Cambodia: a race on the verge of extinction by RFA 36. Large Vietnam deals inked. 37. A book "Cambodia' s Curse" by Joel Brinkley; reviewed by E. Becker 38. Week in review 39. Constructive Cambodian 40. Aid to Cambodia rarely reaches the people it's meant to help 41. A personal struggle to balance Khmer nationalism and Peacebuilding 42.The idea of kingship in bhuddist Cambodia 43 Not a prayer for US vietnam diplomacy 44. Ex-KR leader responds to activist’s allegations 45. No defense necessary: Sam Rainsy 46. 'Angkor' electric vehicle to hit road 47.Like father, like son in Cambodia 48. Rainsy stripped of MP status 49. The Cambodian genocide and Imperial Culture 50. Cambodia's Hun Sen is no Savior 51. Hun Sen is making an impact 52. The 'emperor's clothes' are coming to Vietnam 53. Thai, Cambodian and Vietnamese ties 54. ASEAN Flexes mediatng musle 55. Cambodia, Vietnam re-affirm their vows 56. Opposition leader loses final appeal 57. Vietnam in Cambodia tourism push 58. Border conflict poses more questions than answers 59. What is Vietnamese nationalism? 60 Thailand-Cambodia A Love-Hate Relationship 61. The view from Cambodia [Preah Vihear Temple] 62. The Preah Vihear dispute and some misguided overseas Cambodian patriots 63. Vietnam as Tunisia in waiting 64. Someone explain why' - fighting again at the borders 65. Someone expains why; the Brunei times 66. Bombshells and rally cries 67. Nationalsim behind Thai-Cambodian rift; Experts 68. Cambodia remembers its fallen Muslims 69. Rainsy says Kingdom could go way of Egypt 70. New Khmer Rouge suspects investigated 71. Khmer Rouge Tribunal legacy hinges on final cases 72. Sides still spar over merging party names 73. Opposition merger talks 74. Human rights in freefall 75. Hun Sen sounds off 76. Cambodian envoy raps BBC report 77. Cambodia; a land up for sale 78. China aid floods Cambodia 79. Don't call me a traitor 80. Hun Sen must be prosecuted for crimes against humanity 81. January 7 reignites debate 82. PM takes aim at Liberation Day critics 83. 2010 Alternative Prizes 84. To live and to die with Hun Sen 85. The Prince of Ploys 86. Prince Sihanouk and the New Order in Southeast Asia; a CIA Secret Report | |
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| 1. Split personalities revealed in Cambodia By Sebastian Strangio Asia Times, July 27, 2011 http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Southeast_Asia/MG27Ae03.html
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(Comments: this article titled “Split personalities revealed in Cambodia” based on the cables by the US embassy cables, leaked by WikiLeaks, provides the inner most look at Cambodian politics and the peculiar mind of Cambodian politicians, namely, of Hun Sen, and his CPP members, the royal family, and opposition leaders, with their bickering and pettiness.
The other Companion article titled “Cambodia Shrugs off aid curb“ shows how Hun Sen totally ignores any threat from the world bank to cut off aid in protest against his regime oppression against the Cambodian poor by dispossessing their land to give it to those who are his friends and supporters.
It also shows how difficult for Cambodia go anywhere but down, until such time, a real leader with dignity and courage can be found. It is a must for all those who are interested in helping Cambodia to have a better chance to survive. Naranhkiri Tith Ph.D. Washington DC. August 25, 2011)
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PHNOM PENH - As part of its ongoing release of leaked United States diplomatic cables, the anti-secrecy organization WikiLeaks this month released its small cache of Cambodia-related dispatches. The 777 cables from the US Embassy in Phnom Penh - an eagerly awaited bounty for Cambodia-watchers and local analysts - span the period from 1992 to 2010, nearly the entire life of democratic Cambodia.
While nothing in the Phnom Penh cables approaches the incomparable account of a wedding in the post-Soviet Republic of Dagestan in 2006 (a bacchanalia at which Chechen president Ramzan Kadyrov "danced clumsily with his gold-plated automatic stuck down the back of his jeans") (06MOSCOW9533), certain of the dispatches shine a rare light on the faults, foibles and eccentricities of Cambodia's leadership.
It is surprising perhaps that strongman Prime Minister Hun Sen - the most prominent figure in Cambodia and the one whose personality would likely provide the most grist for analysis - is spared the harsher assessments of US officials. In one dispatch from 1995 (95PHNOMPENH3751), Hun Sen is described as showing evidence of "paranoia" after rumors of an assassination plot cropped up in the local press.
It describes a leader who "continues to show a near-obsession with his personal security" and would not travel outside the city unless accompanied by a retinue of around 60 bodyguards. In later years, Hun Sen showed signs of "increasing maturity", according to a 2008 cable (08PHNOMPENH694) signed by outgoing US ambassador Joseph Mussomeli, who cited the government's "restrained" reaction to provocations from Thailand on contested border territory and apparent commitment to democratic reform.
Overwhelmingly, however, the cables paint a picture of a leader adept at flattering and cajoling US officials while playing his own cards close to his chest. "The PM was on a charm offensive that encompassed an hour and a half of discussion peppered with jokes, historical references, and talking points that played to issues of [US government] interest," stated a cable (06PHNOMPENH361) documenting a meeting between Hun Sen and US Senate staffer Paul Grove.
In her first meeting with Hun Sen in 2009 (09PHNOMPENH79), current ambassador Carol Rodley recalled him "gushingly stating that he spends more of his time with the American ambassador than with any other members of the diplomatic community". Ahead of the 2008 Cambodian national election, however, another cable (09PHNOMPENH489) described Hun Sen as also presiding over an "autocratic nip-and-tuck" and a "sophisticated, rules-based campaign to chip away at free speech".
Unlike the prime minister, Cambodia's feckless royalists provide a target-rich environment for sharp-tongued US diplomats. "Cambodia's royal family", states one May 2006 cable (06PHNOMPENH839), "is a tragedy, comedy and melodrama all rolled into one that could have provided grist for at least a half dozen Shakespeare plays.”
A particular target is Prince Norodom Ranariddh, then leader of the Funcinpec party, whose limelight-stealing antics following the October 2004 abdication of King Norodom Sihanouk and the accession of the prince's half-brother Sihamoni prompted some colorful take-downs from embassy officials.
One cable (04PHNOMPENH1701), titled "Cambodia's Man Who Won't Be King - Ranariddh's Snit Fit", paints a picture of a prince acting in "childish and petulant" manner, out of apparent pique at being "passed over for a younger half-brother as King".
In one instance documented in the cable, Ranariddh flew into a rage when he had the central palace gates closed in his face while he was attempting to follow the king's motorcade, ordering the dismissal of the palace's head of security; a few days later, he failed to attend a Buddhist coronation ceremony for royals.
"[R]ather than raising his stature," the cable concluded, "he is increasingly making himself a laughing stock." In a December 2009 cable (09PHNOMPENH920), following Funcinpec's implosion at the 2008 national elections, ambassador Rodley wrote that the moribund royalists "don't have much of a presence, or a future" in Cambodian politics.
In contrast, the cables paint a positive picture of King Sihamoni, describing his "regal" behavior during his coronation (04PHNOMPENH1701). Another dispatch following the coronation (04PHNOMPENH1985) claimed that he had brought "a new sense of dignity to the royal house" and was a welcome change to Sihanouk and the wayward Ranariddh.
"His careful, well-modulated speeches, though prompted as much by his lack of familiarity with his native Khmer as anything, have been a welcome change from the high-pitched speech characteristic of his father and older half brother," it stated.
The most controversial of the cables is a June 2002 dispatch (02PHNOMPENH1361) detailing long-standing Foreign Minister Hor Namhong's alleged activities during the murderous Khmer Rouge regime. The short cable, which cites an "undated, unattributed report" on file at the embassy, stated that Hor Namhong - described in a 2008 cable (08PHNOMPENH399) as "aged and sclerotic" - returned to Cambodia after the takeover of the Khmer Rouge in April 1975 and took charge of Boeung Trabek prison, a Khmer Rouge interrogation center in Phnom Penh
During the Khmer Rouge regime, "he and his wife collaborated in the killing of many prisoners", the cable states, including members of the royal family, and sentenced one inmate to death for listening to a French radio broadcast. (The prison was liberated by the Vietnamese before the latter sentence could be carried out). Hor Namhong's wife is cited as saying she "helped [Khmer Rouge leader] Ieng Sary bring back a lot of people to be killed" and that she hoped in exchange that her daughter would be given a role in the communist government.
(Earlier this month, Hor Namhong issued a statement condemning the contents of the cable as "highly defamatory". He has twice sued opposition leader Sam Rainsy for defamation for making similar claims in his autobiography Rooted in Stone).
Perhaps the most illuminating of the cables, however, is one from August 2007 (07PHNOMPENH1034), titled "Cambodia's Top Ten Tycoons", illuminating the rich nexus of politicians, cronies and businessmen that undergirds the rock-solid rule of the Cambodian People's Party (CPP).
Among those profiled is Australian-born Kith Meng, who is described by one source cited in a cable as "a relatively young and ruthless gangster"; another source claims the head of the Royal Group conglomerate - who is blessed with the alias "Mr. Rough Stuff" - is "notorious for using his bodyguards to coerce others into brokering deals"
Particularly close to the prime minister, according to the cable, is Mong Reththy - "Hun Sen's money man" - who has built a fortune from agriculture and construction, and owns a private port, naturally named after himself, near Sihanoukville on the country's south coast.
The two leaders reportedly spent time together at a Phnom Penh pagoda during secondary school; in 1997, when Mong Reththy's name was raised in connection with a seven-ton marijuana bust, Hun Sen "publicly shielded" him from the accusation, according to the cable.
Other tycoons mentioned include CPP Senator Ly Yong Phat, who maintains a formidable economic fief in the southwestern province of Koh Kong; Sok Kong, who heads Sokimex, the country's largest petroleum supplier that also controls the lucrative ticket revenues from the famous Angkor Wat temple complex; and Lao Meng Khin, a commercial jack-of-all-trades with a seat in the senate, a powerful, well-connected wife and lucrative construction, logging and agribusiness concessions.
According to another leaked cable, Cambodia's leading businessmen are linked to Hun Sen and the political leadership in a tight mesh of personal relationships and economic accommodations. Hun Sen enjoys a "mutually beneficial" relationship with the country's oligarchs who donate money towards the CPP in exchange for his personal backing in their business ventures.
This economic in-breeding, the cable concludes, acts to "reinforce the culture of impunity and limit progress on reforms such as Hun Sen's self-declared 'war on corruption'.”
Except for Hor Namhong's angry missive protesting claims he played a significant role in the Khmer Rouge regime, the Cambodian government is unlikely to take the leaks - and their relatively mild disclosures - too seriously. "Information from WikiLeaks is unofficial ... [and] from the perspective of one person," said Phay Siphan, a government spokesman. "It does not represent the official interests of the United States.”
Sebastian Strangio is a journalist based in Phnom Penh, Cambodia. He can be reached at sebastian.strangio@gmail.com.
(Copyright 2011 Asia Times Online (Holdings) Ltd. All rights reserved. Please contact us about sales, syndication and |
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--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 2. Cambodia shrugs off aid curb By Brian McCartan Asia Times: August 23, 2011 http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Southeast_Asia/MH23Ae02.html
Cambodian leaders have shrugged off a World Bank move this month to suspend new lending due to state-sponsored, large-scale evictions to clear land for development projects. While rising access to private Asian capital, particularly from China, has helped Cambodia weather previous Western donor pressure for reform, the socio-economic costs of the latest sanction could be much higher.
The World Bank had come under pressure from local and foreign non-governmental organizations (NGOs) to take a tough stance against Cambodia's government in response to well-documented forced evictions of communities. The issue centered on a large-scale urban development project planned for central Phnom Penh at Boeung Kak lake where many of the residents are involved in catering to a growing tourist industry
The pressure increased late last year after an internal investigation found that the World Bank had violated its own social and environmental policies in supporting the project. It is being led by the privately-held Cambodian Shukaku company, which signed a 99-year lease with the government in 2007 to develop Boeung Kak and the surrounding area into a district of luxury apartments and high-end shops.
The company is chaired by Lao Meng Khin, a powerful senator affiliated with the ruling Cambodian People's Party (CPP) and a close associate of Prime Minister Hun Sen. Shukaku is partnered with the Inner Mongolia Erdos Hongjun Investment Co Ltd of China, which has pledged broadly to spend US$3 billion in Cambodia on property development, metal processing and power generation.
However, the joint venture has raised some eyebrows due to the unlisted Chinese company's murky background and ownership. Critics say that the company has no proven expertise in any of the areas in which it has pledged to invest, and there is an unusual lack of publicity around a company that has promised to commit such a large amount of capital outside China.
The developers began pumping sand into the lake in 2008, flooding homes and virtually wiping out the once tranquil lake's ecology. Land holders have had no say in the process and have been accused by the government as illegal squatters on state-owned land. These accusations, NGOs say, run counter to Cambodia's land law, which provides protections against evictions to long-time land holders. Many of the residents at Boeung Kak have lived there for decades.
However, the lake's residents were excluded from a process organized by the World Bank to adjudicate property claims. Over 2,000 have already been forced from their homes and another 10,000 now face eviction. The international lender has since called on the Cambodian government to halt the evictions and agree to fair compensation for land holders. After failing to reach an agreement, the World Bank stated on August 9, "Until an agreement is reached with the residents of Boeung Kak lake we do not expect to provide new lending to Cambodia."
The World Bank has lent Cambodia between US$50 million and $70 million annually for the past few years with the last disbursement made in December 2010. Most of the loans have been committed to health and education projects. Despite these capital commitments, Cambodian leaders have so far shrugged off the World Bank's statement about withholding future loans.
Analysts say they can afford to, given the billions of dollars of aid and investment the government now receives from China without strings attached. Cambodia's foreign donors pledged $1.1 billion in aid last year, with China committing the most of any country. China has also become Cambodia's largest source of foreign direct investment (FDI), with stated plans to spend $8 billion on 360 different projects during the first seven months of 2011.
It is difficult to separate Chinese foreign aid from investment since they are often intertwined. Chinese companies receive government subsidies to participate in projects that by Western standards would often be considered as development related. During a 2010 visit by Hun Sen to Beijing, China promised to provide a $300 million loan to construct two national highways and irrigation projects. Other deals concluded during the visit, mostly related to infrastructure, were worth around $293 million.
Hun Sen has made it clear in several speeches that he prefers Chinese to Western aid due to the lack of attached conditions. Western donors often predicate their aid packages on democratic reforms and improvements in human rights and counter-corruption. Hun Sen is apparently not alone in this opinion: the opaque regimes in Laos and Myanmar have also shown a preference for Chinese aid and investment for similar reasons.
Sphere of interest
Together with Cambodia, Myanmar and Laos are often considered Beijing's "sphere of interest" in Southeast Asia.
China became Laos' largest foreign investor in 2010 with total investments amounting $2.9 billion since 2000. Much of China's investment there is in mining, hydropower projects, agribusiness and services. It has also secured a prominent place as an aid donor through large-scale infrastructure projects such as the construction of Route 3 connecting southwestern China with northern Thailand through Laos.
Some of these projects have aimed more at securing goodwill, such as the widening of the Central Avenue in downtown Vientiane and the construction of the National Cultural Hall, than making money. That's evidenced in the fact that many loans are dispensed interest-free.
Last year, largely Western aid agencies and donors cautioned Laos about racing ahead with a development plan based too heavily on natural resource exploitation without enough emphasis on health, education and capacity development among the local population.
The Lao government has stated some of its own concerns over investment, especially in terms of long-term and concessions, such as those granted to Chinese investors to build casino complexes. However, the government has made it clear it intends to reduce its high dependency on official development assistance in favor of increased access to Asian private capital, especially from China.
In Myanmar, where the country ostensibly made a transition from direct military rule to a democratic system earlier this year, there is increasing Chinese investment as the country's leaders continue to look to Beijing for economic as well as diplomatic support. Much of China's investment is in natural resource extraction, hydropower projects, and infrastructure, but there is a growing interest in acquiring agricultural land, especially for rubber.
Myanmar's rulers have long relied on Chinese investment and aid to make up for a lack of development assistance from the West. Sanctions and concern over human-rights issues have prevented Western donors from providing funding at levels similar to that donated to Laos and Cambodia. Human-rights and political opposition groups have long argued that Chinese aid has allowed the military to stay in power and continue to repress the population.
China plans in coming years to further expand its trade with the region and is making moves to develop more extensive physical trade arteries. Beijing has announced plans to pour money into road and rail projects in coming years, linking its landlocked southwestern region with ports in Myanmar, Thailand and Cambodia. It is hoped this will increase trade, promote regional investment and tourism, as well as strengthen ties with the member states of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN).
This may be music to the ears of Southeast Asian policymakers who are interested in developing their countries' economic potential as well as improving their own financial situations given the high levels of corruption in the region. However, growing Chinese influence, especially in the economic sphere, is becoming increasingly worrisome to the average farmer and shopkeeper in these countries.
For instance, there is growing discontent in Laos over what some see as too much Chinese influence in the country. Laos are especially concerned by the growing number of Chinese migrating to work in the country on Chinese projects. This became especially acute in Vientiane when plans for an urban development project near the iconic That Luang monastery came to light.
The project, which was widely perceived as building a "Chinese city" in the heart of the capital, has stirred nationalistic responses from the city's growing middle class. In addition to a penchant by Chinese companies to import Chinese workers to work on their projects, Laos are worried those workers will not return home after the projects are finished, as has been the case on certain roadway projects in remote northern areas.
Land concessions are also an issue, especially in the north where Chinese companies have been able to acquire large tracts of land for plantation agriculture. While many villagers have been able to arrange contracting agreements to provide rubber to Chinese companies, others say they have been forced to convert their land to rubber cultivation. The north is also the location of two Chinese casino, hotel and shopping complexes at Boten and Huay Xai, where sovereignty has seemingly been handed over to Chinese developers.
There is also a longstanding, but largely quiet, animosity towards Chinese influence in Myanmar. Growing Chinese economic influence in recent years has heightened a perception of Chinese as untrustworthy businessmen bent on taking over the country.
As evidence, many Burmese point to the large areas of Mandalay and other cities which have become crowded with shops with store signs only in Chinese and catering to the growing number of Chinese moving into them. This perception apparently extends to the upper echelons of government, where some leaders are reportedly alarmed by China's growing economic clout vis-à-vis the local population.
For the average Myanmar farmer, especially in the country's northern region where there is an increase in China-linked agribusiness projects, there is concern over being evicted from their lands in favor of commercial plantations. Human rights groups have documented this practice throughout the country in a process often carried out by military units.
Others are worried their land will be taken for infrastructure and other projects. Environmental groups have documented the confiscation of land to build a deep sea port in Myanmar's south that will ship oil and gas through pipelines being constructed by Chinese companies to China's land-locked southwestern region.
While not solely the work of Chinese companies, rising evictions in Cambodia are creating a huge number of landless displaced people across the country. Some analysts speculate that the sheer number of people displaced could lead to social stability problems in the future as Cambodians forced off their land and without other viable economic options become increasingly desperate.
Unless Cambodian government policymakers make a shift from their headlong rush for development and reckless policies to supply China's demand for natural resources, agricultural products and diplomatic allies, the risk will rise that their development projects cause more social problems than they resolve.
It's a message the World Bank has delivered belatedly with its suspension of new lending and advice Cambodia's leaders would be wise to heed if they are to maintain social stability amid rapid economic growth and rising Chinese influence.
Brian McCartan is a freelance journalist. He may be reached at brianpm@comcast.net.
(Copyright 2011 Asia Times Online (Holdings) Ltd. All rights reserved. Please contact us about sales, syndication and republishing.)
3. Scope of land evictions revealed The Phnom Penh Post; Tuesday, 16 August 2011 15:01 John Anthony
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(Comments: this article show how the Hun Sen regime supported by Sihanouk has been taking away lands from the poor Cambodian people to give or sell to the rich and the Vietnamese.
Thanks to the courageous voices of people like Ou Virak, chairman of the Cambodian Centre for Human Rights (CCHR), and the reverend Loun Savath, the voices of these victims of Hun Sen’s inhuman and pervasive oppression are being heard. Naranhkiri Tith Ph.D. Washington DC. August 16, 2011)
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Land stats 2007-11 · Worst provinces
1. Phnom Penh - 22 conflicts 2.Banteay Meanchey - 17 3.Rattanakkiri - 17 · Families: An estimated 47,342 families have been affected or could be in the future. · Resolution: About 90% of land conflict cases are unresolved. Victims of land disputes nationwide are being encouraged to unite, as figures released yesterday highlighted the magnitude of what is often referred to as an “epidemic of land grabbing”. Ownership of at least 5 per cent of all land in Cambodia was a matter of dispute between 2007 and 2011, according to a study by the Cambodian Centre for Human Rights.
CCHR presented the findings of its study on land conflicts in Cambodia at a press conference in Phnom Penh yesterday. As many as 47,000 families had been or could be affected by land conflict cases, some of which are on-going, covered in the study.
The study, which was restricted to publicly available information, found that there had been 223 land conflict cases from 2007 to 2011. These comprised 165 reported land grabs and 66 evictions. More than 9,000 square kilometres of land had been confiscated during the period, the study found.
At the conference a number of land conflict victims delivered emotional accounts of losing their homes and land, and the impact it had on them.
Venerable Loun Sovath, the senior monk in Siem Reap’ province’s Chi Kraeng district, said that evictions violated human rights and international laws. “I call on the government, relevant ministries and stakeholders to enhance respect for human rights and the law,” he said. Loun Sovath has become an outspoken voice on land rights issues over the past two years, combining human rights and a respect for the rule of law with peaceful advocacy grounded in Buddhist precepts. His advocacy on behalf of communities involved in land disputes began after two members of his family were shot during a land dispute in 2009.
Prey Lang committee chief Moeurn Sopheap also called on victims to band together.
“People must know that as the victims we have rights to make complaints. We have to unite, combat and protest against those violating our rights,” Moeurn Sopheap said.
Prey Lang forest, which covers sections of four provinces, was in the spotlight earlier this year when hundreds of residents were evicted to make way for rubber plantations.
About 30 per cent of land conflicts in CCHR’s study occurred in or around Phnom Penh, while border provinces accounted for 27 per cent. Nearly half of all cases involved violations of human rights. A third of all land conflict victims were reportedly arrested while 45 per cent were subjected to intimidation or destruction of property.
CCHR president Ou Virak said the study would not have been possible without help from victims. He encouraged victims, various stakeholders and NGOs to rally together to combat land conflicts.
“These conflicts destroy lives. Cambodia has had enough of land grabbing and impunity, and real reform is required to ensure equality and security in the land sector,” he said. The study’s findings will be presented to government ministries, parliamentarians and NGOs, he said.
The figures were limited to publicly available data as CCHR did not want to present statistics that the government would be likely to immediately dismiss. Ou Virak said. “We have more information on more cases, but we wanted to play the low-ball numbers.”
The Ministry of Land Management had seen the figures and responded, which was a positive step forward, he said. But they disputed the figures and came back with a total of only 5,000 cases, a fraction of 47,000 the centre had found, he said.
The ministry declined to comment yesterday.ADDITIONAL REPORTING BY PHAK SEANGLY
4. What Happened to Obama? By DREW WESTEN Opinion
The New York Times: Published: August 6, 2011 (Comments: Obama had fooled me and my friends during the 2008 presidential election, but, he will never fool me again, It was a big mistake for me and my Asian-American friends to have organized a supporting group of voters for Obama in 2008. As it turns out, the Slogan "Change; Yes We Can" is an extravagant fraud. He does not have the minimum mecessary moral quality and political courage even to be a leader in a respectable developing country such as; Indenesia, or Singapore, and certainly not a leader of a great country like the America. The last straw for me from Obama is well captured by two articles posted below, titled " Obama will fold again," and " The Diminsihed President." Obama lack of leadersip is overwhelming and pervasive. Granted that Obama had no choice but to act more calmly than what most Afro-American leaders, such as the Reverend Sharpston and others, who are so bitter that they tend to overreact, in their publicdebate and discussion with other white politicians, instead of calmly acting in public. Hiding behind this over cautious behavior, he often uses the word "compromise" in a negative way, which really is equivalent to "surrender", in order to hide his shyness and aloofness to concede, instead of politely but resdolutely confronting the Republicans irrational aggressiveness, especially the racist Tea Party members. But, his real failure as president of the USA is the fact that he practically failed in all his his major reform attempts in the economic, financial, political, social sectors; such the health care that led to increase in insurance premium for those who are not covered by the health care progra; the financial reform to eliminate the mentality of "Too Big to fail" led to more concentration of wealth and income to the rich, (See an articvle posted below titled "Obama's Biggest Mistake: Selling Out to the Bankers "; the Middle East problem led to nowhere; the irrational confrontation with China led by Hillary Clinton using Vietnam as an ally, while China has been a good partners in both military and economic cooperation to make the world safer, have not met their intended objectives, or even making things worse than before the introduction of these reforms. This weakness of President Obama was well captured by Drew Westen, the author of one of the articles titled "What Happened to Obama," posted below, when he wrote that: "A real president like John Kennedy would have told the Republican Tea party to take a hike, but the wimp in chief and cowardly and or dishonest Barack Obama, who doesn’t have the backbone of even his young daughter, is pathologically weak." To read all the articles mentioned, please, go to this page of my web site http://cambodiana.org/MainreasonsofmysupportofObama.aspx " Obama is not only a disaster for America, but, for the whole world. He did so much damage to this country that it will take a long time for America to recover from his tragic and weak personality and aloofness. Most of all, he will prevent all minorites in this country to have any chance to become a president, in the future. Perhaps a food summary of the main reasons why Obama has failed miserably was given by Professor Westen in an article published by the New York Times titled; " ", when he summarized Obama's dramatic and total failure in the following concluding sentence: "But the arc of history does not bend toward justice through capitulation cast as compromise. It does not bend when 400 people control more of the wealth than 150 million of their fellow Americans. It does not bend when the average middle-class family has seen its income stagnate over the last 30 years while the richest 1 percent has seen its income rise astronomically. It does not bend when we cut the fixed incomes of our parents and grandparents so hedge fund managers can keep their 15 percent tax rates. It does not bend when only one side in negotiations between workers and their bosses is allowed representation. And it does not bend when, as political scientists have shown, it is not public opinion but the opinions of the wealthy that predict the votes of the Senate. The arc of history can bend only so far before it breaks. ". I will never vote for any Republican to be president of the USA. But, I will never vote for Obama again. I am still supporting all democratic candidates, except Obama. Naranhkiri Tith Ph.D. Washington DC. August, 11, 2011) -------------------------------------------------------- Drew Westen is a professor of psychology at Emory University and the author of “The Political Brain: The Role of Emotion in Deciding the Fate of the Nation.”
Atlanta IT was a blustery day in Washington on Jan. 20, 2009, as it often seems to be on the day of a presidential inauguration. As I stood with my 8-year-old daughter, watching the president deliver his inaugural address, I had a feeling of unease. It wasn’t just that the man who could be so eloquent had seemingly chosen not to be on this auspicious occasion, although that turned out to be a troubling harbinger of things to come. It was that there was a story the American people were waiting to hear — and needed to hear — but he didn’t tell it. And in the ensuing months he continued not to tell it, no matter how outrageous the slings and arrows his opponents threw at him. The stories our leaders tell us matter, probably almost as much as the stories our parents tell us as children, because they orient us to what is, what could be, and what should be; to the worldviews they hold and to the values they hold sacred. Our brains evolved to “expect” stories with a particular structure, with protagonists and villains, a hill to be climbed or a battle to be fought. Our species existed for more than 100,000 years before the earliest signs of literacy, and another 5,000 years would pass before the majority of humans would know how to read and write. Stories were the primary way our ancestors transmitted knowledge and values. Today we seek movies, novels and “news stories” that put the events of the day in a form that our brains evolved to find compelling and memorable. Children crave bedtime stories; the holy books of the three great monotheistic religions are written in parables; and as research in cognitive science has shown, lawyers whose closing arguments tell a story win jury trials against their legal adversaries who just lay out “the facts of the case.” When Barack Obama rose to the lectern on Inauguration Day, the nation was in tatters. Americans were scared and angry. The economy was spinning in reverse. Three-quarters of a million people lost their jobs that month. Many had lost their homes, and with them the only nest eggs they had. Even the usually impervious upper middle class had seen a decade of stagnant or declining investment, with the stock market dropping in value with no end in sight. Hope was as scarce as credit. In that context, Americans needed their president to tell them a story that made sense of what they had just been through, what caused it, and how it was going to end. They needed to hear that he understood what they were feeling, that he would track down those responsible for their pain and suffering, and that he would restore order and safety. What they were waiting for, in broad strokes, was a story something like this: “I know you’re scared and angry. Many of you have lost your jobs, your homes, your hope. This was a disaster, but it was not a natural disaster. It was made by Wall Street gamblers who speculated with your lives and futures. It was made by conservative extremists who told us that if we just eliminated regulations and rewarded greed and recklessness, it would all work out. But it didn’t work out. And it didn’t work out 80 years ago, when the same people sold our grandparents the same bill of goods, with the same results. But we learned something from our grandparents about how to fix it, and we will draw on their wisdom. We will restore business confidence the old-fashioned way: by putting money back in the pockets of working Americans by putting them back to work, and by restoring integrity to our financial markets and demanding it of those who want to run them. I can’t promise that we won’t make mistakes along the way. But I can promise you that they will be honest mistakes, and that your government has your back again.” A story isn’t a policy. But that simple narrative — and the policies that would naturally have flowed from it — would have inoculated against much of what was to come in the intervening two and a half years of failed government, idled factories and idled hands. That story would have made clear that the president understood that the American people had given Democrats the presidency and majorities in both houses of Congress to fix the mess the Republicans and Wall Street had made of the country, and that this would not be a power-sharing arrangement. It would have made clear that the problem wasn’t tax-and-spend liberalism or the deficit — a deficit that didn’t exist until George W. Bush gave nearly $2 trillion in tax breaks largely to the wealthiest Americans and squandered $1 trillion in two wars. And perhaps most important, it would have offered a clear, compelling alternative to the dominant narrative of the right, that our problem is not due to spending on things like the pensions of firefighters, but to the fact that those who can afford to buy influence are rewriting the rules so they can cut themselves progressively larger slices of the American pie while paying less of their fair share for it. But there was no story — and there has been none since. In similar circumstances, Franklin D. Roosevelt offered Americans a promise to use the power of his office to make their lives better and to keep trying until he got it right. Beginning in his first inaugural address, and in the fireside chats that followed, he explained how the crash had happened, and he minced no words about those who had caused it. He promised to do something no president had done before: to use the resources of the United States to put Americans directly to work, building the infrastructure we still rely on today. He swore to keep the people who had caused the crisis out of the halls of power, and he made good on that promise. In a 1936 speech at Madison Square Garden, he thundered, “Never before in all our history have these forces been so united against one candidate as they stand today. They are unanimous in their hate for me — and I welcome their hatred.” When Barack Obama stepped into the Oval Office, he stepped into a cycle of American history, best exemplified by F.D.R. and his distant cousin, Teddy. After a great technological revolution or a major economic transition, as when America changed from a nation of farmers to an urban industrial one, there is often a period of great concentration of wealth, and with it, a concentration of power in the wealthy. That’s what we saw in 1928, and that’s what we see today. At some point that power is exercised so injudiciously, and the lives of so many become so unbearable, that a period of reform ensues — and a charismatic reformer emerges to lead that renewal. In that sense, Teddy Roosevelt started the cycle of reform his cousin picked up 30 years later, as he began efforts to bust the trusts and regulate the railroads, exercise federal power over the banks and the nation’s food supply, and protect America’s land and wildlife, creating the modern environmental movement. Those were the shoes — that was the historic role — that Americans elected Barack Obama to fill. The president is fond of referring to “the arc of history,” paraphrasing the Rev. Dr. Martin Luther King Jr.’s famous statement that “the arc of the moral universe is long, but it bends toward justice.” But with his deep-seated aversion to conflict and his profound failure to understand bully dynamics — in which conciliation is always the wrong course of action, because bullies perceive it as weakness and just punch harder the next time — he has broken that arc and has likely bent it backward for at least a generation. When Dr. King spoke of the great arc bending toward justice, he did not mean that we should wait for it to bend. He exhorted others to put their full weight behind it, and he gave his life speaking with a voice that cut through the blistering force of water cannons and the gnashing teeth of police dogs. He preached the gospel of nonviolence, but he knew that whether a bully hid behind a club or a poll tax, the only effective response was to face the bully down, and to make the bully show his true and repugnant face in public. IN contrast, when faced with the greatest economic crisis, the greatest levels of economic inequality, and the greatest levels of corporate influence on politics since the Depression, Barack Obama stared into the eyes of history and chose to avert his gaze. Instead of indicting the people whose recklessness wrecked the economy, he put them in charge of it. He never explained that decision to the public — a failure in storytelling as extraordinary as the failure in judgment behind it. Had the president chosen to bend the arc of history, he would have told the public the story of the destruction wrought by the dismantling of the New Deal regulations that had protected them for more than half a century. He would have offered them a counternarrative of how to fix the problem other than the politics of appeasement, one that emphasized creating economic demand and consumer confidence by putting consumers back to work. He would have had to stare down those who had wrecked the economy, and he would have had to tolerate their hatred if not welcome it. But the arc of his temperament just didn’t bend that far. The truly decisive move that broke the arc of history was his handling of the stimulus. The public was desperate for a leader who would speak with confidence, and they were ready to follow wherever the president led. Yet instead of indicting the economic policies and principles that had just eliminated eight million jobs, in the most damaging of the tic-like gestures of compromise that have become the hallmark of his presidency — and against the advice of multiple Nobel-Prize-winning economists — he backed away from his advisers who proposed a big stimulus, and then diluted it with tax cuts that had already been shown to be inert. The result, as predicted in advance, was a half-stimulus that half-stimulated the economy. That, in turn, led the White House to feel rightly unappreciated for having saved the country from another Great Depression but in the unenviable position of having to argue a counterfactual — that something terrible might have happened had it not half-acted. To the average American, who was still staring into the abyss, the half-stimulus did nothing but prove that Ronald Reagan was right, that government is the problem. In fact, the average American had no idea what Democrats were trying to accomplish by deficit spending because no one bothered to explain it to them with the repetition and evocative imagery that our brains require to make an idea, particularly a paradoxical one, “stick.” Nor did anyone explain what health care reform was supposed to accomplish (other than the unbelievable and even more uninspiring claim that it would “bend the cost curve”), or why “credit card reform” had led to an increase in the interest rates they were already struggling to pay. Nor did anyone explain why saving the banks was such a priority, when saving the homes the banks were foreclosing didn’t seem to be. All Americans knew, and all they know today, is that they’re still unemployed, they’re still worried about how they’re going to pay their bills at the end of the month and their kids still can’t get a job. And now the Republicans are chipping away at unemployment insurance, and the president is making his usual impotent verbal exhortations after bargaining it away. What makes the “deficit debate” we just experienced seem so surreal is how divorced the conversation in Washington has been from conversations around the kitchen table everywhere else in America. Although I am a scientist by training, over the last several years, as a messaging consultant to nonprofit groups and Democratic leaders, I have studied the way voters think and feel, talking to them in plain language. At this point, I have interacted in person or virtually with more than 50,000 Americans on a range of issues, from taxes and deficits to abortion and immigration. The average voter is far more worried about jobs than about the deficit, which few were talking about while Bush and the Republican Congress were running it up. The conventional wisdom is that Americans hate government, and if you ask the question in the abstract, people will certainly give you an earful about what government does wrong. But if you give them the choice between cutting the deficit and putting Americans back to work, it isn’t even close. But it’s not just jobs. Americans don’t share the priorities of either party on taxes, budgets or any of the things Congress and the president have just agreed to slash — or failed to slash, like subsidies to oil companies. When it comes to tax cuts for the wealthy, Americans are united across the political spectrum, supporting a message that says, “In times like these, millionaires ought to be giving to charity, not getting it.” When pitted against a tough budget-cutting message straight from the mouth of its strongest advocates, swing voters vastly preferred a message that began, “The best way to reduce the deficit is to put Americans back to work.” This statement is far more consistent with what many economists are saying publicly — and what investors apparently believe, as evident in the nosedive the stock market took after the president and Congress “saved” the economy. So where does that leave us? Like most Americans, at this point, I have no idea what Barack Obama — and by extension the party he leads — believes on virtually any issue. The president tells us he prefers a “balanced” approach to deficit reduction, one that weds “revenue enhancements” (a weak way of describing popular taxes on the rich and big corporations that are evading them) with “entitlement cuts” (an equally poor choice of words that implies that people who’ve worked their whole lives are looking for handouts). But the law he just signed includes only the cuts. This pattern of presenting inconsistent positions with no apparent recognition of their incoherence is another hallmark of this president’s storytelling. He announces in a speech on energy and climate change that we need to expand offshore oil drilling and coal production — two methods of obtaining fuels that contribute to the extreme weather Americans are now seeing. He supports a health care law that will use Medicaid to insure about 15 million more Americans and then endorses a budget plan that, through cuts to state budgets, will most likely decimate Medicaid and other essential programs for children, senior citizens and people who are vulnerable by virtue of disabilities or an economy that is getting weaker by the day. He gives a major speech on immigration reform after deporting around 800,000 immigrants in two years, a pace faster than nearly any other period in American history. THE real conundrum is why the president seems so compelled to take both sides of every issue, encouraging voters to project whatever they want on him, and hoping they won’t realize which hand is holding the rabbit. That a large section of the country views him as a socialist while many in his own party are concluding that he does not share their values speaks volumes — but not the volumes his advisers are selling: that if you make both the right and left mad, you must be doing something right. As a practicing psychologist with more than 25 years of experience, I will resist the temptation to diagnose at a distance, but as a scientist and strategic consultant I will venture some hypotheses. The most charitable explanation is that he and his advisers have succumbed to a view of electoral success to which many Democrats succumb — that “centrist” voters like “centrist” politicians. Unfortunately, reality is more complicated. Centrist voters prefer honest politicians who help them solve their problems. A second possibility is that he is simply not up to the task by virtue of his lack of experience and a character defect that might not have been so debilitating at some other time in history. Those of us who were bewitched by his eloquence on the campaign trail chose to ignore some disquieting aspects of his biography: that he had accomplished very little before he ran for president, having never run a business or a state; that he had a singularly unremarkable career as a law professor, publishing nothing in 12 years at the University of Chicago other than an autobiography; and that, before joining the United States Senate, he had voted "present" (instead of "yea" or "nay") 130 times, sometimes dodging difficult issues. A somewhat less charitable explanation is that we are a nation that is being held hostage not just by an extremist Republican Party but also by a president who either does not know what he believes or is willing to take whatever position he thinks will lead to his re-election. Perhaps those of us who were so enthralled with the magnificent story he told in “Dreams From My Father” appended a chapter at the end that wasn’t there — the chapter in which he resolves his identity and comes to know who he is and what he believes in. Or perhaps, like so many politicians who come to Washington, he has already been consciously or unconsciously corrupted by a system that tests the souls even of people of tremendous integrity, by forcing them to dial for dollars — in the case of the modern presidency, for hundreds of millions of dollars. When he wants to be, the president is a brilliant and moving speaker, but his stories virtually always lack one element: the villain who caused the problem, who is always left out, described in impersonal terms, or described in passive voice, as if the cause of others’ misery has no agency and hence no culpability. Whether that reflects his aversion to conflict, an aversion to conflict with potential campaign donors that today cripples both parties’ ability to govern and threatens our democracy, or both, is unclear. A final explanation is that he ran for president on two contradictory platforms: as a reformer who would clean up the system, and as a unity candidate who would transcend the lines of red and blue. He has pursued the one with which he is most comfortable given the constraints of his character, consistently choosing the message of bipartisanship over the message of confrontation. But the arc of history does not bend toward justice through capitulation cast as compromise. It does not bend when 400 people control more of the wealth than 150 million of their fellow Americans. It does not bend when the average middle-class family has seen its income stagnate over the last 30 years while the richest 1 percent has seen its income rise astronomically. It does not bend when we cut the fixed incomes of our parents and grandparents so hedge fund managers can keep their 15 percent tax rates. It does not bend when only one side in negotiations between workers and their bosses is allowed representation. And it does not bend when, as political scientists have shown, it is not public opinion but the opinions of the wealthy that predict the votes of the Senate. The arc of history can bend only so far before it breaks. This article has been revised to reflect the following correction: Correction: August 8, 2011 An earlier version of this essay referred incorrectly to the number of deportations of immigrants during President Obama’s term. Around 800,000 immigrants were deported during his first two years in office; it is not the case that a million immigrants were deported in 2010, the year Mr. Obama gave a speech on immigration reform. Also, a larger number of deportations occurred during the two terms of Mr. Obama’s predecessor, George W. Bush; Mr. Obama has not overseen more deportations than any other president. 5. Anti-government group imprisoned The Phnom Penh POst; Friday, 05 August 2011 15:02 Buth Reaksmey Kongkea
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(Comments: This article shows the tragedy of Cambodia at its lowest point, and how Cambodia is really the country of the absurd. Hun Sen, a former Khmer Rouge a cruel, corrupt, ignoramus and a traitor, with the full support of the cameleon-like Sihanouk, who pretends to be the hero of Cambodia.
But, the real heroes of Cambodia are these brave and daring young Cambodian people who dared to challenge Hun Sen and his deadly regime. That is why Cambodia is known as the country of the absurd, because everything about Cambodia is irrational and abnormal in the eyes of who follow closely the Cambodian political events and issues.
Where is the “great leader” Sam Rainsy? In Tunisia. Why is he in Tunisia when these brave young Cambodian men are now in jail? He is not what a real leader is. He is not Aung San Suu Kyi, nor Nelson Mandela, both of whom were in jails for daring to challenge their oppressors. Rainsy is simply a plain coward in showing by going to Tunisia, instead of coming back to Cambodia to face Hun Sen like these young Cambodians are admirably doing. Naranhkiri Tith Ph.D. Washington DC. August 6, 2011)
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Five men who distributed hundreds of leaflets critical of Prime Minister Hun Sen between the years 2008 and 2011 were sentenced to jail time yesterday by the Phnom Penh Municipal Court.
The leaflets accused the prime minister of selling Cambodian land to foreign countries, calling him a “traitor” and a “puppet of Vietnam”, municipal court judge Sem Sak Kola said.
She added that the leaflet referred to the ousting of the Khmer Rouge on January 7, 1979, as “the day Vietnam occupied Cambodia”.
The verdict, announced yesterday, found all five dissenters guilty of “inciting the people to commit serious crimes against Prime Minister Hun Sen and the Royal Government of Cambodia”.
Phon Sam Ath, a 26-year-old teacher and former student at the Royal University of Phnom Penh, was arrested on January 27, 2011, in Takeo Province, Sem Sak Kola said. She referred to him as the “mastermind” of the operation, adding that he had written and distributed hundreds of leaflets in both Battambang and Phnom Penh.
Four others – So Khemarak, aged 25, Ngor Menghong, 21, Eang Samorn, 23, and Chem Bol, 27 – were arrested on February 29 in the capital.
Phon Sam Ath and Eang Samorn were both sentenced to two years in prison, while their three collaborators each received 18 months, Sem Sak Kola said. All five were fined two million riel (US$487).
In an interview yesterday, Ouk Syroeun, defence lawyer for So Khemarak, called the verdict “unjust”.
“My client did not commit the crimes he is being accused of…he did not break any laws,” he said, adding that he was asking the court to drop all charges.
Ouk Syroeun yesterday submitted an appeal to the Appeal Court in an effort to overturn the verdict and, he said, to “find justice for [So Khemarak]”. The five convicted could not be reached for comment yesterday.
6. Opposition highs and lows The Phnom Penh Post; Thursday, 14 July 2011 15:02 James O’Toole and Thomas Miller Photo by: Heng Chivoan Sam Rainsy speaks to reporters in Phnom Penh in 2009. -------------------------------------------------------------------- (Comments: this article which is a leak from the US Embassy in Cambodia on the role and the status of the opposition parties in Cambodia. It is interesting for all of us who have been following this political situation to read this article, especially what the US Ambassadors to Cambodia thoughts on Sam Rainsy on various issues facing Cambodia.
One particular issue which I have been pointing out about Sam Rainsy as an opposition leader, to the effect that he is not an inspirer but rather an inciter, was revealed by a comment on him by US Ambassador to Cambodia, as follows:
The problems culminated later that year, when charges were filed against Sam Rainsy in relation to a protest he staged in October against alleged Vietnamese encroachment in Svay Rieng province. US ambassador Carol Rodley noted in a November cable: “The Sam Rainsy Party has taken a disruptive approach to a major problem and added toxic.”
That is why Sam Rainsy has lost all credibility in the USA and other major democratic countries in the world.
Yet, because of their lack of a critical mind and the habit of having the mentality of “Chhen Chhay” or “compromise”, so many Cambodians still blindly follow Sam Rainsy leadership. That is the main problem for the Cambodian people to extricate themselves from the road to oblivion. Naranhkri Tith Ph.D. Washington DC. August 2, 2011)
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As one-time Funcinpec leader and National Assembly President Norodom Ranariddh was forced from the parliamentary leadership in 2006, US embassy officials cast a worried eye over the state of political pluralism in the Kingdom, according to newly released diplomatic cables.
“What is disturbing is that the [Sam Rainsy Party] is on the sidelines, cheering on FUNCINPEC’s problems, just as FUNCINPEC did nothing to assist the SRP when Hun Sen was attacking the opposition during 2005,” a March 2006 cable states. “Both parties believe they would be beneficiaries of the other’s demise; unfortunately, neither party leader trusts the other enough to overcome past differences and work together to achieve the reforms needed within the Cambodian government.”
The American diplomatic cables released on Tuesday detail the struggles of the Royalist movement through the middle of the past decade, from the perceived frustrations of Ranariddh in being passed over for the kingship to the corruption allegations that dogged the party as Hun Sen sought to oust them from the coalition government. At the same time, the halting reform efforts of the SRP are depicted in the on-again, off-again relations between Sam Rainsy and Hun Sen.
With the 2004 coronation of King Norodom Sihamoni, who drew praise in the cables from American diplomats for his graceful and unassuming style, Ranariddh is said to have displayed “petulance” and alienated fellow Funcinpec members in his apparent frustration at being passed over. Eating dinner with US diplomats in October 2004, three senior Funcinpec officials reportedly “expressed grave doubt in Ranariddh’s leadership ability, suggesting that, rather than raising his stature, he is increasingly making himself a laughing stock”.
As years pass, American diplomats see the once-powerful party undone. “Because of corruption and nepotism, the party is losing support from the people and talented officials, such as the SRP’s Mu Sochua, have left the party,” a Funcinpec party member tells American diplomats, later saying most of the royalist party’s officials were “weak and interested only in womanizing and money”.
Cambodian People’s Party official Prum Sokha, meanwhile, reportedly complained that Funcinpec officials “have bloated the staffing of ministries with relatives and party members without consideration of qualifications or interest in the jobs”.
A former Funcinpec secretary general reportedly complains in a May 2006 cable that party leader Nhek Bun Chhay and the rest of the party have been almost totally co-opted by the ruling party; Sirivudh thus terms the party “HUNSENPEC”. Deputy Prime Minister Nhek Bun Chhay said yesterday that allegations that he had sold out the party to the CPP were “for political interest”, and defended cooperation with the ruling CPP since 1993. Norodom Ranariddh party spokesman Pen Sangha could not be reached.
As Ranariddh’s star fell, Sam Rainsy reportedly enjoyed a period of rapprochement with Hun Sen upon returning to the Kingdom in 2006, having fled in relation to a defamation case the previous year. A cable signed by Ambassador Mussomeli from February 2006 recounts a meeting in which Sam Rainsy outlined his strategy for “reconciliation” with Hun Sen. Sam Rainsy was allowed to return to the Kingdom that month following his pardon for a defamation conviction.
“Hun Sen decides everything in Cambodia, and the government institutions, e.g., the courts, the parliament, are just a ‘facade,’ complained Rainsy,” Mussomeli stated. “If Cambodia is ruled by one man, then in order to get anything done, one must begin by talking to that man, said the opposition leader, who added it had been a difficult choice.” An SRP source even told American diplomats in March 2006 that Hun Sen had “recently offered to take opposition leader Sam Rainsy into the government as a deputy prime minister, possibly with broad authority over various ministries”.
“Rainsy reportedly declined, telling the PM that such a move would be ‘political suicide’ for an opposition leader,” according to the source.
But the July 2008 elections, in which the SRP won a disappointing 26 seats, spoiled any chance of his desired “political reconciliation” with Hun Sen and the CPP. During a meeting in August 2008 with Ambassador Mussomeli, “an animated Sam Rainsy” “continued his single-minded crusade to taint CPP’s election victory” with allegations of “massive electoral fraud”, which the US viewed sceptically.
In later years, American diplomats speak of an apparent rivalry between Sam Rainsy and current Human Rights Party leader Kem Sokha, one that has been borne out in recent months as merger talks between the two groups have suffered a bitter collapse. The difficulties for the opposition continued in 2009, as prominent SRP lawmaker Mu Sochua was locked in a legal battle with Prime Minister Hun Sen. Fellow opposition lawmaker Tioulong Saumura, the wife of Sam Rainsy, reportedly criticised Mu Sochua for picking a fight with the government. “It’s crazy to be fighting this battle,” Saumura reportedly said.
The problems culminated later that year, when charges were filed against Sam Rainsy in relation to a protest he staged in October against alleged Vietnamese encroachment in Svay Rieng province. US ambassador Carol Rodley noted in a November cable: “The Sam Rainsy Party has taken a disruptive approach to a major problem and added toxic elements of racism and anti-Vietnamese sentiment to make it worse.”
SRP lawmakers Son Chhay and Yim Sovann could not be reached for comment yesterday.
7. Cambodian awarded ‘Nobel prize’ of Asia Te Phnom Penh Post: Friday, 29 July 2011 15:01 Daniel Sherrell ----------------------------------------------------------
(Comments: this article shows the true image of those Cambodians who are really courageous by daring to challenge Hun Sen and his CPP deadly regime in Cambodia and not from Paris, as Sam Rainsy is doing. The award of the Ramon Magsaysay prize, which is the equivalence of the Nobel Prize in Asia, to Mr. Koul Panha (Please, read his bio in a companionarticle psoted below titled "Activist long road to find peace" ) is really a great tribute to him and to all freedom-loving Cambodians in Cambodia and in the world (Please, read his bio in .
I want to wholeheartedly congratulate Mr. Koul Panha on this honourable occasion for his bravery and sacrifice on behalf of all those Cambodians who are not afraid to challenge Hun Sen dictatorial power and corrupt practice. He is, by definition, a real hero for the Cambodian people who still want to remain free of Vietnamese colonization supported by Hun Sen and Sihanouk. Naranhkiri Tith Ph.D. Washington DC. August 01, 2011) ---------------------------------------------------------- Cambodian citizen Koul Panha has been awarded the prestigious Ramon Magsaysay Award, often referred to as Asia’s Nobel peace prize, for his work with the Committee for Free and Fair Elections.
He is one of six people to receive this year’s award, which will be presented to them at a ceremony in Manila on August 31. He is being recognised for “his determined and courageous leadership of the sustained campaign to build an enlightened, organised and vigilant citizenry who will ensure fair and free elections – as well as demand accountable governance by their elected officials – in Cambodia’s nascent democracy”, the Ramon Magsaysay Award Foundation said.
In an interview with The Post, Koul Panha said he was “surprised” and “excited” to receive the award.
Koul Panha is executive director of Comfrel, which seeks to increase electoral transparency and voter participation.
Since 1997 it has enlisted more than 50,000 election volunteers and held election-related workshops for about 150,000 voters, he said.
Koul Panha said the award would encourage his organisation to work harder, especially in preparation for the commune elections next year and national elections in 2013.
“We will deploy our volunteers to inform people about the importance of elections and their right to vote, as well as advocating electoral fairness, integrity and an even playing field for all [political] parties,” he said.
“The history of Cambodia is full of conflict. People want, finally, to enjoy democracy and fair elections.”
The award is named after a president of the Philippines who died in a plane crash in 1957. The foundation that oversees the award was established by the Rockefeller Brothers Fund to “honour his memory and perpetuate his example of integrity in public service and pragmatic idealism within a democratic society”.
Koul Panha will receive a certificate, a cash prize and a medallion emblazoned with the image of Ramon Magsaysay. A total of 290 people in 22 Asian countries have been given the award.
7. a. Activist’s long road to find peace The Phnom Penh Post: Monday, 08 August 2011 15:00 Ou Mom
Cambodian Koul Panha has been awarded one of six prestigious Ramon Magsaysay 2011 awards for his unremitting work in fighting for a free and fair democratic system in the Kingdom. The awards, often referred to as the
“Nobel peace prizes of Asia”, are “given to persons – regardless of race, nationality, creed or gender – who address issues of human development in Asia with courage and creativity, and in doing so have made contributions which have transformed their societies for the better”, according to the foundation’s website.
Koul Panha’s journey to reach this point in his work and career has been a long and often traumatic, albeit history changing one.
Now an engineer, he was only eight years old when his father and relatives were killed by the Khmer Rouge.
Remembering his childhood, Koul Panha said he used to live in Sangkat number six in Phnom Penh before the Khmer Rouge took over.
“At that time, I just knew that there was going to be bombing in the city and for a long time, we hid in a trench. That was until April 1975 when black uniformed soldiers forced us to leave home.”
Although he was so young, Koul Panha seems to remember clearly the scenes and feelings he was confronted with when the regime continued to grow in strength.
“I was horrified but I remember my mother was so brave. She wanted to protest when the Khmer Rouge ordered us to leave the city unreasonably without taking our belongings,” said Koul Panha. “As I recall, however, my father stopped her, telling her it would be dangerous and that she could be shot. My mother understood what went on after that and agreed that we would go along [when the soldiers told us to leave].”
Less than a year passed before the family’s life would be rocked even further, and with even more horrific results.
“In 1976, we started hearing word that the Khmer Rouge had requested my father in order to pick beans. My father knew himself that he would be faced with a big problem,” said Koul Panha. “Then I got information from villagers about the killing of my father. The villagers told me that he did not let Khmer Rouge soldiers kill him – he fought them back. However, we did not see that activity with our own eyes; it was just a picture in my mind.”
Koul Panha’s family was among the 1.7 million Cambodians who perished at the hands of the brutal regime and the repercussions of the period have been myriad.
It doesn’t take focused investigation into how the country has fared since that era to realise that one of the biggest problems to have lingered since then is the disjointed adherence to a free and fair political system.
Cambodia has been in a constant state of struggle to democratise its society since the fall of the Khmer Rouge, yet took the first steps in establishing a multi-party liberal democracy when it embarked on its first democratic elections in 1993.
And Koul Panha made certain he was a part of it.
Education, then and now, is a passion of Koul Panha’s. He studied at the Institute of Technology of Cambodia with chemical engineering as his major, and also went on to learn about teaching.
His clear passion for passing on knowledge and raising awareness among others again came to the fore when he became one of 15 founding members of the Cambodian Human Rights and Development Association (ADHOC) in the hope of gradually bringing peace to the Kingdom. Kuol Panha’s interest in this kind of work spurned him on to then volunteer with the United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC) in order to assist and prepare the 1993 elections.
After completing his engineering studies in Phnom Penh, Koul Panha then joined the non-partisan Task Force on Cambodian Elections and was one of the organisers when the group morphed into the Committee for Free and Fair Elections in Cambodia (COMFREL) in 1997. By 1998, Koul Panha had become the director of education voters of the committee and has been tireless in his work throughout the Kingdom’s five national and local elections that followed the first.
In 1999, with support from ADHOC, Koul Panha completed a master’s degree in the politics of alternative development from the Institute of Social Studies in The Netherlands.
According to Koul Panha, the central aim and most vital element in achieving a safe and stable democratic nation lies in the electoral system becoming the people’s own; in it becoming their main instrument in building a democratic nation.
Again, he strongly believes that the advancement of democracy and elections free of violence, corruption and factionalism lies in education – particularly the education of youth.
“I think that hopefulness is youth. Youths participate not only in the election process but also in social activities mainly involving political tasks. And youth do not think that politics is dirty work,” he added.
“Politics is a necessary area which our youths have to study and comprehend since sometimes because of wrong politics, it may make our country not develop or be stable, which in turn results in human violations.”
Koul Panha’s own father was a clerk at the Ministry of Interior and his mother was an officer within the National Library. He says that due to his mother’s job, he was “fortunate” in that he could read a number of books that weren’t freely or willingly distributed or loaned to the public, many of which were politically based.
Now, as information is more readily available and formal education is an option for some of the nation’s youth, Koul Panha aims to share his experiences with younger generations, hoping to inspire them in the continued struggle for democracy as, he claims: “Only youths are the power that can enforce democracy and better our society.”
By the year 2000 Koul Panha had been promoted to the position of executive director of COMFREL and to date, the organisation has deployed over 100,000 volunteers to cover 95 percent of Cambodia’s polling stations, while over 150,000 Khmer have participated in various COMFREL training programmes and workshops.
Yet Koul Panha remains humble about his achievements and the significant impact his work has had on Cambodia’s political landscape.
“It [being a political activist] does not mean we are skillful or we do whatever. Political work is what we have to know, and getting involved in politics can train us all to become a leader.”
The announcement of the six recipients of the Ramon Magsaysay Awards was declared on July 27, 2011. Koul Panha will travel to Manila, the Philippines, to be presented with his award on August 31.
8. Khmers Helping Khmers and how they are doing it
------------------------------------------------------------------------ (Comments: this set of emails provided a poignant eyewitness account of the tragic current situation in Cambodia, especially the condition of the poor Cambodians, and it shows how spontaneously, Khmers can help Khmers and how they do it. It is both hart-warming and hart-breaking. No further comments are needed. Naranhkiri Tith Ph.D. Washington DC. July 29, 2011) -----------------------------------------------------------------------
From Ou Ritthy:
In a message dated 7/27/2011 4:09:32 A.M. Eastern Daylight Time, ouritthy87@gmail.com writes: Dear Lok Om, I hope you and your family are fine there. Lok om, I want to inform you that I have successfully completed my BA Political Science in India. I reached Cambodia on 13th July. When reaching Phnom Penh International Airport, I directly traveled to my home in Pursat Province. Because this time is raining season, I have to help my parents planting rice in the rice field and in my village needless to talk about internet connection, there is even no electricity. As a result, I am very late to inform you that I reached home safely. Lok om, This is my first observation in my village. Most of the people are indebted to Micro finance institutions. They sell their lands, cows and buffalos to Vietnamese people and those villagers use their money for gambling, and alcoholics and buy new phone and motorbike. Farming now is very hopeless. Villagers cannot do farming without chemical fertilizers. Sadly enough, fertilizer is increasingly expensive as I know it is produced by Vietnamese Company. It is now extremely hard to believe in such remote areas even vegetable like ginger, onion, sweet chilly…are from Thailand. There is almost no home-grown product except rice. Maybe because of being poor financially and educationally, morality of teenagers and adults in the village are very poor and selfish. Many old people in villages have been still working in the field and many of teenagers and adults have gone to Thailand and for female to Malaysia to find jobs there. So I reached home, I could not find my parents and my grandmother at home as they were planting rice in the fields. I was very painful to see my 74-year old grandmother spending whole day planting rice.
Anyway, Lok om, now I am staying at Saravoan Pagoda in Phnom Penh. I am now applying for job. But as a fresh graduate, I find it very hard to be employed. So many graduates are fighting for few jobs. Lastly, I am very appreciated and grateful to you that you have put tirelessly your knowledge and wisdom into writings and send it me. I wish you and your family best of health. With my deepest respect, Ou Ritthy ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- On Thu, Jul 28, 2011 at 8:39 PM, <Naranhkiritith@aol.com> wrote:
July 28, 2011
Dear Ritthy:
Thank you for keeping me informed about your where about. I am glad that you have completed your BA. and now back in Cambodia. I am also very sad to hear all the bad things that you have written about the Cambodian people, and about your own family.
I can promise you that I will always do whatever I can to help you. What about your application for a scholarship to Germany? You should approach the American Embassy for a scholarship to come and study here in the USA.
Please, keep me informed on your plan, and I am prepared to help you anyway I can so that you can continue to study for an advanced degree here in the USA. You have great potential for graduate studies. Best regards.
Dr. Naranhkiri Tith -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- From Ou Ritthy Dear Lok om,
Thank you so much for your kind, supportive and encouraged words to me. I am truly lucky to know you who always advices and educates me.
It is very hard to tell the story in detail about people in my village. But I would say shortly that I do not see any positive and bright future for my villagers.
Regarding German Scholarship, I already applied for MA Public Policy through DAAD scholarship at German Embassy in Phnom Penh. However, the chance seems to be slim as they told me that the previous few successful candidates are only those who have work experience at two years. Even worse, I do not have IELTS or TOEFL certificate when applying.
Regarding the Fulbright scholarship, it requires a 4-year Bachelor's degree education. However, my BA is only three-year education. Plus, I have never tried applying as I graduated lately after the closing date.
Anyway, I am responding your mail with great please and honor when reading your kind and supportive words. My dream is to go for postgraduate studies abroad. I am stuck with this dream no mater whenever chance is given. I am very hard to access to internet, good newspaper, good books, other sources of information in Cambodia. It is not as easy as what I had been doing in India.
Once again, thank you so much for your care, help, encouragement and support given to me so far. My parents are extremely happy when hearing that I have known you and other highly intellectual Khmer people abroad.
I wish you and your family best of health.
With my deepest respect,
Ou Ritthy
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- From Chou Ngeth; Phnom Penh, Cambodia Dear Ritthy: I appreciate your brilliancy! And welcome back to our home country. Going through your email below, I think it is a ditto message from my own view as well. And they become my big concerns. Most of our new generations are playing with risky game and are moving in wrong direction. For labor migration and supply of agricultural produces from Vietnam and Thailand, they are completely true. Regarding over-indebtedness with micro fiance, as a microfinance consultant of USAID-funded project, I am not really sure there are too many cases against total borrowers of the country. One proxy evidence is Portfolio At Risk (PAR) of the whole industry is some 0.8% only. Anyway, experts agree that financial education/literacy becomes a key to reduce over-indebtedness. I am working with those MFI operators and stakeholders to improve access to formal finance at a sustainable way. I have lot of experience regarding employment and acceleration of professional growth. For brilliant guy like you, you should apply for high end internship or management trainee programs with leading companies or organizations such UN agencies, US embassy, IRI, BAT, Mobitel, ANZ, etc. Having an opportunity to do internship or engage in management trainee program with one of these organization are a lot better than getting most of full-time job with any other organizations or companies. You will get good hand-on management and leadership skills as well as better pay compared to normal employment as a fresh graduate. I am more than happy to share with you about lessons I have learned as a poor student from rural and how I become success in my career. I can be contact via 012 786 800 and you can learn more about me via: http://choungeth.blogspot.com/ Facebook: Chou Ngeth If you have a chance to pursue your study abroad, please commit to come back and work for our nation. We really need brilliant young generation like you. Best regards, Ngeth Chou ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- From Buntha Eakim; Paris, France Dear Kmouy Rithy, Hope that you are fine and happy to go back home.
I read all-comment exchanges between you and Lok Om Tith. Many thanks to Lok Pou to put me in his Copy-email. I met him and his wife Pat in Washington DC, in December 2010. I will be in Phnom Penh from 11 august to 1 September. I would like to meet you there. Please let me know via my email, if it is possible. Some websites to you: Our lovely country of birth: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=fj_3oLBuQ6Y
The Global Campaign for Education in Cambodia 2011 : http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=S6ib968jLXk&feature=youtu.be
Philip Day - City of the God Kings http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Pdj_mtIAeBk
And this below site can be helpful for Cambodian farmers : The SYSTEM of RICE INTENSIFICATION http://sri.ciifad.cornell.edu/countries/cambodia/index.html
Best regards Ming Buntha ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- From Tipanna Tith; Long Beach, California Dear Lok Bang Kiri
A very sad and touchy issue of Phaon Ou Rithy from Pursat. This is the true Khmer story and all Khmer abroad must understand very well about, we could become minority in our own place of birth and become slave of their own country. Thank you Bang kiri for continue informing and empowering us for the sake of our country of birth. Respectfully your Tippana Tith 9. Khmer spy blog http://kh-spy.blogspot.com/p/about-us.html I am surprised to see my name mentioned as a supporter of Kem Sokha. I am an American since 1960 by choice, how can I support Kem Sokha? I congratulate him and other when they are doing good things , and I criticized him as much as I did to Sam Rainsy, even Sihanouk, not to mention Hun Sen and his traitor colleagues. As a free person but responsible, I can criticize anybody whom I think is not performing according to what they preach. What disturbed me the most about your group is the fact that you do not dare to show your face. Hiding behind a wall is not what I call real courage. I have a web site in which I post all the information about my background, I have nothing to hide. So, don't pretend to inform other when you are cowardly talk about people without showing your real identity. Naranhkiri Tith Ph.D. Washington DC July 23, 2011
10. TOP 10 TYCOONS (Please, “Control-Click” on the title to see the photos of these Tycoons) The Phnom Penh Post; Wednesday, 13 July 2011 11:47 Post Staff ------------------------------------------------------------------------- (Comments: this article and the pictures of the top 10 tycoons in Cambodia says all about who really owns the wealth and the power in Cambodia . While the vast majority of Common Cambodian have only one dollar to survive and to feed their starving family members, the tycoons live in vast and luxurious mansions, and drive super luxury cars, such as; BMW, Mercedes, Lexus, even Rols Royce.
All their wealth has been accumulated thanks to their close connection with Hun Sen and his corrupt CPP. Among these tycoons, two, namely, Sok Kong and Yeay Phu, are Vietnamese nationals and close friends of Hun Sen. Sok kong is the owner of SOKIMEX, a vast empire of businesses including monopoly in tourism, petroleum production and distribution network of oil and gas products along with other several major industries.
That is why Hun Sen has been able to be re-elected again and again since 1997 and remain in power.
Without Sihanouk’s total support, Hun Sen could not have remained in power all this time. Yet, so many Cambodians still venerate Sihanouk as the god-king. It won’t be easy to get out of this tragic situation unless Cambodians would dare to confront Sihanouk, and stop considering him as the only one leader who can save Cambodia. Naranhkiri Tith Ph.D. Washington DC. July 21, 2011))
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Kith Meng - “Mr Rough Stuff” |
| Chairman and CEO of the Royal Group Kith Meng was described in the cable as a “relatively young and ruthless gangster”.
He could not be reached for comment. | Ly Yong Phat - “The King of Koh Kong”
|
| Ruling party senator Ly Yong Phat’s nickname derives from his prominence in his home province. According to the cable, Ly Yong Phat has business interests in tobacco, electricity, casinos and resorts. | Lim Chhiv Ho - “The Gatekeeper”
|
| The director of Attwood Export Import Co Ltd - a liquor distributor - Lim Chhiv Ho is “one of Cambodia’s most well-connected women”, according to the cable. | Kok An – “Gambling King Pin”
|
| The senator, who could not be reached, has branched into fishing, tobacco and casinos. The cable states he reportedly helped to pay US$50 million compensation to Thailand for damage to the Thai embassy during 2003 riots. | Mong Reththy - “Hun Sen’s Money Man”
|
| Described in the cable as “likely the closest business tycoon and ally to Prime Minister Hun Sen”, he said yesterday that he conducts business only in a legal way. | Sok Kong -“Mr Sokimex”
|
| Sok Kong ‘s company Sokimex is one of the largest petroleum suppliers in the Kingdom. In 1999, Sokimex acquired ticketing rights to Angkor Wat, a deal which the cable says became embroiled in controversy amid claims that Sokimex underreported revenue from ticket sales.
Sok Kong could not be reached. | Yeay Phu and Lao Meng Khin – “Power Couple”
|
| Described in the cable as “one of the most politically and economically connected couples in the country”, Yeay Phu and CPP senator Lao Meng Khin are co-owners of local developer Pheapimex. Lao Meng Khin also now runs development firm Shukaku Inc and, according to the cable, the “dynamic duo” have a strong relationship with Hun Sen and his wife, Bun Rany. | Pung Kheav Se - “Banking pioneer”
|
| He made a fortune in Canada before founding Canadia Bank: one of the country’s largest banks. He also maintains close ties to Hun Sen and Bun Rany. | Sy Kong Triv – “Pacific Giant”
|
| Described in the cable as one of the CPP’s “main financiers”, Sy Kong Triv is chairman of KT Pacific Group, a manufacturing and distribution group, and also owns a number of local businesses. |
9. America’s Nuclear Vietnam August 11, 2010 4:00 A.M Henry Sokolski http://www.nationalreview.com/articles/243652/americas-nuclear-vietnam-henry-sokolski (Comments: this article written by Henry Sokolski, executive director of the Nonproliferation Policy Education Center in Washington, D.C. vindicates me that I was right to have raised the question to a former State Department official, why did Secretary of state Hillary Clinton recently signed an agreement to transfer America’s nuclear technology to Vietnam. She was not happy with my question, and it had said that this nuclear technology is only for peaceful purposes. However, this is not a very responsible act by the Obama Administration as this article pointed that; “The Obama administration has botched its atomic negotiations with Hanoi.
In Washington, government officials rarely (if ever) admit to making policy mistakes, even when they’ve clearly botched things up. Take Secretary of State Hillary Clinton’s recent decision to bless a formal civilian nuclear-cooperation agreement with Vietnam. Secretary Clinton endorsed the deal in Hanoi without demanding — as Washington recently did with the United Arab Emirates (UAE) — that Vietnam forswear making nuclear fuel, a process that can bring states within days or weeks of acquiring nuclear weapons.” That is why Cambodian-Americans should not vote anymore for Barack Obama. He has been surrendering all the principles that he so loudly proclaimed during the 2008 presidential elections. We should not forget that Hillary Clinton has been a v strong anti-Vietnam war, (nothing wrong with that) and very anti-Chinese (That is very wrong). No wonder, the relations between Hun Sen Cambodia has been improving so drastically since Hillary Clinton became secretary of state under the Obama Administration. This new agreement to transfer nuclear technology to Vietnam is totally in contradiction with the highly-proclaimed policy of the Obama Administration on denuclearization in the world, as pointed out by Henry Sokoski as follows: “Meanwhile, Congress, ever eager to promote the UAE conditions, is planning on tightening America’s nonproliferation laws. Some on Capitol Hill are already toying with the idea of cutting off foreign firms that refuse to make the UAE conditions a requirement of the nuclear assistance they offer overseas. The House is expected to take up these matters in the fall, around the time U.S. negotiators are scheduled to meet their Vietnamese counterparts to finalize the proposed nuclear deal.” Is this stand by Hillary Clinton logical and compatible with the USA as democratic country and promoter of human rights? Vietnam and China are both still communist countries. By tradition China is a believer and is practicing international relations using soft power (diplomatic economic, political) and not hard power (Military), in its international relations with other countries in the world. While Vietnam has been using hard power to conquest its weaker neighbors (Champa, Kampuchea Krom) gious freedom. But, Vietnam is well-known for its suppression of its minorities (Khmer Krom, and Montagnard) and its religious minorities, namely Christians. While historically, the Chinese do tolerate minorities (Manchu, Tibetan, Tai) within its society, where Vietnam has zero tolerance for minorities. China can be useful to America in in economic terms, as it can be and already is a large market for American export of goods and services, as well as investment, and bought over one US $trillion worth of US Treasury bonds. Whereas Vietnam cannot play that role, at all. These are the considerations that Hillary Clinton seems to ignore in her irrational loyalty to Vietnam and her aggressiveness toward China. This is the kind of fight that I am fighting in many think-tanks in this capital city of the USA that most Cambodians don’t know and can even imagine that the existence of such problem as this non-proliferation of nuclear weapons policy. Please also read the Appendix ar ticle, titled, "Ros-Lehtinen promises to stop Obama's civilian nuclear deals ."Naranhkiri Tith Ph.D. Washington DC. July 19, 2011) PS. To read more on tis important topic, please, go to this link: Is China bad news good for america.docx ------------------------------------------------------------ This immediately raised eyebrows on Capitol Hill. Just months before, State Department officials had pitched the UAE agreement as the new “gold standard” for nuclear-cooperation pacts worldwide. After getting briefed on the Vietnam deal, Hill staffers on both sides of aisle feared Foggy Bottom was throwing in the towel on nonproliferation. asState could have taken its points and sent U.S. diplomats back quietly to get the tougher UAE conditions. Instead, supporters of the Vietnam accord dug in their heels. First, they claimed that the deal in no way changed U.S. policy. Washington, they argued, never intended to push the UAE conditions outside of the Middle East. In fact, the U.S. struck the UAE deal in pursuance of a country-neutral approach to sharing civilian nuclear technology that President Bush and Russia’s Vladimir Putin announced back in July 2007. Their joint declaration aimed to promote civilian nuclear cooperation globally while trying to convince states lacking nuclear weapons to forgo making nuclear fuel. Throughout 2008, U.S. diplomats offered nuclear-power deals and sought no-nuclear-fuel-making pledges, not only from the UAE, Bahrain, Egypt, Turkey, Morocco, Jordan, and Saudi Arabia, but also from Indonesia, Thailand, and Vietnam. Taking this international approach helped address Arab concerns that the U.S. had one nonproliferation standard for them and another for everyone else. Which brings us to the second official defense of treating Vietnam differently. “Given . . . the genuine threat of a nuclear arms race in the Middle East,” a senior State Department official told the Wall Street Journal, “we believe the U.A.E. . . . agreement is a model for the region,” but “these same concerns do not specifically apply in Asia.” How’s that? Last month, Secretary Clinton blew the whistle on North Korea’s possible assistance to a covert Burmese nuclear-weapons effort. Also, since 1990, the U.S. and its allies have pressed Pyongyang to give up its nuclear-weapons activities, lest those activities goad South Korea or Japan to go nuclear. Seoul, which U.S. officials have caught covertly attempting to make nuclear weapons at least twice, now wants to produce its own nuclear fuel. Japan already does produce its own fuel and has stockpiled at least 1,000 bombs’ worth of plutonium. Further south, Taiwan tried covertly to acquire nuclear weapons at least once and is now developing a missile than could hit Beijing. As for China, it keeps modernizing its nuclear-weapons forces under a dark cloak of secrecy. All of this suggests that pushing one nonproliferation policy for the Middle East and another for a “quiescent” Asia is delusional. More important, no one’s buying it: Middle Eastern officials resent the double standard, and the Chinese — who view Vietnam as a potentially hostile vassal state — are taking offense. That brings us to Foggy Bottom’s final defense of the deal: Washington, our diplomats argue, must work with the world as it is, not as it wishes it to be. Vietnam wants nuclear-power reactors. France, Russia, Japan, and China are vying to build them. If America wants to influence Vietnam and secure reactor sales, it must bend to reality and drop the UAE conditions. This pitch, however, ignores an embarrassing truth: Vietnam is unlikely to buy American. In fact, to do so, it would have to forswear suing U.S. firms for damages a nuclear accident might inflict off-site — a demand that America’s government-backed nuclear competitors do not make. In any case, the key reason for cutting the deal wasn’t to generate U.S. jobs, but rather to tighten our strategic ties with Hanoi by formally authorizing it to receive sensitive nuclear goods. America’s commercial losses if Washington demanded that Vietnam adhere to the UAE conditions, therefore, would be essentially zero. As for the contention that the U.S. has no effective leverage over the behavior of its nuclear competitors, just the opposite is the case. That leverage is actually substantial, and it’s also increasing, as foreign companies such as Rosatom, KEPCO, Hitachi, Toshiba, and AREVA seek to expand their business with the U.S. In fact, these government-backed firms are not just trying to sell America more, but (as I have detailed elsewhere) are pleading for billions in U.S.-taxpayer-backed loan guarantees to expand their business in the U.S. Meanwhile, Congress, ever eager to promote the UAE conditions, is planning on tightening America’s nonproliferation laws. Some on Capitol Hill are already toying with the idea of cutting off foreign firms that refuse to make the UAE conditions a requirement of the nuclear assistance they offer overseas. The House is expected to take up these matters in the fall, around the time U.S. negotiators are scheduled to meet their Vietnamese counterparts to finalize the proposed nuclear deal. One would like to think that the discussion will focus on more than just minor details, and that Washington will do what it can to avoid any further Vietnam-style blunders in the area of nuclear diplomacy, whether inside or outside of Asia. What this will first require, though, is an admission of the obvious: that someone in the executive branch made a mistake. – Henry Sokolski is executive director of the Nonproliferation Policy Education Center in Washington, D.C., and author of Controlling the Further Spread of Nuclear Weapons.
Appendix: Ros-Lehtinen promises to stop Obama's civilian nuclear deals Foreign Affair Magazine (FP): Posted By Josh Rogin Friday, January 14, 2011 - 10:07 AM http://thecable.foreignpolicy.com/category/topic/development?page=1
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The Obama administration is negotiating civilian nuclear cooperation agreements with a host of countries around the world. But Congress will intervene to try to stop some of those deals, if House Foreign Relations Committee chairwoman Ileana Ros-Lehtinen but has anything to say about it. Ros-Lehtinen, the Cuban-American firebrand who took over the committee last week, has promised to fight the administration's foreign policy agenda on a wide range of fronts. On her first day, she pledged to take an axe to the State Department's budget, and last month she single-handedly killed the bill to make opposition to forced child marriages an element of U.S. foreign policy. Her next target is the Atomic Energy Act (AEA), the law that governs civilian nuclear agreements -- commonly known as "123" agreements for the section of the AEA governing them.
Ros-Lehtinen is angry that the U.S. entered into a 123 agreement with Russia this month. The administration submitted the agreement to Congress last May. Ros-Lehtinen introduced a resolution to stop it during the previous congressional session, but the resolution never came up for a vote in the Democratic-led House. The deal consequently went through after the 90-day waiting period expired. "The U.S.-Russia nuclear cooperation agreement that went into effect this week never got a vote in Congress," Ros-Lehtinen said Thursday. "The Atomic Energy Act must be reformed so that these far-reaching and potentially dangerous agreements are required to receive an up-or-down vote in Congress before going into effect." She also promised that her bill would require the administration to certify that a country has met a number or requirements before signing a nuclear deal with the United States, and to verify that the deal would advance U.S. interests. Ros-Lehtinen said that Russia did not deserve that "concession" due to what she calls its ongoing support of Iran's nuclear program. She specifically mentioned its assistance in building and fueling the Bushehr nuclear plant, even though George W. Bush's administration actually supported that project. She also criticized Russia for continuing "to shield Iran from U.S. and international sanctions and taking other actions that undermine U.S. interests around the world, such as selling weapons to Syria and signing a nuclear cooperation agreement with the Burmese regime, which is a North Korea nuclear partner." In Ros-Lehtinen's view, the administration has given several "concessions" to Russia already, including the New START nuclear reductions pact, changes in European missile defense plans, and exempting Russian companies from Iranian sanctions. Others in Congress opposed the Russia 123 agreement, including Ed Markey (D-MA), chairman of the Energy and Environment Subcommittee. That loose coalition could create problems for the administration if and when it completes new 123 agreements.
The next countries in line for 123 agreements are Vietnam and Jordan, and their deals promise to face a different criticism than the agreement with Russia. Critics in both parties on Capitol Hill are set to press the administration to include bans on plutonium reprocessing and uranium enrichment in the deals, and those countries aren't likely to agree. The administration painted itself into a corner on this issue when it hailed the 2009 123 agreement with the UAE as the "gold standard," because it included the provisions banning enrichment. But team Obama then hit a wall when Vietnam refused to agree to the same prohibitions. Jordan as well has indicated it wants to preserve what it views as its right to produce nuclear fuel sometime in the future. If the administration insists on the prohibitions now, it risks causing the pending deals with Vietnam and Jordan to unravel in the short term, and perhaps losing out on other potential deals in the longer term. If the administration backs down and signs agreements without nuclear fuel production restrictions, it will cause a bipartisan uproar on Capitol Hill. Inside the administration, Deputy Energy Secretary Daniel Poneman has been arguing for months that the administration should just get rid of the enrichment provisions. On the other side of the debate, Deputy Secretary of State Jim Steinberg has taken the position that the provisions are important. In addition to Vietnam and Jordan, the administration is also considering beginning negotiations on a 123 agreement with Saudi Arabia. Ros-Lehtinen has already come out as a critic of the administration's plan to sell $60 billion worth of weapons to the kingdom. Last August, a bipartisan group of lawmakers wrote to Obama to demand that the UAE standard be applied to all future civilian nuclear deals. The lawmakers threw Obama's own words from his 2009 speech in Prague back at him, when the president said, "We need a new paradigm for civil nuclear cooperation that allows all countries to enjoy the benefits of nuclear power, while avoiding the spread of nuclear weapons and technologies." "That new paradigm exists," the lawmakers wrote, referring to the UAE standard. In November, a group of 16 non-proliferation experts wrote to the administration to demand that the standard in the UAE 123 agreement be extended to U.S. federal energy loan guarantees, federal contracts, or other subsidies or assistance to help foreign government-backed nuclear firms expand their nuclear business in the United States.
The letter was signed by right-leaning experts such as Henry Sokolski, executive director of the Nonproliferation Policy Education Center, as well as left-leaning experts such as Daryl Kimball, executive director of the Arms Control Association. "All of us believe that it makes no sense for our government to help foreign firms expand their nuclear business in the U.S. with federal loan guarantees, government contracts, or Nuclear Regulatory Commission licenses unless they are willing to support the very toughest nuclear nonproliferation standards our own government has developed in the U.S.-UAE deal," the experts wrote.
10. WikiLeaks: Sam Rainsy's Strategy: Push Hun Sen, then beat him at the polls
Reference ID: 06PHNOMPENH327 Created: 2006-02-17 09:20 Released: 2011-07-11 00:00 Classification: CONFIDENTIAL Origin: Embassy Phnom Penh STATE FOR EAP/MLS; GENEVA FOR RMA E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/17/2016 ----------------------------------------------------------------------- TAGS: PGOV PREL KDEM PHUM CB SUBJECT: SAM RAINSY'S POLITICAL STRATEGY: PUSH HUN SEN, THEN BEAT HIM AT THE POLLS Classified By: Pol/Econ Chief Margaret McKean, Reason 1.4 (b) and (d) ----------------------------------------------------- (Comments: These two articles one by Wikileaks on Sam Rainsy and the other by Kim Heng, a Cambodian from France. My only comments is by way of a question. Do you think Sam Rainsy is capable of beating Hun Sen as he seems to imply by doing what he is saying here? That is cooperating with Hun Sen and expecting Hun Sen to just follow what Sam Rainsy is telling him to do, that is adopt democracy? Does Sam Rainsy know that Hun Sen follows only the Vietnamese order, and so is Sihanouk. Naranhkiri Tith Ph.D. Washington DC. July 16, 2011) ----------------------------------------------------- ¶1. (C) Summary. Opposition leader Sam Rainsy says that reconciliation with Hun Sen was the only way to improve his party's position in upcoming national elections and provide hope for the democratic future of Cambodia. Rainsy hopes that his continued ability to move the government towards desired reforms within important national institutions will solidify democracy in Cambodia -- and his detractors (both here and abroad) will recognize the wisdom of his actions. Rainsy said that Hun Sen is a fact of life and his only hope of helping democracy is to work with the PM to make changes that will benefit Cambodians in the long run. The political landscape is shifting, says Rainsy, and it is unclear which parties will be standing for election in 2008; FUNCINPEC may disappear, CPP could split, and there could be other opposition parties that form between now and elections. The Sam Rainsy Party, however, will continue to work on the side of democracy and the Cambodian people and seek to eventually become the ruling party in the future. End Summary.
Sam Rainsy Explains Himself ---------------------------
¶2. (C) On February 17, opposition leader Sam Rainsy, accompanied by SRP Standing Committee member Mu Sochua, met with the Ambassador, DCM, and Pol/Econ Chief to outline his political thinking that led to the rapprochement with Prime Minister Hun Sen. Rainsy said that he has undertaken a political reconciliation with Hun Sen, and described the process as just beginning and therefore very fragile – and one that could be reversed. At the moment, the continuation of the process depends on the mood of the PM and not on existing democratic institutions. Hun Sen decides everything in Cambodia, and the government institutions, e.g., the courts, the parliament, are just a "facade,"complained Rainsy. If Cambodia is ruled by one man, then in order to get anything done, one must begin by talking to that man, said the opposition leader, who added it had been a difficult choice. He noted that he risked the support of many friends inside and outside Cambodia to put some trust into a dialogue with Hun Sen, but hopes that dialogue will yield positive results for Cambodia. ¶3. (C) Rainsy credited the international community's interest and support over the past year, as well as the U.S. Embassy's work on his behalf, as critical to arriving at the situation in Cambodia today. In public, Rainsy said that he uses the Prime Minister's rhetoric of the reconciliation being a Khmer-Khmer solution, but in reality he knows that Hun Sen never would have reached this stage without outside pressure. He acknowledged that he has been criticized by colleagues and friends for having given in, but Rainsy insisted that he made the right choice for the right reasons. In order to reach a democratic state in Cambodia, much needs to happen but it all comes down to building democratic institutions. That can only happen through a more independent and transparent political process and elections where average citizens are free to exercise their right to vote without intimidation. ¶4. (C) Rainsy explained that Cambodians were afraid to be associated with the Sam Rainsy Party because the CPP had told them that Sam Rainsy is an enemy who cannot be allowed into power without civil war breaking out. This strategy of manipulating poor, uneducated peasants who value stability after the 25 years of genocide and civil war hurt the SRP, he stated. If Rainsy is seen to be working with the government in a constructive way and the PM no longer characterizes Rainsy as an enemy, people will be more willing to vote in accordance with their beliefs. From Hun Sen's perspective, if can he can work with the democrats like Rainsy and human rights leader Kem Sokha, it will be politically advantageous for him as well. Rainsy said Hun Sen wants better relations with the West, particularly the United States, and recognizes Rainsy can help him on that front. ¶5. (C) Rainsy allowed that his year in exile showed that he cannot reform Cambodia's political institutions from the outside as his party would only become more marginalized. The PM has agreed to SRP representation in the Constitutional Council and the National Election Commission; two crucial institutions for delivering free and fair elections in2008, he noted. By being part of those institutions, the SRP will be in a stronger position to stand for upcoming elections, claimed Rainsy. Rainsy said that it has been helpful to his political future for the Prime Minister to suggest that the CPP would invite the SRP to join a coalition government with them in 2008. Rainsy said he would also invite the CPP to join him if the SRP wins. In either event, it shows the populace that the parties are not enemies but constructive partners for the betterment of Cambodia's future. If the SRP can also show results to the population, that will also help their chances, he said. Hun Sen has complained to Rainsy about the poor governors, ministers and other public officials within the system and asked that Rainsy help him with necessary reforms. Already, the PM is taking my advice, said Rainsy, referring to the PM's instructions to one of his advisors to resolve a dispute between businessmen in Kampong Thom and provincial authorities. Rainsy appealed to the PM to assist in this matter as an advocate for the businessmen, and the PM agreed. These results help the PM take credit but Rainsy said that people will also see him as the catalyst for change and credit him as well. ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Subject: Texte de Sam Rainsy dans Libération du 7 Juillet 2011 Chers compatriotes, A travers le texte de Sam Rainsy dans Libération du 7 Juillet 2011, le roi Norodom a pressenti d’un glissement du régime mis en place vers l’état dictature et fasciste. Que faire nos leaders à l’époque malgré cette mauvaise prémonition ? On avait partagé tranquillement le pouvoir, la richesse, la célébrité, on a essayé de ramasser ce qu’on pouvait, le maximum possible. Samdeach Sihanouk a été très satisfait de recevoir l’autorisation de restaurer la monarchie quelque soit l’avenir du pays et pour renforcer sa monarchie à l’avenir, il a même distribué des titres de Samdeach à des gens qu’il pensait d’être fasciste comme Mussolini. Ainsi, il a créé des nouveaux protecteurs de la monarchie, mais pas des protecteurs du peuple et de la nation. Hun Sen a distribué des maisons, des terres, des postes de ministres, chefs de départements, de provinces, des capitaux, des étoiles, etc…. à des leaders de partis politiques dans la cohésion. Pourtant, tout le monde savait qu’il s’agissait de cohésion factice. Le parti PPC connaissait bien nos points faibles. Il nous a fait noyé dans un bol d’eau depuis le début. Tous les gouvernements depuis des accords de Paris avaient distribué au peuple (80%) des misères, des pauvretés, des déracinés en confisquant ses terres, … Dans le cadre de l’administration, ils appliquaient le système favorisant la corruption permettant d’empêcher toute évolution possible de notre nation vers le progrès. C’est là l’erreur, que nous avons commis permettant de bafouer les accords de Paris. La soif personnelle nous rend aveugles de pouvoir, de confort, de richesse personnelle. C’est cette faiblesse que Hun Sen peut conduire sa politique jusqu’à ce jour. C’est cette soif que notre peuple 80% vit dans la misère et c’est cette soif que nous allons perdre notre nation. Mais, nous sommes assez intelligents pour reconnaître nos défauts et pour sortir de ce désarroi en débarrassant de cet importune soif afin de reconstituer une base saine ni ambition personnelle, ni rancœur, ni rancune sans faire un croche-pied à nos compatriotes de même idée pour la démocratie, pour la défense de la nation, pour le bonheur de nos compatriotes. Que chacun a sa place, que celui ou celle qui sera désigné (e) leader du parti ou d’un groupe d’individus ne se comporte pas comme un empereur intouchable, incritiquable. Notre nation a besoin de nous tous pour atteindre la lumière d’espoir. Un vrai démocrate n’est pas celui ou celle qui dicte la démocratie dans un meeting, mais c’est celui qui applique la démocratie dans tout environnement familial, relationnel (amis, collègues, voisins,..), politique et gouvernemental. La collectivité doit être placée devant l’intérêt individuel. Que sert à l’homme de gagner l’univers, s’il vient à perdre son âme. Kim HENG ------------------------------------------------------- Subject: Text of Sam Rainsy in July 7 Liberation 2011 Dear compatriots, A breadth the text of Sam Rainsy in July 7 Liberation 2011, king Norodom Sihanouk sensing that there was a sliding of the governing system toward dictatorship and Fascism. What did our leaders do in this situation, despite this bad premonition? Those in power quietly had divided the power, wealth, fame, and they tried to accumulate wealth, all they could, to the maximum. Samdeach Sihanouk was very satisfied to receive the authorization to restore the monarchy some is the future of the country and to reinforce his monarchy in the future, he even distributed the honorary titles, Samdeach, to people that he knew to behave like a Fascist, like Mussolini. Thus, he created the new protective framework for the monarchy, but not for the people and nation. Hun Sen gave away houses, land, ministers posts, department heads, of provinces, capitals, stars, etc…. to leaders of political parties in this alliance. Nevertheless, everyone knew that it was an artificial alliance. The CPP knew well our (Cambodians) weak points. This knowledge led us to be drowned in a water bowl since the beginning. All the governments since the Paris Agreements had distributed to the people (80%) miseries, poverties, uprooted while confiscating its land, In the framework of the administration, they applied the system favoring corruption thus preventing any possible evolution of our nation towards progress. It is an error that we had committed to allow the Paris Agreements to fall apart. Personal greed that renders us to be able to have comfort, and personal wealth. It is this weakness that Hun Sen is able to implement his political agenda until this day. It is this greed that our people (80%) are mired in the misery and it is this crave that we will lose our nation. But, we are sufficiently intelligent to recognize our defects and go out of this confusion while ridding of this inopportune craving in order to restore a healthy basis or personal ambition, without resentment, or grudge, without tripping all our compatriots, and we should be applying the same approach to democracy, for the sake of defending the nation, and for the happiness of our compatriots. Each person must knows where he should stands, that is for the one that will be designated (a) leader or for a group of individuals, they should not be allowed to behave as an irreproachable emperor, uncritically. Our nation needs us all to attain the light of hope. A true democrat is not the one who imposes democracy in a meeting, but it is the one who applies democracy in all environment, such as: in family, (friends, colleagues, neighbors, ..), political, and governmental environment. The group interest must be put ahead of that of the individual. What is the point for human being to gain the universe, if in so doing he comes to lose his soul. Kim HENG
11. Plan to shut down tribunal monitor The Phnom Penh Post; Wednesday, 13 July 2011 15:48 Post Staff ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- (Comments: A few years ago, Ronnie Yimsut, now the darling of Youk Chhang and his friends and sponsors, such as; Ben Kiernan, Alex Hinton, and others who job is to demonize the demons making all Cambodians hard-core racists, had asked me to meet with Hun Sen appointed administrator at the Khmer Rouge Tribunal (KRT), Sean Vissoth, and the Australian member of the Australian Communist Party, Helen Jarvis (See an excerpt on Jarvis posted just below), in New York, on the endorsement of the role of the CPP in the KRT. I did not accept that invitation, knowing that Ronnie Yimsut was only interested in endorsing the Vietnamese as “liberators” of Cambodia. Since then, Jarvis was dismissed from the her job as adviser to the KRT, while Sean Vissoth is apparently no longer employed by that tribunal. This article vindicates me and my decision not to have anything to do with Youk Chhang and company, and Hun Sen regarding the pursuit of real justice for the Cambodian people resulting from the mass murder by the Khmer Rouge.
Hun Sen has decided to shut down, the Open Society Justice Initiative,(OSJI),of which I am a member, an NGO whose job is monitor justice implementation in the world, including Cambodia, is a tangible proof that Yimsut and his friends are in the wrong side of justice, and are with and are supporting Hun Sen and his CPP.
As I have been saying very often that the main purpose of Hun Sen and his supporters like Youk Chhang, and his friends and sponsors, in the creation of the KRT is not to render real justice but practical justice for the Cambodian people while demonize the Khmer Rouge by making them not only mass murderers, but, also racists. Now that this goal of demonizing the demons has been achieved, there is not reason, for Hun Sen to allow the KRT to continue its duty to bring all those who are implicated in this mass murder, to justice, especially those who are now in Hun Sen CPP as senior members. Naranhkiri Tith Ph.D. Washington DC. July 14, 2011
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The government planned to shut down the Open Society Justice Initiative, an international group monitoring the Khmer Rouge tribunal, after the NGO called for an investigation into alleged court corruption in 2007, according to a United States cable made public yesterday.
Claims that staff on the Cambodian side of the court were forced to pay kickbacks to their supervisors surfaced in 2006, and OSJI called for an investigation in February 2007. Court staff reiterated the claims to The Post in 2009. Court administrator Sean Visoth was allegedly at the centre of the scandal and international donors and the United Nations sought his dismissal.
According to a diplomatic cable from the US embassy in Phnom Penh marked “confidential” and signed by Ambassador Joseph Mussomeli, Sean Visoth allegedly revealed the plan to close OSJI during a meeting on March 11, 2007, with the former US Ambassador-at-Large for War Crimes David Scheffer. The scheme was reportedly approved by Prime Minister Hun Sen and Deputy Prime Minister Sok An.
“Vissoth confirmed for Scheffer that he (Vissoth) had been instructed by DPM Sok An to construct a chronology of the OSJI affair that would be used as part of the government’s plan to shut down the office,” Mussomeli said. “The order had been given at a recent wedding ceremony where the PM and other senior officials had discussed the matter.”
Other cables released yesterday recount negotiations between donors, the UN and the government that eventually led to the creation in 2009 of an “independent counselor” at the court designed to allow staff to make complaints about corruption without fear of reprisal.
The cables also show that the Cambodian government was allegedly reluctant during negotiations to sack Sean Visoth in the face of donor pressure.
Piper Campbell US embassy Chargé d’Affairs, reported in a confidential cable sent on November 3, 2008, that Sok An said the concerns over Sean Visoth and corruption “were a distraction from the goals of the court”. Campbell added that Sok An “made several pointed criticisms of the UN, all but asserting that UN meddling was intended to mar Cambodia’s significant contributions to the KRT and to assert UN dominance over it”.
Yesterday, a source at the court, who requested anonymity, said details of Sean Visoth’s position were still “not clear” and the issue remained “sensitive”.
Court spokesman Neth Pheaktra said Sean Visoth had not received any salary from the court since he ceased working there over two years ago.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 11.a. Helen Jarvis involvement in Communism http://www.guardian.co.uk/lifeandstyle/2010/jan/10/malcolm-caldwell-pol-pot-murder In one form or another, this exculpation has been used over and again by the supporters of communist revolutions, from the Russian via the Chinese through to the Cambodian. Each new manifestation commanded the fervent advocacy of a new generation of radicals. Sooner or later the grim reality was revealed, which, paradoxically, only raised the hope that the next version would get it right. As the French philosopher Jean-François Revel has remarked: "Utopia is not under the slightest obligation to produce results: its sole function is to allow its devotees to condemn what exists in the name of what does not." Somehow the link between Marxist-Leninist ideology and communist terror has never been firmly established in the way, for instance, that we understand Nazi ideology to have led inexorably to Auschwitz. As if to illustrate the point, earlier last year the ECCC announced that Helen Jarvis, its chief of public affairs, was to become head of the victims unit, responsible for dealing with the survivors, and relatives of the dead, of S-21. Jarvis is an Australian academic with a longterm interest in the region, who was recently awarded Cambodian citizenship. She is also a member of the Leninist Party Faction in Australia. In 2006 she signed a party letter that included this passage: "We too are Marxists and believe that 'the ends justify the means'. But for the means to be justifiable, the ends must also be held to account. In time of revolution and civil war, the most extreme measures will sometimes become necessary and justified. Against the bourgeoisie and their state agencies we don't respect their laws and their fake moral principles." Jarvis refused to speak to me about these matters. But Knut Rosandhaug, the UN's deputy administrator for the tribunal, said that the administration "fully supports" her. In this sense, although she was never a Pol Potist herself, Jarvis shows that the spirit of Malcolm Caldwell has survived the last century. It lives on in the conviction that the ends justify the means, and in the manner that liberal institutions can house the most illiberal outlooks. The means, of course, always become the ends. Duch or someone like him is the method and the madness, the process and the final product. At least the man himself claims to grasp what continues to elude too many who should by now know better. In his deposition to the court, he said: "I clearly understand that any theory or ideology which mentions love for the people in a class-based concept is definitely driving us into endless tragedy and misery." 12. Shares Needed as Cambodia Gets a Stock Exchange By SIMON MARKS The New York Times; Published: July 10, 2011 ------------------------------------------------------------- (Comments: Normally, every Cambodian living overseas or in Cambodia, should rejoice at the news has advanced to become one of the sophisticate economic financial countries in Asia. Having taught international finance for over twenty years at the school of Advanced International studies, (SAIS), at the Johns Hopkipns University, and for having lectured on financial reform and management,for the IMF in almost all formely Communist countries in Asia and Eastern Europe and the former Socist Union, a few words of caution on the stock in Cambodia are necessary. Even in an advanced country like the USA, with a non=corrupt and a political judicial and legal system, the financial system is still very dangerous place to manage and to invest in, due to either lack of sufficiently open and fair regulatory rules, and agencies, as the current exceptionlist place erronously granted to the largest financial institutions (Too big to fail), and with poor supervision, which led to current protracted and deep economic and financial crisis in this country with a continuing reveberation around the world. Cambodia is knnown for its systemic corruption and no rule of law. Cambodia still does have an anti-corruption law, along with a weak legal and a highly politicized judicial system. How on earth, can an open, trusted and honest stock market be operating in that kind of abnormal environment? No wonder, there is hardly companies listed in that stock market. To see Keat Chhon a former economic adviser to Pol Pot standing with the world Bank president is really absurd. The, afterall Cambodia is better known as the country of the absurd. Naranhkiri Tith Ph.D. Washington DC. July 13, 2011)) ---------------------------------------------------------------
PHNOM PENH — Having experienced more than a decade of economic growth after years of civil unrest and political disorder, Cambodia is set to open its stock market Monday, a move the government hopes will attract more investors to this country’s small and developing economy. Enlarge This Image ti Chor Sokunthea/Reuters Robert B. Zoellick, president of the World Bank, left, with Keat Chhon, who will head the commission overseeing the stock market, which is based in a Phnom Penh office tower. Enlarge This Image
Samrang Pring/Reuters A Phnom Penh office tower which houses the offices of the Cambodia Securities Exchange. But there is a stumbling block: Cambodia has no companies that are ready to go public. And the lack of preparedness among local businesses reflects a broader uncertainty about the country’s capacity to adapt to the challenges of operating financial markets. The introduction of an exchange would add sophistication to the Cambodian economy and potentially help to wean it off its dependence on the dollar. But in a society where claims of corruption are common and laws often weakly implemented, critics say there are concerns over whether market regulators are capable of enforcing rules on issues like corporate governance and accounting and trading standards. “Cambodia’s market regulator will have all the necessary laws to tackle crime, ensure good governance and create a decent, law-abiding exchange,” said Lee In-pyo, senior manager of the derivatives market division at the Korea Exchange, which has a 45 percent stake in the Cambodia Securities Exchange, with the government owning the remaining 55 percent. “But given Cambodia’s common practices, culture, and experience, full implementation of the law will be very difficult.” Korea Exchange signed a venture agreement with the Cambodian government in March 2009 as part of wider plans to expand throughout the region. Keat Chhon, the country’s finance minister, will be the chairman of the Securities and Exchange Commission of Cambodia. So far only three state-owned enterprises have announced their intention to list on the Cambodia Securities Exchange: Telecom Cambodia, Phnom Penh Water Supply Authority and Sihanoukville Autonomous Port. Han Kyung-tae, managing director for Tong Yang Securities, which is preparing the initial public offerings for Telecom Cambodia and Phnom Penh Water, said the two companies still needed work to make sure they were compliant with market regulations. Mr. Han said the two were hoping to be ready to list by the end of the year at the earliest. SBI Phnom Penh Securities, which is preparing the initial public offering for Sihanoukville Autonomous Port, did not respond to requests for comment. Still, with the Cambodian economy having rebounded from a 2 percent contraction in 2009 during the global financial crisis to experience growth in gross domestic product of 6.7 percent in 2010, according to the World Bank, economists say the exchange could help bring more capital into the economy. In a country where the total number of loans in the banking system accounts for 30 percent of gross domestic product, compared with nearly 100 percent in Thailand and Vietnam, there is plenty of room for an influx of funds. “It’s a very good time for Cambodia to introduce a stock market,” said Hiroshi Suzuki, chief economist for the Business Research Institute of Cambodia. Cambodia has its own currency, the riel, but the economy essentially functions on the dollar, with 90 percent of deposits and credit in the banking system denominated in dollars. This restricts the tools available to the central bank for cooling or stimulating the economy and inflation. While all stock quotations on the Cambodian exchange are to be in riel, the dollar can be used to buy shares for the first three years of the bourse. After that, the central bank, which issues the riel, will have more influence on the money circulating in the domestic financial system, making the Cambodian economy less dependent on the dollar. Morten Kvammen, founding partner at Cambodia Capital, a corporate advisory and investment firm and one of seven licensed underwriters in Cambodia, said the attractiveness of the market in Cambodia went far beyond that of the Lao Securities Exchange, which after six months of trading has just two state-owned companies trading stock. “We think volume will build very quickly, and we could have up to or maybe more than 10 companies listed in the first year of trading,” he said. Mr. Kvammen noted that while Laos had licensed two companies capable of underwriting and brokering, Cambodia had 13 doing the same thing. Still, Cambodia has ranked near the bottom of Transparency International’s Corruption Perceptions index for years. And some people in Cambodia are all too aware of the risks that could come along with a stock market, saying that it could act as a tool to further benefit the country’s elite. “We live in a culture where there is no rule of law,” said Tioulong Saumura, a lawmaker for the opposition Sam Rainsy Party and former vice governor of the National Bank of Cambodia. “No doubt it is easy to adopt a good regulation — copy it down yourself and come up with something on paper that looks good.” Hang Chuon Naron, secretary of state at the Ministry of Finance, said that enforcing high regulatory standards depended upon not only the government, but also issuers and investors. He said that bringing a stock market to Cambodia would be a “learning process” for everyone involved and that it could take up to five years to ensure all the necessary standards are met. Analysts often draw cautionary lessons from the Ho Chi Minh Stock Exchange, formerly known as the Ho Chi Minh City Trading Center, when it opened in Vietnam in 2000. Trading was slow to take off and only a handful of companies were listed after five years of trading. Then in 2005, as the world economy was enjoying a period of sustained growth, speculation brought in a plethora of companies and investors. The Ho Chi Minh index jumped from 100 points in 2000 to about 1,000 points in early 2007. But by early 2009, the market had dropped to below 300 points as investors pulled out in the wake of the global financial crisis. “I think it is going to be a steep learning curve, not only for the fund managers but also for the locals,” said Sany Zainudin, a fund manager at MIDF Amanah Asset Management in Kuala Lumpur, who was one of 32 regional fund managers who arrived in Cambodia in November to learn about the country’s legal framework with a view to investing in the market. Economists also say that many Cambodian companies with the financial clout to be able to list are completely unaccustomed to the financial benefits associated with a stock market, as they are used to a culture of running businesses as family outfits. “They don’t like to see some part of the stock sold to others,” said Mr. Suzuki, the economist. Mr. Suzuki said he expected some of Cambodia’s larger telecommunication companies like Mobitel, as well as some of the bigger local banks, to be among the first private companies to list. As was the case in Vietnam, Mr. Suzuki said, securities firms would probably spend years trying to persuade companies to list. “How to increase the number of these companies will be the hardest job,” he said. A version of this article appeared in print on July 11, 2011, in The International Herald Tribune with the headline: Shares Needed as Cambodia Gets a Stock Exchange,.
13. Govt hails Thai election The Phnom Penh Post: Tuesday, 05 July 2011 15:02 Cheang Sokha and James O’Toole
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(Comments: when Hor Namhong cheered the victory of Yingluck Shinawatra, Taksin’s sister in the recent elections in Thailand, it means that Cambodia is again in bigger trouble, as Taksin is a friend of Hun Sen, since Hun Sen gave him the monopoly of cell phone in the mid-1990’s and started to make his first million from it. With this victory, Yingluck would become the first female prime minister in Thailand, and would follow her brother close association with Hun Sen, as shown by Hor Namhong exhilaration about the election victory of Taksin’s sister as follows:
“Speaking to reporters yesterday following the signing of an aid agreement with Japan, Hor Namhong said the Cambodian government “cannot hide” its pleasure at Puea Thai’s victory over the Democrat Party of outgoing Prime Minister Abhisit Vejjajiva.”
Please, also note how naïve those Cambodians who commented on this issue of utmost importance to Cambodia. I don’t blame them. But, I am also frightened by their naivety.
What this means for Cambodia, is that Vietnam is more than ever in firm control of Cambodia, as Thailand is no longer a threat to it. Only, time will tell how bad Cambodia future will be under the alliance between Taksin and Hun Sen. Naranhkiri Tith Ph.D. Washington DC. July 8, 2011)
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Thai elections Cambodian reaction
Chamroen Pheap, 66, sells drinks by Phnom Penh riverside.
I am so old that I don’t know much about how Thai policy affects Cambodia. I do know that our country needs to stay away from war. My husband and children died during war in 1977 and now I am alone. So, Thailand must not create conflict with Cambodia.
Chan Sokhum, aged 36, works for a private company.
Abhisit wanted to create conflict with Cambodia and now he is feeling the results of the election. I hope that the new Thai government and the Cambodian government will work together peacefully. I have waited for this day for a long time. We want to have peace.
Chhouen Sengheang, 18, is a first year banking student at Norton University Outside of the problems at the border and Preah Vihear, areas such as diplomacy and commercial business will be vastly improved. I hope Thailand will have a fresh start after the election of the country’s first female prime minister.
Pha Long, 25, studies management at Build Bright University in Phnom Penh
I was surprised when Abhisit lost the election. I think that although this event happened in Thailand it will affect Cambodia. As we know Yingluck is a sister of Thaksin and Thaksin is a friend of our country. So the new leader will follow Thaksin’s policy.
------------------------------------------------------ Foreign Minister Hor Namhong yesterday cheered the victory of Thailand’s Puea Thai party in the country’s national elections on Sunday, as analysts were cautiously optimistic that the change in government could ease tensions between the two countries.
Speaking to reporters yesterday following the signing of an aid agreement with Japan, Hor Namhong said the Cambodian government “cannot hide” its pleasure at Puea Thai’s victory over the Democrat Party of outgoing Prime Minister Abhisit Vejjajiva.
Tensions along the border between Thailand and Cambodia have been heightened over the past few months, twice spilling over into violence – in February, near Preah Vihear temple, when at least 10 people where killed, and in April and May, near Oddar Meanchey province, killing at least 18.
“It is true, we cannot hide the fact that we are happy with the victory of the Puea Thai Party in Bangkok. We hope that the new government in Thailand that is organised by Puea Thai will resolve issues with Cambodia more positively and more peacefully,” Hor Namhong said.
“What we want is a peaceful solution. We don’t want anything from Thailand other than a fair solution, peaceful and in accordance with international law.”
Puea Thai’s incoming prime minister, Yingluck Shinawatra, reportedly said yesterday that the restoration of ties with neighbouring countries would be a priority for the new government, Bangkok’s The Nation newspaper said. Yingluck apparently did not mention a specific country, but was understood to be referring to Cambodia.
The border tensions between Thailand and Cambodia focus largely on Preah Vihear, kicking up following the inscription of the temple as a UNESCO World Heritage site for Cambodia in 2008. Thai Foreign Minister Noppadon Pattama had supported Cambodia in the run-up to the temple’s inscription, but was later forced to resign over the issue amid pressure from hard-line nationalists who accused him of selling out Thai territory along the border.
Noppadon served in a government aligned with former Thai premier Thaksin Shinawatra, who was ousted in a 2006 coup and lives abroad to avoid a jail term on graft charges. Yingluck is Thaksin’s younger sister and is widely expected to hew closely to his policies – Thaksin himself has referred to her as his “clone”.
Having been unable to return to Thailand since 2008, Thaksin has trotted the globe over the past few years, memorably touching down in Cambodia several times in 2009 and 2010 after Prime Minister Hun Sen named him an economics adviser. Analysts said the appointment was intended as a jab at Abhisit, a bitter enemy of Thaksin who has come under harsh criticism from Hun Sen.
The premier said in 2009 that he was “waiting for the next Thai government”, later saying Abhisit had “no family honour” and calling the Democrat leader the most difficult Thai PM he had ever worked with. By contrast, Hun Sen has termed Thaksin his “eternal friend”, and Lao Mong Hay, a former researcher with the Asian Human Rights Commission, said the election of a pro-Thaksin government in Bangkok is likely to improve relations between the two sides.
“I think it should ease the tensions, and then perhaps Thaksin will step in again behind the scenes,” Lao Mong Hay said. “We have to be patient and let the new government settle down and sort out the mess left over by the outgoing government.”
Even with the overwhelming victory scored by Puea Thai, though, there is concern that the new government could be forced out through a military coup, as Thaksin was in 2006, or through a court decision, as was the fate of pro-Thaksin prime ministers Samak Sundaravej and Somchai Wongsawat in 2008.
In response to such concerns, outgoing Defence Minister Prawit Wongsuwon told Agence France-Presse following the polls that the military “will not get involved” this time around.
Puangthong Pawakapan, a professor at Bangkok’s Chulalongkorn University and an expert on Thai-Cambodian relations, said yesterday that Puea Thai would likely tread carefully in handling the border issue, wary of the passions it arouses in some quarters. Unlike the outgoing government, however, she said the Yingluck administration would likely be uninterested in politicising the issue.
“I think Puea Thai realise that they have to try to solve this Preah Vihear temple issue,” Puangthong said. “The new minister of foreign affairs needs to have the guts to fight against the misinformation created by the nationalists and be firm on the previous positions taken by Samak Sundaravej – that supporting Cambodia’s World Heritage inscription will not affect Thai territory at all.”
14. As Number One, China to Face Hour of Choice The Brookings Institution: Tuesday July 5, 2011 http://www.brookings.edu/opinions/2011/0630_china_bush.aspx: China, China's Economy, Asia, Northeast Asia, International Relations Richard C. Bush III, Director, Center for Northeast Asian Policy StudiesYaleGlobal: June 30, 2011 —----------------------------------------------------------
(Comments: Please, find this historic and eye-opening article titled "China's Choices" and read it carefully, on the confirmation by the International Monetary fund (IMF, of which I was a senior official for 24 years) that China will soon surpass the USA as the most important economy in the world. It is sent to me by the Brookings Institution, one of the most influential think tanks in this country, located here in Washington DC. , of which I am a member since 1980.
It also shows how mistaken Hillary Clinton is to have misled this country, which has already so many problems and so fiscally broke, to be an ally with Vietnam, and to be able to fight China rising power in Asia and the world.
However, this situation does not mean that Cambodia should gang up against Vietnam and the US. What it means is that Cambodia should remain neutral knowing that China tributary system since 2000 years ago, does not involve territorial conquest. But, Hun Sen has revealed himself to be closer and siding with Vietnam, whose spokesman had recently and publicly said that “Cambodia is close to china but is closer to Vietnam.”
What it means that Vietnam had modified China’s tributary system of no-interest or habit in conquering the territory of its weaker neighbors’ (Champa, Kampuchea Krom, Laos) territories, into a very deadly form of colonialism and imperialism, in which it does not allow any minorities (Chams, Montagards, Khmers Krom) to exist in its cultural, political and social space.
(Please, the Vietnamese modified tributary system compared to that of China in this link; http://cambodiana.org/Vietnamtributarysystemwithdeadlytwist.aspx ;)
It is a unique opportunity for Cambodia to get rid of Communist Vietnam's colonialism and imperialism, once and for all, if only we have a real, credible, brave, dignified, honest, and internationally respectable leader (such as Aung San Suu Kuy, or Nelson Mandela), to grasp this unique historical moment for Cambodia to lead the Cambodian people to be free again. Naranhkiri Tith Ph.D. Washington DC. July 5, 2011) ----------------------------------------------------------
Recently the International Monetary Fund confirmed what the average Chinese has long anticipated: China will soon have the world’s largest economy, surpassing the United States. There may be quibbles about measuring sticks and low per capita GDP, so timing is imprecise. But the trend is clear. In terms of gross domestic product, China will become number one in this decade or the next and the United States will become number two. Yet rankings do not automatically confer power and influence. More important is how a major country chooses to use its power, for good or ill.
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Reuters
RELATED CONTENT The Republic of China in Historical Perspective Richard C. Bush III A Spectacular Century: The Republic of China Centennial Democracy Forums June 24, 2011 Simulation of a Crisis in East Asia Simulation of a Crisis in the Taiwan Strait More Related Content » ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- That China will have the world’s largest economy is a remarkable achievement. In 1949, when the Chinese Communist Party came to power, China was a very poor country, the result of more than a century of decline. Thirty years later, it was still a poor country, wracked by continual political turmoil. But China’s leaders then abandoned central planning and autarky in favor of export-led growth fueled by external investment and local initiative. They stuck to that strategy while adapting skillfully to changing circumstances. They improved the living standards of hundreds of millions and transformed the face of the country This milestone is as important psychologically as it is economically. Chinese take pride in their civilization.They believe that their country, in its weakened state, was victimized for more than a century by the countries of the West plus Japan. To restore China to its past glory and position as one of the world’s great powers would right those wrongs. That this growing power is coming at the expense of the United States, with which China at best has had a difficult relationship for much of the last 60 years, is particularly sweet.
Some Chinese believe that passing this milestone will have automatic consequences for international politics, giving China more international influence. In their view, other countries should then confer more deference on China and accommodate to it on issues that China regards as important, rather than China continuing to accommodate them. At some point, Beijing will likely insist that the head of the International Monetary Fund or World Bank be a Chinese. Discussions of China’s having the largest GDP come with a subtext – that rapid rise of a new power can destabilize the international system and even lead to conflict. Economic power can be translated into military power and political influence. But as history shows, the path may not have a single destination. According to the conventional narrative, Germany challenged Great Britain’s dominant position in the international system and World War I was the result. Yet this narrative is at odds with the economic rankings at that time, according to estimates of the late Angus Maddison, a prominent economic historian. In 1913, the year before the outbreak of World War I, the United States had the world’s largest GDP, with just more than $500 billion in 1990 prices. Next, four countries were bunched together, each with $225 to $240 billion. Germany and Great Britain were in this group but so were Russia and, surprisingly, China. France was at $144 billion and Japan only had a GDP of $71 billion. China’s second-tier economy is not surprising. In 1913, as today, it had the world’s largest population. More people can produce more stuff. But China then was also politically weak: divided internally and vulnerable to external imperialism. While, of course, the world today is very different from what it was a century ago, the 1913 configuration is instructive. First of all, the 1913 rankings demonstrate that a large economy itself does not automatically translate into global political influence. In 1913 the United States may have had the world’s largest economy, but was virtually irrelevant in Europe’s gathering storm. Great Britain, on the other hand, “punched above its weight” to preserve stability in the international system. Second, a large economy does not necessarily result in a robust military. The United States had a comparatively small military establishment in 1913, despite having the largest GDP. Relative to their economic size, Germany and Japan had large armies and navies. Third, the emergence of a new economic number one doesn’t mean that international conflict is inevitable. By 1913, the United States was the dominant power in the Western Hemisphere, but Great Britain accepted this decline in its global influence. Japan, on the other hand, had fought and won wars against two countries three times its economic size: China in 1894-95 and Russia in 1904-05. Despite their commercial and colonial interests, however, Britain and the United States chose to accommodate Japan rather than challenge it. Fourth, when conflict occurs, it is not necessarily because a rising power is bent on aggression. Germany’s decision to go to war in the summer of 1914 was driven by rigid alliance commitments and anxiety, probably misplaced, that Russia was growing stronger. Berlin opted to strike preemptively to preserve its security. Russia was caught in the same dilemma. In short, the choices that major powers make are more important than their economic rank. As number one, China may assume that it has the right to extend its influence at the expense of others. Its expansion of its strategic perimeter in the East and South China seas is a case in point. Or it may continue to focus on its economy and create a prosperous life for most of its people, letting the United States continue to bear the burden of international leadership. If so, it will remain a country that has global impact, as Kenneth Lieberthal, director of the John L. Thornton China Center, puts it, but is not a global player. Or it may opt to work with other major powers to meet the critical challenges to the international system – that is the Obama administration’s hope. Or it can read the worst into what others do, particularly the United States, and act on its fears. Which choice China makes will have profound consequences for East Asia and the world. The United States has choices too. It can regard becoming number two as another sign that of permanent decline and retreat from international leadership. It can choose to rebuild the pillars of national power that have been neglected – government finance, education, science and technology, and so on. It can conclude – without justification – that China is sure to become America’s adversary and base policy on that fear, producing a dangerous vicious circle. Or it can forgo the temptation to read the worst into China’s revival and instead seek to influence China’s trajectory in the direction of cooperation rather than conflict.
And for each country, not making conscious choices about future direction is also a choice. China is going to be number one, but that’s no reason for Americans to head for the hills. YaleGlobal is the flagship publication of the Yale Center for the Study of Globalization, published since 2002.
15. Reflections on Cambodian History · 14.3 (Fall 1990) Cambodia (use control and click to read more articles on Cambodia) · By Chandler, David P. http://www.culturalsurvival.org/publications/cultural-survival-quarterly/cambodia/reflections-cambodian-history ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- (Comments: this article by David Chandler, titled “Reflections on Cambodian History,” and the next one by Charles Keyes, titled “The Legacy of Angkor” are most crucial for all those (Cambodians and non-Cambodians alike) who want to understand the main factors behind Cambodia’s past and current tragedy, and could be used as an important and indispensable lessons for those Cambodians who want to allow Cambodia to continue to live longer, by avoiding or repeating the same mistakes made in the past. It shows the cultural difference between the two aggressors, the Thai and the Vietnamese, of Cambodia since the fall of Angkor in 1432. Using (But not accepting his implied thesis of the superiority of the western civilization over others) Professor Samuel Huntington’s book (See book description pasted below) titled “The Clash of Civilizations,” the aggression by the Thai against the Cambodians can be classified as war within the same civilizations; whereas the aggression by the Vietnamese against the Cambodians can be classified as a clash between two different civilizations. Of the two articles, that of Chandler is the most negative and biased, although disguised towards the Cambodians, and accepting Vietnamese as no longer having a colonialist and imperialist design on Cambodia. In this context, he appears to give credit to Hun Sen and his CPP the good mark for being realistic in accepting to consider the Vietnamese as a good neighbor and savior, and not as an invader, In other words, the Cambodians can only survive if they stop resisting the Vietnamese imperialism. I must confess that I have been always distrustful of David Chandler (who worked and cooperates with Ben Kiernan and his protégé Youk Chhang of DCCAM, whose main objective is to “demonize the demons”, so as to make the Khmer Rouge not only mass murderers but also a racists, therefore to make the Vietnamese more acceptable to the international community) real intention towards Cambodia and its people. For that resistance and non-acceptance of his covert friendship for Vietnam, that Cambodia can only survive if it recognizes Vietnam as a friendly neighbor and a savior. He appeared to have minimized Vietnamese imperialism and colonialism, for the conquest and the total disintegration of Champa, or for the slow, but certain elimination of the Khmers Krom (which is genocide by definition, according to Geneva Convention of Genocide) from their ancestral land of Kampuchea Krom, as something belonging to the past.
He also ignores the estimated four million of illegal immigrants now residing in Cambodia and continuously supporting Hun Sen’s reelection every four years so that he can continue allow Vietnam to be in firm control of Cambodia. Last but not least, Chandler was most deadly and reveals himself to be part of that group of foreign intellectuals who favors and accept Vietnamese hegemony over Cambodia, as a natural phenomenon, granted that most Cambodians cannot control their innermost emotion and show themselves to be more anti Vietnamese than they really are, thus making Chandler’s claims a reality. Chandler’s main hypocrisy, as I had described earlier can be captured from his writing as follows: “Animosity toward Vietnam and fears of encirclement have faded from official pronouncements. Vietnamese ambitions toward Cambodia, whatever they were, seem to have receded. As the demythologizing process works itself out on both sides of the border, cultural differences between Cambodians and Vietnamese, so useful to Cambodian demagogues in the past, are blurring, and the people of both countries find themselves as neighbors in a global village. Cambodian culture, insofar as it is unique and looks backward to its periods of greatness, will survive, and a more internationalized "Indochinese" culture may develop (anthropologist as it seems to be doing among some Cambodian migrants in the United States). The Cambodian people and some kind of Cambodian nation will also survive, provided that the fighting stops, political stability reasserts itself, and foreign powers stop using the country as a testing ground for allegedly larger interests, such as punishing Vietnam, pleasing Beijing, or avenging the coup that removed Sihanouk from power 20 years ago. Perhaps the most preposterous and hypocritical of Chandler is revealed in this sentence as his perception of the so-called future relationship between the Cambodians and Vietnamese people, when he prophesized that: “Animosity toward Vietnam and fears of encirclement have faded from official pronouncements. Vietnamese ambitions toward Cambodia, whatever they were, seem to have receded. As the demythologizing process works itself out on both sides of the border, cultural differences between Cambodians and Vietnamese, so useful to Cambodian demagogues in the past, are blurring, and the people of both countries find themselves as neighbors in a global village.“ Are Cultural differences between Cambodians and Vietnamese, so useful to Cambodian demagogues in the past are blurring? Is it true that Vietnamese aggression towards Cambodia, seem to have receded, as Chandler suggested? How could this be when the Vietnamese never allowed any minorities (Cham, Khmer Krom, Montagnard) to exist in its social and political and living space. History had shown and well-respected historians and anthropologist specializing in Cambodian affairs, such as; American military historian Bernard Fall, Australian historian Milton Osborne, and French anthropologist Marie Alexandrine Martin, had shown how the Vietnamese had committed genocide against its immediate neighbors, namely; Champa, Cambodia, and Laos. And we should not forget that Vietnam is still one of the four remaning self-preserved Communist countries in the world. Communism is not knoiwn for their love of Freedom, but is known for accpeting mass murder a solution for changing society (See the review of Stephane Courtois' book titled "The black Book of Communism" posted in the home page of this web site). According to an Irish libertarian Mark Humphrey, who characterizes the crime of communism and fascism as follows: "The evil philosophies of fascism and communism were the two great 20th century mass killers. Of these, communism was the greatest killer. 100 million men, women and children have been murdered by socialism so far, and the killing continues today, notably in North Korea. In terms of body count, socialism is by far the most evil religion, the most evil ideology of any sort, of all time. " The article by Keyes is more accurate, constructive, and less controversial. It pointed out the realities of Cambodia under the influence of the past and its inability to change. He correctly concluded that: “Despite the fundamental agreement between the Phnom Penh government and those associated with the noncommunist resistance that Angkorean civilization is the source of a distinctive and valued national identity for Khmers within an international community, these parties and their backers have failed to find a means to effect national reconciliation.” Naranhkiri Tith Ph.D. Washington DC. July 4, 2011) Happy Fourth of July to all our visitors and friends ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- In 1975, a spokesperson for the newly installed communist regime in Phnom Penh claimed proudly that because of the revolution "2,000 years of Cambodian history have ended." By "history" the spokesperson seems to have meant the sum total of Cambodia's past, as well as all the narratives about it prior to 1975. The abruptness with which the new government embarked on a new era made many Cambodians agree that the old "Cambodia" had to an end. Francois Ponchaud's disquieting title, Cambodia Year Zero, makes this very point. For some Cambodian communists, on the other hand, Cambodian history ended when they were driven from power in 1979. Others still consider that this dispossession was temporary and contingent; they hope to return to power and regain control of the historical process. Still others - most Cambodians, perhaps - have assumed that Cambodia's history, like the society itself, will sooner or later resume its prerevolutionary form. Against this shifting, post-revolutionary backdrop, I would like to discuss three themes in modern Cambodian history: Cambodia's accessibility, cultural distance from Vietnam, and the grandeur of its medieval past. Cambodia's Accessibility Since about 1800 the Mekong River basin, where most Cambodians live, has been accessible to military forces, immigrants, and influences from southern Vietnam and central Thailand. In the mid-nineteenth century, Vietnamese forces occupied Cambodia for several years, and when Thai forces came to the "rescue" of the Cambodians, the kingdom became a battlefield. The hardships of that time, Vietnamese attempts to colonize Cambodia, and popular resistance to their rule all entered popular memory, reemerging when Cambodians began fighting the Vietnamese again in the 1970s. At that point, some Cambodians may have thought that history was repeating itself. The nineteenth-century struggle ended when France established its protectorate over Cambodia in 1863, separating the combatants. Had France not done so, Cambodia would probably have disappeared as a sovereign state divided into spheres of Vietnamese and Thai control, with a frontier running along the Mekong River or nearby. "Cambodia" survived by exchanging the hegemony of its neighbors for dependency on France. In some ways, it was a French invention. Under French protection, however, Cambodia became even more entangled with Vietnam. In the early 1900s, without being consulted, Cambodia became a component of "French Indochina," comprising three segments of Vietnam, Cambodia, and three principalities in Laos. Other entanglements followed. In 1930, a handful of Vietnamese radicals led by Ho Chi Minh founded a Communist Party, and succumbed to the "Indochina" concept, probably on Soviet advice. The consequences of an "Indochinese" communist Party, with no Cambodian members prior to the 1940s, still reverberate in Cambodian politics. Moreover, because the French educational system in southern Vietnam, or "Cochinchina," was more extensive than its counterpart in Cambodia, many more southern Vietnamese than Cambodians were literate in French. They soon filled up the middle ranks of the supposedly Cambodian civil service. During the colonial era nearly half a million other Vietnamese, mostly farmers, fisherpeople, and artisans, emigrated to Cambodia, encouraged by the French authorities, who considered them more vigorous than the Cambodians as a "race." By 1945, more than half the inhabitants of Phnom Penh were ethnic Vietnamese, and so were nearly all the workers on Cambodia's rubber plantations. Cambodian nationalists in the 1930s were distressed by these developments. Many educated Cambodians eared that they were being sidetracked by the French and that they would eventually be "swallowed" by Vietnam. The push against Cambodia from the Vietnamese and later from the French was matched in the nineteenth century by similar pressure from the Thais. In 1794, Thailand annexed two Cambodian provinces, Battambang and Siem Reap. The former was prosperous agriculturally; the latter housed the "undiscovered" ruins of Angkor. The Thais annexed the provinces in exchange for allowing a Cambodian prince back into his country to be king, and they held onto them until they were forced to give them up by the French in 1907. When France was prostrated by World War II, the Thais took the two provinces back, releasing them in 1946 as part of a deal that enabled them to enter the United Nations. It is not surprising that when Cambodia gained its independence in 1953, Thai and Vietnamese activities over the past century and Cambodian perceptions of their intentions led the kingdom's leading politician, Prince Norodom Sihanouk, to be wary of these neighbors. In the 1950s, Sihanouk's watchfulness was justified by frequent plots against him undertaken by the pro-US governments in Thailand and South Vietnam. Later on, he had to worry about the clandestine occupation of much of eastern Cambodia by Vietnamese communist troops. Sihanouk agreed to this installation, being unable to resist it, and also to gain credit with the communists if they won the Vietnam War. His own preferences were both Vietnams to leave Cambodia alone. Sihanouk frequently claimed that Cambodia was "surrounded" by Thailand and Vietnam. In his speeches he indulged in racist rhetoric to assert Cambodia's superiority over the three states, a tendency that kept relations at a fever pitch. Unlike Lon Nol and Pol Pot, who said similar things, Sihanouk had a healthy respect for the military potential of the two powers and a corresponding sense of Cambodia's vulnerability. To counterbalance pressure from his neighbors, he formed an alliance with China. This "pro-communist" behavior infuriated Bangkok and Saigon authorities all the more. Cambodia's modern history has been entangled with the histories and interests of Thailand and Vietnam, largely because of its accessibility to these two powers. Another reason for the entanglement lies in the cultural differences between Thailand and Cambodia on the one hand and Vietnam on the other. Cultural Distance These differences spring from the fact that until very recent times both Thailand and Cambodia were Theravada Buddhist kingdoms with cultural roots stretching back to India, while Vietnam, until 1945 a Mahayana Buddhist empire, derives much of its culture from China. The differences have grown less important over time, but they still form a component of Cambodian, Thai, and Vietnamese cultural baggage, and they deeply influenced Cambodian political behavior in the 1970s. Traditional attitudes of the nations toward each other also affect many of the choices that Cambodians, Thais, and Vietnamese make in the sphere of foreign relations. The Thais and Cambodians have traditionally perceived the Vietnamese as territorially aggressive, mendacious, and condescending. As non-Theravada Buddhists, the Vietnamese have also been seen as nonbelievers, un-redeemably beyond the pale. Two anecdotes will illustrate this point. In April 1970, soon after the coup that had removed Sihanouk from power, anti-Vietnamese riots in Phnom Penh got out of hand and thousands of unarmed Vietnamese civilians were massacred by Cambodian troops. No expressions of regret were forthcoming from Lon Nol's government, the press, or the Buddhist monastic order. For Cambodians, there were no "innocent" Vietnamese and no "guilty" Cambodians, either. Five years later, when the Cambodian communists came to power, one of their first actions was to dismantle the Roman Catholic cathedral in Phnom Penh, which they called "the Vietnamese church." They also tore down other Catholic churches frequented by Vietnamese. Cambodia's own Buddhist temples were not subject to the same abuse, and neither was the former US Embassy, the headquarters of Cambodia's "Enemy Number One." If Cambodian feelings about Vietnam were traditionally fueled by resentment, those of Vietnamese toward Cambodians, until very recently, have occasionally been tinged with a sense of superiority, often disguised as bafflement. Vietnamese have tended to see Cambodians as a childlike, barbarian people whose kingdoms on the outer reaches of Vietnam cry out for management or stratagems. These attitudes were submerged in fraternal rhetoric and behavior in the years of Vietnam's protectorate over Cambodia in the 1980s. During that time, many Cambodians at home at abroad began to question some of their mythology. Were the Vietnamese better or worse than Pol Pot? Was there a future for a brand of nationalism based on mistrust and confrontation with Vietnam? A third theme affecting modern Cambodian politics, related to the other two, is the grandeur of its medieval past. Cambodia's Medieval Past When France abandoned Cambodia is the 1950s, it left behind an ambiguous legacy. Starting in the 1870s, French archaeologists, historians, and savants had untangled the chronology of medieval Cambodian history; recovered the names of Angkorean kings; excavated, named, and dated more than a thousand religious monuments; and deciphered roughly the same number of inscriptions. They had constructed a framework for Cambodia's history. Arguably, this work was France's most enduring contribution to Indochina. What were the Cambodians to make of this extraordinary gift? The narrative of Cambodian history bequeathed to them by France involved a period of greatness, culminating in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries and followed by a long decline. The period of greatness was marked by strong leadership, monumental art, imperial ambitions, and a highly stratified society. Times of "decline" were characterized by weak leaders, inward-looking policies, foreign interference, and a society that, if not egalitarian, was organized in terms of villages, families, and entourages rather than on a national scale. The French associated what they insisted was Cambodia's decline with the refusal or inability of Cambodians to continue to behave in Angkorean ways. A fondness for grandeur, nourished by a close study of Cambodia's extraordinary art, made some of them disdainful of periods when Cambodia's rulers and ruled seem to have made more realistic assessments of their environment, and perhaps lived on better terms with each other. At the level of popular belief, Cambodians blamed the abandonment of Angkor in the fifteenth century on supernatural causes and the machinations of the Thais. Here is Lon Nol, talking to US Ambassador Swank in July 1971: In response to my request for his assessment of the internal political situation he launched into an exposition of his plans to rejuvenate the Khmer nation. Warming to an obviously favorite subject, he spoke of the historical superiority of the Khmer people to their western and eastern neighbors and of the long centuries of their decline... He recounted the legend explaining this decline involving the capture by the Thai of a sacred buffalo impregnated with the creative soul of the Khmer nation, thereafter lost for centuries. The present task, he continued, is to restore to the nation its soul, the formulae (kbbuon) which once made it great. The idea that Angkorean greatness was purely Khmer and could be reconstituted almost by an act of will preoccupied Pol Pot and his colleagues after 1975. "If we can build Angkor," Pol Pot declared, "we can do anything." Cambodia's grandeur, for example, could be summoned to defeat the Vietnamese. Cambodia is the only country in the world to display a ruin on its national flag. The gift from the French of a certified "greatness" (as well as a certified "decline") has been a mixed blessing to a country suffering from its accessibility to outsiders, a shortage of saleable resources, and a relatively small population. The tension between its past greatness and its present misfortune has characterized a good deal of Cambodian political thinking in recent times. Cambodia Today The People's Republic of Kampuchea (now known as the State of Cambodia) submerged or altered some of these psychological tensions because the PRK, like its Vietnamese patrons, was eager to set itself apart from previous regimes ("feudal" Sihanouk, "puppet" Lon Nol, "fascist" Pol Pot) and disavow the strand of Cambodian nationalism that was based on conflict with Vietnam. This belated injection of common sense into Cambodian self-perceptions contrasted sharply with the rhetoric of many Cambodian refugees and of opposition groups along the Thai border, who still proclaim that prerevolutionary Cambodia and its privileges can be brought back to life, and that the raison d'être of all Vietnamese has always been to "extinguish" the Cambodian "race." With the withdrawal of Vietnamese troops from Cambodia, some of these fears and animosities might reemerge, or flare up, in the countryside, where Vietnamese migrants have settled in large numbers. Prerevolutionary "live and let live" attitudes among Khmers are also likely to revive. At the government level it seems unlikely that policies will ever be based on the military confrontation with Vietnam or on alliances with Vietnam's enemies. Paradoxically, 10 percent of the pronouncement that opened this article seems to be coming true. Two hundred years of Cambodia's history, rather than two thousand, have ended - or have been modified at least in the last ten year or so. Animosity toward Vietnam and fears of encirclement have faded from official pronouncements. Vietnamese ambitions toward Cambodia, whatever they were, seem to have receded. As the demythologizing process works itself out on both sides of the border, cultural differences between Cambodians and Vietnamese, so useful to Cambodian demagogues in the past, are blurring, and the people of both countries find themselves as neighbors in a global village. Cambodian culture, insofar as it is unique and looks backward to its periods of greatness, will survive, and a more internationalized "Indochinese" culture may develop (as it seems to be doing among some Cambodian migrants in the United States). The Cambodian people and some kind of Cambodian nation will also survive, provided that the fighting stops, political stability reasserts itself, and foreign powers stop using the country as a testing ground for allegedly larger interests, such as punishing Vietnam, pleasing Beijing, or avenging the coup that removed Sihanouk from power 20 years ago. When peace turns, the outside powers that guarantee it will probably not allow Cambodia the luxury of unbridled nationalism, the chance to revert to the status of a hermit nation, or to be swallowed up by one state or another. Instead, what we might see in the 1990s is a more outward-looking, post-revolutionary phase of Cambodian history, dominated by Cambodia's independence guaranteed by the United Nations. The prospect of Cambodia becoming a small state locked into the rest of Asia, bereft of some of its mythology, does not seem to be too high a price for Cambodians to pay for their survival. They have already paid for more than most of us. Article copyright Cultural Survival, Inc. Cultural Survival helps Indigenous Peoples around the world defend their lands, languages, and cultures as they deal with issues like the one you’ve just read about.
16. The Legacy of Angkor · 14.3 (Fall 1990) Cambodia · Charles Keyes http://www.culturalsurvival.org/publications/cultural-survival-quarterly/cambodia/legacy-angkor Angkor, the great medieval city located near the Tonlé Sap (the "Great Lake") in northwestern Cambodia, was abandoned by Khmer rulers in the fifteenth century in an effort to find a capital that could be more easily defended against the expansionistic Thais. In the ensuing centuries - called the first "dark age" of Khmer history (the second being that instituted by the Khmer Rouge under Pol pot) - Angkor become a ruin, destroyed as much by the inexorable expansion of nature as by the destructive acts of humans. Although it was never really lost to Khmers, who recalled the past glories of Angkor in folktales, it ceased to be the cultural center of Khmer civilization after the fifteenth century. In 1860 the French explorer Henri Mouhot made his way to ancient ruins surrounded by jungle in the vicinity of the Tonlé Sap. Mouhot has sometimes been wrongly credited with having discovered Angkor, but his description of the ruins in his Le Tour du Monde did awaken the outside world to one of the great architectural wonders of history. Mouhot's "discovery" ushered in a period of interest French interest in Angkor, an interest that led the French government to support, through that Ecole Francaise d'Extrême-Orient, archaeological and historical researches into the character of Angkorean civilization. In the twentieth century, the colonial government of Indochina also contributed considerable funds toward Angkor's reconstruction. The research and reconstruction undertaken by the colonial government not only contributed significantly to worldwide awareness of the uniqueness of the great civilization that khmers had developed, but also sharped the historical consciousness of the Khmer themselves as a nation. Angkor become, and remains today, the preeminent symbol of Khmer national identity. Angkorean Civilization Although myths place the founding of Angkorean civilization in the ancient past, historical records permit the dating of its beginning in the early ninth century A.D. A king known to posterity as Jayavarman II (c. 802-850) erected his capital near the Great Lake, from which he and his court could obtain a regular supply of fish to eat with the rice produced in the fertile fields irrigated by the lake. Jayavarman II gained the support of the populace, apparently because the rituals of his court were seen as essential to ensuring the fertility of the land. He began what is known as the cult of the devaraja (the "god-king") by identifying himself with the Hindu god Siva and representing the potency of both god and king in the from of a phallic image known as a linga. All subsequent kings of Angkor also equated themselves through ritual and the monuments with a sacred power, sometimes Hindu, sometimes Mahayana Buddhist. Angkor, which is a Khmer version of the Sanskrit term nagara ("city"), was in fact a succession of sacred cities that served as the capital of the rulers of an empire from the ninth o the fifteenth centuries. Each pyramidal-shaped structure or temple that we so associate with Angkor was a re-creation in stone of the cosmology by which the Khmer rulers ordered their lives and that of their subjects. Through such buildings, the rulers of Angkor sought to bring the world of strife and struggle into harmony with ultimate order. The identification of the kind with a Hindu (or Buddhist) deity become complete at the time of the King's death. The shrine he had built during his lifetime become, after his death, his immortal body. Members of the royal family and the aristocracy emulated the ruler by erecting many more shrines in the capital and provincial centers. The culmination of the pyramid-temple form, which represents in stone and space he sacred center of the universe, Mt. Meru, was realized in the twelfth century with the construction of unquestionably the most well-known monument at Angkor, Angkor Wat. Although the name Angkor Wat means "pagoda of the capital," it was not, in its original conception, a Buddhist temple (wat), but was, rather, dedicated to god Visnu. The cult of Visnu did not survive for very long as the exclusive religion of Angkor. King Jayavarman VII (1181 to the early thirteenth century), the best remembered king of the Angkorean period, sought (apparently form his wife's influence)religious inspiration from Mahayana Buddhism rather than from Hinduism. This inspiration did not lead Jayavarman VII to make a radical break with the architectural and iconographic traditions that had preceded his reign. His city, Angkor Thom, still centered on a representation of the sacred Mt. Meru, but he added new Buddhist elements to his shrine. Like Angkor Wat, the Bayon (temple mountain) has bas-reliefs. These are not, however, scenes from the lives of Visnu or Rama; rather they are scenes from the world of humans, the most important of the worlds in the Buddhist realm of feeling and desire, Aside from their religious meaning, these murals tell us much about life in Angkor at the time. The higher elevations of the shrine represent the realm of the gods, a realm dominated by the Bodhisattva, Lokesvara, whose compassion for all humans can assist them in achieving ultimate salvation. The images of Lokesvara that dominate the Bayon have long captured the attention of visitors. Pierre Loti, in his Pélerin d'Angkor, wrote: "I looked up at the tree-covered towers which dwarfed me, when all of a sudden mu blood curdled as I saw an enormous smile looking down on me, and then another smile on another wall, then three, then five, then ten appearing in every direction." The faces represent not only the Bodhisattva alone; they are also of Jayavarman VII, who has become the Buddharaja, the king who is also a Buddha. The images looking in many directions were indicative of Jayavarman VII's control over a vast domain. While Jayavarman's authority may have been extended over a larger territory than his predecessors, the Angkorean world had long included much of what today is not only Cambodia, but also most of northeastern and much of central Thailand, central and southern Laos, and southern Vietnam. The account of Chou Ta-kuan, a Chinese envoy to Angkor at the end of the thirteenth century, reveals that much of the populace as well as many in the elite adhered to that form of Buddhism known as the "Way of Elders," Theravada, although the Chinese themselves termed it Hinayana (the "lesser vehicle") in contrast to their own from of Buddhism, Mahayana (the "greater vehicle"). With the adoption of Theravada Buddhism, much of the rational for the monumental architecture of Angkor disappeared since people found greater appeal in the rituals performed in small shrines by Buddhist monks than in those performed by kings and priests in large temples. As the rational for Angkorean civilization was undermined, so too did the military power of Angkor decline. In the fourteenth century a number of new states were formed by Tai-speaking peoples in what is today Thailand and Laos. Although the Tai from Ayutthaya attacked and defeated Angkor in the fifteenth century, it is more appropriated to see Ayutthaya as one of a number of successor states to Angkor - including also those of Lan Xang (Laos) and Phnom Penh - rather than as an aggressor intent on destroying Khmer culture. The court of these new Tai kingdoms, like that of Phnom Penh, derived most of their ideas about statecraft from Angkor. The Politics of History Although Thais and Lao lay some claim to the heritage of Angkor, it is the Khmers for whom Angkor holds the greatest historical significance. The various parties to the conflict that has so torn apart the country of Cambodia in the past two decades disagree about many things, but they have all looked to Angkor as the wellspring of Khmer identity. The national flags of the kingdom of Cambodia under Prince Sihanouk, the Khmer Republic headed by General Lon Nol, Democratic Kampuchea under Pol Pot and in its reincarnated form as a coalition of the Khmer Rouge, the Khmer Peoples National Liberation front (under Son Sann), and followers of Prince Sihanouk, and the People's republic of Kampuchea (now the State of Cambodia) under Heng Samrin and Hun Sen all display an image of Angkor Wat, albeit somewhat different in each case. Today, the icon most likely to be encountered in an office in Phnom Penh is not a picture of a revolutionary hero but a painting, photo, or carved image of Angkor Wat. Similarly, at events involving Khmer refugees, images of Angkor Wat are likely to be very much in evidence. The consensus - signified in the images on their flags and in other forms - among of Khmers that Angkor is the preeminent symbol of their civilization has not prevented the extremely destructive fratricide that has taken place in Cambodia since 1970. Beneath the consensus lie fundamentally different interpretations of what aspects of Angkorean civilization should be retained in contemporary Khmer culture. For Prince Sihanouk - when he was still ruling the country - Angkor represented the triumph of his predecessors, the Angkorean rulers, in creating a great civilization based on the idea that the kings themselves embodied the sacred essence of the state. Angkor Wat, the Bayon, and other great monuments of the Angkorean complex were known to have been at once cult centers and funerary monuments dedicated to the cult of the "god-king" - that is, a king who was also the incarnation of a Hindu god or the Buddha. According to this view of Angkor, the populace supported the Angkorean kings by paying taxes and performing the Angkorean kings by paying taxes and performing the heavy labor needed for constructing and maintaining the large monuments because they believed that the "god-kings" were able to bring order to a chaotic world. Sihanouk also added to this the idea, adopted after the end of the Angkorean period, of the righteous king, the king who is widely acclaimed because he ruled in accord with the teachings of the Buddha. The royal interpretation of Angkor thus sees Khmer civilization as one that achieves its highest development through acts spread to the populace by a just king seeking to be compassionate, in a Buddhist sense, toward his subjects. The Khmer Rouge also sought to assert a Khmer identity that embodied the glory of Angkor, but its Angkor was not a civilization in which the world was to take pride, but was seen, as the historian Chandler has written , as having been created as "a purely national event." Under the Khmer Rouge almost no outsider visited the famous ruins. The Khmer Rouge also turned the royalist interpretation of Angkor on its head: the rulers of Angkor, like all kings, were the
corrupt products of feudalism. As such, as a monarchy had no place in a revolutionary Cambodia. Angkor still remained relevant, however, as a symbol of what the power of the people working collectively could accomplish. Under the Khmer Rouge the idea of collective labor was raised to the level of the sacred. Angkor was evoked, in Chandler's words, "to demonstrate that ordinary people, when mobilized in vast numbers by the state can do extraordinary things." Although the Angkorean legacy was the only part of the Khmer past to be given any positive value by the Khmer Rouge, this legacy was itself of only limited significance. The new society to be created by the Khmer Rouge was, in the words of the national anthem of Democratic Kampuchea, to be "more glorious than Angkor." The legacy of Angkor has been reinterpreted anew in the wake of the installation of a Vietnamese-backed government in Phnom Penh and the creation of a coalition of Khmer Rouge, Sihanoukist, and republican factions with support in refugee camps in Thailand and among refugees living elsewhere. In the immediate aftermath of the Vietnamese push into the country, the area containing the Angkorean monuments become a battlefield. There was some damage to the monuments. Although how much will only be know when all monuments (not just Angkor Wat and those of Angkor Thom) are open to outside inspection. The greatest loss was in the form of the many images, bas-reliefs, and other Angkorean artifacts that were stolen and then sold on the international art market (mainly through Bangkok antique shops). When I visited Angkor in May 1989, I asked our local guide about the theft of Angkorean antiquities. Although be laid the blame on the Khmer Rouge, an official of the Phnom Penh government quickly added that refugees fleeing the country, Vietnamese, and "even our own people" has also been involved. To those who have been left very little in the upheavals of the past 20 years, the temptation to gain what would seem an immense fortune through the sale of Angkorean antiquities must have been, and still must be, extraordinarily difficult to resist. Following the displacement of the Khmer Rouge regime in 1979, Heng Samrin's new government established control over most of the Angkorean monuments; this government also reassessed the significance of the legacy of Angkorean civilization. In 1984, on the fifth anniversary of "liberation," Heng Samrin said, "The architectural works of Angkor, While a brilliant proof of the matchless skills and creativeness of Kampuchean working people, intellectuals, and artists (have) cost the people untold misery and countless lives of forced labor and caused the exhaustion and decline of the country for centuries." No longer was Angkor to be taken as a symbol of what the people's labor could create. This rather negative view of Angkor has given way in subsequent years to a pre-Khmer Rouge interpretation of Angkorean civilization as a source of national pride. The Phnom Penh government has sought to reclaim the Angkorean legacy in the form of artistic, musical, and especially dance forms whose antecedents can be seen in the bas-reliefs. In the past few years, the Phnom Penh government has sponsored renewed restoration efforts - undertaken at Angkor Wat by an Indian team and at the Bayon by a Polish group - and the reopening of Angkor to a limited number of tourists. Both acts resituate the Angkorean legacy as part of world civilization. These efforts within Cambodia find echoes among Khmer refugees in camps in Thailand and among Khmers in the United States and Europe who link themselves to the Angkorean legacy through dance, music, and art. Some, like the owner of a restaurant in Virginia with whom I talked last year, already anticipate a time when they can organize tours from the United States of Angkor. Despite the fundamental agreement between the Phnom Penh government and those associated with the noncommunist resistance that Angkorean civilization is the source of a distinctive and valued national identity for Khmers within an international community, these parties and their backers have failed to find a means to effect national reconciliation. In the renewed conflict that has occurred since the withdrawal of Vietnamese forces in May 1989, Angkor appears likely to become a battlefield once again. And if the Khmer Rouge should once again emerge triumphant from the new conflict - a distinct possibility unless there is strong international support for excluding it from any new government - Angkor could become a symbol not of national pride but of totalitarian oppression. --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- References Briggs, L.P. 1951 The Ancient Khmer Empire. Philadelphia: The American Philosophical Society. Chandler, D. 1983 Seeing Red: Perceptions of Cambodian History in Democratic Kampuchea. In D.P. Chandler and B. Kiernan, eds. Revolution and Its Aftermath in Kampuchea: Eight Essays. pp. 34-56. New Haven, CT. Yale University Southeast Asia Studies, Monograph Series 25. Ciochon, R.L. 1990 Jungle Monuments of Angkor. Natural History 1:51-58. Coedes, G. 1963 Angkor: An Introduction. Translated and edited by E.F. Gardiner. Hong Kong: Oxford University Press. 1968 The Indianized States of Southeast Asia. Translate from the French by S.B. Cowing and edited by W.F. Vella. Honolulu: East-West Center Press. Freison, K. 1988 The Political Natural of Democratic Kampuchea. Pacific Affairs 61 (3): 405-427. Garrett, W.E. 1982 The Temples of Angkor: Will They Survive? National Geographic 161(4): 548-551. Kuhike, H. 1978 The Devaraja Cult. Translated by I.W. Mabbett. Ithaca NY: Cornell University, Southeast Asia Program, Data Paper No. 108. (Orig. published in German in 1974.) Myrdal, J. and G. Kessle 1970 Angkor: An Essay on Art and Imperialism. Translated from the Swedish by P.B. Austin. New York: Vintage Books. Richardson, M. 1984 Letter from Angkor. Far Eastern Economic Review. 19 April. p. 94. White, P. and W.E. Garrett 1982 Ancient Glory in Stone. National Geographic 161(4):552-589. Article copyright Cultural Survival, Inc. ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ Annex. Samuel P. Huntington's Clash of Civilizations by James Graham Published: May, 2004 Who is Samuel P. Huntington? Samuel P. Huntington Born April 18, 1927. Harvard based since 1950.
Founder and co-editor of the quarterly journal, Foreign Policy. Currently Eaton Professor of the Science of Government at Harvard C.V. reads like a description of the US foreign policy machinery. Recieved $US 4,719,832 over 15 years from the John M. Olin Foundation, a right wing think tank that grew out of a chemicals and munitions business. More info here. Policy adviser to U.S. Presidents Lynson Johnson and Jimmy Carter. Has his own Yahoo category alongside Marx and Aristotle! Huntington's thesis outlines a future where the "great divisions among humankind and the dominating source of conflict will be cultural" (Huntington 1993:22). He divides the world's cultures into seven current civilizations, Western, Latin American, Confucian, Japanese, Islamic, Hindu and Slavic-Orthodox (Huntington 1993:26). In addition he judged Africa only as a possible civilization depending on how far one viewed the development of an African consciousness had developed. These civilizations seem to be defined primarily by religion with a number of ad hoc exceptions. Israel is lumped together with the West, Buddhist states and the whole religion is completely ignored. Huntington argues that the end of ideological confrontation between liberal democracy and communism will see future conflict occurring along the borders between civilizations at a micro level. At a macro level he predicts conflict occurring between states from different civilizations for control of international institutions and for economic and military power (Huntington 1993:29). He views this mix of conflict as normal by asserting that nation-states are new phenomena in a world dominated for most of its history by conflicts between civilizations. This is a dubious statement as inter-civilizational conflict driven mainly by geo-political factors rather than cultural differences is an equally if not more persuasive way to view much of history. The theory at least differentiates between non-Western civilizations rather than grouping them together. He also explains how the West presents pro-Western policies as positive for the entire world and that the very idea of a universal culture is a Western idea. This he argues is evidenced by most important Western values like human rights often being the least important values to other civilizations. His escape from a Eurocentric bias is however only temporary. He completely fails to account for indigenous cultures even though one can argue they collectively comprise a separate civilization (Fox 2002:430). The article also predicts future conflicts will be started by non-Western civilizations reacting to Western power and values ignoring the equally plausible situation where Western states use their military superiority to maintain their superior positions. The policy prescriptions he suggests to counter this perceived threat equate to increasing the power of the West to forestall any loss of the West's pre-eminence. Thus he suggests the Latin American and Orthodox-Slavic civilizations be drawn further into the Western orbit and the maintenance of Western military superiority (Huntington 1993:47).
17. Monk, publisher win awards The Phnom Penh Post; Monday, 27 June 2011 15:02 Meas Sokchea ------------------------------------------- Photo by: Will BaxterThe venerable Luon Savath Photo by: Heng Chivoan Publisher Hang Chakra. ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ (Comments: these two brave, dignified, and patriotic Cambodians, the Venerable Loun Savath, and newspaper publisher Hang Chakra, totally deserve this Human Rights Watch prize, our group respect and total support. They represent the essence of courage, dignity, selflessness, and commitment to help their fellow countrymen, which is sorely lacking in all current political leaders of Cambodia, ranging from Sihanouk, to Hun Sen, Sam Rainsy, and Kem Sokha. Unlike Sam Rainsy who prefers to be hiding in Europe, these two civic leaders, have the genuine courage to face Hun Sen’s savage wrath and jail upfront, rather than surrendering to his thug-like conduct, or hiding. We need more of these kinds of great patriots in order to give Cambodia a better chance to survive. It is this kind of brave and dignified persons and genuine Cambodian heroes by definition, that I am willingly and totally committed to support them. Naranhkiri Tith Ph.D. Washington DC. 28, 2011) ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ A monk who went into hiding in March over fears authorities would arrest him for attending land dispute protests will be awarded Human Right’s Watch’s Hellman/Hammett award next month, along with an anti-government newspaper publisher. Venerable Loun Savath, who has come out of hiding and is now living in Slaeng pagoda in Siem Reap province, said yesterday that the award – which is granted to those who speak out in the face of intimidation – was for the people.
“Though I received the award I don’t regard it as mine, I regard it as people’s award that are thirsty and hungry for the truth,” he said.
In April, a declaration banished Venerable Loun Savath from all pagodas in the capital. It argued his actions had violated the rules of Buddhism and caused villagers to view the religion negatively.
Khmer Machas Srok newspaper publisher, Hang Chakra, will also receive the prize for his defiant critiques of the Cambodian People’s Party after spending more than nine months in prison for an article alleging government corruption in 2009.
Hang Chakra said yesterday he was “very excited” to receive the award for his vigilance after being pardoned by King Norodom Sihamoni in April 2010.
Phil Roberson, deputy Asia director of Human Rights Watch, yesterday slammed the government’s persecution of Loun Savath, saying his case was indicative of disturbing a human rights trend in Cambodia that the international community had failed to combat.
“There is a rapidly escalating level of intimidation and attacks against those like Venerable Loun Savath who challenge the nexus of official corruption, greed and rights abuses that underpin the plague of land grabbing that is happening all over Cambodia,” he said by email.
As a former student of mine from the Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International studies (SAIS), Phil Robertson, had observed that;
"Phil Roberson, deputy Asia director of Human Rights Watch, yesterday slammed the government’s persecution of Loun Savath, saying his case was indicative of disturbing a human rights trend in Cambodia that the international community had failed to combat. “There is a rapidly escalating level of intimidation and attacks against those like Venerable Loun Savath who challenge the nexus of official corruption, greed and rights abuses that underpin the plague of land grabbing that is happening all over Cambodia,” he said by email."
“Ensuring respect for rights like these is one of the basic tests for the UN and development donors to ensure fair and just governance and development in Cambodia.”
18. Vietnam's Dr. Strangelove at war with the Mandarins By Francesco Sisci
Asia Times: June 23, 2011 ------------------------------------------------------- (Comments: this article sarcastically titled “Vietnam’s Dr. Strangelove at war with the Mandarins” is gem for those of the genuine Cambodian patriots to understand how the Vietnamese mind works. Previously I have already posted articles on how the American, Chinese, and other Southeast Asians, even Hun Sen, feel about and react to the Spratly island conflict which could lead to war between China and Vietnam; this time, with the USA (Clinton) siding with the Vietnamese against the Chinese.
It is extremely important for those Cambodians who are not with Hun Sen and Sihanouk, to understand how the Vietnamese mind operates, especially how the Vietnamese are able to play victims, (In reality, they are the worst and most deadly kind of Colonialists) and to use other countries, in this case, the USA to help them fight the Chinese.
However, this article also shows that the Vietnamese might over play their smartness and sows that they may not be as strong as they really are particularly compared to the Chinese power.
The following quotation from the author of this writing by an irate Vietnamese war veteran, that by chance, the Italian journalist, Francesco Sisci happened to get hold of a copy, and translated into English and posted here, is a case in point on what I just mentioned earlier about the Vietnamese cockiness;
“You, youngsters, must not waver, not release your grip, and most of all not be scared by China. The contrast between our relative sizes makes it the perfect occasion and time for our vendetta. The Chinese have forgotten the basics of strategy despite their pride in their strategic tradition. They are trapped in the South China Sea, and they are going to lose anyway while we are going to win. It is only ours to lose, so you do not have to give up. You have to insist, and press ahead - then we can get our revenge for their 1979 invasion. China's decision to organize military drills in the South China Sea and step up the level of confrontation in the region guarantees their failure, provided we do not give in and respond in kind. We have, in fact, to aim for a military clash with them, the larger the better, and then we will win in any scenario. The general situation has dramatically changed in the past couple of months since the Philippines decided to challenge China's role at sea. The Philippines is a former American colony, still close to the US heart. And, unlike us, its people are not considered quarrelsome. If they react, this may be proof enough to the Western world that the Chinese have gone too far. Then this is our moment to step in and stop being pushed around by the Chinese navy, which captures our fishing vessels and holds our sailors for ransom.”
However, Cambodians cannot take advantage of this unique opportunity provided by this moment of weakness from the Vietnamese, because, Cambodia does not have leaders who know and want to defend the national interests of Cambodia. After all, Sihanouk and Hun Sen are both under firm Vietnamese control. Naranhkiri Tith Ph.D. Washington DC. June 27, 2011)
---------------------------------------------------------- BEIJING - After the recent publication of a Chinese document [1], many people sent new ones. Most were not interesting; one, however, caught my attention. The person who gave it to me is a Westerner who had just come back from Hanoi.
There, after a business meeting, a junior official fumbled around his desk, took some papers, made them into a ball, and threw them in the wastebasket whispering "nonsense". He missed, and the ball rolled onto my friend's feet. He picked it up and pocketed it while the official turned to look out the window. He then kindly translated it from Vietnamese for me.
They are apparently the outbursts of an old Vietnamese war veteran, possibly just released from some mental institution. It is a raving mind, a Doctor Strangelove, like many around the world at all times. It is impossible to take the arguments seriously, but they make a nice joke, and in this spirit I wanted to present it - for a laugh after a long day's work Here they are, reproduced in full: You, youngsters, must not waver, not release your grip, and most of all not be scared by China. The contrast between our relative sizes makes it the perfect occasion and time for our vendetta. The Chinese have forgotten the basics of strategy despite their pride in their strategic tradition. They are trapped in the South China Sea, and they are going to lose anyway while we are going to win. It is only ours to lose, so you do not have to give up. You have to insist, and press ahead - then we can get our revenge for their 1979 invasion. China's decision to organize military drills in the South China Sea and step up the level of confrontation in the region guarantees their failure, provided we do not give in and respond in kind. We have, in fact, to aim for a military clash with them, the larger the better, and then we will win in any scenario. The general situation has dramatically changed in the past couple of months since the Philippines decided to challenge China's role at sea. The Philippines is a former American colony, still close to the US heart. And, unlike us, its people are not considered quarrelsome. If they react, this may be proof enough to the Western world that the Chinese have gone too far. Then this is our moment to step in and stop being pushed around by the Chinese navy, which captures our fishing vessels and holds our sailors for ransom. If our navy loses a clash with them, we will have a political victory anyway. China's aggressive and bellicose behavior will scare everybody in the world. It will prove that their theory of "Peaceful Development" is a ruse for gullible foreigners; both domestic and foreign capital will start to flee China; suspicion will grow surrounding China; and the economic and trade atmosphere with China will worsen. It is clear that China, being the bigger country, has greater responsibility to maintain peace around its borders. If it doesn't manage to do so with us, small Vietnam, what can it do with Japan, India, or Russia? Everybody will see they are the warmongers, they will be scared, and we will be the victims to be comforted and helped by everybody.
If we win the clash, we will prove that they are just a paper tiger. We will still have a political victory - plus a military success. We will be the David who has triumphed over the ferocious Goliath, and the consequences for China will be pretty much the same as if we lose. This is the strategy we adopted against America during our war of resistance against them. We knew they would inevitably politically lose the war, despite any military victory, as long as we managed to show the people of the world - and the American people as well - that we were fighting for the liberation of our country and nothing else. Similarly, now we can show that we are fighting for a part of the sea very close to our coasts and far from Chinese shores. This geographical proximity, reinforced by our small size, may prove to the world our right to that sea. In sum, we will win in any case and get the benefits China enjoyed with their invasion against us in 1979. After that Chinese attack, conducted at the behest of the Americans, China proved it was squarely in the Western camp. China showed to be ready to take concrete actions to stem the Soviet penetration in Asia by trying to stymie us while we were involved in our effort to liberate Cambodia from the hands of the nefarious and pro-China Khmer Rouge. China was rewarded for that attack with a political green light from the US for investment and the sale of technology. The following flow of investments enabled China's early phase of development. The support for investment basically never stopped, not even after the 1989 Tiananmen crackdown. China's growth and development would have been impossible without that early go-ahead. In other words, the 1979 war opened the gates for China's development. Without that war, development would have been impossible or very difficult. The lesson was: fight with the US and you will be rewarded; go against the US and you will be politically punished. Yet, the Chinese seem to have forgotten that lesson or simply do not understand the new general political atmosphere around China. Everybody in Asia is scared about China's growth. China's economy is now bigger than Japan's, and this is a warning sign for the whole world - including America. There are growing voices calling for a coordinated effort to contain China. Yet there is no decision on what to do, as there is still doubt about China's real intentions and strategy. A clash with tiny Vietnam would show the world that China is truly aggressive and can't be trusted.
All of this would be to our advantage: Before the world, we would be the ones who stopped mighty China - just like 40 years ago we stopped the Asian expansion of imperialistic America. The time is ripe for this In recent days, even the Philippines came out arguing against China's encroachment in the area. It started calling that sea the West Philippine Sea and called for US involvement the area. After a clash, the US will have to decide to take sides, and it certainly can't side against its former colony, the Philippines; nor can it side with the gigantic rising local bully, China, which is intimidating its small neighbors with military drills, as if its massive size or its fast economic growth were not scary enough.
If the US will then side with us, the momentum of China's fast economic growth will have to halt as very few people in the world will want to do business with a country bullying its neighbors - especially before it has the largest economy in the world. The message will be: What will China do to its neighbors, business partners, and really anybody when becomes even more powerful? It will be a worse bully than America without even the veneer or pretense of human rights. Who would want this kind of future for the world? Then global investment will move somewhere else, and we shall be rewarded for our pivotal role in stopping the growth of the ugly giant. This future is within our grasp To prevent this future, China should organize a large regional initiative to solve the South China Sea problems and do it modestly, without a sense of wounded pride. It should also move its claim from historical to legal grounds, which are more understandable to the world. China's leaders should beg the Americans to stop us, or anybody stirring trouble with provocative actions. But by doing this, they would have everybody, including the US, officially involved in an area they claim as theirs. This is something they are unwilling to do because it would increase foreign involvement in what they believe to be internal affairs. In fact, by renouncing this strategy and remaining basically hostage to different domestic constituencies vying for political turf, they fail to grasp the essence of modern politics. Here the old divide between internal and international affairs grows smaller by the day for everybody - especially for larger players like America or China. By trying to keep domestic something that is objectively international, they fall into a trap from which there is no way out Moreover, China misses another important point. All countries are looking for American protection against the rise of a new and still mysterious China. Despite all qualms and doubts one might have about America, the US is still the old, known power - everybody is acquainted with it. Therefore, everybody will seek the US protection against secretive newcomer China. Then the US, despite all the possible goodwill it might feel toward China, cannot just cast away all other countries' interests and fears in order to defend Beijing. If some small, peaceful country - one formerly part of America itself, as a colony - shouts out against China, how can the US ignore it and stay aloof, just because, say, in this controversy old friend Taiwan sides with Beijing. For this reason, we have a unique chance to change the world and even become the driving player in the region. We only have to be determined and brave, and we will be rewarded just as we managed to defeat the French and the Americans (Please do not believe for one minute there is a gram of truth in all of this - it is just a hoax.) Note 1. Sharp relief for a flat world, Asia Times Online, June 9, 2011 Francesco Sisci is a columnist for the Italian daily Il Sole 24 Ore and can be reached at fsisci@gmail.com |
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19. China runs gauntlet in South China Seas By Jian Junbo and Wu Zhong Asia times; June 24, 2-11
------------------------------------------------- (Comments: This article authored by two Chinese scholars, shows the Chinese view of the dispute between some Southeast Asian countries (Malaysia, Taiwan, the Philippines, and Vietnam) and China over the ownership of the Spratly Island, and also indirectly with the United States supporting Vietnam, its newly found ally.
Perhaps, this following quote will indicate the level of cautiousness from the part of China in this problem, it also shows the ramification of this issue in China’s internal politics, as follows:
“For Beijing, this is not simply an issue of international relations. It also has great impact on China's strategy for a "peaceful rise" and on domestic stability. This may explain why so far Beijing has exercised self-restraint in the face of what it sees as provocations by Vietnam. These included high-profile war games in disputed territories, issuing toughly-worded statements to condemn……
To concentrate on China's own economic development with reform and opening up, Deng Xiaoping then set a policy of "shelving disputes for joint cultivation" of the South China Sea.
After three decades of reform and opening up, China has grown into the world's second-largest economy. But Beijing is fully aware of emerging problems at home. In this regard, a peaceful international environment is crucial for China. President Hu Jintao is seeking a "peaceful rise" to ease concern that China may seek world hegemony. “
However, this Chinese restraint may not last as Vietnam’s provocation would have an impact on Chinese Communist Party legitimacy in governing china (the Mandate of Heaven), as this authors of this article has pointed out, as follows:
“If there is a danger that the CPP might lose the people's support over a certain policy, then it would have to change it. Needless to say, the "core interest" of all "core interests" for the CCP is to continue its rule of China. Compared with this, other affairs - such as maintaining regional peace and good relations with other countries or acting like a "responsible player" - are all secondary.”
In a previous posting of an article, Hun Sen and Sihanouk have not choice but to blindly following Vietnam path to war. The USA decision to support Vietnam is incomprehensible, as the USA is practically broke at home and have many political and economic problems to solve, at home and abroad. The USA has no other way to support Vietnam but in words more than in deeds. As former Secretary of State, Henry Kissinger has recently pointed out in his recently published book titled “On China,” President Obama should not to treat China as an enemy but a partner, in diplomatic, financial, and economic matter. Sadly, for Cambodia, the chance to get away from the grip of Vietnam is lost by the betrayal of Sihanouk for his total support for Hun Sen who is in turn under Vietnam total control. Yet so many still think that only the god-king can save Cambodia. That is why Cambodia is known among other bad names, as the “Country of the Absurd.”
Naranhkiri Tith, Ph.D. Washington, June 25, 2011)
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LONDON and HONG KONG - The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) will celebrate its 90th birthday on July 1. While the party has withstood tough tests to reach this point, without doubt there are challenges ahead. One immediate issue is the escalating tensions on the South China Sea with neighboring countries, Vietnam in particular.
For Beijing, this is not simply an issue of international relations. It also has great impact on China's strategy for a "peaceful rise" and on domestic stability. This may explain why so far Beijing has exercised self-restraint in the face of what it sees as provocations by Vietnam. These included high-profile war games in disputed territories, issuing toughly-worded statements to condemn.
"China's invasion" and allowing fierce protests against China.
Beijing's reaction has been low key. Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman Hong Li reiterated on June 16 that China would always seek a bilateral solution to disagreements on the South China Sea, and not use or threaten force. He added that China would work together with all parties to effectively implement the Declaration on Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea and maintain stability in the region.
There are ample reasons for China to cool tensions with Vietnam. Firstly, territorial disputes between China and Vietnam in the South China Sea are not a new issue - the dispute largely emerged in the 1970s after the discovery of huge oil and gas reserves there.
Vietnam (and some other Southeast Asian countries) began to gradually colonize some islands and explore oil and gas in waters that Hanoi had previously recognized as China's sovereign territories. For instance, the People's Republic of China (PRC) issued a declaration on September 4, 1958, defining its territorial waters which encompassed the Nansha (Spratly) and Xisha (Paracel) Islands.
North Vietnam's then prime minister Pham Van Dong sent a diplomatic note to Chinese premier Zhou Enlai stating, "The Government of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam respects this decision and will give instructions to its State bodies to respect the 12-mile [19-kilometer] width of the territorial waters of China in all their relations in the maritime field with the PRC [People's Republic of China]." The diplomatic note was written on September 14 and was publicized on Vietnam's Nhan Dan newspaper on September 22, 1958. [1]
To concentrate on China's own economic development with reform and opening up, Deng Xiaoping then set a policy of "shelving disputes for joint cultivation" of the South China Sea.
After three decades of reform and opening up, China has grown into the world's second-largest economy. But Beijing is fully aware of emerging problems at home. In this regard, a peaceful international environment is crucial for China. President Hu Jintao is seeking a "peaceful rise" to ease concern that China may seek world hegemony.
In recent years there have been growing calls, especially from the United States, for China to act as a "responsible player" in international affairs.
Therefore, Beijing does not want to take tit-for-tat actions against Vietnam that could jeopardize its image.
China may also see Vietnam's provocation as related to the latter's domestic issues. Vietnam's economy is in a bad shape and public discontent is growing. It is an ancient Chinese wisdom (Vietnam is strongly influenced by Chinese culture) that a foreign enemy can be of great use in easing domestic tensions.
Beijing does not want to be goaded by Hanoi. Moreover, China has kept a wary eye on the US ever since Washington announced its "return to Asia". Vietnam has openly called for US intervention in the South China Sea, and if Beijing reacts too harshly, this may give the US a convenient excuse to step in.
For Beijing, which always opposes any attempt to internationalize the South China Sea issue, US intervention would further complicate the matter.
On June 22, China's Vice Foreign Minister Cui Tiankai warned the US to stay out of the escalating tensions in the South China Sea:
“I believe some countries now are playing with fire. And I hope the US won't 'draw this fire onto itself'." Apparently referring to remarks from Washington about free passage in the South China Sea, Hong had said earlier: "China's maintenance of sovereignty in the South China Sea ... will never influence the freedom of navigation of other countries in the South China Sea.”
These factors are behind Beijing's low-key reaction. However, the strategy means taking some risks on the home front. The Chinese public has criticized their government as "too weak" and "spineless" over the issue, demanding "another severe punishment" on Vietnam - China officials describe the war against Vietnam in 1979 as a "war of punishment" for its invasion of Cambodia. While netizens have not criticized top Chinese leaders, they have taken aim at generals of the People's Liberation Army (PLA), as well as officials and media commentators who have appealed for calm. Websites of state-run media are a prominent forum for nationalists expressing their frustrations.
One of the more striking comments was found on the online forum of the website of Global Times, a sister publication of the People's Daily, the CCP's flagship newspaper:
Confronting such a hooligan country and in face of losses of national territories, you spineless generals and officials must listen to people's voices: "We must strike back! We must take back our territories lost because of the treacherous shelving disputes for joint development." China is in peril today mainly because the government is full of corrupt officials ... and party members and cadres have lost their faith! Now only the powerless, penniless but selfless and fearless grass-roots people remain patriotic.
Another comment on the same forum said China must learn from the US to dare to "bully small nations".
Beijing is walking a tight rope between behaving as a "responsible player" in international arena and responding to these domestic pressures. The balancing act is particularly fraught ahead of the CPP's 90th birthday, which the party will use to justify the legitimacy of its continuous rule by glorifying past successes.
If there is a danger that the CPP might lose the people's support over a certain policy, then it would have to change it. Needless to say, the "core interest" of all "core interests" for the CCP is to continue its rule of China. Compared with this, other affairs - such as maintaining regional peace and good relations with other countries or acting like a "responsible player" - are all secondary. Apparently in response to the rising nationalistic zeal over Vietnam's "provocations", China has quietly taken some action, such as staging a war game on Hainan Island and sending a sea border patrol boat through the South China Sea to Singapore. For the time being, Beijing can still feel comfortable over the nationalism rage as its expression is largely limited to the virtual space (the Internet). There are no sharp criticisms of Beijing's policy in state-controlled media or any spontaneous street demonstrations in protest at "Vietnam's invasion". The row, for the time being, is still not big enough to provoke the social instability that the CCP considers a threat. However, if Hanoi keeps escalating tensions, and especially if the US sides with Vietnam, Beijing will be forced to take more radical actions. Despite its low-profile stance, Beijing has imagined all possible scenarios and prepared for the worst. For the sake of its "peaceful rise", war is the last thing the Chinese government or people want. Fortunately, there is no sign so far indicating the current tension between Vietnam and China is likely to escalate into a violent conflict. Instead, the latest development suggests that tensions between China and Vietnam have eased. Xinhua reported this week a statement on the website of China's Defense Ministry that China and Vietnam conducted joint naval patrols in the Beibu (Tonkin) Gulf (between Vietnam and China's Hainan) from June 19 to 20. After the joint patrols, a Vietnamese naval delegation will visit the coastal city of Zhanjiang in south China's Guangdong province from June 21 to 24. The statement said the joint naval patrols and the port call were part of a scheduled bilateral annual exchange plan, but stressed it was "a friendly exchange activity between the two armed forces". That such activity could take place at this juncture is strong evidence that tensions between the two countries on the South China Sea has so far not affected normal channels. Note 1. File: 1958 diplomatic note from Pham van Dong to Zhou Enlai, Wikimedia. Dr Jian Junbo, an assistant professor of the Institute of International Studies at Fudan University, Shanghai, China, is currently an academic visitor at London School of Economics and Political Science, United Kingdom. Wu Zhong is China Editor of Asia Times Online. (Copyright 2011 Asia Times Online (Holdings) Ltd. All rights reserved. Please contact us about sales, syndication and republishing.)
| 20. Waters roil in the South China Sea By Joel D Adriano Southeast Asia
------------------------------------------------------- (Comments: as shown in this article, there is no direct problem or claim between China and Cambodia. On the surface this good for Cambodia, because it does not need to have any problems with China. On the contrary, Cambodia has been receiving an enormous amount of aid from China; in return, China is using the resources of Cambodia in the form of land for agriculture, and the newly-found oil and gas in Cambodia. But, unlike Vietnam, China from time immemorial, and from the principles contained in its tributary system, is not interested in conquering the land of its neighbors, including that of Cambodia.
However, in view of the closeness if not the control of Cambodia by Vietnam, it is difficult to imagine that Hun Sen and Sihanouk could get away from this potential war between China and Vietnam over the Spratly Islands.
Since Cambodia is totally controlled by Hun Sen and with the support of Sihanouk, there is only one way for Cambodia to go is to be with Vietnam, especially with Hillary Clinton now a closer friend of Vietnam (See companion article titled "Officials eye soth China Sae spoat."
Too bad for Cambodia, because this opportunity would have been a good opening for Cambodia to get away from Vietnam. Unfortunately, for this move to be successful, Cambodia needs a good leader with high moral principles and impeccable characteristics of a good leader, comparable in stature (both Nobel Prize laureates) and importance, to th0se of Nelson Mandela or Aung San Suu Kyi (By the way Aung San Suu Kyi is invited to speak at the joint US Congress, soon), as an alternative to Hun Sen and Sihanouk.
Unfortunately, Cambodia does not have such leader at the moment. Naranhkiri Tith Ph.D. Washington DC. June 21, 2011))
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MANILA - Escalating tensions between China and Southeast Asian claimants to the Spratly Islands threaten to spill over into a full-blown conflict. The Philippines and Vietnam are at particular loggerheads with Beijing after a series of provocations that some believe show China is taking a more assertive stance on its claims in the potentially oil and gas rich maritime area.
Vietnam last week accused China of "intentionally" attacking one of its survey ships in an area Oninside its exclusive economic zone. It represented the second a Chinese vessel confronted a Vietnamese one in the area over the last two weeks. On Thursday, China sent patrol ships into the sea to "protect maritime security," according to the official Beijing Daily.
The tension has fueled anti-Chinese sentiment across Vietnam, with thousands taking to the streets in Hanoi and Ho Chi Minh City to protest Chinese naval operations in the disputed waters and Vietnamese hackers launching cyberspace attacks on official Chinese websites.
China has also crossed swords with the Philippines through repeated intrusions on Philippine-claimed islands in the Spratlys. China has dismissed the accusations as "rumors" even as Chinese ambassador to the Philippines Liu Jinchao during a news conference warned Asian neighbors to stop oil and gas explorations in areas Beijing considers as part of its sovereign territory.
The two countries have swapped high-level diplomatic protests to stake their claims. The Philippines cited six Chinese intrusions from February to May in a protest filed with the United Nations earlier this month. The incidents include the Chinese navy firing on Filipino fishermen, a Chinese vessel intimidating a Philippine oil exploration ship and Beijing putting posts and buoys in waters claimed by Manila.
Manila is also protesting China's construction of new structures on islands it claims. Senator Francis Pangilinan criticized China's actions as "unbecoming of a world power". For its part, China submitted a diplomatic note to the United Nations claiming that the Philippines invaded the Spratlys in the 1970s - a claim that security analysts consider ridiculous given the pathetic state of the Philippine navy.
Ambassador Liu said that the Chinese ships took action to keep Filipino fishermen from its "jurisdiction" despite the fact the areas claimed by China are geographically very close to the Philippines. For instance, the Reed Bank area where one incident took place is just 80 nautical miles (148 kilometers) from Palawan, the Philippines' western-most province, but is nearly 500 miles (800 kilometers) from China.
The Kalayaan islands and the Scarborough Shoal are both closer to Palawan than to any of the other claimants and lie within its archipelagic baselines - the only claimant who can make such a geological claim.
United States Defense Secretary Robert Gates, who was in the Philippines on May 30 for talks related to bilateral defense ties, warned the competing claims could cause instability in the region and that clashes could erupt unless nations with conflicting claims adopt a mechanism to settle disputes peacefully.
The Spratly islands, named after English mariner Richard Spratly, are part of a group of more than 650 islands, islets, reefs, cays and atolls in the South China Sea. They comprise less than five square kilometers of land area spread over more than 400,000 square kilometers of sea.
The disputed islands are largely uninhabited but include important shipping lanes and are believed by some to hold major reserves of oil and gas. They are claimed in whole or in part by Brunei, China, Malaysia, the Philippines, Taiwan and Vietnam . The area is considered by US intelligence as one of the eight top flashpoint areas in the world, according to reports
Tensions could escalate further after a live ammunition military exercise earlier this week by Vietnam and an earlier joint US-Philippine exercise in the disputed waters. The Philippines is also upping the ante against China with plans in congress to formally rename the South China Sea to the West Philippine Sea.
In filing the resolution, Akbayan party-list representative Walden Bello said the South China Sea name is a misnomer which China is using and which has given it undue advantage in its territorial claim. By renaming it "we are taking a proactive move that strengthens our claim", Bello said.
The Philippine government used the new name officially for the first time last Friday during a news briefing on the issue. Department of Foreign Affairs spokesperson Eduardo Malaya explained that the name West Philippine Sea is reflective of its proper geographic location. Media organizations in the Philippines have also started using the new name.
Political analyst Ed Dagdag of the University of the Philippines' Asian Center suggested that government officials including the presidential spokesperson should refrain from making inflammatory statements if they want to settle the dispute peacefully.
Dagdag believes that if a military confrontation breaks out that the US, a key Philippine military ally, would be unlikely to side with the Philippines due to the risk of being dragged into a potential major conflict with China. Gates stressed during his Philippines visit that the US has "no position" on the competing Spratly claims.
Despite the posturing and rhetoric, the Philippines will be hard-pressed to prevent future Chinese incursions and construction in the contested area. Philippine President Benigno Aquino, along with other claimant Southeast Asian states, has said they prefer to strike a multilateral solution to the dispute - in stark contrast to China's position of insisting on bilateral negotiations. But because China has balked at suggestions the US play a mediating role, tensions in the South China Sea are set to get hotter before cooler.
Joel D Adriano is an independent consultant and award-winning freelance journalist. He was a sub-editor for the business section of The Manila Times and writes for ASEAN BizTimes, Safe Democracy and People's Tonight.
(Copyright 2011 Asia Times Online (Holdings) Ltd. All rights reserved. Please contact us about sales, syndication and republishing.)
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19. a. Officials eye South China Sea spat The Phnom Penh Post; Tuesday, 21 June 2011 15:02 Cheang Sokha ----------------------------------------------------------- (Comments: This article proves my point that Hun Sen is more subservient to Vietnam when his spokesman said that: “Ruling party lawmaker Cheam Yeap said yesterday that China was “a close friend” of Cambodia, and that Vietnam was “even closer”. He accused the SRP of lacking a “faithful stance” in professing its support for China.” But, we still have not heard anything from the god-king Sihanouk. Naranhkiri Tith Ph.D. Washington DC. June 21, 2011) ---------------------------------------------------------------
Government officials have sounded a note of caution amid escalating tensions between Vietnam and China, competing patrons of the Kingdom who are engaged in a territorial dispute in the South China Sea.
In rare public demonstrations over the past few weeks, hundreds of Vietnamese have taken to the streets in protest of what they say are violations of Vietnamese sovereignty by China in an area that is home to a number of the world’s key shipping lanes and is thought to hold significant deposits of oil and natural gas.
Vietnam has called for international intervention in the dispute, a move vigorously opposed by China. The Vietnamese navy has begun conducting live-fire military exercises off its central coast, and Hanoi has accused China of twice harassing its survey ships in the South China Sea in recent weeks; China, in turn, has accused Vietnam of “gravely violating” its sovereignty in the area. Cambodia foreign ministry spokesman Koy Kuong declined to take sides in the dispute, saying only that Cambodia hopes to see the issue settled according to the 2002 Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea, which was signed by China and members of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations at a 2002 ASEAN summit in Phnom Penh. “Cambodia hopes that the dispute will be resolved peacefully,” Koy Kuong said.
The opposition Sam Rainsy Party has repeatedly inveighed against alleged encroachment by Vietnam on Cambodian territory in recent years, and in a statement on Friday, the SRP threw its support behind Beijing.
“We have been denouncing and condemning Vietnam’s arrogance and groundless claims to territories belonging to neighbouring countries,” the SRP said.
“The continuous violation of Cambodia’s territorial integrity by expansionist Vietnam and the bellicose position Hanoi is adopting in Southeast Asia and in the South China Sea constitute a serious threat to peace and stability in the region.” Ruling party lawmaker Cheam Yeap said yesterday that China was “a close friend” of Cambodia, and that Vietnam was “even closer”. He accused the SRP of lacking a “faithful stance” in professing its support for China.
“We want our two friend countries to use the legal maps and abide by international law,” Cheam Yeap said. “If they cannot resolve the dispute and they use violence to flex their muscles, it will affect the region’s security.”
Meanwhile, Defence Minister Tea Banh left for China yesterday for a one-week, unofficial visit.
“The meetings will aim to boost cooperation in military fields between the two countries,” he said yesterday, speaking to reporters at Phnom Penh International Airport ahead of his departure. “And of course, we will learn from China.”
In addition to its massive investments in infrastructure projects in the Kingdom in recent years, Beijing has also provided significant military support.
Last year, China donated more than 250 military trucks and 50,000 military uniforms to Cambodia, donating a further 50,000 uniforms last month.
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20. THE KPRP http://countrystudies.us/cambodia/79.htm Russell R. Ross, ed. Cambodia: A Country Study. Washington: GPO for the Library of Congress, 1987
Cambodia Table of Contents
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(Comments: this excerpt from a US Congress report on Cambodia, gives us a very accurate and frightening picture of how Cambodia became a real pawn of Vietnam and how Pen Sovann was a Vietnamese creation. This is why I have always said that it is wrong for the Human rights Party (HRP) headed by Kem Sokha is no ;longer credible as an opposition party in Cambodia.
Cambodians should never rely on any foreign countries to come and save them, and especially on Vietnam, the most deadly among all aggressors of Cambodia. Vietnam allows no minorities in its nationalism. If Cambodia cannot learn from this simple historical lesson, its future is forever doomed. One rule that Cambodia should always adopt is; whoever is or was cooperating with Vietnam, should never be allowed to be anywhere near the leadership position in Cambodia, and that includes Sihanouk, who is now the most ardent supporter of Hun Sen who is the Vietnamese perfect servant and stooge.
It is also interesting to note how this report has alluded to the number of Vietnamese illegal immigrants already present in Cambodia in 1987, and how the Heng Samrin/Pen Sovann regime was trying to hide this dangerous and mortal fact for Cambodia. Naranhkiri Tith Ph.D. Washington DC. June 19, 2011.
--------------------------------------------------------------- In late 1987, the Kampuchean (or Khmer) People's Revolutionary Party (KPRP) continued to be the ruling Marxist- Leninist party of the PRK. It is an offshoot of the Indochinese Communist Party (ICP), which played a dominant role in Cambodian resistance against the French and the Japanese. Some leaders of the anticolonial Cambodian resistance, or Khmer Issarak, had been members of the ICP, and they had helped found the KPRP in 1951. The party was formed after the decision by the ICP's Second Party Congress in February 1951 to dissolve itself and to establish three independent parties for Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos. On September 30, 1960, the KPRP party was renamed the Workers' Party of Kampuchea (WPK). Pol Pot emerged as the key figure. In 1966 shortly after Pol Pot returned from talks with Chinese leaders in Beijing, the party's name was changed to the KCP. The communist party in Cambodia has a history of bitter factional feuds. After the Second Party Congress in 1960 and the disappearance of party General Secretary Tou Samouth in 1962, the party split into pro-Soviet and pro-Chinese factions. The dominant faction, led by Pol Pot, adopted a position that was pro-Chinese and anti-Soviet. In January 1979, the split became irreversible as the pro-Vietnamese/pro-Soviet faction under Pen Sovan replaced the Pol Pot faction as the de facto ruler in Phnom Penh. The rival factions even disagreed on the founding date of the communist party in Cambodia: the Pol Pot faction, under Khieu Samphan, in late 1987, claimed September 30, 1960; however, the other group, the mainstream KPRP under Heng Samrin, continued to honor 1951 as the founding year. The Heng Samrin faction held the Third Party Congress of what would later become the KPRP between January 5 and 8, 1979. Heng Samrin's faction claimed that it alone was the legitimate descendant of the communist party founded in 1951. Very little is known about the Third Party Congress (also known as the Congress for Party Reconstruction) except that Pen Sovan was elected first secretary of the Central Committee and that the party then had between sixty-two and sixty-six regular members. Some key figures in the Pen Sovan leadership were former collaborators with Pol Pot, but this information, and the communist ideological convictions of the new leadership were not publicized because the leadership feared backlash from people who had been brutalized by the Pol Pot regime. Such concern was implicit in Pen Sovan's political report to the Fourth Party Congress held from May 26 to May 29, 1981. In the report, he was careful to distance the KPRP from Pol Pot's KCP, and he denounced the KCP as a traitor to the party and to the nation. The KPRP decided at the Fourth Party Congress to operate "openly." This move seemed to reflect the leadership's growing confidence in its ability to stay in power. The move may have had a practical dimension as well because it involved the people more actively in the regime's effort to build the country's political and administrative infrastructure. The Fourth Party Congress reviewed Pen Sovan's political report and defined the party's strategy for the next several years. The Congress adopted five "basic principles of the party line," which were to uphold the banners of patriotism and of international proletarian solidarity; to defend the country (the primary and sacred task of all people); to restore and to develop the economy and the culture in the course of gradual transition toward socialism; to strengthen military solidarity with Vietnam, Laos, the Soviet Union, and other socialist nations; and to develop "a firm Marxist-Leninist party." At the Congress it was decided that henceforth the party would be known as the KPRP, in order to distinguish it from "the reactionary Pol Pot party and to underline and reassert the community of the party's best traditions." The Fourth Party Congress also proclaimed its resolve to stamp out the "reactionary ultra-nationalist doctrine of Pol Pot," to emphasize a centralized government and collective leadership, and to reject personality cults. The "ultra-nationalist doctrine" issue was an allusion to Pol Pot's racist, anti-Vietnamese stance. The Congress, attended by 162 delegates, elected twenty-one members of the party Central Committee, who in turn elected Pen Sovan as general secretary and the seven members of the party inner circle to the Political Bureau. It also adopted a new statute for the party, but did not release the text. According to Michael Vickery, veterans of the independence struggle of the 1946 to 1954 period dominated the party Central Committee. A majority of the Central Committee members had spent all or part of the years 1954 to 1970 in exile in Vietnam or in the performance of "duties abroad." The KPRP's pro-Vietnamese position did not change when Heng Samrin suddenly replaced Pen Sovan as party leader on December 4, 1981. Pen Sovan, who was reportedly flown to Hanoi under Vietnamese guard, was "permitted to take a long rest," but observers believed that he was purged for not being sufficiently pro-Vietnamese. In any case, the new general secretary won Hanoi's endorsement by acknowledging Vietnam's role as senior partner in the Cambodian- Vietnamese relationship. The party recognized the change in leadership symbolically by changing the official founding date of the KPRP from February 19, 1951, to June 28, 1951, in deference to the Vietnam Workers' Party (Dang Lao Dong Viet Nam), which was established in March 1951. In mid-1981, the KPRP was essentially a skeletal organization. It had few party branches except for those in Phnom Penh, in Kampong Saom, and in the eighteen provincial capitals. Party membership was estimated at between 600 and 1,000, a considerable increase over 1979 but still only a fraction of the number of cadres needed to run the party and the government. In 1981 several of the 18 provinces had only 1 party member each, and Kampong Cham, the largest province with a population of more than 1 million, had only 30 regular members, according to Cambodia specialist Ben Kiernan. The party held its Fifth Party Congress from October 13 to October 16, 1985, to reflect on the previous five years and to chart a new course for the next several years. The party's membership had increased to 7,500 regulars (4,000 new members joined in 1985 alone). The party had an additional pool of 37,000 "core" members from which it could recruit tested party regulars. There were only 4,000 core members in mid-1981. According to General Secretary Heng Samrin's political report, the KPRP had twenty-two regional committees and an undisclosed number of branches, circles, and cells in government agencies, armed forces units, internal security organs, mass organizations, enterprises, factories, and farms. The report expressed satisfaction with party reconstruction since 1981, especially with the removal of the "danger of authoritarianism" and the restoration of the principles of democratic centralism and of collective leadership. It pointed out "some weaknesses" that had to be overcome, however. For example, the party was "still too thin and weak" at the district and the grass-roots levels. Ideological work lagged and lacked depth and consistency; party policies were implemented very slowly, if at all, with few, if any, timely steps to rectify failings; and party cadres, because of their propensities for narrow-mindedness, arrogance, and bureaucratism, were unable to win popular trust and support. Another major problem was the serious shortage of political cadres (for party chapters), economic and managerial cadres, and technical cadres. Still another problem that had to be addressed "in the years to come" was the lack of a documented history of the KPRP. Heng Samrin's political report stressed the importance of party history for understanding "the good traditions of the party." The report to the Fifth Congress noted that Heng Samrin's administration, in coordination with "Vietnamese volunteers," had destroyed "all types" of resistance guerrilla bases. The report also struck a sobering note: the economy remained backward and unbalanced, with its material and technical bases still below pre- war levels, and the country's industries were languishing from lack of fuel, spare parts, and raw materials. Transition toward socialism, the report warned, would take "dozens of years." To hasten the transition to socialism, the Fifth Congress unveiled the PRK's First Plan, covering the years 1986 to 1990. The program included the addition of the "private economy" to the three sectors of the economy mentioned in the Constitution (the state sector, collective sector, and the family sector). Including the private economy was necessary because of the "very heavy and very complex task" that lay ahead in order to transform the "nonsocialist components" of the economy to an advanced stage. According to the political report submitted to the congress, mass mobilization of the population was considered crucial to the successful outcome of the First Plan. The report also noted the need to cultivate "new socialist men" if Cambodia were to succeed in its nation-building. These men were supposed to be loyal to the fatherland and to socialism; to respect manual labor, production, public property, and discipline; and to possess "scientific knowledge." Heng Samrin's political report also focused on foreign affairs. He recommended that Phnom Penh strengthen its policy of alliance with Vietnam, Laos, the Soviet Union, and other socialist countries. He stressed--as Pen Sovan had in May 1981--that such an alliance was, in effect, "a law" that guaranteed the success of the Cambodian revolution. At the same time, he urged the congress and the Cambodian people to spurn "narrow-minded chauvinism, every opportunistic tendency, and every act and attitude infringing on the friendship" between Cambodia and its Indochinese neighbors. (He was apparently alluding to the continued Cambodian sensitivity to the presence of Vietnamese troops and of about 60,000 Vietnamese settlers in Cambodia. CGDK sources maintained that there were really about 700,000 Vietnamese settlers in the country.) The KPRP's three objectives for the period 1986 to 1990 were to demonstrate military superiority "along the border and inside the country" for complete elimination of all anti-PRK activities; to develop political, military, and economic capabilities; and to strengthen special relations with Vietnam as well as mutual cooperation with other fraternal countries. Before Heng Samrin's closing address on October 16, the 250 party delegates to the congress elected a new Central Committee of 45 members (31 full members and 14 alternates). The Central Committee in turn elected Heng Samrin as general secretary, a new Political Bureau (nine full members and two alternates), a five-member Secretariat, and seven members of the Central Committee Control Commission. After the Fifth Congress, the party's organizational work was intensified substantially. The KPRP claimed that by the end of 1986 it had more than 10,000 regular members and 40,000 candidate members who were being groomed for regular status. |
20. Vietnam seeks US support in China dispute By Ben Bland in Hanoi The Financial Times: Published: June 12 2011 14:29 | Last updated: June 12 2011 21:36 http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/05e83b34-94db-11e0-a648-00144feab49a.html?ftcamp=rss&ftcamp=crm/email/2011612/nbe/AsiaMorningHeadlines/product#axzz1P7R9CQ8t ------------------------------------------------------------------------------ (Comments: this article shows how Vietnam is trying to use the USA’s fear of China’s rising power in Asia and in the world. As an American citizen, I can agree or disagree with this decision for the USA to be using Vietnam as an ally to fight the rising power of China in Asia, and in the world, per extension. First and foremost, Vietnam is still a communist country, so is China. Second, China was the supporter of Vietnam during the Vietnam War when the USA was the main aggressor. Since the end of the Vietnam War, relations between China and the USA have been improving progressively, in all fields. While US-Vietnam relations have also been improving. With a rapid improvement growth and importance of China in economic, diplomatic, as well as in military terms, the USA has felt threatened by this rising power of China. In this context, with Hillary Clinton as the secretary of State, she initiated “the return to Asia” of the USA to counter the perceived threat from the rising power of China. Also remembering that Hillary Clinton and her husband, the ex-President Bill Clinton, are known anti-Vietnam War advocates, thus making them a natural friend of Vietnam. It is against this background that as a citizen of the USA that I am analyzing this new "love affair" between the USA and Vietnam initiated by Hillary Clinton. Also important is the understanding of China as a new rising power of the world and especially in Asia. The most informative way to assess this China rising power is the ask the question whether or not China is by tradition and historical records is an imperialist country. To answer this important background information on China is to retrace and understand the role of the China and its relations with other countries in the world and especially those within China’s territorial proximity, known as the tributary system. The tributary system is based on the fact that China considers itself as a major and dominant power in Asia, and it expected that those neighboring of China would pay recognize China as such, and as a recognition of that power of China these neighboring countries are demanded to pay tribute to China in gift and trip to pay respect the emperor of China, living in to the center of power in China, be they Beijing, or any other capital cities during the pong and turbulent history of China. In other words, China was not interested in territorial conquest, but simply in having the recognition China as the major power in Asia by those neighboring countries. In other words, China never used “Hard Power,” but only “Soft Power” as its means to deal with her neighbors (For more details on these concept please, read “Soft Power, Hard Power and Leadership By Joseph S. Nye, Jr.” On the contrary, Vietnam is known to have modified the Chinese “Soft Power’ tributary system to the “Hard-Power” based strategy to conquer its neighbors namely Champa and Kampuchea Krom to escape the Chinese threat to it. (For more details on the Chinese tributary system, in its original version and as modified by Vietnam, please, go to this link from my web site; http://cambodiana.org/Vietnamtributarysystemwithdeadlytwist.aspx It is against this historical and ideological background that the article should be read. In this context, it is clear that that given all the major domestic problems that the USA is having such as the economic depression, high national debt problem, Middle East intervention and its high and rising costs, the political problems as a result of the political dominance of “too large to fail” financial institutions, and its impact on the social instability of this country, the USA is in no measure to venture into another war in Asia, especially based on the wrong assumption of China as a threat to its neighbors, while in reality it is Vietnam which is the real threat to Cambodia, Laos, and Thailand, therefore to the whole Southeast Asian countries. It is in this background that Hillary Clinton policy of rapprochement (Including trnasfer of nuclear technology, which is against the official general US policy of denuclearization in the world) with Vietnam is not only wrong but immoral. More importantly, it is not in the best interests of the United States of America. Those who still think that Cambodia can count on the USA to ward off Vietnam’s threat to Cambodia is not only naïve, but totally ignorant of the reality of the political and diplomatic situation in Asia and in the world. Naranhkiri Tith Ph.D. Washington DC. June 16, 2011) ----------------------------------------------------------------------------- Vietnam has called on the US and other nations to help resolve the escalating territorial disputes in the resource-rich South China Sea, in a move likely to anger Beijing, which opposes what it sees as outside interference. Tensions between China and Vietnam continued to rise over the weekend, ahead of live-fire drills planned by Vietnam’s navy on Monday on an islet around 20 miles from the coast of central Vietnam, which Hanoi described as “routine”. EDITOR’S CHOICE Pilling: Asia’s quiet anger with ‘big, bad’ China - Jun-01 Vietnam and China oil clashes intensify - May-29 China defends naval actions - Jun-05 US warns Beijing over South China Sea - Jun-04 In depth: China shapes the world - Apr-25 China and Philippines tensions mount - Jun-01 Stirred by a number of maritime confrontations with China over recent weeks, hundreds of Vietnamese took part in rare anti-China protests on Sunday for the second straight weekend, with the usually draconian police allowing the demonstrations to take place. “China is running an information campaign to blind people,” said Pham Gia Minh, a 55-year-old investment consultant who attended a protest outside the Chinese embassy in Hanoi. “We have to let people understand that we want peace but when the aggressor comes we will stand up to them.” In addition to China and Vietnam, Brunei, Malaysia, the Philippines and Taiwan claim some or all of the territory in the contested area of the South China Sea, which is believed to contain vast oil and gas reserves and incorporates key trade routes and abundant fish stocks. The Vietnamese government has ratcheted up its rhetoric in recent weeks amid growing public disquiet over perceived maritime bullying by China, which dominated Vietnam for 1000 years and fought a brief but bloody border war against it in 1979. At the weekend Vietnam’s foreign ministry said that it would “welcome” efforts by the US and other nations to help resolve the South China Sea dispute and maintain peace and stability. Such sentiments are unlikely to go down well in Beijing, which insists that the long-running row over the South China Sea must be resolved on a purely bilateral basis. China reacted angrily last July when Hillary Clinton, US secretary of state, insisted that the South China Sea was of strategic importance to the US and offered to act as a mediator. The US said on Friday that is was “troubled” by the latest developments in the South China Sea, with Mark Toner, a state department spokesman, warning that “shows of force” only increase tensions, which have been on the rise in recent weeks. Hanoi and Beijing have traded accusations of infringement of sovereignty and harassment of their fishing and oil exploration vessels and China has also clashed with the Philippines in a similar fashion. “China’s behaviour has gone from assertive to aggressive,” said Ian Storey, a fellow at the Institute for Southeast Asian Studies in Singapore and an expert on maritime security in the South China Sea. In the latest incident, last Thursday, Vietnam claimed that, for the second time in recent weeks, Chinese boats had trespassed onto its territory and deliberately tried to cut undersea cables deployed by a ship hired by PetroVietnam, the state oil and gas monopoly. China dismissed the allegations, claiming that the boats were fishing in its sovereign waters when they were “illegally chased away by armed Vietnamese ships,” endangering the fishermen’s lives. The Chinese government remained silent on Sunday, but Hanoi’s latest move is likely to infuriate Beijing as China insists its territorial disputes in the South China Sea must be dealt with bilaterally. A year ago, Beijing decisively rejected remarks by Hillary Clinton in which the US secretary of state called peace in the region a US national interest and called for a multilateral approach in resolving the disputes. A regional security expert at National Defense University in Beijing called Hanoi’s latest move a provocation. “This is calculated to provoke a reaction in China which they can then dismiss as aggressive,” said the expert who declined to be named because he was not authorized to speak to foreign media. The growing tension in the South China Sea also triggered angry reactions among nationalist Chinese on the internet. ”If a single shell falls into Chinese waters, including disputed waters, we should shoot to kill. Can’t we do what North Korea can?” wrote one user on Tiexue, an online bulletin board popular with military enthusiasts and nationalist web users, in reaction to Vietnam’s plans for naval exercises in the area on Monday. Copyright The Financial Times Limited 2011. You may share using our article tools. Please don't cut articles from FT.com and redistribute by email or post to the web 21. Democracy roots spread in Southeast Asia Asia Times: June 1, 2011
By Michael Vatikiotis http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Southeast_Asia/MF01Ae01.html
---------------------------------------------------------------------- (Comments; this rather hopeful message about Southeast Asia political change similar to the recent Middle East mass movement, is unfortunately not applicable to Cambodia.
Cambodia with the collusion between Hun Sen and Sihanouk makes the situation more difficult to change. Unfortunately, most Cambodians, educated or not, still believe that only Sihanouk can save Cambodia, although there is enough evidence that Sihanouk had done more harm than good, to Cambodia and the Cambodian people, during his long and firm grip to power in Cambodia since Cambodia’s independence in 1953. Also, the expectation that Cambodia can only be saved by international intervention, has also contributed to this intractable situation of Cambodia.
Un less, Cambodia can get rid of its double dependency of the god-king and the foreign powers to save them, Cambodia will not benefit from this sea-change in the political and social system in Southeast Asia. As suggested by the author of this article. Naranhkiri Tith Ph.D. June 6, 2011)
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Fifteen years ago I published a book on political change in Southeast Asia. I gave it the title Trimming the Banyan Tree.
The book, rather controversially for the time, predicted no great wave of democracy sweeping across the region. "The prevailing political cultures of the region are proving resistant to change," I wrote. "Strong leadership, supported by an enduring culture of patronage remains a characteristic feature of the more economically successful states...." For all the liberal triumphalism of the post-Cold War era, I saw no swift or linear progression towards greater pluralism and democracy in Southeast Asia; rather I predicted a slow, gradual pace of reform, subject to setbacks. "It is easier for ruling elites to trim the banyan tree at their convenience," I wrote at the time, "harder for activists to muster the strength to hack off whole limbs." Looking at Southeast Asia today I would say I was partly wrong, but sadly also partly right. I was partly wrong in the sense that democracy has made significant advances in the region - notably in Indonesia. I was partly right because we have also seen parallel advances in political reform rolled back in countries like Malaysia, Thailand and also arguably in Cambodia and Myanmar - where even marginal openings since the 1990s have been closed. Some commentators have characterized surprising gains made by the opposition in the recent Singapore elections as a "tsunami", but half a dozen seats in parliament at the expense of a couple of senior ministers is more of an unusually high tide than a tsunami.
The mid-1990s, when I was writing Trimming the Banyan Tree, were years of social and economic change and upheaval. The post-Cold War era lent impetus to liberal notions of democracy and human rights in Asia. Across the region, old sclerotic autocracies were forced to give way to reform. This process was greatly accelerated by the financial crisis that hit the so-called tiger economies in 1997-98. Indonesia's long transition to multi-party, freewheeling democracy got underway.
But there was no great avalanche of change. Unlike the Arab Spring we are currently witnessing in the Middle East and North Africa, there has been no chain-reaction across borders in Southeast Asia. Indonesia's democratic transition has had little or no impact on politics in neighboring Malaysia or in Myanmar, for example. The main reason for this is language. In the Middle East, Arabic is the lingua franca at all levels of society; here in Southeast Asia, the common language is English, which is mostly spoken at the elite level and thus among power holders. Modern forms of strong leadership and one party rule, often led or backed by military might, prevail across much of mainland Southeast Asia. The region is home to two Communist Party dominated states (Vietnam and Laos) and two countries where the military determines political direction (Myanmar and Thailand). In Malaysia racially defined politics makes for virtual one-party rule with the military taking a back seat to sweeping internal security laws wielded by a strong police force. To be sure there is more respect for basic human rights than there was 15 years ago - though some may question this in times of upheaval. But there is little sign that entrenched notions of paternalistic rule exercised by strong leaders are disappearing in the face of genuine popular sovereignty. Even in Indonesia there is something of a hankering for the strong leadership of former dictator Suharto, and bureaucratic reform aimed at instilling greater transparency and equality has ground to a halt. Some in Jakarta even talk of a democracy recession. Why is this so? What makes political change in Southeast Asia so challenging? Why is democracy so imperfectly in place after such a long struggle spanning many decades? And why is successful political reform subject to regression? Firstly, changes to traditional social and cultural norms in Southeast Asia have been slow to occur. This social inertia tends to reinforce acceptance of strong leadership, it generates low expectations from more autonomous forms of political behavior, and above all sustains receptiveness to the obligations of patronage. Across the region, political parties tend to act as vehicles for bringing individuals to power rather than representing the interests of voters. In Thailand I have been asking the question of the coming July 3 election: Will voters be swayed by the critical issues of truth, justice and the need for reform thrown up by the upheaval of May last year? The answer I get from almost everyone is "no" - it’s still the money that counts. Secondly, economic growth, though impressive, has trickled down unevenly. Rural areas in particular are prone to high levels of poverty that maintains dependency on government handouts and patronage, reinforcing respect for leaders who deliver from the top down. The resilient faith placed in strong leadership represents the survival of an arcane social contract that entrusts social harmony and economic management to a firm patriarch aided by a few mandarins. "In the fields there is rice, in the water there is fish" promised the ancient Thai Kings.
As a result of this surprising degree of social and economic inertia, Southeast Asia's paternalistic leadership models have adapted rather than yielded to demands for pluralism. Great stress is placed on the formal legitimacy conferred by constitutions and elections, rather than their meaning in terms of meeting popular aspirations for change. The rules of democracy tend to be engineered to favor power holders and greatly inhibit abrupt changes of order. In any case, the batteries of draconian security laws available to governments in most countries of the region create barriers to effective protest for change.
Momentum for change
That said, there are recent trends that suggest the coming decade will see more rather than less momentum for political change. These factors could well be enhancers and accelerators of political change.
The first factor is the rise of populist politics. The 1997-98 Asian financial crisis generated popular discontent with old established elites regarded as corrupt and excessively rich, opening the door to populist figures appealing to the frustrated middle classes who lost their wealth and those who felt excluded from power. Joseph Estrada in the Philippines and Thaksin Shinawatra in Thailand rode the crest of this wave. The new populist politics has shaken the foundations of established elites and opened the door to more radical social change.
Mobile phone services and the Internet have proven to be powerful agents for mobilizing popular support. More important than the sheer numbers that can be mobilized using mobile phone messaging and the Internet is the ability of the new technology to spread consistent messages and consolidate popular constituencies around platforms for change. Thailand’s Red Shirt movement was effectively launched on the back of the ability to digitally shape and transmit a simple but powerful message that differentiated between the haves and have-less - the "amart" or aristocrats and the "phrai" or peasants. In Singapore, muscular media management couldn’t cope with the power of social networking and instant messaging that drew huge crowds to the political rallies organized by weak opposition parties and transformed their lawyerly candidates into virtual rock stars.
The major driving force of political change today is pressure from civil society. Across Southeast Asia, people are organizing themselves at the community level to challenge the power holders. Above all, they are able to do so because of the modest opening of space and respect for human rights. In Indonesia, civil society and a free media hold the line against backtracking on bureaucratic reform and a subtle but noticeable impulse to restore central authority and moving away from the decentralization that has helped reduce conflict. Equally, civil society is more focused on the needs of ordinary people. For much of the last 30 years - especially after the collapse of the Soviet Union and Communist Eastern Europe, religion replaced socialism as a basis of salvation ideology in the region. However, religious faith is a less effective mobilizer of political change because it is either innately conservative or too far out on the radical fringe to move the mainstream of society. This would appear to be changing with the rise of new neo-socialist movements on the back of populist politics. Add to this the real chance of deeper and long-lasting recession around the corner combined with the factors mentioned above and this will make it harder for the kind of V-shaped recovery needed to protect the political status quo. One of the inhibitors of sweeping democratic change in the past was the ability of conservative elites to re-invent themselves as democrats in time to prevent the mobilization of mass-based movements with the real capacity to change the status quo. This kind of moderation will be harder to sustain in a prolonged period of economic stress. If the pace of democratic change in Southeast Asia has been slow and subject to regression these past few decades, what would accelerated and sustained change look like? Will it bring violence? And what form of democracy will evolve? These are tough questions to answer. What we see in the Middle East provides a clue and a warning to what happens when long pent up frustrations boil over and people are willing to subject themselves to violence and even civil war in order to bring down the old autocratic order.
Here in Southeast Asia, fundamentally anti-democratic elites long ago learned to release pressure for change with piecemeal reforms, symbolic gestures and modest but limited measures of popular sovereignty. I coined the term "Trimming the Banyan Tree" but you could also call it "Democracy light". The region’s fast-paced growth of consumption has generally dampened frustrations and provided a sufficient accommodation between the growing aspirations of ordinary people and narrow elite interests. So long as the economic dynamism of this region continues, I see no reason why this should change.
All this is not to say that democracy has shallow roots in Southeast Asia. US President Barack Obama during his visit to Jakarta in November 2010 told Indonesians that "your democracy is sustained and fortified by its checks and balances: a dynamic civil society; political parties and unions; a vibrant media and engaged citizens who have ensured that - in Indonesia - there will be no turning back."
In other countries of the region too, the key to moving forward is to thwart the anti-reformist urges of resilient anti-democratic elites by ensuring a prominent space for civil society and respect for truth and justice that constitutes the basis for equality. Political Change in Southeast Asia: Trimming the Banyan Tree was published by Routledge in 1996. Michael Vatikiotis has since remained a keen observer of the political landscape in the region, but has not felt the urge to revise his thesis. This article is adapted from a presentation he made in his personal capacity to the Political Development Council of Thailand in May 2011.
(Copyright 2011 Michael Vatikiotis.)
22. Kem Sokha denies cooperating with CPP The Phnom Penh Post; Wednesday, 01 June 2011 15:03 Meas Sokchea -------------------------------------------
(Comments: it strange to see this article. As this article has pointed out Khem Sokha seems to be very deferential towards the Cambodian dictator and traitor, Hun Sen. May be this is due to the presence of Pen Sovann in his party. After all, Pen Sovann was Hun Sen’s boss before he was demoted by the Vietnamese, in early 1980’s
If Kem Sokha wants to restore his credibilty, he must kick Pen Sovann out of his (HRP) party. As far as I can judge, Pen Sovann is still thanking the Vietnamese for “liberating” Cambodia. That is not what I call a very patriotic statement. It sounds strange and abnormal that Penn Sovann has been allowed to criticize Hun Sen without any fear of retaliation from the Cambodian dictator and traitor. Naranhkiri Tith Ph.D. Washington DC. June 2, 2011) ---------------------------------------------------- Human Rights Party president Kem Sokha has accused the ruling Cambodian People’s Party of leaking a recorded conversation between himself and Prime Minister Hun Sen in retaliation for his refusal to collaborate with the CPP. In the recording, which dates back to 2007 and was posted on Sunday by DAP News, Kem Sokha can be heard asking the premier for assistance in securing use of the Olympic Stadium for a party conference. The Sam Rainsy Party, the Kingdom’s largest opposition party, has seized on the recording as evidence of alleged collusion between the HRP and CPP and has said that flagging negotiations on an SRP-HRP merger will be halted as a result Kem Sokha claimed yesterday that the leak had been orchestrated as a result of his repeated rebuffs of entreaties from the ruling party. “They have tried very hard. They have tried to persuade me and have also threatened me, but I have not agreed,” he said, adding that if he had indeed colluded with the CPP, “please let lightning strike me”. In the recording, Kem Sokha can be heard attempting to mollify Hun Sen in advance of future criticisms.
“I would like to inform Samdech that if I am against what Samdech is doing, the principles by which I work are from my heart,” Kem Sokha says, using the premier’s honourific. “I would ask Samdech to understand that we can work together in the future.” Hun Sen later responds that even if politicians from the ruling party and opposition attack one another, “we can still have friendly cooperation with each other”. The premier later suggests that the HRP poach members from the SRP. “I think a good idea is to grab some people in the provinces, provincial council members of the Sam Rainsy Party – good people who have the ability to attract votes,” Hun Sen says. Kem Sokha responds “yes” to this statement on the recording before changing the subject. He said yesterday, however, that this assent was merely one of politeness. “I did not say I agreed to do what he said,” Kem Sokha said. “I said that I will oppose him.” Hang Chhaya, executive director of the Khmer Institute for Democracy, said that despite Kem Sokha’s protestations, the recording could prove politically damaging for the HRP. “People are suspicious of that because it seems like he’s allowed to freely attack the government, whereas anything that Sam Rainsy would say on radio or elsewhere would get a reaction from the government,” Hang Chhaya said. In a statement issued yesterday, the SRP cabinet said the recording “has the effect of a bomb on Cambodia’s political landscape”. “Hun Sen and Kem Sokha clearly showed their common goal: the destruction of the Sam Rainsy Party (SRP), the main opposition party that had unwaveringly been standing against the CPP,” the SRP said. “Kem Sokha is not an honest man. He is not honest with the SRP and cannot be a loyal partner.”
The SRP and HRP have long mooted a potential merger, and last year, United States secretary of state Hillary Clinton reportedly encouraged the two parties to form a united opposition against the CPP. The CPP currently holds 90 seats in the National Assembly, compared with 25 for the SRP and three for the HRP.
23. Dissident Plans a More Active Role in Myanmar By KEVIN DREW The International Herald Tribune: Published: May 30, 2011 http://www.nytimes.com/2011/05/31/world/asia/31iht-myanmar31.html?_r=1
(Comments: comparatively, the main problems facing Burma or Myanmar are much more difficult to solve than those facing Cambodia, because of the ethnic composition of that former country. Burma has, at least, six major different ethnic groups in its population, namely; the Burman, the Karen, the Mon, the Arakanese, the Chin, the Kachin, and the Shan; while Cambodia has mainly four major groups; The Cambodians, the Vietnamese, the Chinese, and the Cham. However, in number, the Vietnamese has become the largest minority group in Cambodia. Although the exact number of the Vietnamese residents in Cambodia is available from the census of population, but, for personal gain (illegal Vietnamese immigrants would most likely vote for Hun Sen and his CPP to keep the Cambodian dictator in power in order to better serve the Vietnamese imperial design over Cambodia), and at the expense of Cambodia’s national interest and survival, Hun Sen has been refusing to release them, as they would reveal the hidden number of illegal Vietnamese immigrants, estimated to range from 1 to 4 million.
What really is different between Burma and Cambodia is in the quality of their respective leaders. In Burma, Aung San Suu Kyi represents the quintessence of what a dignified, brave, kind, patient, compassionate, and smart leader is all about. Because of her courage and dignity, she has earned the respect and strong support from all world leaders and international organizations.
Cambodia never had such strong, intelligent, brave, patient, and dignified leaders since the Angkor time, due to the preeminence and dominance of the cult of the god-king. The hallmark of her character is her modesty and of the strength of her conviction in principles, during her long house arrest by the Burmese Junta, which was captured in the following way;
“When asked by a student how she has managed to maintain her conviction in principles, she was blunt: “Discipline. That’s how I managed to live in isolation and keep my faith.” Under house arrest for 15 of 21 years before her release in November, she spoke on Monday of maintaining simplicity in her daily life. “I’ve learned to be happy with small things,” she said. “You have to learn to be happy with small things.” Unlike Sam Rainsy, who prefers to escape jail and to be hiding in France, and to even ask Hun Sen for pardon so many times, Aung San Suu Kyi was kept in house arrest for over 20 years, and never ask for anything from the Burmese military Junta. When a country has a good, dignified, high moral-grounding, and brave leader, as in the case of Burma's Aung San Suu Kyi, it will automatically get all the support without asking for help, from major powers, international organizations, and NGOs. Until the majority of Cambodians can come up with high caliber and dignified leaders such as Aung San Suu Kyi, and stop depending on the god-king and foreign powers (Especially Vietnam) to save them, there is no other direction for Cambodia to go in the future but down and down. Naranhkiri Tith, Ph.D. Washington DC. June 1, 2011) ----------------------------------------------------------------- Top of Form HONG KONG — Daw Aung San Suu Kyi, the most high-profile dissident in Myanmar, signaled on Monday that she would be seeking to broaden her audience in her country since being released from house arrest. Speaking from Myanmar via a live video link to an audience at the University of Hong Kong, she confirmed that she would begin traveling outside of Yangon, the biggest city in Myanmar and its economic capital, a move that may test boundaries imposed on her since her release in November. In 2003, during a period free from detention, Mrs. Aung San Suu Ky toured the country, drawing increasingly large crowds, and on one trip, a band of men attacked her convoy in what some people believed was an assassination attempt. She was then sent back to house arrest. On Monday she also urged the international community to reach out to the opposition movement in Myanmar by using modern communications technology. In the months since her release from house arrest, Mrs. Aung San Suu Ky, recipient of the 1991 Nobel Peace Prize, has used video links and other means to connect with students and activists in Europe and North America. “We can help each other now — we now have the ability,” she said after being asked how people outside of Myanmar could an engage with her and other pro-democracy activists inside her country. Mrs. Aung San Suu Kyi would not specify when or where she would travel, or even the purpose of her trips. But she pointedly noted on Monday that the government had not provided assurances of her safety and that she had made it clear that she expected the authorities to ensure her security. “It is the duty of the government to provide assurances,” she said. Some Burmese dissidents have been hoping that Mrs. Aung San Suu Kyi would take a more active political role. Her supporters, while acknowledging the range of opinions within the democracy movement in Myanmar, described her decision to travel around the country as a natural progression. “She is the leader of the democracy network, and that includes addressing issues such as social welfare, political prisoners, farmers’ rights and civil rights lawyers,” said Aung Din, executive director of the United States Campaign for Burma, a lobbying group. “She is the leader of a broader civil society movement.” The military has ruled Myanmar since 1962, and the elections in November were advertised as a “road map to democracy.” In March, a civilian government was installed under President Thein Sein, but analysts say little has changed inside Myanmar since the elections. The new government has done little to end abuses across Myanmar, said Tomás Ojea Quintana, the U.N. special rapporteur on human rights in Myanmar. Speaking by telephone, Mr. Quintana listed several areas in which the new government failed to make any significant progress, noting land confiscation, forced labor, internal displacement of people, extrajudicial killings and sexual violence against women. “These problems remain widespread and unaddressed,” said Mr. Quintana, who in May visited Thailand for a week to speak with refugees from Myanmar. The Myanmar government has refused entry to Mr. Quintana. He said he was preparing a report to present to the U.N. General Assembly this year. Likewise, little progress has been made to confront what has been described as rampant corruption of the Myanmar economy. It has been “a little disappointing,” Sean Turnell, professor of economics at Macquarie University in Sydney, said of the new government’s response to initiating economic reforms. The military remains by far the largest expenditure in Myanmar, at about 25 percent of the budget, he said. “That is causing all sorts of distortion to the economy, and creating a very serious budget deficit,” he said. “But the government’s response to budget deficits has been to print more money, which has led to the highest rate of inflation in Southeast Asia.” Mr. Turnell said, for example, that he had expected the government to address the gap between the official exchange and market rates of Myanmar’s currency, the largest such gap in the world. The official exchange rate is 6 kyat to the U.S. dollar, while on the market, a dollar exchanges for 350 kyat, Mr. Turnell said. No action has been taken, he said. “Economic reform is really going to run up against vested interests,“ he said, pointing to a relatively few number of oligarchs who command most of the business enterprises in Myanmar. The address on Monday by Mrs. Aung San Suu Kyi was preceded by a videotaped speech from her. In it, she emphasized the need for education and described people as “learners and nonlearners.” When asked later how she would describe the military establishment in Myanmar, she said, “I would say they are not very fast learners.” When asked by a student how she has managed to maintain her conviction in principles, she was blunt: “Discipline. That’s how I managed to live in isolation and keep my faith.” Under house arrest for 15 of 21 years before her release in November, she spoke on Monday of maintaining simplicity in her daily life. “I’ve learned to be happy with small things,” she said. “You have to learn to be happy with small things.” When asked by a female student at Hong Kong University about the role of women in politics in Myanmar, Mrs. Aung San Suu Kyi said many women were playing roles inside her party, the National League for Democracy. Then she smiled, adding “sometimes I think they are more helpful than men.” A version of this article appeared in print on May 31, 2011, in The International Herald Tribune with the headline: Dissident Plans a More Active Role in Myanmar.
24. Cambodia's king seen as a 'prisoner' in his palace Associated Press: Posted: May 29, 2011 10:30 AM EDT Updated: May 30, 2011 12:10 AM EDT By DENIS D. GRAY Associated Press http://www.kswo.com/story/14746452/cambodias-king-seen-as-a-prisoner-in-his-palace --------------------------------------------------------- (Comments: my only comment is that the king looks pitiful. Hun Sen has it all. Milton Osborne had a good observation on the future role of monarchy in Cambodia, when wrote that: "If he were to try to take a political role I have no doubt Hun Sen would act to diminish him and the monarchy generally almost immediately. Which is why he is effectively a prisoner in the palace," says Milton Osborne, an Australian historian and author of a Sihanouk biography. "He could very well be the last king of Cambodia." The fate of Cambodia is sealed. This is a clear message for those Cambodians who still believe that only the king can save Cambodia. Naranhkiri Tith, Ph.D. Washington DC. May 31, 2011) ) -------------------------------------------------------- PHNOM PENH, Cambodia (AP) - As the sun sets and the last tourist departs his vast, fairy-tale palace, the gentle, dignified man is left almost alone with memories of happier times, before he became the reluctant king of Cambodia - and perhaps its last. King Norodom Sihamoni may be heir to a royal line trailing back some 2,000 years, but he always seemed more suited to the arts scene in Europe, where he was a ballet dancer, than the rough and tumble politics of his homeland. Now, close aides and experts say, he has become figuratively, and more, a prisoner in his own palace. The chief warden: Prime Minister Hun Sen, who rose from a poor rural background to become a brilliant and crafty, some say ruthless, politician. Hun Sen consolidated power in a 1997 coup as Cambodia slowly emerged from being dragged into the Vietnam War and its own civil war. While the country is nominally democratic, he uses all the machinery of government to lock up critics and ensure his re-election. Human rights groups allege that he and his business friends are enriching themselves, while most of the population remains mired in poverty. His control extends over the palace. The king is surrounded by the government's watchdogs, overseen by Minister of Royal Affairs Kong Som Ol, an official close to Hun Sen. Sihamoni is closely chaperoned on his few trips outside palace walls, with the media kept away. Although the constitution endows him with considerable powers, these have never been granted. "I think we can use the words 'puppet king.' His power has been reduced to nothing," says Son Chhay, an opposition member of Parliament and one of the government's few outspoken critics. "The king must please the prime minister as much as possible in order to survive. It is sad to see." It wasn't always so. Sihamoni's flamboyant and charismatic father, Norodom Sihanouk, bestrode the country like a colossus for decades. Many regarded him as a god-king, and thousands flocked to the plaza fronting the Royal Palace for fireworks and other lavish celebrations on his birthday. Sihanouk abruptly abdicated in 2004 following confrontations with Hun Sen. Son Chhay and others say Sihamoni accepted the crown under pressure from parents hoping to ensure the survival of the monarchy. Seven years later, "sad, lonely, abandoned" are words sympathetic Cambodians often use when describing Sihamoni. The 58-year-old monarch spends much of each day signing documents, receiving guests and handling other routine business, then retires mostly to dine alone and read, says Prince Sisowath Thomico, Sihanouk's private secretary and an adviser to his son. Unlike his father, who had six wives and numerous lovers, Sihamoni is a lifelong bachelor and unlikely to leave an heir. His birthday passed recently with little notice. Within the palace's crenelated walls, among the graceful pavilions and gilt spires, there was no sign of activity. Outside, knots of people went about their normal evening pastimes at the grassy, riverfront square, feeding pigeons, lounging on reed mats and snacking on lotus seeds and noodles. "The king is a good, gentle man, a symbol of Cambodia. But he has one problem: no power. He only stays inside the palace. On television the leaders bow down before him but behind his back there is no respect," said Sin Chhay, a young civil servant at the plaza. "You could say that Hun Sen is the real king of Cambodia." Information Minister Khieu Kanharith insists the king is involved in social and religious affairs and judicial reviews, receives a monthly report from Hun Sen on government activities and makes recommendations on them. "The current King Sihamoni has played an important role in restoring the ... monarchy. As a king and symbol of national unity he maintains strict neutrality and doesn't become involved in any political activities," he said. "To say that he's a prisoner in the palace would be inappropriate." Sihamoni, a former ballet dancer and cultural ambassador, spent 25 years in Czechoslovakia and France. That European past, Western diplomats say, is his great escape. He returns regularly to what is now the Czech Republic, calling it "my second homeland," and has said his time in Prague "belongs to the happiest in my life." Fluent in the language - which reportedly vexes his keepers trying to eavesdrop on conversations with Czech visitors - he avidly reads Czech theater reviews and savors DVDs of ballets and operas. He keeps in close touch with the family that cared for him after he arrived in the Czech capital at age 9. Thirteen years later, he graduated from Prague's Academy of Musical Art. Shortly after, he joined his parents, who were being kept under virtual house arrest within the palace by the brutal Khmer Rouge government, which came to power after defeating a U.S.-backed government in 1975. Sihamoni worked in the palace gardens and cleaned out the throne hall. An estimated 1.7 million people died during the Khmer Rouge reign of terror, including more than a dozen of Sihanouk's children and relatives. Three decades later, the country is still coming to terms with that period. A U.N.-assisted tribunal is trying a handful of the surviving leaders of the Khmer Rouge, but the trials have been plagued by long delays and corruption allegations. Sihamoni has had only ceremonial involvement with the tribunal. Any deeper association would irritate both Hun Sen and Sihanouk, who for a time allied himself with the Khmer Rouge but has also supported the trials. After the fall of the Khmer Rouge, Sihanouk went to Paris, from where he backed resistance against a Vietnamese-installed government that replaced it. Sihamoni also went to the French capital and stayed on even after his father was restored as king in 1993. He taught, performed and choreographed classical Cambodian dance as well as Western ballet and served as ambassador to the U.N. Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization. He gave up this much-cherished life to become king in 2004. The king's high privy councilor, Son Soubert, who is aligned with one of the two small opposition parties with parliamentary seats, says the government has blocked passage of two constitutional provisions: the formation of a potentially powerful Supreme Council of National Defense headed by the king, and an annual National Congress that would continue the tradition of citizens appealing directly to the monarch. Commenting on the congress, the information minister said that in today's Cambodia such a meeting would be a mess and powerless to override any decisions made by an elected National Assembly. Some question just how much power Sihamoni wants to wield or is capable of exercising. "If he were to try to take a political role I have no doubt Hun Sen would act to diminish him and the monarchy generally almost immediately. Which is why he is effectively a prisoner in the palace," says Milton Osborne, an Australian historian and author of a Sihanouk biography. "He could very well be the last king of Cambodia." Prince Sisowath Thomico, the adviser, insists there is no animosity between king and prime minister and says Cambodia's monarchy has merely entered a new stage, shedding its political role. "The king now serves as a guardian of the past, of tradition, the moral character of Cambodia and points the way ahead for future generations," he says. "We leave the present to the government." By most accounts, Sihamoni is still largely respected, especially in the countryside. He is probably considered less relevant in urban areas, especially among an extremely young population - the median age is about 23 - that was not around during Sihanouk's heyday, before violence engulfed the country. Prince Norodom Ranarridh, who heads a pro-monarchy party, believes Cambodians are "still royalists at heart" and holds a nuanced view of his half brother. The king doesn't exercise his prerogatives under the constitution to avoid jeopardizing an institution he regards as more important than himself, Ranarridh said. At the same time, Sihamoni's personality is unassertive, so he falls comfortably into the role of doing the minimum. "So both the king and prime minister are very happy with the situation. It is some kind of a gentlemen's agreement," the prince says, laughing. But he adds: "I don't think my brother is very happy. He would like to be somewhere else." ___ Associated Press writer Grant Peck in Bangkok contributed to this story. Copyright 2011 The Associated Press. All rights reserved. This material may not be published, broadcast, rewritten or redistributed.
25. Widyono; a witness to turbulent era The Pnom Penh Post: Tuesday, 24 May 2011 15:01 James O'Toole ------------------------------------------------- (Comments: this interview of Benny Widyono by the Phnom Penh Post,, who wrote a book titled "Dancing in Shadows: Sihanouk, the Khmer Rouge, and the United Nations in Cambodia," (See a review of that book in the page titled "Book Review" of this site) on the role of Sihanouk during the United Nations Transitional authorities in Cambodia, (UNTAC) period in iew is very revealing and of major historical importance, on the crucial and disastrous role of Sihanouk in bringing back Hun Sen to power, after the UN-sponsored elections in 1993. As was pointed out by Marie A. Martin in her book titled "Cambodia; A Shattered Society," that Sihanouk started compaigning for Hun Sen, as soon as he returned to Cambodia in 1991. Please, also remember that Sihanouk had allied himself with the Khmer Rouge during the 1970's and 1980's, which led to the legitimization of that murderous group, and to the mass murder of more than 2 million innocent Cambodians and non-Cambodinas people, during their murderous and bloody regime from 1975 to 1979 . In 1993, after the CPP have lost the elections to Ranariddh's FUNCINPEC, Hun Sen and Chea Sim came to the royal palace to ask Sihanouk to take over the reins of the government. According to Sina Than, (an adviser to Sihanouk, who was present at that meeting) during that meeting, Sihanouk had reassured Hun Sen and Chea Sim that, he will bring them back to power. To fulfill that diabolical promise, first, Sihanouk attemped to take over the power for himself, after the 1993 UN-sponsored elections, in which his own son Ranariddh had won the absolute majority of voters, and the right to form his own government (I was told by Keat Chhon, CPP minister of Finance, that my name was on a list of members of the cabinet to be presided by Sihnaouk, as minister of economy, I was not consulted on this; while Ranariddh and Hun Sen were listed as First Deputy and Second Deputy Prime Ministers, respectively). However, his marchiavellian scheme was aborted and turned down by UNTAC . After the failure of that attempt to grab power from the cambodian people, Sihanouk in collaboration with Hun Sen, fomented another of his many personal "coups d'etat", by creating a secession movement of the Eastern provinces that was led by Chakrapong, one of Sihanouk's favorite sons. This coup, in turn, had allowed Sihanouk to invent a unique and bizarre system of governance in the world, a two-prime ministers system in Cambodia. In so doing, he had succeeded in bringing Hun Sen back into power, thereby nullified the ballot victory of FUNCIPEC led by his own son, Ranariddh. It is astounding how Sihanouk never stop doing more damages and harm to Cambodia and its people. (See quotation below on the secession ovement). "The CPP had lost the election, but senior leaders threatened a secession of the eastern provinces of the country. As a result, Cambodia ended up with two prime ministers: Norodom Ranariddh as first prime minister, and Hun Sen as second prime minister." (Lonely Planet, a history of Cambodia, http://www.lonelyplanet.com/cambodia/history) The curcial question is; why did Sihanouk decided to switch his support to Hun Sen and the Vietnamese, after a decade of fighting him and the Vietnamese? The answer, is due to the fact that Hun Sen under the advisement of the Vietnamese, must have told Sihanouk at the first time when they met in small town (Fer-en-Tardenois) near Paris in 1987, that, if he does not support him, he will have to bring Sihanouk to be tried at a tribunal, should that judicial institution be organized, which it did with the creation of the Khmer Rouge Tribunal (KRT) in the early 2000's. For more background information and documentation on Sihanouk's deep involvement with the Khmer Rouge, please, go to this link: http://cambodiana.org/SihanoukandhisTragicRoleinContemporaryCambodia.aspx The following quotation from Wdyono's book "Dansing in Shadows" proiveds additional information on Sihanouk and Hun Sen past association with the Khmer Rouge; "With regard to the Khmer Rouge’s international tribunal, the author compared the trial with the Nuremberg trial. It will take long time and it will be different from the Serbian or other recent trials. Hun Sen insisted to have a Cambodian Court and have very little trust to UN after being manipulated in the past. The author maintains that such manipulation still continue. He mentioned the US’ refusal to contribute financially to the trial until all Khmer Rouge was put on trial. But it is complicated because King Sihanouk and Hun Sen were also Khmer Rouge." This interview is also a warning for those Cambodians who still want and ask for help from foreigner powers, namely. to revive the 1991 Paris agreements. What these people do not know is the fact that there is a fatigue by all major world powers about Cambodia. Sihanouk had fooled them too many times already. They will not come back anytime soon to help Cambodia out of the current mess resulting from the Cambodian own-making. Yet, sadly, so many Cambodians still believe that only Sihanouk can save Cambodia. Naranhkiri Tith Ph.D. Washington DC. May 24, 2011) -------------------------------------------------- Benny Widyono had a front-row seat during the 1990s for some of the defining events of the Kingdom’s recent history: the 1993 national elections, the break-up of the Funcinpec-Cambodian People’s Party coalition and the struggle to finally defeat the Khmer Rouge. He served first as provincial director – or “shadow governor” – for Siem Reap during the United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia from 1992-1993, and later as the United Nations secretary general’s political representative from 1994 to 1997. An economist and a native of Indonesia, Widyono published a historical memoir relating to his time in Cambodia in 2008 titled Dancing in Shadows. Tonight at 6:00pm, the Cambodia-Japan Cooperation Centre at the Royal University of Phnom Penh will host a launch of the book’s Khmer translation. Widyono will join the event for a discussion about the book and his time in Cambodia. He spoke with The Post yesterday about Cambodian politics past and present. What do you see as UNTAC’s legacy?
It started a process of development, because during the 11 years of these unjust decisions [by Western countries and the UN following the overthrow of the Khmer Rouge], Cambodia was isolated. When we established a new government, aid was pouring in like there was no tomorrow, because the Western powers – I think it’s like a white man’s burden. So that, of course, combined with the fact that there was the Asian miracle – it’s foreign aid and also foreign investment.
About political institutions, actually UNTAC did not help much, I must say. The fact that there were two prime ministers was a recipe for disaster. I haven’t seen any other country where there were two prime ministers. First there was a short honeymoon period, and then they started fighting each other.
With the United Nations having shunned the government of what is now the Cambodian People’s Party for so many years after the overthrow of the Khmer Rouge, how were you and other members of the UNTAC mission received when you arrived in 1992? For 11 years, Hun Sen doesn’t exist for the UN, so it’s an ostrich policy – putting their heads in the sand. I was in Siem Reap, supposed to be the governor of Siem Reap. When I arrived there, I presented my credentials, I said ‘I’m the governor,’ and the real governor said, ‘I’m the governor.’ This mandate for us to control the government with a handful of people who don’t even speak Khmer was a ridiculous mandate. We had trouble from the beginning. It is often said that Hun Sen bullied his way into the coalition with Norodom Ranariddh and Funcinpec. Do you think this is a fair assessment, and if so, is there anything UNTAC could have done to prevent it? The UN had nothing to do with this coalition government. Our task was to do the elections and leave it, like Pontius Pilate, and say ‘You take care of that.’ So it was left for [King Father Norodom] Sihanouk to decide on this, and he said ‘Children, children, don’t quarrel, you can both be prime minister’ – Ranariddh and Hun Sen. The [King] father is a very realistic man. Because of all this - Hun Sen has stayed there [in government] for 11 years - [Ranariddh] agreed to share the prime ministership, but from the beginning, he was the loser.
Could it have been avoided? UNTAC had no power to disturb, but suppose UNTAC said, according to the [UN] Security Council, we have to declare that the winner should be the head of the government. Then we could have had problems because of that. If we had insisted that Norodom Ranariddh would have been the only prime minister, probably that would have happened, but it was not in our mandate. Wrongly, people say that UNTAC had the stupid decision of having two prime ministers, but that’s not true – it’s Sihanouk. What is your view of the factional fighting in 1997 that resulted in Ranariddh’s ousting, and which many have called a coup d’état? The problem is [Ranariddh] came in from outside. He won the election, because that’s what the people voted for, but the government was 11 years established here, so he had a hard time. He had no one. He had a handful of people from outside, so he called himself a puppet governor. It’s like a losing proposition for Ranariddh, so that ended up in a violent clash in 1997. I don’t call it a coup d’état for very simple reason – because Hun Sen had already all the power in his hands – why should he coup d’état against himself? Do you feel that the current government has been allowed for too long to use Cambodia’s status as a post-conflict country as an excuse for limited political reforms? My perspective on that is, where in Asia do you have democracy? India is a democracy, and I must say proudly, Indonesia. Singapore is not yet a democracy; of course Burma, forget it. Thailand is in turmoil now. Full democracy, it’s very difficult to achieve. It’s through the maturity of the society, it has to mature. Indonesia is more mature now after 32 years of totalitarian power. I certainly recognise it’s not the best here, [but] maybe my opinion is shared by these donors who continue to pour in all this money. INTERVIEW CONDUCTED AND EDITED BY JAMES O’TOOLE 26. NGOs concerned about KRT The Phnom Penh Post: Friday, 20 May 2011 15:02 James O'Toole
------------------------------------------------------ (Comments: this article has once more prove that I am right on the fact that Hun Sen has used the Khmer Rouge Tribunal to advanced his main objective and that of the Vietnamese, which is to maintain their grip on Cambodia and its people, by “demonizing the demons.” What is not surprising is the fact that Sihanouk has remained silent on all this issue and its impact on the survival of the Cambodian people. After all, Sihanouk is now firmly under the control of Hun Sen and his boss the Vietnamese. Total destruction is inevitable, unless the Cambodian people are in full charge of its own destiny. But, in order to do that, the majority of the Cambodian people should stop depending on Sihanouk and on foreign countries or international organizations to save them. Naranhkiri Tith, Ph.D. Washington DC. May 22, 2011) ------------------------------------------------------ More than 30 local NGOs have joined to criticise the Khmer Rouge tribunal’s handling of its controversial third and fourth cases, expressing concern that “the impartiality, integrity, and the independence of ECCC judges are being tainted”. Developments over the past few weeks at the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia, as the tribunal is formerly known, have sparked accusations from some observers that the court’s investigating judges are planning to scuttle the third and fourth cases due to pressure from the Cambodian government. While the Case 004 investigation is still open, the investigating judges announced the closure of their Case 003 investigation last month.
In response, British co-prosecutor Andrew Cayley issued a statement last week saying that the allegations in Case 003 “have not been fully investigated” and calling for a series of additional – and seemingly basic – investigative steps including examinations of mass grave sites and the questioning of the suspects in the case. The Case 003 suspects are identified in court documents as former KR navy commander Meas Muth and air force commander Sou Met, though the court has not yet officially made their names public.
Yesterday, 32 civil society groups including Legal Aid of Cambodia, Adhoc and the Cambodian Human Rights Action Committee issued a statement urging the court and the international community to ensure that judicial independence is maintained.
“We urge all concerned individuals and groups to take appropriate action to ensure that the Case 003 and 004 investigations are full and genuine,” the groups said, adding that the court “must safeguard against any creation of negationist or revisionist records about what happened” under the Khmer Rouge.
United Nations court spokesman Lars Olsen said yesterday that the tribunal did not need outside input in its judicial decision-making.
“The court will continue to do its job independently according to the legal framework for the ECCC,” he said. “That means also independent of civil society
27. Vietnam stays the nuclear course By M Goonan Asia Times: May 13, 2011 ---------------------------------------------------------- (Comments: this article missed a very important hidden agenda of Vietnam, which is to become a nuclear power in Southeast Asia. This agenda of Vietnam to become a nuclear power in Southeast Asia, runs counter the plan by President Obama to denuclearize the world. Vietnam was clever to hide this plan by using its lack of non-nuclear sources of energy, such as coal, oil and gas, as suggested by the author of this article as follows: “Hanoi's decision to pursue nuclear power dates back to the mid-1990s when market reforms started to take root. Prime Minister Nguyen Tan Dung has since made industrialization by 2020 a key goal of his economic development agenda, but drought-stricken hydropower dams and diminishing coal supplies have contributed to frequent power outages and put Dung's industrialization ambitions in doubt.” There is only a small step from having nuclear based electricity to making a nuclear bomb, as was done by other countries, such as North Korea, and soon, Iran. This act of becoming a nuclear power by Vietnam was supported by the USA in a recent decision to transfer nuclear technology by the USA to Vietnam. In so doing the USA hopes to use Vietnam as its new ally to fight the rising power of China in the region and in the world. One can immediately speculate that Thailand will not sit quiet and watch Vietnam becoming a nuclear power in the region. As to Cambodia, Vietnam will have another means to put Hun Sen and Sihanouk under their firm control. So, the Vietnamization of Cambodia and Laos, is being reinforced. Naranhkiri Tith Ph.D. Washington DC. May 19, 2011) -------------------------------------------------------------- HO CHI MINH CITY - Pervasive and ongoing power shortages represent perhaps the biggest hurdle to sustaining Vietnam's fast economic growth and attractiveness as a manufacturing base to foreign investors. The country will need to add an additional 4,600 megawatts of generating capacity per year from now to 2016 just to keep pace with demand, according to government estimates. While other countries in the region rethink their nuclear power plans in the wake of the March 11 earthquake and tsunami that destroyed nuclear power plants in Japan, Vietnam has stood firm behind its ambitious designs. Vietnam plans to build 14 nuclear reactors with Russian, American and Japanese assistance over the next two decades. The first, in Ninh Thuan province, is under construction. Hanoi's decision to pursue nuclear power dates back to the mid-1990s when market reforms started to take root. Prime Minister Nguyen Tan Dung has since made industrialization by 2020 a key goal of his economic development agenda, but drought-stricken hydropower dams and diminishing coal supplies have contributed to frequent power outages and put Dung's industrialization ambitions in doubt. Power outages are endemic across Vietnam. Local news reports last year pointed to instances where tourists had been stuck in hotel elevators during electricity blackouts. Generators at luxury resorts catering to foreigners and at other high end businesses are also frequently overstretched. Mattias Duehn, the European Chamber's executive director, was quoted by Bloomberg saying "the power cuts affect Vietnam's competitiveness and may direct investment elsewhere." While these pressures will push the government's nuclear plans ahead, there are concerns both at home and abroad about Vietnam's capacity to safely manage nuclear facilities. A shortage of technicians will be one key issue, according to Carl Thayer, a Vietnam expert at the Australian Defense Force Academy. Disaster management is another. In October last year, a bauxite mining accident in Hungary reignited debate and criticism of plans to establish bauxite mines in Vietnam's Central Highlands region. The toxic red sludge had barely reached Hungary's Danube River before many, including several senior retired and still serving Vietnamese officials, were calling for a moratorium on the plans. It's not apparent yet that officials reacted the same way after recent events in Japan that led to a nuclear meltdown and raised safety concerns worldwide about nuclear power. Indeed, the internal debate over the costs and benefits of nuclear power have been held behind closed doors and have had little outlet in the local press. Since Japan's nuclear disaster, state-controlled Vietnamese newspapers have carried stories reaffirming the government's nuclear energy development plans and emphasized the differences between the "old" plants in Japan and the more modern, safer technology that would be deployed here. This is because the local press was reportedly told that the government's nuclear plans are deemed a "sensitive" issue, meaning journalists risked reprisals for straying from the official line in their reporting. The news blackout nonetheless stirred some panic. In March, false reports that radioactive rain from Japan's disaster had fallen in Hanoi sent parents rushing to schools to collect their children. Vuong Huu Tan, head of Vietnam's nuclear energy institute, reaffirmed in an interview that Japan's accident had not changed plans to build several nuclear reactors in Vietnam. "We understand the nature of the problem in Japan," said Tan. "They use the old type of reactor, built 40 years ago... the new generation of reactor has improved on shortcomings." He added that the potential threats from earthquakes, tsunamis and climate change would be factored into the reactors' designs. Climate change is a particularly pressing problem, with environmental scientists blaming it for a wide range of emerging problems, including increased storms and inclement weather such as drought, sea-level rises along the country's long coastline, and salt water intrusion into Mekong Delta areas where the majority of the country's rice crop is grown. International bodies, including the World Bank, Oxfam and United Nations Development Program, have all predicted Vietnam will be one of the countries most affected by climate change. That's arguably already contributing to the country's rising power woes. Droughts last year and this have dramatically lowered levels in hydropower dams, which account for 20% of the country's total power supply, according to the US Energy Information Administration. Other estimates put that contribution as high as 40%. Meanwhile, indigenous supplies of coal are depleting, forcing the country to start importing power from historical adversary China. All of these factors have driven the official insistence and lack of open debate over nuclear power development. Yet analysts warn Vietnam does not at present have the infrastructure or expertise to guarantee a smooth nuclear transition. Apart from inconsistent power supplies, they note many roads across the country remain in a parlous state and drainage systems cannot handle heavy rains. Across the country, accidents at oil refineries, mines and factories are more common than they should be, say industrial safety experts. At the same time, Vietnam is one of the most storm-affected countries in the region; the Central Coast region in particular has been hit by more and bigger typhoons in recent years. While authorities tend to respond swiftly to storm threats, the country's overall disaster response mechanism is neither centralized nor well-coordinated. For example, earthquakes are covered by one government agency while petroleum spills are handled by another. Nor is there a central body or unified strategy for handling industrial disasters. The potential for nuclear accidents and a haphazard government response has already started to worry Vietnam's non-nuclear neighbors - if not its own citizens. An anti-nuclear rally was held outside the Vietnamese embassy in Bangkok in April, when protestors submitted a letter of concern that the first plant to be built in Ninh Thuan would be only 800 kilometers from the Thai border. But with future economic growth and Dung's industrial vision at stake, those concerns are expected to fall on deaf ears. M Goonan, a pseudonym, is a Vietnam-based freelance journalist.
28. Credibility of Khmer Rouge tribunal under threat ABC; http://www.radioaustralia.net.au/asiapac/stories/201105/s3214328.htm Updated May 11, 2011 21:46:23 Observers at the UN-backed Khmer Rouge tribunal in Phnom Penh fear political pressure and UN-donor inaction have doomed its third and fourth cases.
On Monday the court's international prosecutor called on the investigating judges to do more work on the third case. But that likely won't make much difference.
Presenter: Robert Carmichael Speakers: Andrew Cayley, international co-prosecutor at the Khmer Rouge tribunal; Clair Duffy, trial monitor, Open Society Justice Initiative Listen: · Windows Media ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- (Comments: as I have said so many times the Khmer Rouge Trial (KRT) for the Vietnamese and Hun Sen, now with the support of Sihanouk, was not to seek the truth and real justice for the those victims of the Khmer Rouge’s atrocity against the Cambodian people and those non-Cambodian victims, but to “demonize the demons” so as to make the Vietnamese and Hun Sen look like liberators, which they are not. Now that Hun Sen had succeeded to use the KRT to do the job of “demonizing the demons,” by having found “Duch” guilty of ‘crime against humanity” with a light sentence and not of death penalty that he deserves, there is no reason for Hun Sen and the Vietnamese to allow anybody else to be brought to be tried in this KRT. So, Case 2, 3, 4 will never be brought to trial, as Hun Sen had repeatedly said on this subject, that he will never allow other cases to be tried at the KRT.
It is more of a farce than real justice. Naranhkiri Tith Ph.D. Washington DC. May 14, 2011)
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- CARMICHAEL: The wheels of international justice tend to move slowly, and the Khmer Rouge tribunal in Phnom Penh is no exception. It didn't hear its first case until 2009, three decades after the Khmer Rouge were overthrown having caused the deaths of around 2 million people. The prosecution has long envisaged no more than 10 people would face trial in four separate cases. Case One involved a man called Comrade Duch, the former security chief, whom the court last year convicted of war crimes and crimes against humanity. Case Two involves the four senior surviving leaders of the Khmer Rouge movement, and is scheduled to start later this year. But it is the final two cases - known as Cases Three and Four - that are causing concern. They involve the last five suspects, as well as tens - if not hundreds - of thousands of deaths. However many observers fear they are doomed, thanks to political interference from the Cambodian government, which has said repeatedly it would not permit them to proceed. Its stance has led most Cambodian staff at the tribunal to stop working on the cases. Inaction by the United Nations and donor reluctance to keep funding the court have also not helped.
A fortnight ago Case Three was in the tribunal's investigation's office, its home for nearly two years. The role of the investigating judges is to examine the allegations against the suspects - by interviewing witnesses, visiting crime sites, that sort of thing - as they seek to find evidence of guilt or innocence. Case Four is still with the investigating judges, but on April 29 they announced they had closed their Case Three investigation and handed the file to the prosecution. This week international co-prosecutor Andrew Cayley handed it back, saying it needed a lot more work.
CAYLEY: If you're asking me how much more investigation needs to be done, I would simply use the words "a significant amount" of investigation is still left to be done in that case.
So what has Cayley asked the investigating judges to do?
CAYLEY: I don't consider that the investigation is concluded and I've asked for a number of steps to be taken including the interviewing of the suspects who are named in the introductory submission, and a number of other steps including investigation of crime sites also originally named by the prosecution in the introductory submission, which haven't been investigated at all.
CARMICHAEL: Under the tribunal's rules, the investigating judges can ignore Cayley's requests. If that happens the international prosecutor's last chance is to appeal to a bench of five judges - three of whom are Cambodian. The case hasn't got there yet. However we do know the investigating judges failed to interview the suspects in Case Three and did not even tell them they were under investigation. Clair Duffy is a trial monitor for the Open Society Justice Initiative, or OSJI, which is funded by US billionaire George Soros. She says it's the first time she has heard of that happening at an international tribunal.
DUFFY: I think it's surprising, shocking even that at the very least they weren't offered to participate in interviews and that the allegations - very, very serious allegations against them - weren't put to them and them asked to respond to that. To me that's a very basic investigative act to undertake in any investigation.
CARMICHAEL: Case Three has got victims' lawyers worried too. The Khmer Rouge tribunal was the first to allow victims - who are known as civil parties - to take part. They played a key role in Duch's trial and will do so again in Case Two. But the investigating judges refused to say which crime sites they were looking at, which meant ordinary Cambodians had no idea whether the crimes being examined affected them personally. And that meant they could not apply to register as civil parties with the investigating judges.
In the past week or so just four people have applied as civil parties for Case Three. None has yet been approved, and the deadline for applications expires in a week. Civil party lawyers say the investigating judges have deliberately excluded their clients. The OSJI's Clair Duffy says it appears the investigating judges have "next to zero" interest in the rights of civil parties to take part in Case Three.
On Tuesday the international investigating judge, Siegfried Blunk, replied to a list of emailed questions, one of which asked whether he thought his office had kept potential civil parties for Case Three sufficiently informed. He replied they had "ample opportunities" to find out what was going on through the tribunal's Victims' Support unit. But that is at best disingenuous: The victims' unit has no access to the case file, and until prosecutor Andrew Cayley took it upon himself to publish the crime sites this week, the unit itself did not know what sites Judge Blunk's office had investigated. Judge Blunk did not reply to further emailed questions.
The combination of political interference, United Nations' silence and donor fatigue mean Cases Three and Four are highly unlikely to proceed. Some suspect the UN is colluding to shut them down. If true, that could account for what looks to be a very poor Case Three investigation.
The bigger picture is that this tribunal was meant to provide some accountability and answers for what happened to millions of Cambodians during their nation's darkest days. The tribunal has made important strides in that direction, but the way it deals with Cases Three and Four could significantly undermine that legacy.
This is Robert Carmichael in Phnom Penh.
29. Cambodia’s Curse: The Modern History of a Troubled Land
Joel Brinkley Reviewed by Kok-Thay ENG Director of Research Documentation Center of Cambodia truthkokthay@dccam.org
April 2011
(Comments: this review of Joel Brinkley’s book titled “Cambodia’s curse: the Modern History of a troubled Land” is a repetition of this book reviewed by Elizabeth Becker (posted below in this page).
Perhaps, the most damaging of this review by Mr. Kok-Thay Eng, is the fact that he criticized Joel Brinkley of being negligent and factually inaccurate, which he was, but Mr. Eng, as a reviewer, himself is negligent of factual misinterpretation, and by not providing the documents to back up his accusation on what he accused Mr. Brinkley of doing, especially on Brinkley emphasizing the lack of morality among the majority of the Cambodian people, when he said that:
“It seems that every actor in Cambodian development politics receives blame in this book, from the ordinary Cambodians who are lazy, timid, stupid and savage; to a negligent, corrupt government lead by a networks of partisans; to a donor community that seems a bit self-caring and yet unable to force change in Cambodia. Nobody is good. Nobody deserves credit for what they do or endure. So what is the author’s solution? Can he move beyond critiques and take action? But before he can do that he should spend more time in Cambodia, engage more with local people, studying their culture and tradition, learning the mentality of government officials, looking into more facts and meeting more civil society members.”
For the support of Mr. Brinkley’s view on the reasons behind the lack of strong moral grounding for the majority of the Cambodian people, please, go to this link; SAIS 2009 Presentation on Angkorian Empire.ppt rationale for institutional org.ppt It is sad that all those who work for DCCAM are not at all objective in their interpretation of recent Cambodian problems. They are the main contributors to the efforts organized by the Vietnamese government to “demonize the demons” to make Hun Sen and his boss the Vietnamese, only demons, while making the Khmer Rouge not only “Demons” but, also “Racists.”
How could a racist killer be different from a demon killer? Since the Vietnamese committed genocide against the Khmer Krom, the Chams, and the Montagnards, and the Khmer Rouge, who are not in their ideological framework of mind. It is no surprise to me to read this kind of inconsistency from a member of Youk Chhang DCCAM, whose main job is to “demonize the demons,” and not to seeking for the real truth and justice for the Cambodian people, as they so loudly proclaim. Naranhkiri Tith Ph.D. Cannes, France, May 6, 2011.)
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"Joel Brinkley is cursing Cambodia to these problems, not showing that Cambodia is a cursed land."
Joel Brinkley’s new book, “Cambodia’s Curse: The Modern History of a Troubled Land,” is the first general study about Cambodia since Evan Gottsman’s “Cambodia After the Khmer Rouge” in 2004. But Gottesman was light-handed in his criticism and more formal in the style of his writing. In Brinkley’s account, no one character in Cambodian socio-politics, foreign or national, is held up as a positive example, and even its people are negatively and sometimes ruthlessly criticized. However I am grateful to and respect Joel Brinkley for his efforts and passion in writing this book.
The book is lengthy and organized into seventeen chapters. Each one follows roughly a chronological style. But the chapters do not have titles explaining each chapter’s focus. Brinkley tries to cover almost every aspect of post-genocide, post-UNTAC Cambodia.
The introductory chapter starts with former US ambassador Joseph Mussomeli’s prophetic words: “Be careful because Cambodia is the most dangerous place you will ever visit. You will fall in love with it and eventually it will break your heart.” I met Joseph Mussomeli personally. He was a passionate, true lover of Cambodia and a defender of human rights. During his ambassadorship the US embassy changed its face and became friendlier to local Cambodians. I do not think the phrase was intended as a criticism of Cambodia, but instead as complement. However, it seems that Brinkley may have had bad experiences in Cambodia and left feeling embittered.
Chapter Summary and Comments
In chapter one, the author discusses Cambodia’s ancient history, particularly from the Angkorean civilization onward until Lon Nol’s coup against Prince Sihanouk in March 1970. Much of the facts about these periods as described in the book are well-known. As throughout other chapters of the book, I feel that the author cherry-picks negatives of the past to make conclusions about the present. At times the author includes quotes about Cambodian people that suggest barbarity, such as his mention of the way Cambodian kings punished criminals, although in Medieval times how could one expect a punishment to be more humane.
The author also discusses the barbarity of stealing gall-bladders to expand one’s spiritual potency (although only Lon Nol and his brother Lon Nil are well known for having believed in such an extreme practice and having used it in formal settings) and the Cambodian people’s supposed lack of intelligence, laziness, indolence, ignorance, torpidity, and historically-rooted corruption. Some of these claims come from Thai, Vietnamese and French officials, although Vietnam, Thailand and Cambodia have long had ethnocentric feuds. Cambodians themselves have a lot to say about Vietnam. At one point the author even hints that Cambodians’ supposed lack of ambition and struggle for change is rooted in their religion, Theravadist Buddhism, which he views as passive and lacking aggressiveness.
Chapter two discusses the Khmer Rouge’s control of Cambodia, not from viewpoints inside Cambodia, but from activities of the international community, particularly US officials. I thought that a book about Cambodian history should include more Cambodian characters. The chapter begins with former ambassador Kenneth Quinn’s discovery of the Khmer Rouge’s burning of villages. He viewed that from a hill across the border in Vietnam in the early 1970s. Quinn later wrote a revelatory research report in February 1974 about the current situation and the future of the Khmer Rouge. Still, Brinkley believes that Quinn was wrong in that paper to find that all Khmer communists were anti-Vietnamese communists, instead of merely the southwestern Khmer Rouge. Quinn was not wrong.
The author also discusses the US’s main policy with Cambodia at the time: the bombing of Cambodia. The chapter ended partly at the Khmer Rouge’s arrival in Phnom Penh in April 1975. The author then follows the experiences of another former US ambassador to Cambodia, Charles Twinning, who arrived in Bangkok in June 1975 to observe Cambodia when the Khmer Rouge’s repression had already begun in earnest. Brinkley includes a debate on whether the situation in Cambodia observed along the border was widespread mass killing. One of Brinkley’s interesting contributions is his description of 81 Lon Nol officials who tried to return to Cambodia after the fall of the Khmer Rouge. They later were executed at Tuol Sleng prison. The chapter continues with US observations from outside Cambodia about the Khmer Rouge and their brutality, and ends with the Vietnamese arrival in 1979.
Chapter three continues with the fall of the Khmer Rouge and the march of Cambodian people to the Thai border. It includes more observations of Cambodia from the Thai border by American officials such as Stephen Solarz, Cindy Coleman, who were passionate with Cambodian cause. The author notes correctly that even as more and more evidence supported the Khmer Rouge’s crimes against humanity, “American officials seemed capable of hearing only one thing: Vietnam, the United States’ bitter enemy, had conquered Cambodia.”
Typical of discussion of the period immediately after the Khmer Rouge, the chapter discusses UN debate on representation of Cambodian state at the General Assembly. As is well known, the conclusion was that the Khmer Rouge continued to represent Cambodia. Brinkley correctly says that the choice then was between a genocidal former government and an ally of the Soviet Union. I like it when Brinkley mentioned the impression of Robert Rosenstock, a US lawyer, after meeting Ieng Sary: “I realized enough at the time to feel there was something disgusting about shaking Ieng Sary’s hand.”
The chapter also briefly discusses the People’s Republic of Kampuchea, starting with Samdech Heng Samrin’s appointment by Vietnam, the arrival of Samdech Hun Sen in 1985 as prime minister and the withdrawal of Vietnamese army in 1989. The author makes an attempt to cover all parties in the Cambodian conflict by talking about Pol Pot through the lens of his former secretary named Mey Meak and Henry Kamm’s reporting. The chapter discusses the build-up to the Paris Peace Accord on 23 October 1991. World politics was changing. China and Vietnam resumed relations. China also normalized relations with Vietnam and began cutting aid to the Khmer Rouge. In July1990 the US ended its support for the Khmer Rouge. The Khmer Rouge was alone, cutting forest and mining gems to support their army. The road was open for the arrival of the United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC). I like this part of the chapter as it covered really well key players and events during the period.
Chapter four discusses the arrival of UNTAC and its mission director Yashushi Akashi in May 1992. The author highlights Akashi’s encounter with a Khmer Rouge child soldier at a check point near the border. Brinkley claims that Akashi was angry when he was sent back by the soldier, who appeared to be alone. I do not think that the story was that simple or that the child was alone. But Brinkley takes this anecdote as an indication of the lawlessness and lack of cooperation by the Khmer Rouge that made Akashi embittered about the Khmer Rouge and taught the Khmer Rouge that UNTAC was a paper tiger.
Through the words of John Bolton, Rafeeuddin Ahmed, and others, the chapter discusses the UN debates on funding UNTAC, which cost “$3 billion in all,” an amount, the author claims, that went to supporting bloated salaries, extravagant spending, sexual entertainment, and alcoholic drinks. Money was even lost to theft. Brinkley added, during UNTAC times, new freedoms flourished in Cambodia. The media and civil society began to take shape. The chapter also introduces new Cambodian political players including Prince Norodom Ranariddh and Son Sann. Son Sann was not new but he more clearly emerged during that time.
The chapter continues with the election on 23 May 1993 that continued for five days, in which 90% of eligible voters turned up. The CPP won 51 seats, FUNCINPEC won 58 seats. The chapter ends with a discussion of power arrangements between the CPP and FUNCINPEC. This is a good chapter with weighted description of events.
Chapter five is the beginning of book’s critique of Cambodian local politics, its donor politics and political infighting. It introduces a new player: opposition leader Sam Rainsy. According to Brinkley, Rainsy was courageous and benevolent when he left his post as minister of the finance ministry and set up a new party to make the elimination of corruption his personal pursuit.
The chapter introduces the fighting between the CPP and FUNCINPEC in July 1997 by recalling a warning by former ambassador Charles Twinning that such fighting would happen. The chapter also begins the author’s argument that donor community in Cambodia has no power to force Cambodia’s ruling government to change. It quotes numbers indicating that foreign aid averaged about $500 million a year in the 1990s and peaked to around $1 billion in late 2000s together with descriptions of continuous and even increasing social problems, the biggest of which is corruption.
Chapter six’s main focus is the fighting in July 1997 between the CPP and FUNCINPEC, although as throughout the rest of the book it is not easy to determine each chapter’s focus. Although the title says this is a book about Cambodian history, it is dominated by foreign characters and more frequently about US foreign policy toward Cambodia. This chapter starts with the departure of US Ambassador Charles Twinning and the arrival of Kenneth Quinn, two people who were passionate about Cambodia. Both men had predicted that the two ruling parties would clash.
Brinkley discusses the grenade attacked on 30 March 1997 on a political demonstration by the Sam Rainsy Party, which “killed 16 people and wounded 150 others.” The description of the attacked centers on a US official named Ron Abney who was the country director of the International Republican Institute. Ron Abney was injured in the attacked, which enabled the FBI to investigate the incident. However, the FBI did not publish their investigation report. The author also does not offer any conclusions about the persons behind the attack.
The author paints Sam Rainsy as a good liar and as a man who liked to travel overseas, to countries such as in Australia, France and the United States, lobbying world leaders to support his cause, but not a persevering and committed man of the people. The author writes that Rainsy was not dedicated enough to his party.
Groups of Khmer Rouge soldiers began to defect and in August 1996 Ieng Sary defected. Both sides amassed troops and weapons. The author concludes that FUNCINPEC started the fighting in July 1997 and it was not a coup by the CPP. The chapter also mentions the US response to the fighting. This is a good chapter but I wish it had been organized in a less complicated manner.
Chapter seven discusses the mental health problems of Cambodians resulting from the Khmer Rouge era and subsequent protracted conflicts. The author quotes an article of Seth Mydans of the New York Times to support his conclusion that cases of PTSD and other mental health problems are prevalent among Cambodians. To support his claim further, the author mentions a story about a detonation of UXOs by CMAC in late 1990s and the people’s panic afterward as a sign of social mental problems. Throughout the book the author does not have a clear distinction between people’s normal behavior and symptoms of PTSDS. The reaction simply could just be a lack of information in a nation riddled with war and the sounds of guns. If the people did not react the author might also claim that mental health caused them to be slow-moving, unresponsive to danger.
I believe that a discussion of mental health issues should be the task of psychiatrists who base their claims on rigorous studies, not just quotes and feelings from non-psychiatrists.
Brinkley indicates that spirituality in Cambodia is a contributing factor to exacerbate the condition of PTSD. I think that is blatantly inaccurate. Sleep paralysis is a condition that might not be a symptom of PTSD. Cambodians have a common name for it called “Kmaoch Sam Kot” (ghost pushing down); it is nothing new. Everybody knows about this since before the Khmer Rouge. It is when you sleep for too long and unable to get up even when you want to.
Cambodians have a lot of beliefs and they believe in spirits. Sometimes they dream of ghosts. And ghosts in Cambodia are described as shadowy big dark men, horny man-like creatures. These kinds of characters existed before the Khmer Rouge. This is part of Cambodian tradition. It is true that PTSD occurred after the killings and protracted conflicts, but the Khmers show their symptoms it in other ways and forms.
Brinkley goes on to discuss the political settlements after the fighting in July 1997, the preparation for a second democratic election in 1998, and the election itself. The chapter ends with the arrival of former ambassador Kent Wiedemann in August 1999.
In chapter eight, Brinkley turns to forest management. It is a pleasure that the author started the chapter discussing the fact that Cambodian people are tree lovers, as very few good qualities are mentioned in the book. The author starts with destruction of forest by the Khmer Rouge in late and early 1990s, and by others afterward. The World Bank came to the rescue in early 2000s, monitoring logging activities and halting forest concessions, although as stated by the author, by then most of the forest was gone and new cash-rich sectors emerged. The chapter also discusses human trafficking for sex workers and babies for adoption in other countries. It includes the communal election in February 2002, in which the CPP won 1600 communes. Here Brinkley begins his discussion about international community’s pressure for the Cambodian government to pass an anticorruption law. This is a good chapter with adequate information on Cambodian problems and a fair coverage of the situation.
Chapter nine starts with land evictions, deforestation, and natural resource management. The book discusses a forest concession in Pursat province, operated by Pheapimex Company of Oknya Lao Meng Khin. The author describes what Oknya meant, its origins and how one can obtain title today by donating $100,000 for public works projects. The author also discusses Prime Minister Hun Sen’s strategy to build schools and roads in rural villages using contributions from the Oknya. It also discussed sand dredging at sea, conflict of interest among Cambodian senators who own private companies and the national election in 2003, after which the CPP became more popular. The author discusses the political strategies of opposition parties, and how in the end Prince Norodom Ranariddh struck a deal with the CPP.
Chapter ten starts with discussion of rice donated by the government and ends with rice production and shortages. It also describes the government program to install provincial offices with modern conferencing equipment. The author spoke with officials in Battambang, Pursat. Pailin, Kampong Thom and Siem Reap to get their opinion on food aid, rural people’s livelihood and their visions for their respective provinces in the wake of government decentralization in 2009. The author suggests that eyeglasses worn by these officials are an indication of their wealth. I am not sure if this is now true. Young students in Phnom Penh and provincial towns who have eyesight problems can have a pair of eyeglasses. This is an example of misinterpretation of tools. The author also discusses the garment sector, the jobs it created, and its oversight by the government. He interviews In Channy, CEO of Acleda Bank, on his views about economy and business development.
Chapter eleven discusses the educational system and problems associated with it. The author quotes allegations of bribery in schools, low teacher salaries, lack of classrooms, and lack of education for many young Cambodians. Brinkley talks about education in pagodas as a substitute for formal education in the early part of the twentieth century. One of the quotes I do not like in this chapter is another attack on tradition that I consider a misinterpretation. The author writes: “From their earliest years Cambodian children learned that ambition and personal aspiration should not, could not, be a part of their character. Be satisfied with the life you have, the monks told them, no matter how poor or menial.” Like much moral advice, if one interprets it wrongly it will be wrong. Cambodian monks put particular focus on greed and over-ambition, which have plagued Cambodian society. They were suggesting a solution for a peaceful Cambodia. They also asked lay people to work hard, to study hard and to pray hard so as to achieve things that they rightly deserve, not to steal or rob from others out of frustration. Even if one seeks a political path, it should be sought through non-violent actions. This are what the monks teach, if only Brinkley listened longer.
Chapter twelve dedicates itself to the judicial system, which everyone knows is dysfunctional. What I do not like about this chapter is the author’s generalizations about the Cambodian people, such as saying “Cambodians are a conflicted people, generally passive, quiet, non-threatening, but also capable of extraordinary violence and brutality”; “compromise is next to impossible in Cambodian culture”; “there is no cultural tradition for reconciling contrary opinions, even the acceptance of the existence of contrary opinions”; and “in most cases an act of violence is preferable to the loss of face.” These are remarkably incorrect. Cambodia has social problems like any other country. Cambodians are smart enough to see that conflict resolution takes many forms. Community leaders, religious leaders and the educated are entrusted with these tasks. Degrees of compromise vary from persons to persons.
Chapter thirteen focuses on healthcare. It includes stories about doctors seeking bribes, selling medical supplies, and the general lack of medical equipment. The author also points to a mentality of Cambodian people that hurts aid workers in the health sector. For this the author goes back to the remark by former Ambassador Joseph Mussomeli about Cambodians breaking good-willed people’s heart in the end. I think people who have positive things to say about Cambodia should also have been included.
Chapter fourteen discussed the current Cambodian problem of land eviction. Brinkley mentions the cases of Boeng Kak's lake, Group 78, Dey Krahom, Andong, Sambok Chap communities and others. He surveys the livelihood of evicted people and mentions the government-hated Global Witness report on “Cambodia’s Family Tree,” which should more rightly have been included in the chapter on forest management. Included in the chapter is the World Bank effort to help people obtain their land titles.
Chapter fifteen goes back to the anti-corruption law and donors’ relations with the Cambodian government. The author starts with the words of former ambassador Mussomeli in a donor meeting in March 2008. Passing the anti-corruption law, according to the book, was a central concern of donors and was seen as a magic bullet for positive change in Cambodia. It would eliminate “lawlessness, human rights abuses, grinding poverty, corruption, bloated security forces, and an economy thriving on prostitution, narcotics trafficking, land grabbing and illegal logging.” I like how the author was able to list many issues in Cambodia, although some of them are only skimmed through via a few words of actors involved. In the same chapter, the author made an effort to show that although the government was not responsive to donor demands, the donors provided the government increasingly larger funds over the years. However information that he uses to juxtapose government actions and the amount of aid funds is sparse.
He also attempts to explain why donors want to continue working in Cambodia even though the government does not change. Brinkley includes factors such as a nice and comfortable life; abundant restaurants, bars and cafes; better than average two English newspapers (the Cambodia Daily and the Phnom Penh Post); bloated salaries; servants; and comfortable homes. The author also notes that no income taxes are required in Cambodia. I think this situation is changing. Except for some international organizations that have specific MOUs with the government, increasingly more non-governmental organizations are required to pay income tax. The coverage of issues in this chapter is haphazard.
In chapter sixteen, the author examines the Khmer Rouge tribunal, how it was set up and how it was operated, the associated mental stress caused to victims by speaking about the past, and civil society’s outreach activities. The chapter also looks at the politics of corruption at the ECCC and how Sean Visoth was released surrounding corruption allegation.
I think the author over-estimates the amount of stress that might be associated with exposing local people to information about the Khmer Rouge. Unlike the Cambodian diasporas, local Cambodians have developed many ways of looking at the Khmer Rouge. They have discussed the past for the last thirty years to their children, relatives and on the annual May 20 Day of Hate and the January 7 celebration. They have been dealing with the past in the pagodas and in their communities. One of the purposes of having the ECCC in Cambodia is to get the population involved in the court process. How would one weigh this against the author’s worry about recurrent mental health problems? How about the benefits of speaking out, rather than remaining silent? In some communities, people have moved on with forgiveness and reconciliation through local and traditional means of dealing with stressful problems. The Transcultural Psychosocial Organization (TPO-Cambodia) has been involved extensively, but it has been also criticized for not incorporating local healing methods effectively.
In the final chapters, the author makes moral judgments. The author begins by going back to the lack of education in Cambodia, quoting colonial French remarks about Cambodians’ obedience and indolence. The author also hints that Cambodians are stupid. As we moved on in this chapter, it feels like the author is presenting a crude, ethnocentric, orientalist nineteenth century European view of the barbarian East. He quotes an encounter of Michael Vickery in 1962 with “wild looking boys carrying lizards strung on sticks like freshly caught fish” whose parents were hostile and lacked the intelligent to sell their produce and handicraft products for a large sum of money.
The author also says that Cambodians admit that they do not have a national identity. This is erroneous. Cambodia is not Afghanistan, which has more than 30 ethnic groups. Cambodians know exactly who they are because, the majority has the same religion except for the Cham Muslims, the majority refers to Angkorean civilization as a touchstone for their identity and a majority speaks the same language. Even for Cham Muslims, Khmer is their identity. Furthermore, Cambodia has very few instances of religious or ethnic conflict. Except during the Lon Nol times, when ethnic Vietnamese were massacred, sectarian killings have not happened on any observable scale. Even in the Khmer Rouge mass killing, political reasons were the driving forces. Yet to the author, Cambodians have worse internal conflict than the Bulgarians, Indians, Malays, Bolivians, Poles, Burmese and Iranians. In Cambodia, the last Khmer text I’ve seen comparing peoples against each other like this was written by the Khmer Rouge.
Final Comments
Like: Brinkley has written this book with passion and some sense of humor. It is entertaining to read. At times readers can feel his anger in the issues. Intended as a history book, the time span covered is vast and a wide number of topics are addressed. Brinkley does not hesitate to criticize anyone involved when he feels is necessary to do so.
I like this book for its critical study of Cambodian history, society and politics. In some chapters the author’s investigation of corrupt activities within the Cambodian government is a revelation. His studies of US foreign policy on Cambodia are also useful. His coverage of issue areas and events in this book is comprehensive, spanning history, the education system, health care, land evictions, forest management, the donor community, the judicial system, Khmer Rouge justice, mental health, government reforms, society and culture. Although many of these topics were only skimmed in the book, some chapters provide very detailed information of events and background about the actors involved.
Dislike: Although the chapters are presented with a specific focus, often the author changes time periods and switches topics abruptly within the same chapter. There are many quotations; many made out of context.
The book is riddled with flaws whether in its facts, analysis or some of the conclusions. Because the author made extensive efforts to critique everybody involved, and probably the book was written hastily, with very little consultation of original documents, the critiques and supporting arguments are not strong. They are sometimes wrong. The author’s views on Cambodian society and culture are almost always wrong. His hints on Cambodians’ alleged indolence, passivity and stupidity makes the book ethnocentric and orientalist in nature, even racist.
Social and political problems in Cambodia are typical of a post-conflict society. As the author says in the final pages, things are changing and things have changed in the past ten years or so since Cambodia entered a period of peace. As such, social and political problems should be viewed as temporary, not the result of innate traits of the Cambodian people, whom the author suggests have a tendency to corruption. Many researchers have suggested that geopolitics, especially the Vietnam War, played a strong contributing role in Cambodia’s fall into genocide and sustained post-genocide conflict. In a way, Joel Brinkley is cursing Cambodia to these problems, not showing that Cambodia is a cursed land.
It seems that every actor in Cambodian development politics receives blame in this book, from the ordinary Cambodians who are lazy, timid, stupid and savage; to a negligent, corrupt government lead by a networks of partisans; to a donor community that seems a bit self-caring and yet unable to force change in Cambodia. Nobody is good. Nobody deserves credit for what they do or endure. So what is the author’s solution? Can he move beyond critiques and take action? But before he can do that he should spend more time in Cambodia, engage more with local people, studying their culture and tradition, learning the mentality of government officials, looking into more facts and meeting more civil society members.
Although the book is about Cambodian history, much of the early chapters discuss more about US foreign policy and involvement in Cambodian politics, especially since the 1990s. How can Brinkley call it a history book while he also says that UNTAC was too early to be recorded in a history book? The book should be best called a journal of Joel Brinkley. At times it feels like a collection of news articles. A good example of this on page 208 where Brinkley writes: “A teacher from Phnom Penh’s Anuvath primary school, who declined to be named, said Monday that...” He forgot to omit Monday from his previous article.
Recommendation: I wish that this book has been written more carefully. The facts, figures on cultural issues should be checked, refreshed and reframed. I appreciate the critiques the book provides, but without clear information and analysis nobody will listen to the critiques and the book will become useless. End.
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| ENG Kok-Thay was born in 1980 in a remote village in Siem Reap Province. In April 2001, he began working as a volunteer translator for DC-Cam. In 2002 he became co-editor-in-chief of Searching for the Truth Magazine. He is currently deputy/research director of DC-Cam with responsibilities include general management, grant management; and oversight of several projects, research and public relations. Mr. Eng holds a Bachelor of Education (B.Ed) degree from Institute of Foreign Languages and a Bachelor of Business Administration (B.A.) from Norton University. He has a Master's Degree from the Center for the Studies of Forgiveness and Reconciliation, Coventry University, UK, and a Master's degree in Global Affairs from Rutgers University, USA, attending as a Fulbright Scholar. He is now finishing his Ph.D. dissertation on how Cambodian Muslims have reconstructed their society since 1979.
30. Domestic issues fuel Thai-Cambodian spats By Nelson Rand Asia Times; April 30, 2011 (Comments: These comments missed the main point that is the security of Thailand is being threatened if Vietnam is allowed to be in full control of Cambodia with the increase of the number of illegal Vietnamese immigrants pouring into Cambodia from the eastern zone known as “Development Triangle” under Hanoi control (See how the Development Triangle was conceived and works in this page, posted below). More tragic for Cambodia, is the fact that the old king Sihanouk is now being trapped and kept under leash by Hun Sen for his role and deep past involvement with the Khmer Rouge. If Sihanouk does not support Hun Sen, the Cambodian dictator can bring the former king to be tried at the Khmer Rouge Tribunal (More on Sihanouk and the Khmer Rouge, please, go to the link pasted below). The Cambodian people are paying a very high price for having continuous very bad and corrupt leaders, and for not having a strong moral basis to allow good leaders to immerge. Naranhkiri Tith Ph.D. Washington DC. April 29, 2011) Sihanouk and his Tragic Role in Contemporary Cambodia -------------------------------------------------------- NONG KUN NA and BANGKOK - Fighting between Thai and Cambodian troops along their disputed border continued on Friday for an eighth consecutive day despite reports the day before that a temporary ceasefire had been reached. Since armed hostilities resumed on April 22, at least 16 people have been killed, over 50 injured and at least 50,000 displaced on both sides of the border. Strategic and political analysts foresee sustained sporadic fighting, though the chances of the clashes escalating into full-scale war still seem slim. "Thailand's and Cambodia's relationship is fragile and fighting will likely erupt again," said Pavin Chachavalpongpun, a Thai political scientist at the Institute of Southeast Asian Studies in Singapore. "The dispute has been too politicized that it will take a long time before ties will be healed," he added. "I doubt that a ceasefire will hold because the border tensions are now being driven by their own dynamic," said Marc Askew, a senior fellow at the University of Melbourne who specializes in Thai politics and security issues and who is editor of the recently published book Legitimacy Crisis in Thailand. The latest bout of fighting is centered around a disputed hill near the ancient temples of Ta Krabey and Ta Moan, representing an expansion of previous hostilities that centered on the contested Preah Vihear temple. Although both countries have long laid claim to these ancient ruins and border territories, most analysts believe the conflict is being driven more by domestic politics in both countries. "[The border conflict] is a function of the two states' domestic politics, and especially Thailand's civil and military relations in the midst of a major political transition," wrote Stratfor, a United States-based private intelligence firm, in a recent analysis of the conflict. "On the Cambodian side, nationalism is always a way to boost Prime Minister Hun Sen's leadership, and Cambodia is no doubt willing and ready to exploit a neighbor consumed by intense factional politics," Stratfor wrote in a separate analysis. The neighbors have been locked in a diplomatic row for nearly three years while Thailand has been rattled by a prolonged and sometimes violent political crisis. The border issue has presented both governments with an opportunity to galvanize nationalist sentiment at home and gain popular support by rallying their citizens against an external threat. This has been especially the case for Thailand, which is beset by entrenched political and social divisions at a time when the Thai military has been strengthening its influence and power in politics. With general elections expected to be held in late June or early July, analysts believe the Thai military is now flexing its muscles to signal its intention of retaining strong influence over the next elected government. After launching a military coup in 2006 to depose prime minister Thaksin Shinawatra, the military's stake would surely be reduced if the pro-Thaksin Puea Thai Party wins the elections - as its predecessors of the now dissolved People's Power Party did the last time the country went to the polls in December 2007. Recent opinion polls show Puea Thai stands a good chance in what is expected to be a tightly fought election. "Certainly there is some sort of connection between the current armed clashes with Cambodia and the upcoming election," said Singapore-based political scientist Pavin. "This reflects a desperate measure of the Thai military to maintain its power position in politics, and indeed its domination of domestic and foreign policy," he added. Diplomatic politics Compared with the incumbent Abhisit Vejjajiva-led coalition, Puea Thai has comparatively good relations with Cambodia - as does its allied United Front for Democracy Against Dictatorship (UDD) protest movement, whose mass street campaign last year resulted in some of the country's worst political violence in its modern history. Many UDD leaders fled to Cambodia after last year's military crackdown on its members to escape arrest by Thai authorities. That sanctuary was given after Thaksin was made a special economic advisor to Hun Sen in late 2009, a move that infuriated Bangkok and contributed largely to the recent deterioration in bilateral ties. Now, the armed hostilities are emerging as a campaign issue as both sides swing into vote-getting mode. "If we win the elections, we will seek friendship with Cambodia," Puea Thai parliamentarian and prominent UDD leader Jatuporn Promphan told reporters on Tuesday night at the Foreign Correspondents Club of Bangkok. "There is no reason for us to fight." Paul Chambers, a Thai military affairs specialist at Heidelberg University, contends there is a good chance that violence along the Thai-Cambodian border will continue in the run-up to the elections and that this recent fighting could be an attempt by the Thai military to delay the polls. "The violent intensity of frontier friction between Thailand and Cambodia will be determined first by the arch-royalist Thai military's preference to delay the upcoming Thai election [and] second, the Thai election itself, after which tensions could diminish since Thai politicos will no longer be campaigning through the use of anti-Cambodian rhetoric," he said. Domestic imperatives are also pushing Cambodia's hardline stance. "[The level of hostilities will also depend on] Hun Sen's own satisfaction with the successful use of irredentist ultra-nationalism to bolster the political power of himself and his son," said Chambers. Hun Sen's eldest son, Major General Hun Manet, is reported to be one of the key commanders overseeing operations along the border. The 33-year-old West Point Graduate has rapidly moved up the ranks of the Cambodian army, with some observers believing Hun Sen is grooming him to assume his position as premier. Despite the intensity of the recent clashes and rising death tolls, most analysts believe it is unlikely the conflict will expand into full-scale war. "Both Thailand and Cambodia will pull back from the brink of a full-blown conflict," said Ian Storey, a fellow at Singapore's Institute of Southeast Asian Studies. "Thailand could not expect a quick victory against Cambodia, and Hun Sen will not want to get into a protracted war with an important neighbor," he added. According to Stratfor, this latest round of fighting can be explained through both countries' temporary political considerations and does not represent a threat to the vital interests of either country. "The two sides have fought low-level border conflicts for decades that have not escalated to broad war," Stratfor said in an April 26 analysis of the conflict. Nevertheless, both sides are digging in by sending reinforcements and bolstering their defenses. On the Thai side of the border, the army has this week actively recruited, armed and trained civilians affected by the fighting to act as village defense guards in border areas. "I've come [back] here to protect my village, to defend my home, my land and the Thai people," said Wonbik Chai, a newly recruited village defense guard in Nong Kun Na two kilometers from the frontline. "Anyone who takes our land, we will take it back," he added while holding a shotgun. Nelson Rand is a Bangkok-based journalist with a master's degree in Asia-Pacific policy studies. He may be reached at nelsonrand@hotmail.com. (Copyright 2011 Asia Times Online (Holdings) Ltd. All rights reserved. Please contact us about sales, syndication and republishing.) 31. Thailand, Cambodia edge toward war By Richard Ehrlich Asia Times; Apr 27, 2011 (My letter to the editor of the Phnom Penh Post; This Preah Vihear conflict is much broader and deeper than what has been reporting by your newspaper and elsewhere. Deep-down to this conflict is the rivalry between Thailand and Vietnam over Cambodia. Thailand, along with those of us, Cambodians, who believe that it is Vietnam, which is more dangerous for Cambodia's survival, from a historical and ideological perspective. Vietnam silent and continued invasion by sending illegal immigrants into Cambodia whose number was estimated to be around 4 million and growing, was advanced by some experts in this field; such as Ambassador Bindra, the former head of the International Control Commission (ICC) that was created after the 1954 Geneva Conference, to verify the evacuation of the Viet Minh troops from Cambodia. Although there have been many census of the Cambodian population, no figures have ever been released by the Hun Sen’ s regime. It is a greater concern to Thailand’s national security to see Vietnamese continued increase in their influence in Cambodian political as well as economic life. Logically, Thailand cannot afford to stand by and let this Vietnamese hegemony over Cambodia without any real concern. In my opinion, Thailand would prefer to see Cambodia remain neutral, but under Hun Sen is anything but neutral. It is under Vietnam's full control. For instance, although Cambodia is a member of ASEAN, but, it belongs to a sub-group known as the former French Indochina Federation that includes Cambodia (quasi-Communist), Laos (Communist) and Vietnam (Communist), under Vietnam’ s control. Unfortunately this challenge to Thailand is now being transformed into a form of open warfare. I am fully aware that my view on this subject is politically incorrect, for your newspaper and Hun Sen and his CPP. But, I also believe that your newspaper respects freedom of expression. This is not to stir up hatred, but as a warning on what might happen in the future. Naranhkiri Tith Ph.D. Washington DC. April 28, 2011) ------------------------------------------------------------ BANGKOK - Thailand and Cambodia fortified their border positions on Tuesday after four days of artillery and mortar battles killed seven Cambodian soldiers and five Thai troops, while both sides tried to dominate nearby ancient Hindu temple ruins. No deaths were reported during Monday's clashes. Thai troops with scant medical equipment used stretchers and open pickup trucks to transport some injured soldiers from border fights to hospitalization during the weekend. Thailand moved tanks and armored personnel carriers along the mountainous jungle frontier about 560 kilometers northeast of Bangkok. Cambodia installed more multiple-rocket launchers and other heavy weaponry to bolster its side. Phnom Penh said on Monday that shelling and rifle fire by Thai forces during the weekend damaged the crumbling stone ruins of two small 1,000-year-old Hindu temples, Ta Krabey and Ta Moan. The extent of the damage was unclear. The ruins are in a disputed border area where most of the four straight days of clashes have occurred. Both Buddhist-majority countries again used artillery, mortars and rifles on Monday night near Ta Krabey, according to Thai and Cambodian military spokesmen. "The Cambodian acts of aggression left Thailand with no choice but to defend its sovereignty and territorial integrity by using proportionate means with necessity, under international law, and strictly directed at only military targets," the Thai Foreign Ministry said on Sunday. About 20,000 villagers on each side of the frontier have fled to makeshift shelters, while camouflaged Thai and Cambodian troops continue to patrol the jungle. The clashes were not expected to escalate immediately into full-scale war between Thailand and Cambodia, but the fighting has shut cross-border trade and caused jitters in both Southeast Asian capitals. United Nations secretary general Ban Ki-moon and the 10-member Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) - of which both Thailand and Cambodia are members - have called on the countries to arrange a ceasefire, but the Thai military said it was fighting to stop Cambodia's attempt to seize the Ta Krabey and Ta Moan temple ruins. Cambodia wants to expand upon its 1962 success when the International Court of Justice in the Hague awarded Cambodia ownership over larger stone temple ruins at Preah Vihear, about 201 kilometers to the east of the current fighting, the Thai army said. "There must not be Cambodian soldiers around Preah Vihear, other temples, and communities," Thai army commander General Prayuth Chan-ocha said on Monday. "Cambodia would have seized the area, as they did in the areas near Preah Vihear temple," Thai army spokesman Sansern Kaewkamnerd said on Sunday. "So letting problems occur today is better than seeing it turn chronic in the future," he said, explaining why Thai forces were defending the two smaller temples and nearby disputed territory. Both sides have repeatedly blamed the other for being the aggressor and firing first. In February, four days of fighting near Preah Vihear killed a total of 10 soldiers on both sides before hostilities quieted. Cambodia wants to internationalize the problem and called on the United Nations and Indonesia to mediate. Thailand has said it prefers to negotiate through bilateral rather than multilateral means. Indonesian Foreign Minister Marty Natalegawa, in his role as current chair of ASEAN, postponed his scheduled trip on Monday to Cambodia and Thailand after Bangkok tried to limit Indonesia's efforts to send military observers to the disputed border where recent fighting occurred. During the weekend, Cambodia said Thai forces fired 75mm and 105mm shells "loaded with poison gas", but no evidence was provided and Bangkok denied the allegation. In February, Bangkok denied using cluster bombs but later reluctantly admitted to firing several cluster-loaded bombs at Cambodia. Thailand has in return accused Cambodia of moving civilians as human shields into militarized areas. The United States has good relations with both countries' armed forces and has refrained from openly intervening in the conflict. Thailand is a non-North Atlantic Treaty Organization military ally of the United States and is bigger, wealthier and better armed than Cambodia, but Cambodian soldiers are considered tougher fighters on the ground. Cambodia's military leaders include Hun Manet, who received his diploma in 1999 from the US Military Academy at West Point. Two-star Lieutenant General Hun Manet is deputy commander of the Royal Cambodian Armed Forces infantry and director of the Defense Ministry's US-backed counter-terrorism department. He is the eldest son of Cambodian Prime Minister Hun Sen, who was a Khmer Rouge guerrilla regiment commander under Pol Pot when they successfully fought against the US-backed Cambodian General Lon Nol's regime in the early 1970s during the US's regional Vietnam War. Thailand is peeved by Cambodia's plan to bring tourists to the scenic stone ruins of Preah Vihear's cliff-top, the 11th century Hindu temple on the disputed border. Preah Vihear was part of a network of ancient temple sites linked to Cambodia's nearby slave-built Angkor Wat complex. In 2008, the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization-endorsed Cambodia's bid to grant the temple World Heritage status. That could turn Preah Vihear into a money-making tourist attraction for Cambodia, especially when the Cambodians modernize a path up their steep cliff as an alternative entrance to the temple, which currently has its main access across flatter disputed territory. The fresh clashes meanwhile coincide with fears expressed by Thailand's media and opposition politicians that Bangkok's coup-minded military is preparing a putsch to install a puppet regime because the generals fear a possible return of former prime minister Thaksin Shinawatra, who was ousted Thaksin in a bloodless 2006 coup. Thaksin has based himself mostly in Dubai in the United Arab Emirates to avoid a two-year jail sentence for corruption during his five-year elected administration. Diplomatic feathers were ruffled when Hun Sen appointed him as a special economic advisor, a position Thaksin later dropped. One year ago, tens of thousands of Thaksin's "red-shirt" supporters staged a nine-week insurrection in Bangkok by barricading streets in the heart of the capital, while demanding immediate elections to bring back Thaksin. After devastating urban battles, the red shirts were crushed by the army, resulting in 91 deaths, most of them civilians. Several red shirt leaders, including those who face potential terrorism charges, fled to Cambodia. Abhisit, who took office in a parliamentary vote in December 2008, has enjoyed strong military support while allowing the generals to arrange costly and controversial large-scale weapons purchases, including a dozen Swedish Gripen warplanes, six used German submarines, Ukrainian armored personnel carriers, and other weaponry. Abhisit has said he hopes to stage nationwide elections in June or July, but it is not clear to many analysts whether the military agrees with the plan due to its concerns that a pro-Thaksin government could be elected. Richard S Ehrlich is a Bangkok-based journalist from San Francisco, California. He has reported news from Asia since 1978 and is co-author of the non-fiction book of investigative journalism, Hello My Big Big Honey! Love Letters to Bangkok Bar Girls and Their Revealing Interviews. His website is www.asia-correspondent.110mb.com
32. Silent Cultural and Racial Genocide against the Khmer Race Chamroeun Kith ----------------------------------------------------------------- (I don't need to add any comment on these two articles posted just below; this one written by Mr. Chamroeun Kith stands for my comment, and the other article written by Mr. Hassan Kasem of RFA, titled "Cambodian: a race on the verge of extinction ," is a summary of my thoughts on this painful and tragic history of the Cambodian society and its people. Our visitors who wish to have more information, based on scholarly written documents, on this deadly Vietnamese death trap for the Cambodian people, please, go to this web link pasted just below. Naranhkiri Tith Ph.D. Washington DC. April 27, 2011) http://cambodiana.org/Vietnamtributarysystemwithdeadlytwist.aspx ------------------------------------------------------------------- After suffering from an unnamable crime perpetrated by the Khmer Rouge, a communist party that was brought to power by Hanoi and Beijing in April 1975, the Khmer race, as written by Prof. Naranhkiri Tith, is on the verge of extinction (read his article below). This danger of extinction is a direct result of a very long and repeated process but never clearly and widely revealed or taught in today’s Cambodia. So those who have taken and still take until today the lead of this process know perfectly what they want to do, but the majority of Cambodians are regrettably not well informed about it. Due to this asymmetry of information / knowledge, some of Cambodian leaders from the past until the current days contribute intentionally or not intentionally to this tragic process of destruction. After invading Cambodia on the 7th of January 1979, Hanoi and the Phnom Penh regime celebrate every year this event as a so-called liberation just to remind Khmer people their “eternal debt of gratitude” toward Hanoi. This date clearly marked the final transformation of Cambodia into the “Indochinese Federation” under the tight control of Hanoi. This final transformation has enabled Hanoi to proceed in a very large scale to a vietnamization of Cambodia through political and demographic. The Vietnamese settlers, politically encouraged by Hanoi, have reached a dramatic part, representing more almost 40% of the Cambodian total population. After this insidious strategy of political and demographic colonization, Hanoi implements openly a process of economic colonization of Cambodia. All sectors of the Cambodian economy are under tight control of Hanoi through the Vietnamese population in Cambodia. The Vietnamese communist leaders publicly announce that trade exchanges with Cambodia are on the vibrant track to reach 2 billion US dollars and their direct investment mounted nearly 1 billion US dollars. This is just to purposely show the international community that, after the so-called liberation of Cambodians in January 1979, Hanoi is contributing to the Cambodian development. That is a new political strategy of Hanoi. All these statistics are just an embellishment on paper. No Cambodian has really benefited the spill-over effects from these so trade exchanges and investment. In the contrary, they continue to suffer from the new form crime that is the silent cultural genocide through political “man made” poverty and ignorance (read below the comments made by Sophie and Jean Claude Santerre). Because in real, the financial counterpart of the so-called export of Cambodian products to Hanoi reminds, as it was outlined by Prak Soeurn in her article “La Coopération Economique entre le Vietnam et le Cambodge” in the Revue d’Etude Politique, Conflits Actuels : Cambodge, Drames et Reconstruction, n° 20, 2007, the unexplored topics. It is the same for the so-called Vietnamese direct investment. Is there a real entry of Vietnamese financial flows in Cambodia or just merely virtual statistics to “hide” the plundering of Cambodian natural and economic resources to the detriment of Cambodians? Below are articles to read for our own Khmer consciousness and duty.
33. Cambodian: A race on the verge of extinction
20 April 2011 By Hassan Radio Free Asia Translated from Khmer by Soch Click here to read the original article in Khmer ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ A number of overseas Cambodian intellectuals researched and wrote that Cambodian is a race that is on the verge of extinction.
They based their claims on a number of facts, but nobody dare to speak directly due to a number of factors that could affect them personally. What do these Cambodian-American intellectuals base their facts on? From Washington DC, Hassan is providing a short report on an article prepared by a former US university professor that will be presented at a meeting in France next month. What former Economic professor Tith Naranhkiri writes for his seminar in France to be held in May 2011, some Cambodians may think that he wrote without knowing Cambodia too well, either that or he was writing in order to scorn his own race. In fact Dr. Tith’ s writing reflects that he is a Cambodian who studied and now lives overseas, and it also shows his concerns for the future of the Cambodian people, a race that is inferior to their neighbors for a long period of time. Dr. Tith Naranhkiri used to teach at John Hopkins University and he used to work for the IMF in Washington DC, USA. Cambodians do not understand the Viet strategy and they have many internal conflicts Dr. Tith Naranhkiri raised a number of issues showing why Cambodia remained under the inevitable influence of Vietnam. These include the fact that Cambodians do not look deeply into the Vietnamese strategy: Vietnam maintains order and rule, Vietnam knows how to organize the ruling institution, and it also holds a long vision into the future, etc… As for the Cambodians, they have a lot of internal enemies, their society is weak and they can never respond quick enough to any change. Furthermore, he said that there is also the issue of the king who assumes a very heavy and dangerous burden for the dictatorial regime – a regime that irresponsible, that is immoral, that is selfish, a regime whose leaders only think about their own interest. The Cambodian administration is filled with high ranking officials at the top, but it lacks middle men below them. The law and justice are unclear and high ranking officials can say whatever they want as long as they do not get involved in lese-majesty. Cambodia’s borders with neighboring countries are not well delimited. Officials’ promotion is not done based on merit and knowledge, but it is rather done through family and clan ties, through praises heaped on higher ranking officials. These are all traits that the Vietnamese do not follow, quite contrary to their Cambodians counterpart. Barbaric and not advanced Dr. Tith Naranhkiri quoted a Vietnamese author, Nguyen The Anh, who claimed that Cambodian is a race that is not very advanced, a race that is barbaric. Yang Bao Yun, a Chinese intellectual, and French author Jean de la Croix (known in Chinese as Joao da Cruz), wrote on the Vietnamese expansion, starting from the Annamite Nguyen dynasty in 1670. Based on these last two authors, Champa was the first kingdom that fell victim to this Viet expansion. Dr. Tith also brought up a number of examples involving the loss of [Cambodia’s] national sovereignty in subsequent years, and through them, he views that Cambodia is placed under the hidden yoke of the Vietnamese Imperialism and Communism with the tacit support of former hero-king Norodom Sihanouk and prime minister Hun Xen: first through the tight alliance between the ex-hero-king and North Vietnam, and second through the tight alliance between the hero-king and the Khmer Rouge, as well as the tight alliance between the ex-king and Hun Xen. Dr. Tith Naranhkiri indicated that, since the day Vietnam invaded and occupied Cambodia in order to topple the Khmer Rouge regime, the Hanoi regime had taken all means to put into application its ethnicide or ethnocide policy, i.e. the elimination of a race through the destruction of its culture.asted below)
34. Large Vietnam deals inked The Phnom Penh Post; Monday, 25 April 2011 15:01 Soeun Say (Comments: this article shows how Vietnam is using the cover of Globalization (Especially the so-called Development Triangle; see more details on that disguise form of Vietnamese colonization of Cambodia and Laos,, in the table pasted just below) to continue its deadly grip on and control of Cambodia. It could not have done this if there is no cooperation from the Cambodian side, namely, Hun Sen and Sihanouk. The following remarks by both the Vietnamese Prime Minister, Nguyen Tan Dung , and by Hun Sen, sum up pretty accurately the complete control by Vietnam and the complete sale out by Hun Sen of Cambodia’s national interests. But, behind all these investment follows closely the movement of illegal immigrants from Vietnam, which is a form of hidden colonization which Vietnam has been using since the 17th century to take over the Cambodian land. “Nguyen Tan Dung said the latest investments join significant Vietnamese projects ongoing in Cambodia, in areas such as telecommunications, banking and finance, mineral resources, and rubber plantations. Prime Minister Hun Sen pointed to Cambodia’s open business environment and investment laws as important in attracting outside investment – with agriculture in particular offering opportunity. “Cambodia has abundant potential in the agriculture sector, and with preferential law and economic incentives, it is a good opportunity for investors to grow rice, corn, cassava, bean, rubber and agro-industry, as well as in food-processing plants.” “Beside the agriculture sector, we have some others sectors with strong potential. Infrastructure, industry exports, oil and gas, mining and tourism are waiting for investment from foreign investors, including those from Vietnam,” he said. “ Did we hear anything from the old king or the new king? Absolutely nothing! Remember the picture (Posted in this web site in the home page) of the so-called private visit by Sihanouk, his wife Monique, and his son the current king Sihamoni to Hanoi last June, is a perfect proof that Cambodia land and other interests are now being sold or given to Vietnam without anything in return, using globalization as an excuse. Naranhkiri tith Ph.D. Washington DC. april 26, 2011) -------------------------------------------------------------------------- | | Socio-economic development master plan for Cambodia - Laos - Vietnam development triangle (2004) (17/11/2010-04:35:00 PM) (Please, click on any of the chapter titles to see its content; this is how Vietnam is cleverly using the concept and practice of Globalization to slowly taking over the land of the Cambodian people, as they had done before with Champa and Kampuchea Krom, and now Cambodia proper; They could have done all this without the open support of Khmer leaders such Chhey Chhetha Ii, now sihanouk, and Hun Sen. ) |
| Please, click on this link to see an administration map of the so-called "Development Triangle" Map of the administration of cambodia-Laos-vietnam Development Triangle.docx Vietnamese Prime Minister Nguyen Tan Dung on Saturday held talks with his Cambodian counterpart, Hun Sen, in Phnom Penh on issues relating to the two countries' relations and other matters of common concern. | |
During the talks, the two PMs expressed their delight in the solidarity, friendship and co-operation enjoyed by Viet Nam and Cambodia, which they said would go from strength to strength. They also applauded preparations made for the second Vietnam – Cambodia Investment Promotion Conference, which was hosted by the two PMs yesterday. During the conference, the two sides said they expected to sign a number of co-operative agreements in areas such as aviation, banking, telecommunications, hydropower, mining, rubber and sugarcane production. The two leaders expressed their belief that the conference would be a success, and contribute to bolstering economic co-operation between the two nations. Dung and Hun Sen acknowledged the great effort made by the two countries' offcials border demarcation and marker planting, adding that the completion of the programme would bolster borderline peace, friendship and co-operation and boost development and prosperity in the region. The two Government leaders asked border demarcation and marker planting forces to continue to closely co-operate and do everything in their power to fulfill the targets that had been set by the two countries. The two PMs agreed to entrust the two countries' Joint Committee for Land Border Demarcation and Marker Planting to designating where to position markers No 30 at the Le Thanh (Gia Lai) – Odadao (Ratanakiri) international border gate, No 275 at the Tinh Bien (An Giang) – Phnom Don (Takeo) international border gate, marker No 314 in Kien Giang and Kampot provinces (the last on the land border line between the two countries). Further posts are earmarked for Chang Riec, Tan Ha, Tan Dong and Tan Binh (Tay Ninh Province of Viet Nam), On Lung Chrey, Thlok Trach, Bung Chron and Phum Don (Kampong Cham Province of Cambodia). The settlement of these areas would be implemented under the principles specified by the 1985 Treaty on Delineation of National Boundaries and the supplementary treaty in 2005 signed by Viet Nam and Cambodia, they said. They added that border demarcation would be based on existing maps and on the traditional work habits of the people in both countries. The PMs said the border demarcation and marker planting work along the entire Vietnam – Cambodia land border would be completed by the end of 2012. Meanwhile, on the subject of building hydropower works on the Mekong River, such as the Sayabouly dam, the two leaders said they hoped countries bordering the river, such as Laos, Cambodia, Thailand and Vietnam, together with the International Mekong River Commission would take into account the possible negative impacts of the work. Hun Sen discussed with his Vietnamese counterpart the border conflict with Thailand in recent days. Dung expressed his deep concern about continued clashes over the Cambodian – Thai border. He said Vietnam hoped the two sides would do their utmost to avoid armed conflict and would settle their differences peacefully according to international law and the UN Charter, and in the spirit of friendship and solidarity within ASEAN. He added that Viet Nam would like Cambodia and Thailand to implement commitments reached at the ASEAN Ministerial Meeting Retreat in Jakarta on February 22, 2011, to prevent the situation from becoming more complicated. After the talks, the Vietnamese and Cambodian PMs witnessed the signing ceremony of a memorandum of understanding between the two governments on borderline adjustments and a co-operative agreement on aviation. Lasting impressions On arrival in the Cambodian capital, Dung paid a courtesy visit to former Cambodian King Norodom Sihanouk, and met Acting Head of State and President of the Senate Samdech Chea Sim and Acting President of the National Assembly Nguon Nhel. During the meeting with King Norodom Sihanouk, Dung said the visit to Vietnam by the former King, the Queen Mother and the King of Cambodia in June 2010 had left a great impression on the Vietnamese people. He also thanked the former King for the great support Cambodia had given Vietnam during its struggle for national independence and during the later reunification and construction process. He said he was delighted with the great achievements made by the Cambodian people over the past few years and affirmed Vietnam's commitment to maintaining and consolidating the good relations enjoyed by the two countries and with the region and rest of the world. The former Cambodian King warmly welcomed Dung's visit to Cambodia and expressed his deep gratitude to the Vietnamese Government and people for the invaluable support and assistance they had given. He said he hoped the friendship and co-operation enjoyed by Cambodia and Vietnam would continue to prosper. During Dung's meeting with Acting Head of State and President of the Senate Samdech Chea Sim and Acting President of the NA Nguon Nhel, the two sides expressed their satisfaction with the traditional friendship enjoyed by the two countries and co-operation between the two parliaments and people. The leaders of Cambodia's legislative bodies thanked the Vietnamese people for their support during the process of national revival. They said they would do their utmost to foster greater ties between Cambodia and Vietnam. Investment Promotion Prime Minister Nguyen Tan Dung and his Cambodian counterpart Hun Sen yesterday co-chaired the second Viet Nam-Cambodia Investment Promotion Conference. The one-day event attracted 600 representatives from ministries and agencies and 200 leading enterprises of the two nations. Dung told the conference he appreciated the outcomes of bilateral co-operation in economics and trade since the first conference was held in HCM City in December, 2009. Those outcomes would be a foundation for further fostering co-operative relationships and developing the potential of the two sides, he said, and the conference would become a regular information exchange channel for both business communities. Dung asked Vietnamese companies doing business in Cambodia to comply with the country's laws, manners and customs and pay attention to ensuring employment and social welfare as well as eliminating hunger and reducing poverty to maintain the good image of Vietnamese businesses in the country. "The Vietnamese Government is determined to boost and facilitate Vietnamese enterprises' investment to foreign countries in general and to Cambodia in particular," Dung said. For his part, Hun Sen said the conference would contribute to consolidating the two nations' traditional friendship and co-operation. He said the Cambodian Government was making every effort to create a favourable investment environment and implement reforms in specific fields in which the country had an advantage, such as telecommunications, rubber planting, minerals and hydropower plants. To encourage Vietnamese investment in Cambodia, Minister of Planning and Investment Vo Hong Phuc suggested State agencies of the two sides speed up the implementation of bilateral agreements such as on investment protection and promotion, double taxation avoidance and rubber planting co-operation. He urged the prompt completion of the legal system of investment and business, reform of administrative procedures and improvement of infrastructure, especially transport and electricity, which were needed to encourage the participation of economic sectors. Meanwhile, representatives of the Cambodian Development Council and Cambodian Chamber of Commerce introduced the country's economic development strategy and investment incentives, and commitments of the council, to Vietnamese enterprises operating in Cambodia. Hoang Anh Gia Lai Group chairman Doan Nguyen Duc said Cambodia was a country full of untapped potential. It was convenient that the two countries had one common border, with many border gates, and had similar cultures, he said. The private group has had large investments in Cambodia in minerals, rubber and sugar processing, Ho Chi Dung, general director of Viettel Telecom, which has poured US$235 million in to Cambodia, said two years after the group entered the market, its Metfone subscribers increased by three times. Over the past year, Vietnam and Cambodia have signed more than 60 co-operation agreements and formed the necessary co-operation mechanisms. This contributed greatly to increasing two-way trade from $950 million in 2006 to $1.8 billion in 2010. Vietnam is now one of the three biggest foreign investors in Cambodia with 87 projects worth over $2 billion, focusing on telecommunications, airlines, agriculture, energy, minerals and banking. Also at the conference, the two Government leaders witnessed the signing of memorandums of understanding on: ° Promoting investment between the Ministry of Planning and Investment and the Cambodian Investment Council, ° Granting an investment licence to the Se San 2 hydropower plant project between Viet Nam's Ministry of Industry and Trade and Cambodia's Ministry of Industry, Energy and Mining. ° Licensing other production projects. On the same day, the two leaders cut the ribbon to open the Viet Nam-Cambodia Securities Company. | | | | | | VNS | | | | | | |
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------------------------------------------------------------------------- VIETNAM Prime Minister Nguyen Tan Dung yesterday urged Vietnamese investors to look to Cambodia for increasing opportunities, as the two nations signed nine Memorandums of Understanding worth nearly US$900 million. Although Vietnamese investments in Cambodia currently total more than $2 billion – excluding yesterday’s MoUs – Nguyen Tan Dung said: “It is still not enough to harness the huge potential that Cambodia has.” “So I would like to encourage more Vietnamese investors to consider ventures in Cambodia, and I urge Vietnamese investors already here to strengthen and expand their capital investments to build closer economic cooperation...” he said at the 2nd Cambodia-Vietnam Conference on Investment Promotion held at Phnom Penh’s Peace Palace yesterday. The largest MoU signed yesterday was for a hydroelectric plant on the Lower Sesan River, which has been pegged at $700 million by Royal Group, a partner in the joint venture, though a number of other deals were signed. MoUs were also inked for a $32-million iron ore project by Hoang Anh-Ratanakiri, part of the Hoang Anh Gia Lai Group conglomerate, a $20-million cassava plantation by Cam-Viet Rural Development Ltd in Ratanakkiri province, and $75-million investment by Star Premier International for sugarcane farming in Kampong Speu province. Agreements for investments in rubber plantations and a carbon credit project by Indochina Green JSC Company were also signed yesterday, though dollar figures were not announced at the conference.
Nguyen Tan Dung said the latest investments join significant Vietnamese projects ongoing in Cambodia, in areas such as telecommunications, banking and finance, mineral resources, and rubber plantations.
Prime Minister Hun Sen pointed to Cambodia’s open business environment and investment laws as important in attracting outside investment – with agriculture in particular offering opportunity.
“Cambodia has abundant potential in the agriculture sector, and with preferential law and economic incentives, it is a good opportunity for investors to grow rice, corn, cassava, bean, rubber and agro-industry, as well as in food-processing plants.” “Beside the agriculture sector, we have some others sectors with strong potential. Infrastructure, industry exports, oil and gas, mining and tourism are waiting for investment from foreign investors, including those from Vietnam,” he said. University of Cambodia professor of business and economics Chheng Kimlong said yesterday’s agreements were a positive sign for bilateral trade between the countries, which has been increasing year to year. “The deal shows the very strong trade relationship between Vietnam and Cambodia, which has been building up for a long time,” he said, adding that Vietnam investors have been able to take market share in the agriculture and agri-business sectors. Peter Brimble, Senior Country Economist for the Asian Development Bank, said that while he hadn’t reviewed the MoUs, the Vietnamese government was serious about promoting investment in the Kingdom. “There’s no question that Vietnam is going to play a bigger role in Cambodia,” he said. Trade between Cambodia and Vietnam increased by nearly 50 percent in the first quarter of the year compared the same period last year, according Viet
35. 'Cambodia's Curse,' by Joel Brinkley Book Re4iew by Elizabeth Becker, Special to The Chronicle http://www.sfgate.com/cgi-bin/article.cgi?f=/c/a/2011/04/16/RVTE1IKUA9.DTL Sunday, April 17, 2011 Cambodia's Curse The Modern History of a Troubled Land By Joel Brinkley (PublicAffairs; 386 pages; $27.99) This year Arab leaders have been caught off balance by their citizens, who have shown unexpected courage and come out in force to demand democracy and an end to corruption and cruel inequities. Those protests are proof that the truism that Arabs needed "strongmen" to rule them was wrong. In just weeks, the nonviolent demonstrators overthrew the ruling tyrants in Tunisia and Egypt, inspiring other uprisings in Yemen, Bahrain, Libya and Syria. Now, no matter how these revolts play out, Arabs have broken out of racial and cultural stereotypes that said they were unfit for democracy. In his new book "Cambodia's Curse," the former New York Times journalist Joel Brinkley comes very close to offering a similar dead-end theory to explain why he thinks the people of Cambodia are "cursed" by history to live under abusive tyrants. In his telling, Cambodians are passive Buddhists who have accepted their stern overlords since the days of the Angkor Empire. "Far more than almost any other state, modern Cambodia is a product of customs and practices set in stone a millennium ago," he writes, blaming that history for the ability of Cambodian Prime Minister Hun Sen to squash meaningful dissent against his corrupt regime. As a young reporter, Brinkley won a Pulitzer Prize in 1980 for his coverage of the Cambodian refugee crisis. Returning to the region 30 years later, Brinkley - now a professor of journalism at Stanford - chose his subject well. Hun Sen deserves a thorough examination. Along with his cronies, he has amassed extraordinary wealth selling off the country's assets to the highest bidder. Everything is up for grabs - land wrested from peasants to be sold to corporations and turned into plantations or tourist resorts, young girls and boys sold into prostitution, and dense forests cut down and the lumber sold abroad. Corruption is everywhere. Underpaid schoolteachers demand bribes from their students, judges issue rulings based on the amount of money paid on the side or the dictates of the government, businesses flourish by paying handsome bribes for licenses and to avoid unwelcome regulations. Brinkley admirably highlights nearly all of these crimes and demonstrates that Hun Sen's administration has been a disaster for many Cambodians. His portrait of the businessman Mong Reththy is a gem, showing how businessmen enrich themselves through corrupt government concessions and then underwrite charities or schools in the areas impoverished by their corruption. Yet there are only two types of Cambodians in these pages - either victims (passive, poverty-stricken Cambodians for whom Brinkley shows great sympathy) or villains (cruel, selfish politicians and businessmen). Missing are normal Cambodians who work day jobs and study at night to get ahead; Cambodians who return from abroad with dreams of a better life; Cambodians who promote human rights or flourish in the arts and sciences. The few people painted in full, heroic strokes are American diplomats who served as ambassadors to Cambodia. Brinkley focuses on them and the foreign community of aid groups and governments who spend billions of dollars to improve the lives of Cambodia's poor. He correctly asks whether much of that money has gone to waste or into bank accounts of corrupt officials, and chastises foreign governments for not demanding real reforms for the aid. Undermining his reporting is his thesis that thousand-year-old traditions are to blame for this state of affairs rather than 21st century realities. Brinkley fails to track the extraordinary sums of foreign investment fueling official corruption. Crooked signing bonuses and commissions, money laundering, selling off government land to foreign investors, human trafficking - these modern plagues are hardly confined to Cambodia. International businesses are pouring billions into Cambodia. China and South Korea are at the top of that list, giving them an outsize influence in Cambodia, yet they barely appear in Brinkley's book. To retain control over all that money, Hun Sen has amassed a monopoly on power through the army and police, buying off or killing off dissidents. His path to power has been anything but democratic: Trained as a young Khmer Rouge officer, Hun Sen defected and was installed as prime minister by the Vietnamese occupiers; later he bullied the United Nations into appointing him a co-prime minister even though he lost the country's first election, then rigged subsequent elections. Brinkley makes the blanket claim that Cambodians accept this because they are a people who "could not, would not, stand up and advocate for themselves," forgetting Cambodia's history of revolts or movements against French colonial rule, King Sihanouk's autocracy, the corrupt Lon Nol regime, the Khmer Rouge, Vietnam's occupation and Hun Sen himself. In more recent times, Chea Vichea led a free-trade union movement and became a serious challenger to Hun Sen's power until he was gunned down by thugs. Brinkley mentions Vichea's murder in a short paragraph without fully describing his impact or the courage and skill he showed organizing Cambodia's textile workers. And countless Cambodians have fought back when soldiers and police have thrown them off their lands. Cambodian activists like Dr. Pung Chhiv Kek have been so successful defending against human rights abuses that the government issued a draft law in December to effectively put them under government control. Brinkley might have also given greater weight to Cambodia's short experience with fully free elections and the legacy of the Khmer Rouge revolution, which could put a damper on anyone's desire to revolt again. Further clouding his book are frequent errors. He describes the United Nations' 1993 peacekeeping operation as an "occupation," and then compares it unfavorably to the Allied occupation of Germany. He claims it is "rare to see Cambodians laugh." He confuses the Hindu faith with the Hindi language. He has China invading Vietnam in 1989, rather than in 1979. And why does he make the exaggerated claim that Cambodians are "the most abused people in the world"? By arguing that Cambodians are passive and that the "Buddhist notion of individual helplessness" is a central factor holding them down, he dismisses the possibility that Cambodians could reform their own country. Instead he concludes that the country's best hope is in the hands of foreigners. He challenges the foreign governments to withhold aid money until Hun Sen lives up to his promises to enact reforms and respect human rights. "Maybe, just maybe, after 1,000 years, Cambodia's rulers might finally be forced to give the people their due," he writes. Or maybe Hun Sen doesn't need that money so desperately and those donor governments are not such disinterested parties. Brinkley may blame the legacy of Angkor kings for Hun Sen's ability to keep down Cambodians. But the Cambodian leader's recent actions suggest otherwise. When Egypt's Hosni Mubarak started tottering under the demands of protesters, Hun Sen shut down the opposition websites in Cambodia. Elizabeth Becker, a former correspondent for the New York Times and Washington Post, is the author of "When the War Was Over" (1986), a history of Cambodia and the Khmer Rouge. E-mail comments to books@sfchronicle.com.
36. Week in review Phnom Penh Post; Post Staff Wednesday, 13 April 2011 15:01 (Comments: the three excellent articles titled, respectively: “Week in Review," "Constructive Cambodian,“ and “Aid to Cambodia rarely reaches the people, it’s meant to help, “ posted immediately below, are complementary to each other and reflect the main and intractable problems of current economic, foreign relations, political, and social issues in Cambodia. The article titled “Week in review” deals with the crucial and massive people movement that is now taking place in the Middle East, which is still shaking the world. After pointing out the similarity between what is happening in the Middle east and Cambodia, the author of the article raised the question whether such movement can take place in Cambodia as follows: “Cambodia’s government, like those in the Middle East, has restricted the political freedoms of citizens in order to prevent opposition voices from becoming too loud or preventing rallies from ever happening (4). People critical of the Cambodian People’s Party have been increasingly sent to Cambodia’s court system to defend themselves against charges of defamation, libel and disinformation, where they have almost unanimously been found guilty (5) . The United Nations recently reported that the governments treatment of critical voices was stifling public debate. In a country such as Cambodia, where innovative ideas, and critical feedback, will be necessary to development (6) , open discussions about how to move forward are crucial, but are currently being slowed by a government that refuses to allow transparency in their own dealings, or open conversations about their decisions and activities if they involve a critical opinions.” What the article did not, purposely or no not, point out, was the presence of Sihanouk, a political leader and his influence and importance in all aspect of the life of the Cambodian people. Is it possible for such a movement to take place in Cambodia with Sihanouk allying himself with Hun Sen? In all honesty, and with my humble opinion, the answer is a resounding NO. The second article titled “Constructive Cambodia “deals with the freedom of the Press in Cambodia. The current press freedom or the lack thereof, in Cambodia was summarized in that article as follows: “Surya Subedi, the UNs special rapporteur for human rights in Cambodia, has said that Cambodia’s government needs to quicken reforms, including those surrounding press laws. “Those holding public positions should be willing to accept criticism for their decisions. Criticism is not a crime, but an exercise of freedom of conscience, and an act of intelligence,” he said in one of his visits to the Kingdom. Press Freedom Day will be celebrated around the world on May 3, but if we are being honest, Cambodian citizens don’t have much to cheer about. Freedom of speech and the freedom of the media seem to be deteriorating despite the insistence of foreign donors that the government increases transparency and respects democratic human rights. “ Finally, the third article titled “Aid to Cambodia rarely reaches the people it’s meant to help,” addresses the issue of foreign aid to the Hun Sen regime, captured by the author of the article as follows:
“Most of these donors should simply stay home. Year after year, smiling Cambodian government leaders attend these pledge conferences, holding out their hands. But first they have to listen as ambassadors and aid officers stand at the podium, look them in the eye, and lambast them for corruption and jaw-dropping human rights abuses. Each year Prime Minister Hun Sen promises to reform. The donors nod and make their pledges — $1.1 billion last year. Then everyone goes home and nothing changes. In the following months, officials dip into the foreign aid accounts and build themselves mansions the size of small hotels, while 40 percent of Cambodia’s children grow up stunted for lack of nutrition during infancy.” What is amazing is the fact that there is still critical voices in Cambodia who had dared to raise these important political, and social issues that are currently being practiced in the wilderness of Hun Sen/Sihanouk’s Cambodia. Naranhkiri Tith, Ph.D. Washington DC. April 18, 2011) ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ Although Southeast Asian governments have so far been immune to the rebellion and revolution happening in the Middle East (1), the two regions have much in common, both in terms of politics and development. Countries in both of these regions have benefited greatly from integration into the world market (2) , but are struggling to adapt their political institutions to suit the countries that they are doing business with. Western ideals such as freedom of speech are accepted to a certain point, but once the ruling powers come under attack, they are ignored in favour of preserving existing power structures. While Hosni Mubarek stepped down in Egypt with minimal bloodshed, Muammar Gaddafi in Libya is one of a number of leaders in the Middle East, including the ruling parties in Saudi Arabia (3) and Syria, who have refused to go down without a fight.
Cambodia’s government, like those in the Middle East, has restricted the political freedoms of citizens in order to prevent opposition voices from becoming too loud or preventing rallies from ever happening (4). People critical of the Cambodian People’s Party have been increasingly sent to Cambodia’s court system to defend themselves against charges of defamation, libel and disinformation, where they have almost unanimously been found guilty (5) .
The United Nations recently reported that the governments treatment of critical voices was stifling public debate. In a country such as Cambodia, where innovative ideas, and critical feedback, will be necessary to development (6) , open discussions about how to move forward are crucial, but are currently being slowed by a government that refuses to allow transparency in their own dealings, or open conversations about their decisions and activities if they involve a critical opinions.
Even the recent call for government officials to disclose their earnings has provided little comfort to those seeking transparency. Hun Sen revealed that he earned US$1,450 per month for his role as Prime Minister of the Kingdom. He did not explain how his family can afford to own sprawling villas in and around Phnom Penh (7) or to purchase stake in companies competing in various sectors in the Kingdom.
It is a given in present-day Cambodia that personal freedoms are restricted, but technology is changing how this impacts people, as new platforms are emerging for conversing and coming together on the internet. In this issue we look into whether Facebook is creating a more free space for Cambodians to discuss politics, society and life. Leaders in the Middle East and Southeast Asia have pointed to online social networking as increasingly important tool to rally young supporters (8) , and we wanted to find out if Facebook is also empowering Cambodians to speak their mind.
While we are looking into digital communications, we also wanted to find out why TMS messaging on TV stations such as MyTV has caught on in the Kingdom, and figure out what exactly users hope to get out of their messages.
This week’s Constructive Cambodian column looks as freedom of expression for those of us in the real word. We are also opening our “What’s new” review page to readers. We hope you will send us your opinion on the latest restaurants, music acts or art exhibits open in the Kingdom. Since our readers reviews will be done over Twitter, it will only take you a few minutes to share your thoughts with thousands of our readers.
Hope you enjoy issue 66 of Lift, let us know what you think over email, on Facebook, or by sending a text message to the Lift line.
37. Constructive Cambodian The Phnom Penh Post; Post: Wednesday, 13 April 2011 15:01 Sun Narin Sun Narin is concerned that constraints on freedom of Cambodia’s press are being tightened by the government, with little protection of journalists in the new criminal code and reports of state efforts to block opposition voices online
Hang Chakra was convicted in 2009 of defamation and disinformation and sentenced to one year in prison for articles alleging that officials working for Deputy Prime Minister Sok An had been involved in corruption.
Ros Sokhet was sentenced to two years in prison after sending text messages to Soy Sopheap (pictured below), accusing him of demanding money from a woman who illegally fired a gun to keep her story out of the press. The freelance journalist was released in 2010 after a year in prison.
Surya Subedi, the UNs special rapporteur for human rights in Cambodia, has said that Cambodia’s government needs to quicken reforms, including those surrounding press laws. “Those holding public positions should be willing to accept criticism for their decisions. Criticism is not a crime, but an exercise of freedom of conscience, and an act of intelligence,” he said in one of his visits to the Kingdom. Press Freedom Day will be celebrated around the world on May 3, but if we are being honest, Cambodian citizens don’t have much to cheer about. Freedom of speech and the freedom of the media seem to be deteriorating despite the insistence of foreign donors that the government increases transparency and respects democratic human rights. In a recent example, officials from the Ministry of Information ordered Sombok Khmom radio to no longer rent their studio to Khmer Post Radio, a local news programme that often covers social issues around developments such as deforestation and land disputes. The government was quoted by Radio Free Asia as saying that the reason the programme was cancelled was because it had failed to acquire approval from the Ministry before broadcasting.
A more interesting incident was the first confirmed instance of the government meddling in journalism and political commentary taking place on the internet.
Last February, according to The Post, the government requested some internet service providers such as Metfone and Ezecom to block the blog KI-Media, which posts Cambodia-related content and hosts discussions on Cambodian current events that are often highly critical, of government officials.
Mao Chakrya, director general of the Ministry of Posts and Telecommunications initially said that no such decree had been made, however an email from one of his subordinates revealed that some companies had, in fact, been asked for their “cooperation” in blocking access to KI-Media, and thanked in advance for their compliance.
In an email regarding the internet censorship issue, Information Minister Khieu Kanharith said that the government was committed to protecting the right to political speech online, despite the role that social media and online authors had played in recent uprisings across the Middle East. But if the actions of some government officials are any indication, there is concern within the ruling Cambodian People’s Party over the impact that online opposition voices might have on Cambodian politics.
Ou Virak, president of the Cambodian Center for Human Rights, said in a statement that the site’s blockage “is clear evidence that the government is working to ensure that online democratic space is policed and controlled in much the same way as traditional forums for communicating ideas and criticisms”.
Most journalists working for traditional media outlets in Cambodia have learned to practice self-censorship, or else share the fate of outspoken critics in the media such as Ros Sokhet, who has been in and out of court, and prison, for his abiding opposition to the CPP and other powerful figures allied with the government.
In an interview with The Post, Ou Virak said the government fears “the creation of a digital democracy which permits the sharing of grievances, criticisms and opinions which run counter to [their own]”. The occurrences of the government taking action over these concerns are few, but the critical nature of the sites which have been affected suggests purposeful censorship on the part of the government.
A new criminal code enacted in December includes more than 20 articles related to journalism, and according to civil society groups and opposition lawmakers, it provides little legal recourse for journalists or other critical voices.
The Cambodian Center for Human Rights, in a statement to local press, said that the new criminal code’s provisions for defamation “jeopardize the constitutionally guaranteed right to freedom of expression” and called on the government to apply international standards to their freedom of speech laws.
According to a March, 2011 report from Radio Free Asia, 40 journalists from 24 media outlets in Cambodia appealed to the government to expand the freedoms guaranteed to individuals and the press, fearing the current law would allow for discrimination against voices that the government seeks to silence.
If Cambodia wishes to be taken seriously by other democracies, human rights and democratic liberties must be protected. Crimes such as defamation or disinformation must be clearly defined, so that authorities can’t suppress dissenting voices to protect their own interests. Journalism is often called the cornerstone of democracy. The interests of the people cannot be represented if they are scared to speak and are unable to access reliable information about the country’s current leaders. In Cambodia, and in other countries around the world, the government’s refusal to accept or respond to constructive criticism is the greatest obstacle standing in the way of true democratic development.
38. Aid to Cambodia rarely reaches the people it’s meant to help The Washington Post; Sunday, April 17, 7:45 PM
By Joel Brinkley http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/aid-to-cambodia-rarely-reaches-the-people-its-meant-to-help/2011/04/15/AF2JN8vD_print.html
Representatives of more than 3,000 governments and donor organizations are meeting in Phnom Penh, Cambodia, on Wednesday. If past experience is indicative, they will pledge to provide hundreds of millions in aid. Most of these donors should simply stay home. Year after year, smiling Cambodian government leaders attend these pledge conferences, holding out their hands. But first they have to listen as ambassadors and aid officers stand at the podium, look them in the eye, and lambast them for corruption and jaw-dropping human rights abuses. Each year Prime Minister Hun Sen promises to reform. The donors nod and make their pledges — $1.1 billion last year. Then everyone goes home and nothing changes. In the following months, officials dip into the foreign aid accounts and build themselves mansions the size of small hotels, while 40 percent of Cambodia’s children grow up stunted for lack of nutrition during infancy. This year should be different. Over the past two decades, the Cambodian government has grown ever more repressive. Now it is actually planning to bite the hand that feeds it: The legislature is enacting a law that would require nongovernmental organizations to register with the government, giving venal bureaucrats the ability to shut them down unless they become toadies of the state. Eight major international human rights organizations are calling on Cambodia to back down, saying the bill is “the most significant threat to the country’s civil society in many years.” Donors, they say, should hold back their pledges. But they say that every year, and each year the donors ignore them. Meanwhile, the status of the Cambodian people the aid is supposed to help improves little if at all. Nearly 80 percent of Cambodians live in the countryside with no electricity, clean water, toilets, telephone service or other evidence of the modern world. All of this might surprise most Americans. It has been decades since many people here have given Cambodia even a thought. Forty years ago, Cambodia was on the front pages almost every day as the United States bombed and briefly invaded the state during the Vietnam War. Then came the genocidal Khmer Rouge era, when 2 million people died. How many know what has happened there since? Last month, the Nexis news-research service carried 6,335 stories with Thailand in the headline. Vietnam had 5,196. For Cambodia, 578. Most people don’t know that Cambodians are ruled by a government that sells off the nation’s rice harvest each year and pockets the money, leaving its people without enough to eat. That it evicts thousands of people from their homes, burns down the houses, then dumps the victims into empty fields and sells their property to developers. That it amasses vast personal fortunes while the nation’s average annual per capita income stands at $650. Or that it allows school teachers to demand daily bribes from 6-year-olds and doctors to extort money from dirt-poor patients, letting them die if they do not pay. This is a government that stands by and watches as 75 percent of its citizens contract dysentery each year, and 10,000 die — largely because only 16 percent of Cambodians have access to a toilet. As Beat Richner, who runs children’s hospitals there, puts it, “the passive genocide continues.” You wouldn’t know any of that from the donors’ behavior. You see, for foreigners Phnom Penh is a relatively pleasant place to live. Rents are cheap and household help is even cheaper. Espresso bars and stylish restaurants dot the river front — primarily for diplomats and aid workers. Donors have largely been able to pursue whatever project they wanted without interference. They knew that the government would steal some of their money. But so what? “Some money goes this way or that way,” said In Samrithy, an officer with a donor umbrella group. “But it’s useful if some of it reaches the poor. Not all of it does but some does. That’s better than nothing.” Even with that, many donors feel the way Teruo Jinnai does. He’s the longtime head of the UNESCO office in Phnom Penh. “Here I have found my own passion,” he told me. “Here, I can set my own target. So that gives you more power, more energy, more passion.” Well, Mr. Jinnai, the noose is tightening. If, as expected, the NGO bill becomes law, government repression will reach out for you, too. Isn’t it time, then, for all those donors to make a statement? On Wednesday stand up and tell the government: I am withholding my aid. Joel Brinkley, a professor of journalism at Stanford University, is the author of “Cambodia’s Curse: The Modern History of a Troubled Land.”
| 39. A Personal Struggle to Balance Khmer Nationalism and Peacebuilding 4y Sophat Soeung March, 2008 http://www.beyondintractability.org/reflections/personal_reflections/khmer_nationalism_and_peacebuilding.jsp?nid=6810
(Comments; the two articles, one titled “A personal Struggle to balance Khmer Nationalism and Peacekeeping,” by a Cambodian-German named Sophat Soeung, and the other titled “the Idea of kingship in Buddhist Cambodia,” by JEONG Yeonsik. In his article, Mr. Soeung seems to imply that he does not think that the Vietnamese are that bad. It is the Cambodians who are biased and racists. Yet, he confessed that he does not much about the Thai people.
All this shows that Mr. Soeung does not know much about the history of relations between both Cambodians and Thais and especially between Cambodians and Vietnamese. When looking for his background, I have found that he is part of Youk Chhang’s DCCAM whose aim is to propagate what Ben Kiernan and his followers have been doing is to “demonize the demons,” that is it is not enough to show that the Khmer Rouge are mass murderers but more importantly, they are racists, and therefore putting a stigma on all Cambodians as being racists.
Although he is not as bad as Ronnie Yimsut, who openly characterizes all Cambodians except himself and his friend Youk Chhang and Co. as racists, nevertheless, Mr. Soeung is extremely naïve and ignorant of historical events in Cambodia and Vietnam. He seems to believe in myth rather than serious historical records written by serious scholars, when he wrote that: “One story I particularly remember my parents telling me was "Kompup Tae Ong" or "The Spilling of Ong Tea". It alleges many atrocities committed by the Vietnamese on the Khmers some centuries ago during the construction of Vinh Te Canal when parts of Cambodia was under Vietnamese control, but most noted was when Khmers were enslaved and buried up to their heads, which would then be used as the stones for the stove on which they would boil their kettle of tea. “
The other article is very interesting written by a Korean scholar, Mr. Jeong Yeonsik, who wrote a rather accurate and realistic picture of the relations between Hun Sen and Sihanouk. He clearly shows that Sihanouk is no longer the real power, and Hun Sen is to become the real king of Cambodia, waiting to be crowned. What Mr. Jeong had missed is the fact that Hun Sen is only the shadow of real power in Cambodia. However, if you know history, you would know that the real power and boss in Cambodia are the Vietnamese. Am I a racist for saying that? So, be it.
Here we are fellow Cambodians, a country that have traitors as leaders. How on earth do Cambodians expect to go anywhere but down. Naranhkiri Tith Ph.D. Washington DC. April, 2011)
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This piece was written while the author was completing a Master of Arts degree in Peace Studies at the Joan B. Kroc Institute for International Peace Studies at the University of Notre Dame.
I have vivid childhood memories of the frustration of having been assigned by my father to copy short paragraphs in Khmer script, which I found very difficult compared to writing in the Romanized German language. What I did not know at the time was that my father's assignment would have lifelong impact on my personal identity and the dilemma I will have in compromising this identity with the visions of peacebuilding.
I was born in Cambodia, an ethnic Khmer, but between the ages of 6 and 11, my family lived in Berlin, Germany, where we were physically, if not emotionally, distant from ongoing civil conflict back home. My parents did their best to instill in their children the pride in their Khmer (Cambodian) national identity, yet growing up in a German cultural setting at such an early age, it was inevitable for me to develop a unique German identity despite my parents' conscious effort and my own young self-consciousness. This is where all my identity confusion and basis for peacebuilding interest started.
Despite my sense of belonging to German culture, as a foreigner, I was constantly reminded of my nationality when faced with racial discrimination, which was, unfortunately, an everyday reality in Berlin in those days — perhaps even today. On a daily basis, I would ask myself, "Why do some Germans hate us so much? What have we done wrong?" — questions to which I would later find a logical answer when I returned to Cambodia.
After the 1993 elections, my family returned to Cambodia, where despite the difficult cultural transitions, I would put the racial discrimination behind me and live in a place where I would gradually develop a "real" Khmer identity, as my parents had wished. Khmers are the indigenous and dominant ethnic group in Cambodia, comprising some 90 percent of the population (The World Factbook, 2008), making Cambodia one of the most homogenous countries in Southeast Asia. Therefore, Cambodian nationalism is synonymous with Khmer nationalism.
Over time, I would be exposed to elements of Khmer ethno-nationalism, from school and the political media. In high school, most history books reminded us of Cambodia's glorious past during the Khmer Empire, a period some ten centuries ago, and how this glory gradually came to an end with the arrival of the Siems (Siamese/Thais) and Yuons (Vietnamese) "invaders" from the north. We would be taught of the countless heroic wars that mighty Khmer kings fought against these invaders, and the architectural masterpieces they built at Angkor — the ancient capital of the Khmer Empire. With regards to the Thais, we would be told that Angkor fell completely to Siamese forces in 1431 (Chandler, 79) who carried off the whole Khmer court on which the modern-day Thais would build their cultural and political institutions. This instilled a sense of Khmers being culturally and historically superior to the Thais, despite their current military inferiority. The issue is confounded by the fact that there are conflicting points in the Thai version of the history. With regards to the Vietnamese, most history books will discuss the loss of Kampuchea Krom (Kiernan, 1996, 1) to Vietnam in 1949. Furthermore, the Vietnamese intervention in Cambodia in 1979 in response to the Khmer Rouge's unrealistic attempts to "liberate Kampuchea Krom" — an intervention which toppled the Khmer Rouge regime — has been presented by nationalists as another Vietnamese attempt to conquer Cambodia; the border treaties that were made with the Vietnamese-installed government are considered illegal. All these events of ancient and contemporary history of Cambodia shaped both a sense of pride and victimization in many Khmers.
Apart from the academics, nationalism has been a powerful political tool. Many political parties employ anti-Vietnamese or anti-Thai rhetoric during election campaigns. We would often hear the terms Yuon and Siem instead of Vietnamese and Thais — the two former being politically incorrect words — used in these campaigns to mobilize ordinary Cambodians during the elections. Being educated in this kind of environment, I had gradually come to identify myself as a nationalist — internalizing hatred against Thais and Vietnamese and, in a strange way, better understanding the rationales behind the discriminations I once faced in Germany.
History of the Rise of Khmer Nationalism and Distrust for the Neighbors
In Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism, Benedict Anderson defines the nation as "an imagined political community — and imagined as both inherently limited and sovereign" (Anderson, 1991, p. 6). In his words, "it is imagined because the members of even the smallest nation will never know most of their fellow-members, meet them, or even hear of them, yet in the minds of each lives the image of their communion" (Ibid.). Also, "the nation is imagined as limited because even the largest of them, encompassing perhaps a billion living human beings, has finite, if elastic, boundaries, beyond which lie other nations. No nation imagines itself coterminous with mankind" (Anderson, 7). Nations are "imagined as sovereign because the concept was born in an age in which Enlightenment and Revolution were destroying the legitimacy of the divinely-ordained, hierarchical dynastic realm.
nations dream of being free, and, if under God, directly so. The gage and emblem of this freedom is the sovereign state" (Ibid.). He finally argues that, "it is imagined as a community, because, regardless of the actual inequality and exploitation that may prevail in each, the nation is always conceived as a deep, horizontal comradeship. Ultimately it is this fraternity that makes it possible, over the past two centuries, for so many millions of people, not so much to kill, as willingly to die for such limited imaginings" (Ibid.). Nationalism, Anderson points out, is rooted in the cultural systems of religious community and the dynastic realm (p.12). In general, Khmer nationalism draws inspiration from a proud and shared legacy of the ancient Angkorian civilization, and all successive Cambodian regimes have displayed the image of the ruins of the famed Angkor Wat temple on their national flag. The rise of such ideology after World War II is attributed to the struggle for independence from France. According to David Chandler (1993), Khmer nationalism is rooted in two trends: The first was the rise of national and cultural consciousness in response to French reform towards "modernization" (p. 171). In 1943, The French authority introduced a plan to replace the forty-seven-letter Khmer alphabet with the roman one, but the move met resistance from both the Buddhist institution (the sangha) and King Sihanouk, and the independent Cambodian government in the later years officially moved to stop romanization. (Ibid., pp. 169-70)
Some scholars even see the infamous Pol Pot regime of Democratic Kampuchea as a socialist-nationalist revolution (Vickery, 1986, 35) to transform Cambodia into a utopian society. Pol Pot himself envisioned a "return" to an agrarian society with intensive, nonseasonal "permanent irrigation," modeling on the mistaken interpretation of the canal networks at Angkor (Kiernan, 8). In addition, the Khmer Rouge regime also had a Khmer purification program which aimed at reducing the ethnic minorities in Cambodia — including Chams, Chinese, Vietnamese, Thais, Lao — from 20 percent to 1 percent of the total population, and although the majority Khmers comprised the largest number of victims, ethnic minorities were "virtually erased from history" by the regime (Kiernan, 251).
In contemporary Cambodia, Khmer nationalism is again drawn upon both the pride and victimization of history. History textbooks and elders alike would raise our awareness of what in John Paul Lederach (2005) terms as "lived history" (p. 141). On the one hand, we were are constantly reminded of the ancient Khmer people who were "inherently warriors" and through their wars with neighboring nations, built an unparalleled empire in Southeast Asia. The symbols of Angkor Wat can be found everywhere, and nearly so is the statue of King Jayavarman VII — the greatest of all Khmer warrior kings. This reference of violence to the kings also instills a sense that modern Khmers are inherently violent due to their "warrior heritage." On the other hand, we are constantly told about the sufferings of Khmer people under the rule of the Siamese or Thais many centuries ago and as recently as 1940s when Thailand retook control of Cambodia's northwestern provinces, as well as the loss of territories and suffering under Vietnamese control. One story I particularly remember my parents telling me was "Kompup Tae Ong" or "The Spilling of Ong Tea". It alleges many atrocities committed by the Vietnamese on the Khmers some centuries ago during the construction of Vinh Te Canal when parts of Cambodia was under Vietnamese control, but most noted was when Khmers were enslaved and buried up to their heads, which would then be used as the stones for the stove on which they would boil their kettle of tea. The lessons from these stories, I was told, was to never trust either the Vietnamese or the Thais — the historical enemies — because despite Khmers befriending them, they would always be dishonest and regard us as unequal and only want to prey more on our territories.
The above stories are only part of the larger source of centuries-old tension and distrust of the two neighbors — the Thais and Vietnamese. As mentioned earlier, the distrust has deep historical basis. Countless wars over centuries with the Thais or Siems and Vietnamese or Yuons have resulted in Cambodian chronicle identifying the two neighbors as "historical enemies." The words Siem and Yuon are Khmer words that, as a result, have taken on derogative connotations. The Thais, who are culturally similar, are generally seen as competing for cultural heritage and territories. From a Khmer perspective, Thais attempt to make a disconnect between the ancient builders of the Angkorian civilization and the contemporary Khmers of Cambodia. This was the major reason behind the 2003 anti-Thai riots that burned down the Thai embassy and businesses in Phnom Penh. It was rumored that a Thai actress had said that she would not come to perform in Cambodia unless the temple of Angkor Wat be returned to Thailand. Although the news report turned out to be false, immediate condemnations came from both government officials and ordinary people alike. The riots marked the first ever large-scale violence and suspension of diplomatic relations between two ASEAN member countries.
The Vietnamese who are culturally distinct from Khmers are mainly seen as competing for territories and resources. The expansion of Vietnam has historically meant the destruction of the Champa kingdom and the loss of the Mekong delta for Cambodia. The encroachment has resulted in Khmer bitterness toward Vietnamese (Anderson, 131) in general, whether of government or immigrants. During the colonial period, the French treated Khmers as inferior to Vietnamese and settled ethnic Vietnamese in Cambodia to work in the administration (Anderson, 129-30). This further rekindled the anti-Vietnamese sentiments. Perhaps the strongest source of anti-Vietnamese-based nationalism was the political rhetoric to mobilize support following the territorial loss of Kampuchea Krom or Cochin-China in 1949 when France ceded the area to Vietnam. Kampuchea Krom — literally meaning "Lower Cambodia" — is the Khmer name of the former French colony of Cochin-China which geographically occupies the Mekong delta of southern Vietnam, including Ho Chi Minh City or Prey Nokor and Phu Quoc island or Koh Tral in Khmer. The significance of the loss of this territory was the separation of millions of ethnic Khmers living in the Mekong delta from their motherland and the loss of Cambodia's historical access to the sea. This forced the post-colonial government of Cambodia to build a new port city named Sihanoukville on the Gulf of Thailand in the 1960s. Ethnic Khmers in southern Vietnam have not come to be termed Khmer Krom (Lower Khmers) and have embarked on a struggle to greater political recognition in both Cambodia and Vietnam.
In coming to terms with the unthinkable atrocities by the Khmer Rouge against their own people, many Khmers suspect that foreigners, especially the Chinese and Vietnamese were behind the genocide in order to eliminate the Khmer race as a whole. Such assertion, however, is clearly based on ethnic grounds and forgets to take into consideration the fact that both minorities were equally targeted by the Khmer Rouge.
Having lived in this "lived history" of hatred, it was inevitable for me to develop a form of national identity based on hatred towards the neighboring nations or their ethnic members in Cambodia. I shared with many other Cambodians the dream of one day reclaiming lost territories and uniting all Khmer people that have been separated from Cambodia by the current state boundaries. I could truly claim myself to be a nationalist at the time. Within Cambodia, there has also been little attention given to the lives of ethnic minorities, and decades of war and assimilation has virtually made every Cambodian a "Khmer." Except for the Chinese and Vietnamese, all other minorities including the Muslim Chams, and indigenous hill tribes were labeled "Khmer." In this regard, Cambodians rarely think of their country as ethnically diverse, and like most Khmers, I also had no interest in learning more about the lifestyles of Cambodia's minorities.
However, major life events in the last five years have left me questioning my nationalistic rationales. One of these events was the 2003 anti-Thai riots in Phnom Penh. The weeklong build-up of anti-Thai sentiments following the alleged comments by a Thai actress was further legitimized by official anti-Thai rhetoric and ban of all Thai movies in Cambodia. I was not disproving of the Government's measures on the issue, but sudden news of the burned Thai embassy and businesses captured both a sense of satisfaction and anger in me — satisfaction because I shared the grievances with other Cambodians, but anger because as a student of law, I was disturbed with the government's poor protection of a foreign embassy and allegation that the rioters were students, even students of law like myself. I knew too well of the consequences of such unlawful acts on the people's and country's image. The following diplomatic, economic, and political consequences further brought the sense of "ambivalence" of my national pride. From that point on, I realized that the underlying causes of the conflict had to be addressed and that chauvinism is one major cause.
The following years also saw my first contacts with Vietnamese people. Sometime in those years, my family rented part of our house to a Chinese man with a Vietnamese wife. The Chinese man did not speak any Khmer but his Vietnamese wife spoke broken Khmer. However, she did not initially reveal her real ethnic identity, likely out of fear of our not renting the house to them. She would tell us that she was born in Cambodia, but after the civil war broke out, escaped to Singapore, and then to Vietnam, where she picked up Vietnamese. We did however rent part of the house and over the years of living as neighbors she gained our trust and gradually revealed her real identity. In 2005, I had the rare opportunity to travel to Vietnam for medical purposes, to Ho Chi Minh City, a place any Khmer nationalist would call Prey Nokor or former port of Cambodia. Our Vietnamese neighbor was extremely helpful in visa issues, travel arrangements, and network settings for my family who did not have any contacts there. Surprisingly, she was very mindful in even using the Khmer names for places in Vietnam. When traveling into Vietnam, I could not help thinking of traveling into the "lost territory" but once there, I was impressed by the hospitality and helpfulness of ordinary Vietnamese people. I suddenly realized that the animosity in Cambodia was likely one-sided, and unknown to the majority of Vietnamese, and this opened new opportunities for improvements. My journey to Europe later that year, further re-enforced my new vision of harmonious ethnic relations as I witnessed for the first time long-standing animosities between Germans and the French and Poles being replaced by cooperation and tolerance. In the later years, my interest in peacebuilding led to the discovery of a Cambodian youth organization that worked on peacebuilding with neighboring countries, and I have ever since been an active member ever since.
Remaining Challenges to Peacebuilding
Despite the recent good diplomatic relations between Cambodia and its neighbors, on a people-to-people level, relations remain fragile. In addition, possible new sources of conflict are emerging. For one thing, the return of peace and stability in Cambodia has unfortunately also created social space for extreme nationalism and rekindling of past animosities against the "common enemies." The large Cambodian Diaspora which is the legacy of the civil war serves to be another source of nationalism, arguably a more extreme form of nationalism that has sustained the animosities back in Cambodia or even incited more hatred. More Vietnamese immigration to Cambodia has only provoked more anti-Vietnamese rhetoric among politicians and nationalists. And the Vietnamese minority in Cambodia continue to live in fear and discrimination (Myers, The Cambodia Daily).
Perhaps a new yet potentially more problematic dynamic to these relations is the issue of millions of indigenous Khmer people in both Thailand and Vietnam. In the wake of recent opening up of Vietnam to the world, Khmers Krom worldwide have intensified their struggle for self-determination and greater recognition from the international community. Similarly, following the recent loosening of Thai policies in favor of preservation of indigenous culture, Northern Khmers in northeastern Thai provinces have suddenly awakened to promoting their ethnic consciousness and identity and making stronger connections with their fellow Khmers across the border.
Apart from these issues, there remains sensitive land and maritime border disputes with the two neighboring countries. A recent diplomatic row over Cambodia's unilateral push for the Preah Vihear temple to be enlisted as a UNESCO world heritage site has stirred up centuries-old tensions and caused concern about a renewed conflict with Thailand. The dispute over the ownership of the temple went to the International Court of Justice which ruled in favor of Cambodia in 1962, but the areas around the temple have since remained a sensitive issue between the two states.
Moving On: Balancing Nationalism with Peacebuilding?
Despite the challenges that lie is any peacebuilding efforts, I have come to see the unfortunate events as bringing the issues to surface and providing opportunity to strategically transform the situation, rather than just finding short-term solutions. Since the issue of ethnic relations in Cambodia has not been widely discussed, it is now time to address the fragile ethnic relations through awareness raising and improved policies, which will hopefully encourage cultural understanding between the different ethnic groups both in Cambodia and in nearby countries. Having lived abroad as part of a minority group, I see myself as a good asset for peacebuilding cause. My travel experiences to Europe and America have reaffirmed my belief in the virtues of ethnic pluralism. This, I believe, will be a small contribution to ASEAN's (Association of Southeast Asian Nations) goal of integration in 2015.
I have certainly come a long way in my struggle to balance my strong sense of national identity and the vision of peacebuilding. My efforts will likely be seen by nationalist Khmers as at best submission and at worse treason — a risk faced by many peacebuilders. I have, however, found that these two perspectives do not necessarily have to be contrasting. I am certainly not ready to shed my own nationalistic pride, but at the same time I have come to appreciate other cultures and perspectives, and befriended with people I would normally call enemies. I now pride myself on the fact that Cambodia is a multi-cultural society and hope to use my experience to help create more cultural and inter-ethnic understanding and tolerance in other Khmers who are generally considered as gentle and peace-loving people. I have never been to Thailand or befriended with a Thai, and have yet to break down the cultural and ethnic barriers. My little quest of balancing the two philosophies is certainly only the beginning of what I hope to be my contribution to peacebuilding efforts in Southeast Asia. ________________________________________
References:
Anderson, B. (1991). Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism. New York: Verso. Chandler, D. P. (1993). A History of Cambodia. 2nd ed. Chiang Mai, Thailand: Silkworm Books. Kiernan, B. (1996). The Pol Pot Regime: Race, Power, and Genocide in Cambodia Under the Khmer Rouge, 1975-79. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press. Lederach, J. P. (2005). The Moral Imagination: The Art and Soul of Building Peace. New York: Oxford University Press. Meas, S. & Miletic, T. (2007). "Peace Research: Understanding Inter-Ethnic Relations and National Identity in Cambodia," in Cambodia: The Alliance for Conflict Transformation, 89. Retrieve at http://actcambodia.org/pdf/ACT%20Final.pdf. Myers, B. (2002, July 6-7). "The Outsiders: Cambodia's Ethnic Vietnamese Continue to Live in the Shadow of Discrimination and Hatred," in The Cambodia Daily. Retrieved March 17, 2008 at http://www.camnet.com.kh/cambodia.daily/selected_features/vietnamese.htm. Vickery, M. (1986). Kampuchea: Politics, Economics and Society. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publications Inc. ________________________________________ [1] The word "Cambodia" or "Cambodian" in the Khmer language is the equivalent of Kampuchea, deriving from Kambuja, which only refers to the country; the people are called "Khmer." To the ordinary Cambodian, their country is Srok Khmae, literally meaning "Khmer Land." According the 1993 Constitution and national law, the national identity is "Khmer," but the term also refers specifically to the dominant ethnic group. See Meas, S. & Miletic, T. (2007). Peace Research: Understanding Inter-Ethnic Relations and National Identity in Cambodia. Cambodia: The Alliance for Conflict Transformation, 89. Retrieve at http://actcambodia.org/pdf/ACT%20Final.pdf. [2] The territory of Cochin-China was ceded to Vietnam on 4 June 1949 through a French law. Read more at http://khmerkrom.org/eng/?q=node/18. [3] "The idea of lived history is to capture a more expansive view of time, which will vary from younger to older people. My lived history is what I have experienced directly in my lifetime, which is more expansive than my children's but much less so than my grandparents'. ... these are not experiences that were conveyed to me by others, but a history I have seen, touched, and tasted. Intriguingly, a local or national community has within it multiple ranges of lived history. The older people have experienced events that go back across decades, the youngest less than a decade. Thus, the circle of lived history for a community can run from one to about eight, maybe nine, decades." (Lederach, 2005, 141) [4] Also see Seanglim Bit (1991). The Warrior Heritage: A Psychological Perspective of Cambodian Trauma. California: Seanglim Bit (Self-Published). [5] See U.S. State Department Report at http://www.state.gov/p/eap/rls/rpt/20565.htm, retrieved March 17, 2008. [6] See ICJ case concerning the Temple of Preah Vihear at http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/index.php?sum=284&code=ct&p1=3&p2=3&case=45&k=46&p3=5. [7] See http://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/article.aspx?id=184. Beyond Intractability Version IV Copyright © 2003-2010 The Beyond Intractability Project Beyond Intractability is a Registered Trademark of the University of Colorado Project Acknowledgements
The Beyond Intractability Knowledge Base Project Guy Burgess and Heidi Burgess, Co-Directors and Editors c/o Conflict Information Consortium (Formerly Conflict Research Consortium), University of Colorado Campus Box 580, Boulder, CO 80309 Phone: (303) 492-1635; Fax: (303) 492-2154; Contact |
40. The Idea of Kingship in Buddhist Cambodia (Part Two) Source: Kyoto Review of South East Asia
9 January 2011
by JEONG Yeonsik (Changwon National University)
King Sihanouk As Brahmanism was replaced by Theravada Buddhism, so was the idea of divine kingship. And the Buddhist idea of kingship was not particularly effective at engendering the extraordinary authority of kings. The modernization of Buddhism led by the Thommayut order further curtailed the king’s authority. In this case, how can we explain the enthusiastic support given to King Sihanouk? As the Cambodian kingdom degenerated into a powerless country with no strength to stop foreign aggression, people started longing for cakravartin. It was no coincidence that the royal court had to face a number of millenarian movements which claimed the advent of Maitreya. Under such circumstances was Prince Sihanouk enthroned. In other words, he took power at the right time to become a cakravartin. And he seized the opportunity. Whether or not he is a true cakravartin is beside the point. Just as is possible in all political theaters, King Sihanouk played the act so perfectly that he could build up an image of himself as close to cakravartin. He was well aware of the significance of dhammaraja and he distanced himself from the brutality which was an essential part of his rule (Osborne 2008, 125). He had shrewdly taken advantage of the circumstances in order to make himself the liberator of the country from foreign domination. The independence in 1953 meant more than the end of French colonial rule: it signified the end of the devastation and humiliation that had lasted for over two hundred years. King Sihanouk successfully cultivated his image as being the one who made it all happen, and who would further bring a new era of peace and prosperity. Sihanouk’s energy was phenomenal. Working at a pace that exhausted his associates, he traveled widely through the kingdom, opening schools and clinics, inaugurating factories or irrigation schemes. He exhorted, chided and congratulated his ‘children.’ ….Like no other Cambodian ruler before him, Sihanouk was ready to go out among his people. And as with no previous ruler, this readiness earned him an affection that went beyond the traditional awe and devotion felt by rural Cambodians towards their monarch as the ultimate embodiment of the state and Cambodia’s identity. The peasantry were genuine in their warm reaction to Sihanouk, a ruler whom they still saw as possessing semi-divine qualities and who now appeared in their humble villages, arriving dramatically in a flurry of dust and wind as his helicopter sank to the ground (Osborne 1994, 132-133). In addition, King Sihanouk did not forget to support the sangha. He financed new pagoda constructions and supplied them with texts. At ceremonies he was surrounded by monks who, by respectful presence, increased the king’s authority. The economy appeared to be going well at least until the mid-1960s, though that growth seeded the future decay. It is no wonder that those who experienced all of the twists and turns in Cambodian history from 1953 until today have a tendency to think of the Sihanouk’s reign as a “golden age,” a time to be treasured (Osborne 2008, 123). Neither is it surprising that some loyal followers continue to identify King Sihanouk as a Maitreya, the savior. Such affection, however, was neither universal nor unconditional. There was a growing number of urban, young, and educated people to whom monarchy was simply outdated and unfit for the task of modernizing their country. Many of them, including Saloth Sar, were attracted to radical means to overthrow the monarchy. Their voice began to gain audience when the economy went downhill. Sihanouk had to witness to his dismay that “some of his ‘children’ were all too ready to disobey their ‘papa’” (Osborne 1994, 133). Dispossessed peasants often swarmed into the capital to demand support for survival. Sihanouk’s foreign policy inviting over 40,000 Vietnamese troops into the territory further undermined people’s support (Osborne 1994, 209). Many began to doubt if he was a true cakravartin. And his extravagant lifestyle further hurt his image and credibility as a dhammaraja. At last in 1970 King Sihanouk was ousted by his own men and the kingdom was transformed into a republic. The fall of Sihanouk clearly demonstrates that performance is the fulcrum of the Buddhist kingship in Cambodia. It functions to provide a spiritual shield strengthening the king’s power and authority only if the king’s performance is superb in both the spiritual and the material sense. Sihanouk lived a life of humiliation after being dethroned. He had no choice but to live in exile and watch some of his children be murdered by the Khmer Rouge. He returned to Cambodia in January 1976, only to become a prisoner who had to play the part of puppet for the Khmer Rouge. For many Cambodians, Sihanouk was no longer a dhammaraja, let alone cakravartin. In view of the Buddhist logic of merit, he was the one responsible for all of the pain inflicted upon the people. After the rout of the Khmer Rouge, Sihanouk came back to the stage, brilliantly taking advantage of the chaotic disruption in and out of the country. He carved out a niche for himself and FUNCINPEC. Many Cambodians, particularly those who survived to remember Sihanouk as the liberator of earlier times, could have a glimpse in Sihanouk of cakravartin who would end the chaos again. Much of the support given to FUNCINPEC in the 1993 election could have come from such a desperate hope. However, Sihanouk’s goal was simply to be crowned again. It did not take long for the loyal supporters to find out that he was a completely powerless king willing to be as meek as necessary to the de facto ruler. As his image of a cakravartin evaporated, so did the support for him and the royalist party he had created. Buddhism and the Future of King The 2008 general election was conspicuously different from previous elections in that polling stations were colored with orange robes. Monks were again allowed to vote with the privilege of bypassing the queue. They explicitly and implicitly supported different political parties, sometimes even taking part in popular protests. The sangha has never been separated from politics in the history of Cambodia and is not likely to be so in the future. Wat is the sphere where village people gather and exchange their views, and where the government reaches the people. Politicians need to associate themselves with Buddhist monks who can convert people’s respect into votes (Guthrie 2002). In addition, as has always been the case, the sangha itself is in need of material as well as political support. The symbiotic relationship between the sangha and the powerful will thus remain unchanged. Leaders of the sangha seem to have switched their symbiotic partner from the palace to the government. After all, it is the government that has the power and money to support the sangha. The sangha, in return, has to square the account with the raja. To the public gathered at pagodas, monks can deliver in their preaching messages supporting the ruling party. Indeed, Cambodia’s mass media is filled with the projections of political power choreographed in ceremonies. Pictures of alms-giving in which poor peasants line up in front of a smiling politician attempt to build an image of superb merit that entitles power and status. Another scene often played is donations to pagodas. Monks aligned with the powerful make up a backdrop that creates the image of dhammaraja, the one who protects the sangha. At the center of the media coverage is always Hun Sen. He does exactly what Sihanouk did, making up his own personality cult (McCargo 103). Regarding Hun Sen’s effort to project himself as a person of the highest merit, it is important to notice that the concept of saborosjun, a meritorious but not necessarily moral benefactor, has gained saliency in Cambodia’s political theater. It means that Hun Sen has yet to improve his image so as to be portrayed as a dhammaraja. Nevertheless, as Hughes (2006, 479) observes, Hun Sen plays to this figure with great skill and combines it with the image of the strong man, trying to demonstrate that his merit surpasses everyone else. Having the highest merit justifies challenging the palace as all the usurpers did. Since 2006, Hun Sen has increased the level of criticism against the palace (Vickery 2007, 193). He has given warnings that the blood royal must stay aloof from politics. After the landslide victory in 2008, he began to threaten the palace by saying that people would no longer be needed there. The recent feud with Thailand over Preah Vihear offered Hun Sen an opportunity to show the people that his merit extends over the border to an archenemy. Viewed in this context, he had an evident intention to project himself as a cakravartin when he provoked Thailand by inviting Thaksin to become his adviser. Will Hun Sen attempt to change the constitution to that of a republic? Sihanouk abdicated because he feared that his death could be the end of the kingdom. Will Hun Sen dream of enthroning himself? It may sound ridiculous, yet he is already given the title of samdech, which is reserved only for the blood royals. It must be remembered that the 1993 constitution chose kingdom instead of republic on Sihanouk’s insistence, in exchange for leaving FUNCINPEC. Cambodians had been without a king for 23 years prior to 1993 and most of them seem to have no reason to defend that constitution. Raja in Pali means leader or ruler and should not necessarily be king. The Buddhist idea of kingship has served only the raja with power. Bibliography Bizot, François. 2003. The Gate. London: Vintage. Chandler, David. 2000. A History of Cambodia, 3rd Edition. Boulder: Westview Press. Coedès, George. 1968. Angkor: An Introduction. Translated and edited by Emily Gardiner. Hong Kong: Oxford University Press. Edwards, Penny. 2008. “The Moral Geology of the Present: Structuring Morality, Menace, and Merit.” Alexandra Kent and David Chandler (eds.) People of Virtue: Reconfiguring Religion, Power, and Moral Order in Cambodia Today. Copenhagen: Nordic Institute of Asian Studies. Forest, Alain. 2008. “Buddhism and Reform: Imposed Reforms and Popular Aspirations.” Alexandra Kent and David Chandler (eds.) People of Virtue: Reconfiguring Religion, Power, and Moral Order in Cambodia Today. Copenhagen: Nordic Institute of Asian Studies. Gatiloke 1987. Cambodian Folk Stories from the Gatiloke. From a Translation by The Venerable Kong Chhean. Singapore: Tuttle. Guthrie, Elizabeth. 2002. “Buddhist Temples and Cambodian Politics.” John Vijghen (ed.), People and the 1998 National Elections in Cambodia. Phnom Penh: Experts for Community Research. Hall, D. G. E. 1966. A History of South-East Asia. London: Macmillan. Hansen, Anne Ruth. 2004. “Khmer Identity and Theravada Buddhism.” John Marston and Elizabeth Guthrie (eds.), History, Buddhism, and New Religious Movements in Cambodia. Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press. ———. 2007. How to Behave: Buddhism and Modernity in Colonial Cambodia 1860-1930. Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press. Harris, Ian. 2005. Cambodian Buddhism: History and Practice. Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press. ———. 2007. Buddhism under Pol Pot. Phnom Penh: Documentation Center of Cambodia. Hinton, Alex. 2008. “Truth, Representation, and the Politics of Memory after Genocide.” Alexandra Kent and David Chandler (eds.) People of Virtue: Reconfiguring Religion, Power, and Moral Order in Cambodia Today. Copenhagen: Nordic Institute of Asian Studies. Hughes, Caroline. 2006. “Cambodia: Reassessing Tradition in Times of Political Change.” Special Issue, Journal of South East Asian Studies 37(3): 465-483. Ishii, Yoneo. 1986. Sangha, State, and Society. Translated by Peter Hawkes. Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press. Jeong, Y. 2009. “Cambodia’s 2008Elections: Electoral Authoritarianism Consolidated.” East Asian Studies 56: 139-170. [Korean]
41. Not a prayer for US-Vietnam diplomacy Asia Times; April 7, 2011 By Scott Johnson http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Southeast_Asia/MD07Ae01.html
(Comments: why should Cambodians be interested in the fate of the Montagnards? It is a legitimate question for any Cambodian to be asking. In moving south within their strategy known as “Nam Tien” the Vietnamese had one main purpose, which is to escape from the Chinese threat from the north. But, in moving southward, the Vietnamese had modified the Chinese tributary system from not wanting to take any land from any neighboring country nor to eliminate any minority within China, such as the Tibetans, Yunnanese, Manchurians, and other minorities.
In the Vietnamese space, no minority is allowed to subsist. It is this context, the Chams had been eliminated, and now the Montagnards are being eliminated, and so are the Khmer Krom.
Yet, Hun Sen has been allowing the Vietnamese to move into Cambodia under the false pretense of open the border to develop good business and neighborly relations with Vietnam; while practically no Khmer Krom people is allowed to come to Cambodia, which they should be. But, that is the reality in Cambodia. Also this article shows that the United states all it can to ignore the genocide against the Montagnards and the Khmer Krom people, in order to use Vietnam as its ally to fight the growing power and influence of China, in Asia and the rest of the world.
Don’t blame the United states though, for practicing this kind of policy with Vietnam, which is totally contrary to its official policy of protecting the minorities and religious freedom. For Cambodians, the lesson should be clear and obvious; don’t count on anybody, but themselves. Naranhkiri Tith Ph.D. Washington DC. April, 8, 2011)
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While much has been made of the role leaked confidential United States diplomatic cables have played in the political convulsions now sweeping the Middle East and North Africa, there is at least one batch of documents that show how US President Barack Obama's government has willfully looked away from sustained abuses committed by an emerging strategic ally in Asia: Vietnam. The cables in question, entitled "Vietnam Religious Freedom Update - the Case Against CPC [Country of Particular Concern]", were written in 2010 by US ambassador to Vietnam Michael Michalak and published by WikiLeaks in January this year. The leaked correspondence which assessed Vietnam's freedom of religion situation blatantly failed to mention the hundreds of Christian Montagnards, or Degar people, currently imprisoned for practicing their religion and the sustained persecution of independent house churches.
The leaked cables dismiss Vietnam's religious repression as "primarily land issues" and that such actions "should not divert our attention from the significant gains in expanding religious freedom that Vietnam has made". For years, human-rights groups and concerned US Congressmen have complained about Vietnam's abysmal freedom of religion record. The US State Department, keen to foster ties with Hanoi in a bid to counterbalance China's regional rise, has through its silence effectively validated Vietnam's consistent denials about committing human-rights abuses, including its persecution of the Montagnards.
A recent report by rights watchdog Human Rights Watch entitled "Montagnard Christians in Vietnam: A Case Study in Religious Repression" states that "during the last decade, the Vietnamese government has launched a series of crackdowns on Montagnards in the Central Highlands" and "more than 350 Montagnards have been sentenced to long prison sentences on vaguely-defined national security charges for their involvement in public protests and unregistered house churches". The report notes that the "arrests are ongoing, with more than 70 Montagnards arrested or detained during 2010" and "at least 25 Montagnards have died in prisons, jails, or police lock-ups after beatings or illnesses sustained while in custody".
In 2004, the State Department designated Vietnam as a CPC, which places it on an official watch list punishable by sanctions of nations that habitually commit egregious violations of religious freedom. At the time Vietnam was desperately seeking accession to the World Trade Organization (WTO) and effectively required Washington's approval through normal trade relations to join the club.
The two sides negotiated to remove Vietnam as a CPC in 2006 after Hanoi committed to improve its rights record and subsequently normalized trade ties. However, soon after Vietnam entered the WTO in January 2007 the communist-led regime reverted to its old repressive ways. Out of diplomatic expediency or embarrassment, the plight of the Montagnards and other persecuted religious groups has since been ignored by the State Department.
In light of the US's deep history with the Montagnards, that blind eye is an act of betrayal. Tens of thousands of Montagnards were recruited and trained by US troops and were loyally served Washington during the Vietnam War. Their bravery in fighting against the communists was legendary, according to US soldier accounts. Over the life of the conflict it was estimated some 100,000 Montagnards fought alongside US troops and at any given time some 30,000 were actively serving. By the end of the war in 1975, an estimated quarter of the Montagnard population, or over 200,000 people, had perished in the conflict.
The survivors were left to face unassisted the victorious communists' vengeance. On taking over South Vietnam, the communists imprisoned and executed the Montagnard's political and religious leaders. The wider Montagnard population was subjected to forced relocations and thousands were condemned to live on some of the country's poorest cropland. The military also deforested the Montagnard's ancestral lands while expanding their logging operations into neighboring Laos and Cambodia. The Montagnards have been deliberately marginalized as losers of the war and survive today in a cycle of crushing poverty.
Disposable allies
Take, for instance, the case of Puih Hbat, a Montagnard Christian and mother of four whose father served with the US during the Vietnam War. On April 11, 2008, in the dead of night, eight security officials bundled her off screaming into a waiting truck that took her to prison. Her crime: hosting Christian prayer services in her longhouse. Tellingly, her name did not appear in the leaked US cable that claimed to assess Vietnam's freedom of religion situation. Yet the State Department has detailed knowledge of her and hundreds of other Montagnards now in detention. In 2006, John Q Adams, then the State Department's Vietnam desk officer, received a painstakingly detailed report with names and photographs of over 350 Montagnard prisoners arrested for non-violent activities, including merely practicing their faith.
These same prisoners have also been documented by Human Rights Watch, Amnesty International and the US Commission on International Religious Freedom (USCIRF). In January 2009, the European Parliament confirmed Puih Hbat had been imprisoned "for leading prayer services for Christians in her house". Sources confirm that US Embassy officials in Hanoi had investigated her arrest.
The leaked cables make repeated mention of the "significant gains" Vietnam has supposedly made on upholding religious freedoms. That assessment includes references to the "registration of scores of new religions" and the "training of hundreds of new Protestant and Catholic clergy".
"Registration" and "training" are in reality codewords for mechanisms of state control over religious congregations. The so-called "new religions" are in fact government implemented programs designed to control how Vietnamese practice their faith. Hanoi has changed only its tactics of repression since being dropped as a CPC in 2006.
Since then thousands of Montagnard Christians have been arrested, beaten, tortured and then released in a deliberate policy to repress house churches from expanding their memberships. Over the past decade, Protestant congregations, many of which meet and pray underground, have reportedly grown by 600%, a statistic that has reportedly alarmed communist officials. By praising the successful expansion of government registered churches, including the Southern Evangelical Church of Vietnam, the State Department has effectively legitimized the communist government's oppressive tactics against independent churches.
The USCIRF, an independent US federal agency, has called for Vietnam to be redesignated a CPC every year since it was delisted in 2006. In May 2010, the agency specifically identified Montagnard prisoners as just cause for redesignation.
It stated that "hundreds of Montagnard Protestants arrested after the 2001 and 2004 demonstrations for religious freedom and land rights remain in detention in the Central Highlands. The circumstances and charges leveled against them are difficult to determine, but there is enough evidence available to determine that peaceful religious leaders and adherents were arrested and remain incarcerated."
The USCIRF also said "The State Department's standard for determining who is a religious ‘prisoner of concern' draws an arbitrary line between 'political' and 'religious' activity not found in international human-rights law." In other words, the USCIRF believes that the State Department makes up its own rules of classification when dealing with Vietnam. The leaked cables, meanwhile, show that US diplomats have ignored the fate of Montagnard prisoners while simultaneously praising the ruling communist's intensifying controls over religion.
Puih Hbat and hundreds of other Montagnards languish in prison for practicing their faith while the Obama administration concentrates on building strategic ties with Vietnam's communist regime. While her now deceased father served proudly with US forces against those same communists during the Vietnam War, it's unclear whether he would have sided with the Americans knowing that some 40 years later the US government would fail to acknowledge his wrongfully imprisoned daughter's and other Montagnard's ongoing plight.
Scott Johnson is a lawyer, writer and human-rights activist focusing on tribal peoples from Southeast Asia. He may be reached at scottmfi@hotmail.com.
(Copyright 2011 Asia Times Online (Holdings) Ltd. All rights reserved. Please contact us about sales, syndication and republishing.)
42. Ex-KR leader responds to activist’s allegations The Phnom Penh Post; Wednesday, 06 April 2011 15:02 James O’Toole and Thet Sambath (Comments: Theary Seng is back again in the news. After disappearing from the frontline for a while, now she is back with an outrageous claim that two former senior Khmer Rouge military officers, whom she accused of having committed crime against, not the people of Cambodia, but against her parents. As pointed out by Mr. Lars Olsen, the Khmer Rouge tribunal (KRT)l spokesman, who reacted strongly to her demand that:
“Tribunal officials have reacted angrily to Theary Seng’s civil party application, the first lodged in relation to the court’s controversial third and fourth cases. United Nations court spokesman Lars Olsen called it a “reckless act which shows complete disregard for judicial due process and principles of law”.
What Theary Seng is doing here, is to help Hun Sen’s effort to stop the KRT from bringing other former Khmer Rouge senior officials, now Hun Sen senior members of his CPP, to justice such as; Keat Chhonn, Chea Sim, and Tea Banh.
This is no surprise to me, as she had done it before, and this is just another act to keep her in the limelight, and to put her family’s case before that of the whole Cambodian people.
After all, she had subscribed to the concept of “practical justice” not “real justice” for the Cambodian people, as advanced by Craig Etcheson. In other words, the Cambodian people do not deserve “real justice,” but only “practical justice.” Naranhkiri Tith Ph.D. Washington DC. April 6, 2011)
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ Former Khmer Rouge navy commander Meas Muth has hit back at allegations by local activist Theary Seng, who filed a complaint against him at Cambodia’s war crimes tribunal this week, denying that he was involved in KR atrocities.
On Monday, Theary Seng, president of the Civicus Centre for Cambodian Education, filed a civil party application with the tribunal targeted at Meas Muth and former Khmer Rouge air force commander Sou Met, claiming the two are suspects in the court’s pending third and fourth cases. Prosecutors have proposed five suspects for investigation in these cases, which are still in the preliminary stage. The identities of these people remain confidential, though Meas Muth and Sou Met have long been suggested as likely suspects for the court.
Meas Muth said yesterday, however, that he was not concerned about Theary Seng’s allegations or a potential case against him because he had “made no mistakes”.
“I was never involved with arrests or killings. If you ask me about fighting and shooting, I know that well and can talk about it,” he said.
“I see that she is trying to accuse me because she wants to make money from it. It is her business to do this.”
Theary Seng said yesterday that she had collected enough evidence to support her claim that Meas Muth and Sou Met had contributed to the deaths of her parents by helping to formulate the policy of mass arrests and executions implemented under Democratic Kampuchea.
“It’s not surprising that Mr Meas Muth should claim ignorance and should claim innocence, because the charges lodged against him are very grave and would have very serious consequences should a legitimate court and a legitimate trial move forward,” she said.
Tribunal officials have reacted angrily to Theary Seng’s civil party application, the first lodged in relation to the court’s controversial third and fourth cases. United Nations court spokesman Lars Olsen called it a “reckless act which shows complete disregard for judicial due process and principles of law”.
Theary Seng said yesterday that Olsen’s comments were “incredibly misleading” and “highly offensive”.
“It makes me wonder whether the UN is really giving up on this case, whether they too have succumbed to political influence,” she said.
Prime Minister Hun Sen and other officials have expressed opposition to Cases 003 and 004, claiming they are a threat to the Kingdom’s stability.
43. No defence necessary: Sam Rainsy ThePhnom Penh Post; Monday, 28 March 2011 15:03 Thomas Miller and Meas Sokchea (Comments: this article show that sam Rainsy is day-dreaming, not to say more negatively, when he said that:
“Sam Rainsy said “inevitable” political change in Cambodia would bring about a resolution. “A political solution depends on the political situation. There will inevitably be an evolution in the political situation in Cambodia as shown and announced by recent and ongoing developments worldwide (Tunisia, Egypt, Libya, Yemen, Syria, etc),” Sam Rainsy said. “ Cambodia is no Middle East. All those countries in the middle East do not have a Sihanouk who can still sway opinion in Cambodia and dictate the direction of the political trend in Cambodia. Sam Rainsy knows as well as we do, that Sihanouk is now totally with Hun Sen. As long as he is supporting Hun Sen, no Cambodian so-called leader would dare to go after Sihanouk and therefore Hun Sen; thus, the situation in Cambodia has only one way to go, that is down-hill. The Middle East mass movement has more impact and possibility of changes in Vietnam than in Cambodia, as reported in an article titled ‘Vietnam as Tunisia in waiting, ‘ posted below in this page. Unless Cambodia can come up with a real leader than the Sam Rainsy kind, who can challenge Hun Sen and Sihanouk, there is no other place for Cambodia to go but down. Naranhkiri Tith Ph.D. Washington DC. March 29, 2011) ------------------------------------------------------------------- Opposition leader Sam Rainsy said yesterday he will not ask his lawyer to defend him against charges of defamation and disinformation brought by Minister of Foreign Affairs Hor Namhong, in a case stemming from a 2008 complaint that the Phnom Penh Municipal Court announced last week it would hear on April 5.
Sam Rainsy, president of the eponymous political party, said yesterday he would not ask his lawyer to attend the trial “because it’s the same case with the same foregone conclusion”. “As a matter of legal and judicial principle, nobody can be condemned twice for the same offence,” Sam Rainsy, who currently lives in self-exile in Paris, said by email. The Municipal Court issued a summons on March 23 ordering Sam Rainsy to appear in court to face charges brought under Articles 62 and 63 of the UNTAC code. In 2008, Hor Namhong filed a defamation lawsuit in France over a passage of Sam Rainsy’s autobiography, Rooted in Stone, which alleged that Hor Namhong headed the Boeung Trabek prison during the Khmer Rouge reign. Sam Rainsy was fined and last year lost his appeal. The Foreign Minister also filed suit in Cambodian courts in 2008 over a speech by Sam Rainsy that year delivered at the Choeung Ek “killing fields”, which referenced an alleged relationship between Hor Namhong and the Khmer Rouge leadership. Deputy court prosecutor Ek Chheng Huot declined to comment yesterday and referred questions to Judge Seng Neang, who could not be reached. Kar Savuth, Hor Namhong’s lawyer, could not be reached for comment yesterday. The latest case against the embattled opposition leader complicates his appeal for a political settlement that would allow him to return to the Kingdom ahead of upcoming elections in 2012 and 2013.
Sam Rainsy faces a pair of jail terms totalling 12 years, handed down last year in connection with a protest he staged at the Vietnamese border in 2009. He was stripped of his parliamentary seat this month as a result of the convictions. Ou Virak, president of the Cambodian Centre for Human Rights, said yesterday the charges were “mainly to pile up more pressure on Sam Rainsy not to return”, but not necessarily an indication that the government has ruled out a deal. Sam Rainsy said “inevitable” political change in Cambodia would bring about a resolution. “A political solution depends on the political situation. There will inevitably be an evolution in the political situation in Cambodia as shown and announced by recent and ongoing developments worldwide (Tunisia, Egypt, Libya, Yemen, Syria, etc),” Sam Rainsy said.
44. 'Angkor' electric vehicle to hit road the Phnom Penh Post; Tuesday, 22 March 2011 15:01 Sieam Bunthy
(Comments: this article is one of the rare good news recently coming out from Cambodia, recently. It is about the once category that is sorely missing since the Angkor time, the entrepreneurs, as almost non-elite Cambodians were the “Khgnoms”(servants or I’ ‘) of the Khmer god-kings and their protégés, and money was not used, nor salary was needed as those who were favoured by the god-kings, who owned all the land and the monopoly of foreign trade, were given land instead, from which they could produce the necessary barter commodities, namely rice, for trading, locally and internationally. Only a small portion was left to the “Khgnoms” and their family members.
Without this important class of entrepreneurs, Cambodia cannot expect to catch up with high economic growth and development that are being recorded in most Asian countries, since the 1960’s.
That is the reason why Cambodia never had that very important class of people, called entrepreneurs,. Naranhkiri Tith Ph.D. Washington DC. March 25, 2011)
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DOMESTICALLY-produced electric cars may be brought to market early next year thanks to a new factory.
Cambodia’s Heng Development Co has signed an agreement with Hong Kong-based Chau Leong to build an eco-friendly vehicle called the “Angkor.”
The vehicle was developed by local inventor Nhean Phaloek – who once reportedly claimed that the doors to one of his prototype vehicles opened telepathically.
Nhean Phaloek said that construction on the plant started on March 14 on 20 hectares in the Kandal Stoeng district of Kandal province.
Sien Chanheng, director general for Heng Development, said plant will aim to make between 500 and 1,000 cars a year, with the first appearing soon after the beginning of next year.
She also said the US$20 million deal will be split 80 percent/20 percent between her company and Nhean Phaloek, and Chau Leong, respectively. Nhean Phaloek will import machines and spare parts from China, as well as other technology from Germany, to make the Angkor.
He said the goal is to start with two- and four-chair cars sold for $5,000 and then move on to six- and 12-chaired vehicles.
He also expects high demand from visitors to the Kingdom.
“My guess is that 20 cars can be sold in one day because foreign tourists are already booked to buy,” he said.
Nhean Phaloek plans to expand to overseas markets as well, he said.
Ith Praing, secretary of state at the Ministry of Mines, Industry and Energy, who attended the signing ceremony yesterday morning at NagaWorld Phnom Penh, praised the car for its small carbon footprint.
45. Like father, like son in Cambodia By Sebastian Strangio Asia Times; March 17, 2011 (Comments: this article confirms my suspicion that the Hun Sen dynasty is here to stay. This thuggish dynasty will only bring the downfall of Cambodia even faster than it would otherwise. It also shows that while mass vement against dcitaorship has been boiling to a point of major changes, Cambodia is going in the opposite direction. The other interesting information that this article provides is the fact that the United States is now in firm support of Hun Sen and his murderous regime, using the link between Hun Manet's West Point connection - where democracy is being preached and taught- as an excuse. On this special connection, the article pointed out: “West Point teaches civilian control over the military, which is not the case in Cambodia," Thayer said. Getting too close to the US could also "expose" Hun Manet in the event of a cooling of bilateral relations. "He is likely to be a more professional military commander but Cambodia's political culture and existing political system will mitigate against rapid liberalization," he added.” The real reason behind this rapprochement between the United States and Vietnam is the fear of a rising role and importance of China economically, and politically, in Asia and in the world. The United States, think that it can use Vietnam to counter the rising power of China. But, don’t the United States for using Cambodia. It is the Cambodian people that should be blamed for not being able to choose a better leader, by compromising on the criteria of good leadership based on the characteristics of well-known world leaders such as; Nelson Mandela, Aung San Suu Kyi, and Mahatma Gandhi. Cambodians have a long way to go and time is not on thier side. Naranhkiri Tith Ph.D. Washington DC. March 20, 2011) - ------------------------------------------------------------------
PHNOM PENH - On May 29, 1999, Hun Manet, the eldest son of Cambodia's Prime Minister Hun Sen, mounted the dais at the United States Military Academy at West Point to collect his diploma from General Dennis J Reimer, the US Army's former chief of staff. Clad in a traditional grey jacket and red sash, then 21-year-old became the first-ever Cambodian alumnus of the prestigious academy - one of just seven foreign cadets to graduate that year.
During the ceremony, television news cameras followed Hun Manet up to the podium, eager for a glimpse of the son of Cambodia's war-tested strongman. His presence at the graduation had prompted controversy. Congressman Christopher Smith of New Jersey said in congress before the ceremony that Hun Sen was a "mass murderer" and that the US government "should be handing him an indictment, not a visa".
While most of the graduates posed for photographs with their families in a nearby stadium, the New York Times reported that Hun Manet met his father and his entourage beneath shaded bleachers under close guard from US Secret Service agents. In the years since, Hun Manet completed a PhD in economics at the University of Bristol in the United Kingdom. Throughout his time in the West, he maintained a low profile and rarely made public appearances. Recently, however, his inconspicuousness has masked a rapid rise through the country's military ranks. In September, Hun Manet was promoted to deputy commander of his father's powerful personal bodyguard unit. Four months later, in January, he was appointed to the rank of two-star general and as deputy commander of the Royal Cambodian Armed Forces (RCAF) infantry. He also serves as director of the Ministry of Defense's counter-terrorism department, which works closely with the US. Hun Manet's rapid rise has led to widespread speculation that he is being groomed to eventually succeed his father, one of Asia's longest-serving leaders who has been in power in one form or another since 1985. Cambodian officials including Hun Sen have denied any hint of nepotism in Hun Manet's meteoric ascent, frequently pointing out that his academic credentials are sound. At the age of 33 - the same as his father when he was first appointed prime minister - Hun Manet's political star is only beginning to rise. "If you have power, you try to maintain that power and you have to have someone you trust to continue [it]," said Son Soubert, a political commentator and former member of Cambodia's Constitutional Council. "In the human sphere it's quite natural, though not in a democratic system.” Ou Virak, head of the Cambodian Center for Human Rights (CCHR), said that though he is unlikely to take over from his father any time soon - Hun Sen has said he wants to remain in power for at least the next decade - further promotions were a "distinct possibility" for Hun Manet.
Those signs grew clearer last month when deadly clashes broke out between Cambodia and Thailand close to Preah Vihear temple, an 11th century Angkorian temple perched on a cliff along the countries' border. Hun Manet reportedly played a prominent role during four days of armed skirmishes in a disputed area adjacent to the temple, which killed at least 10 people and injured dozens on both sides. The exact nature of his involvement remains unclear. Thai media carried unsourced reports that said he took a "leading role" in the fighting on the night of February 6. Hun Manet has since been credited with helping to negotiate ceasefire arrangements with his Thai counterparts, according to Thai media reports. Some experts believe the appearance of Hun Manet, who has two brothers and three sisters, during the border skirmish could be part of a bid to boost his public profile. Carlyle Thayer, an analyst based at the Australian Defense Force Academy in Sydney, said Manet was clearly being prepared for a military career to provide Hun Sen with assurance that the army will remain loyal - a key concern in Cambodia's highly-personalized political system The Preah Vihear fighting, one of the first times Hun Manet had emerged onto the public stage, was likely intended to establish his credibility as a military commander - whatever his exact role during the clashes "I see his emergence as part of a process of taking responsibility for defense matters first, demonstrating competence, and then embarking on a political career all the while under the tutelage of his father who will remain as prime minister," Thayer said. Western reform hopes Hun Manet's education at West Point symbolized the tentative resumption of ties between the US and Cambodia following years of Cold War estrangement. Barely two years earlier, Hun Sen had ousted his main rival, Prince Norodom Ranariddh, in a series of pitched battles in the streets of the capital Phnom Penh. Dozens of members of Ranariddh's royalist Funcinpec party were butchered in a July 1997 coup, which brought international opprobrium down on Hun Sen's regime and strained Phnom Penh's nascent relations with Washington. So, too, did a grenade attack against an opposition rally in Phnom Penh that same year, which killed at least 16 people and injured 100 more, including a US citizen. The incident was later investigated by the US Federal Bureau of Investigation. Since Hun Manet received his PhD and returned to Cambodia, however, relations with Washington have blossomed. In August 2005, restrictions on US military assistance to Cambodia were lifted and the following year Defense Minister Tea Banh paid a visit to the US Pacific Command to request American military support. In 2007, the US resumed direct foreign assistance to Phnom Penh, making it the third-largest recipient of foreign assistance in East Asia after Indonesia and the Philippines. The blossoming relationship was capped off in June 2009 when the US removed Cambodia and Laos from a Cold War-era blacklist of Marxist-Leninist nations, paving the way for US Export-Import Bank support for American companies to do business with the two countries.
At a time of rising Chinese influence in Southeast Asia - Cambodia has received billions of dollars in aid and investment in recent years - all this raises the question of whether an increasingly prominent Manet, well connected to the US through his West Point connections, could help cement Cambodia's relationship with Washington. Others wonder whether Hun Manet would in a leadership role prompt some liberalization of the country's ossified political system, which his father has presided over in authoritarian fashion. At the time of Hun Manet's graduation, the New York Daily News quoted an unnamed government official as saying granting West Point educations to the children of foreign leaders gave Washington "an automatic in" with those nations. Hun Manet's recent promotions have also prompted calls for him to act as a fifth column of reform within the Cambodian armed forces. Phil Robertson, deputy director of Human Rights Watch's Asia division, told Radio Free Asia after Manet's promotion in January that his group would welcome any attempts to reform the military - especially Hun Sen's bodyguard unit, which has been accused of complicity in a range of rights abuses, including the bloody grenade attack of March 1997. Other observers say it is unclear how much influence Hun Manet will be willing or able to wield. Thayer believes defense ties with the US will likely continue to improve, with Manet's West Point education acting as "a conduit" for the development of a more robust military relationship. As his career progresses, however, Hun Manet is expected to be more attuned to the vagaries of domestic politics than to any external loyalties, heading off the possibility of significant reforms. "West Point teaches civilian control over the military, which is not the case in Cambodia," Thayer said. Getting too close to the US could also "expose" Hun Manet in the event of a cooling of bilateral relations. "He is likely to be a more professional military commander but Cambodia's political culture and existing political system will mitigate against rapid liberalization," he added. Though he is believed by some to be more sympathetic to Western-style liberal democracy and human rights than the stalwarts of his father's ruling Cambodian People's Party and the armed forces, CCHR's Ou Virak discounted the potential for Hun Manet to enact deep-reaching structural or political change. He compared Hun Manet to the sons of Libya's Colonel Muammar Gaddafi and North Korea's Kim Jong-il, neither of whom has shown signs of departing from their fathers' authoritarian ways. Son Soubert said that he witnessed a previous generation of enlightened, French-educated Cambodians - including many members of the Funcinpec party - cast democratic ideals aside and willingly engage in the corruption of Cambodian politics once they returned home. "I think the whole atmosphere of the country is what is at stake," he said of Hun Manet's chances of engineering reform. "If he can maintain his credibility and what he has learned in the US then that would be the best for Cambodia. Sebastian Strangio is a journalist based in Phnom Penh, Cambodia. He may be reached at sebastian.strangio@gmail.com
46. Rainsy stripped of MP status The Phnom Penh Post; Wednesday, 16 March 2011 19:53 Meas Sokchea (Comments: as I have been saying all along, that this time Hun Sen will never allow Sam Rainsy to be back into the Cambodian political arena again, even with the new and old kings ‘request. Because, this time Sam Rainsy had committed the worst crime in the Vietnamese eyes, for violating the 1979, so-called treaty of Peace, Friendship and Cooperation, and that of 1985 related to the border demarcation, with its extension in 2005. Sam Rainsy is not what Cambodia needs as a leader. He does not have the minimum of moral standing to fulfill that demanding and dangerous role as a leader to provide a better chance for Cambodia and its people to escape the Vietnamese death trap. These moral characteristics include; Courage, honesty, compassion, patience, perseverance, and dignity, to name only the main ones. Do the supporters of Sam Rainsy ever think whether their boss ever possess these basic moral characteristics of a leader such as Nelson Mandela, Aung San Suu Kyi, and Mahatma Gandhi? (For more on the moral Requirement for a good leader please read the table pasted below:
QUALITIES OF A HERO | Sacrifice | Sacrifice is the fortitude of something highly valued for the sake of one considered to have a greater value or claim. | Determination | Determination is a fixed intention or resolution; a firmness of purpse or resolve. | Loyalty | Loyalty is the feeling of allegiance or the act of binding oneself to a course of action. | Courage | Courage is that firmness of spirit and swell of soul which meets danger without fear. | Dedication | Dedication is a selfless devotion; complete and whole hearted fidelity or the act of binding oneself to a course of action. | Intrepidity | Intrepidity is firm, unshaken courage. | Valor | Valor is courage exhibited in war, and can not be applied to single combats. | Selfless | Selfless is the quality of unselfish concern for the welfare of others and acting with less concern for yourself. | Conviction | Conviction is a fixed or strong belief; a necessity of the mind or an unshakable belief. | Focused | Focused is the ability to direct one's energy toward a particular point or purpose; to concentrate one's energy. | Gallantry | Gallantry is adventurous courage, which courts danger with a high and cheerful spirit. | Perseverance | Perseverance is a persistent determination. | Fortitude | Fortitude has often been styled "passive courage," and consists in the habit of encountering danger and enduring pain with a steadfast and unbroken spirit. | Bravery | Bravery is daring and impetuous courage, like that of one who has the reward continually in view, and displays his courage in daring acts. |
Source: The research is from Dictionary.com. ------------------------------ I would challenge Sam Rainsy followers to carefully read this table and to let us know whether his boss has the minimum necessary of these moral characteristics of a good leader. One thing that is not lacking in the Vietnamese leadership is the kind of leaders with all these moral characteristics. thatis why the two dynasties, the Trinh lords in the North, and the Nguyen lords in the South had fought each other for two hundred years just to choose which leader can really lead the Vietnamese people to provide them a bettter chance to survive the Chinese threat. It was the Nguyen lords who won and that , in turn, led to change the Chinese classic tributary system to allow the Vietnamese to take over land from their weaker neighbors, namely; Champa and Kampuchea Korm. Not only the Vietnamese took over the land by a systamatic colonization known as the leopard skin strategy, but also not allow these people to continue to have their identity once their land was taken over by the Vietnamese colonizers. In other words, genocide (by definition) is a current practice by the Vietnamese as a matter of policy and practice, in Champa, still being praticed in Kampuchea Krom unitl today. P lease, see an article titled 'What is Vietnamese Nationalism?' No. 12, posting in this same page. Naranhkiri Tith Ph.D. Washington DC. March 18, 2011) ------------------------------------------------------------------------ Sam Rainsy speaking to journalist during the press conference at SRP head office in 2009.Embattled opposition leader Sam Rainsy’s position in the National Assembly has been terminated following a string of losses in his long-running legal saga. In a proclamation dated Tuesday, National Assembly President Heng Samrin said Sam Rainsy’s criminal convictions had rendered him ineligible to serve as a lawmaker based on the Kingdom’s Law on the Status of Parliamentarians. “His Excellency Sam Rainsy has completely lost his rights, prerogatives and membership as a parliamentarian of Kampong Cham provincial constituency in the fourth legislative mandate,” the proclamation states. “This proclamation has judicial power from the day of signature onward.” Sam Rainsy, president of the eponymous party, has lived in exile since 2009 to avoid prosecution in connection with a protest he staged in October that year in Svay Rieng province against alleged Vietnamese land encroachment. Earlier this month, the Supreme Court upheld his convictions for incitement and destruction of public property, for which he has been sentenced to two years in prison.
He was sentenced to an additional 10 years in prison in September for disinformation and falsifying public documents in connection with evidence he publicised from abroad to vindicate his border claims. Speaking by phone from France, Sam Rainsy said he was untroubled by the proclamation and was confident he had the support of legal experts and the international community.
“This shows that power in Cambodia is becoming more and more absolute and more and more illegal,” he said. Despite this grim assessment, however, the opposition leader said he would continue to lead the SRP and predicted that he would be able to return to the Kingdom for the upcoming national elections in 2012 and 2013 via a compromise with the ruling Cambodian People’s Party. “We are not panicking,” he said, adding that the continued attempts to silence him “show the weakness of the CPP”. “They are afraid of Sam Rainsy,” he said. “What gives them a headache, what makes them worried? It is only Sam Rainsy.” In a statement issued today, Cambodian Centre for Human Rights president Ou Virak said Sam Rainsy’s case “shows how the judiciary and legislature serve the political objectives of the executive”. “The National Assembly lifted Sam Rainsy’s parliamentary immunity in apparent disregard for the constitutional guarantee that immunity will not be removed for opinions expressed in the exercise of one’s duties as a parliamentarian,” Ou Virak said. “The judiciary showed an equal disregard for his fair trial rights and convicted him on highly politicised charges without sufficient evidence.” In a speech earlier this year, Prime Minister Hun Sen announced his intention to “make the opposition group die”.
| | 47. The Cambodian Genocide and Imperial Culture
Ben Kiernan
http://www.yale.edu/cgp/KiernanCambodia30thAnniversaryEssay.doc
Published in 90 Years of Denial, a special publication of Aztag Daily (Beirut) and the Armenian Weekly (Boston) in April 2005 to commemorate the ninetieth anniversary of the 1915 genocide of Armenians (pp. 20-21) ------------------------------------------------------------------
(Comments: this article by Ben Kiernan is a tangible proof on what I have been saying all along that the main purpose of his group that includes on the Cambodian side Youk Chhang of the DCCAM, is not to search for the truth and justice for the Cambodian people, as they loudly proclaim but to demonize the demons by making the Khmer Rouge not only the murderers that they really are, but also racists.
In so doing they promote their clients and friends, the Vietnamese as the savior of Cambodia and the Cambodian people. Now, there is a new adept to this group in the name of Ronnie Yimsut, whose book titled “Facing the Khmer Rouge: A Cambodian Journey “ was just published by this group, with the laudatory words David Chandler, Craig Etcheson, and Alex Hinton, and Youk Chhang, among others (See these complementary review on Yimsut’s book, posted C). If Cambodians are really racists, then why there are still more than 400,000 Chams still living in present-day Cambodia; while there is only around 20,000 Chams now recorded officially to be livng in central Vietnam, their ancestral home? And if Cambodians are so racists why there are so many Sino-Cambodians still livng in Cambodia? Admitedly, being so isolated and cut off from the real world, and in order to vent out their frustration resulting from the ongoing oppression from their own leaders since the time of the god-kings at Angkor, the majority of Cambodians tend to went out their innermost feeling against repeated and deadly Vietnamese aggression against them, they tend to say things, which are politically incorrect. Is this racism? What about the genocide that the Vietnamese had committed against the Chams, and are still committing against the Khmer Kroms people. Is this Vietnamese deadly act of aggression not racism, or much worst, a genocide committed by the Vietnamese against the Chams and the Khmer Krom people? What really brought Ronnie Yimsut to the attention and adulation from the Ben Kiernan group is this sentence from an article that he wrote a few years ago, titled "Patriotism, patroitism, racism, and fanaticism." ( http://www.mekong.net/cambodia/natlism.htm)
"There is a fine line between "nationalism, patriotism, racism, and fanaticism." Both Pol Pot and King Jayavarman VII's reign are two classic examples of this "fine line." Each and every Khmer, I believe, considers him or herself as a "nationalist" or a "patriot," as Pol Pot and King Jayavarman VII did. However, very few dares to admit that he or she is a "racist" or a "fanatic." The final results, including both success and failure, are what defined the differences. Like it or not, there will always be "nationalism, patriotism, racism, and fanaticism" in Cambodia and in Khmer society. It is part of human nature. These traits are what made Cambodia great, or not so great, as clearly proven by Jayavarman VII, the greatest Khmer "god king" of ancient Cambodia, and Pol Pot, the greatest Khmer "evil king" of modern day Cambodia." In this article Ben Kiernan had vehemently criticized author Philip Short, the author of a book on the Khmer Rouge titled “Pol Pot; Anatomy of a Nightmare“ for being not tough enough on the Khmer Rouge by characterizing them only as mass murderers but not as racists, when he wrote:
“Short thus overlooks the case that the Khmer Rouge committed genocide against substantial “parts” of Cambodia’s majority Khmer Buddhist community and of ethnic minorities such as the Vietnamese, Chinese, and Cham Muslims. He declines to inform readers of the UN Group of Experts’ 1999 recommendation that Khmer Rouge leaders face trial for genocide, having “subjected the people of Cambodia to almost all of the acts enumerated in the Convention.” Rather, Short compares Pol Pot’s violent “dispersal” of every one of Cambodia’s 113 Muslim communities to “school bussing in the United States to achieve desegregation. That, too, involved the dispersal of pupils of one race among those of another.”
Yet other reviewers of Short‘s book felt differently:
“Instead the New York Times praises a new book judging the Khmer Rouge “innocent” of genocide. Philip Short’s Pol Pot follows the small cohort of Cambodian communists from their student days in Phnom Penh and Paris to their final defeat in 1998-99, largely recounting Cambodia’s tragedy, as Short writes, “from the vantage point of those who created it.” Veteran Indochina reporter Nayan Chanda, reviewing the book for the Washington Post, termed it “an anatomy of the Khmer Rouge nightmare without the cries of its survivors.” By contrast a New York Times reviewer called it “superb, authoritative,” while a cover story in the New York Times Book Review claimed Short “argues persuasively” that Pol Pot “did not… commit genocide,” adding: “Short is no apologist for the Khmer Rouge, but an honest researcher.”
To put all this in the right context, we should not forget that before the Khmer Rouge broke away with the Vietnamese Communists, Ben Kiernan along with his then Cambodian wife had totally supported the Khmer Rouge as the liberator of Cambodia (For more details on the Ben Kiernan and theKhmer Rouge connection, (please, see the appendix A & B in which two articles By Sophal ear, and Steve Morris, on that issue).
Ben Kiernan has been using his professorial position at Yale university, to try to get out of his earlier bad association and support of the Khmer Rouge.
As I said many times before, if there are those Cambodians who continue to be used for their own personal interests by those who are helping the Vietnamese Communists, such as Youk Chhang and Ronnie Yimsut, while there is no voice to go against them, Cambodia and the Cambodian people will have nowhere to go but down, and sooner than later. Naranhkiri Tith Ph.D. Washington DC. March 16, 2011) ------------------------------------------------------- As Cambodia approaches the thirtieth anniversary of its fall to Pol Pot’s Khmer Rouge forces on April 17, 1975, Phnom Penh and the United Nations are moving to establish a special court to try their crimes. A minority of UN-appointed judges will have a veto over its rulings. The USA does not support these prosecutions. Ending a decade of American measures to promote justice for genocide victims, the Bush Administration has reinstated policies that long opposed any tribunal and aided the Khmer Rouge from 1975 to 1993. Now a new book, Philip Short’s Pol Pot: Anatomy of a Nightmare (New York, Henry Holt), condemns not just the Cambodian court but also Khmer Buddhism as a contributor to the disaster. The Cold War’s lengthening shadow has become a silhouette of US culture wars. In 2003, five years after Pol Pot died in 1998, Cambodia and the UN agreed to hold a tribunal to judge the role of surviving Khmer Rouge leaders in the deaths of 1.7 million Cambodians in 1975-79. The top two Khmer Rouge military and security officials have languished in a Phnom Penh prison since 1999, and other former leaders remain at large. Colin Powell’s State Department successfully urged Congress to appropriate $3m. for the new UN-supported Cambodian court, though some wanted to hold justice hostage. Kentucky’s Republican Senator Mitch McConnell insisted on “regime change” in Cambodia instead. After the 2003 re-election of the government of Prime Minister Hun Sen, Cambodia’s opposition parties ratified its tribunal agreement with the UN. But last October, the US Congress diverted the $3m. it had previously appropriated for the Cambodia court, blocking any American funds from contributing to the UN’s budget for prosecution of Khmer Rouge leaders. The House of Representatives scotched support for the tribunal too. Last March, representatives of America’s biggest Khmer community, in Long Beach, Ca., Democrat Juanita Millender-McDonald and Republican Dana Rohrabacher, introduced House Concurrent Resolution 399 with another California Democrat, Tom Lantos. Their resolution urged President Bush “to provide encouragement and support for the ratification, establishment, and financing of a tribunal for the prosecution of surviving leaders of the Khmer Rouge regime.” Fifteen more Congressmen signed on from both parties. However, the chair of the House International Relations Committee, Republican Henry Hyde of Indiana, refused to send this Resolution to the House floor for a vote. In May, genocide survivor Chanrithy Him, author of When Broken Glass Floats: Growing up under the Khmer Rouge, wrote him urging support: “Mr. Hyde, it is time − that the remaining top Khmer Rouge leaders be brought to justice for committing crimes against humanity. Cambodia needs closure and so do survivors in the Khmer diaspora.” She received no reply from Congressman Hyde, who quietly killed the Resolution. Current Bush Administration policy recalls the earlier era of U.S. support for the Khmer Rouge that began soon after their April 1975 victory. More troubled by the concurrent Vietnamese communist defeat of Saigon, Washington sacrificed Cambodia to a new coalition against Hanoi. Eight months into the Khmer Rouge genocide, President Ford and Secretary of State Kissinger visited Indonesia’s then dictator, President Suharto. On December 6, 1975, Ford told Suharto that “we hope to expand” U.S. influence in Asia. Kissinger explained that “China does not have expansionist aims now,” but was opposed to the USSR and Vietnam. Sharing this view, the US accepted China’s support for the Khmer Rouge regime. A deal had been struck; Cambodia was the stakes. As Ford put it to Suharto: “The unification of Vietnam has come more quickly than we anticipated. There is, however, resistance in Cambodia to the influence of Hanoi. We are willing to move slowly in our relations with Cambodia, hoping perhaps to slow down the North Vietnamese influence although we find the Cambodian government very difficult.” Kissinger noted Beijing’s similar strategy towards the Pol Pot regime: “the Chinese want to use Cambodia to balance off Vietnam….We don’t like Cambodia, for the government in many ways is worse than Vietnam, but we would like it to be independent. We don’t discourage Thailand or China from drawing closer to Cambodia.” With this statement to the head of Southeast Asia’s largest state, Washington acknowledged the geopolitics that now authorized diplomatic approaches to succor the Khmer Rouge regime. U.S. and Chinese support for Pol Pot continued long after Hanoi’s 1979 invasion ended the genocide and established the Cambodian regime that came to be led by Hun Sen. The former National Security Advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski recalled that in 1979, “I encouraged the Chinese to support Pol Pot... Pol Pot was an abomination. We could never support him but China could.” They both did. Washington “winked, semi-publicly,” Brzezinski said, at Chinese and Thai aid to the Khmer Rouge forces. “I do not understand why some people want to remove Pol Pot,” was how Deng Xiaoping put it in 1984; “he made some mistakes in the past but now he is leading the fight against the Vietnamese aggressors.” China gave his Khmer Rouge forces US$100 million each year during the 1980s. American military aid to guerrillas allied with the Khmer Rouge reached $17-32 million per annum. Citing Vietnam’s occupation of Cambodia (1979-89), Washington blocked development aid to Cambodia from the UN, the World Bank, and the IMF, and pressured UN agencies to supply the Khmer Rouge camps on the Thai border. In Rice, Rivalry and Politics, Linda Mason and Roger Brown revealed: “The U.S. Government, which funded the bulk of the relief operation on the border, insisted that the Khmer Rouge be fed… the US preferred that the Khmer Rouge operation benefit from the credibility of an internationally-known relief organization.” The World Food Program handed the Thai army over $12 million worth of food for the Khmer Rouge. “20-40,000 Pol Pot guerrillas benefited,” according to then US Assistant Secretary of State, Richard Holbrooke. Mason and Brown wrote: “The Khmer Rouge had a history of unimaginable brutality, and having regained their strength, they had begun fighting the Vietnamese.” US economic rehabilitation of the defeated Khmer Rouge extended to a cover-up of their regime’s murder of about 500,000 Cambodians in 1977-78. A 1980 CIA report falsely claimed that the Pol Pot regime had stopped executing people in 1976. Former CIA deputy director Ray Cline made a secret visit to a Khmer Rouge camp in November 1980. The next year columnist Jack Anderson reported that “through China, the CIA is even supporting the jungle forces of the murderous Pol Pot,” which Newsweek reiterated in 1983. In 1989, Cambodia’s Prince Norodom Sihanouk received intelligence reports of “US advisers in the Khmer Rouge camps in Thailand,... The CIA men are teaching the Khmer Rouge human rights!” In the diplomatic arena, the USA led most of the Western world to support the exiled Khmer Rouge over the Vietnamese-sponsored government of Cambodia. The Carter and Reagan Administrations both voted for Pol Pot’s representative to occupy Cambodia’s disputed UN seat. In 1982 the Reagan Administration justified the Khmer Rouge flag flying over New York by reference to its “continuity” with the Pol Pot regime. The Khmer Rouge ran Cambodia’s UN mission for another decade. In April 1989, U.S. Secretary of State James A. Baker III, seeking to replace the Hun Sen government, proposed including the Khmer Rouge in a new regime. That August, the Bangkok Post reported, Washington “reiterated its support for a Khmer Rouge role in a transitional government.” A diplomat said the Khmer Rouge “got the US and Western countries to block a Vietnamese attempt to isolate and contain them.” Inadequate domestic media coverage facilitated US policies that helped the Khmer Rouge. Despite its superlative reporting in many fields, the New York Times, for instance, covered little of this story. Now it has ignored the renewed US opposition to the genocide tribunal. No newspaper, to my knowledge, has yet reported Washington’s 2004 denial of its previously appropriated funds for the UN/Cambodian court. The New York Times refuses to correct its January 3, 2004, assertion that in tribunal negotiations with the UN, “The Cambodian side has been raising conditions and creating delays since 1996.” On the contrary, in 1997 Cambodia’s co-Prime Ministers both proposed a tribunal, appealing for aid from the UN, which pursued the proposal only from 1999. Instead the New York Times praises a new book judging the Khmer Rouge “innocent” of genocide. Philip Short’s Pol Pot follows the small cohort of Cambodian communists from their student days in Phnom Penh and Paris to their final defeat in 1998-99, largely recounting Cambodia’s tragedy, as Short writes, “from the vantage point of those who created it.” Veteran Indochina reporter Nayan Chanda, reviewing the book for the Washington Post, termed it “an anatomy of the Khmer Rouge nightmare without the cries of its survivors.” By contrast a New York Times reviewer called it “superb, authoritative,” while a cover story in the New York Times Book Review claimed Short “argues persuasively” that Pol Pot “did not… commit genocide,” adding: “Short is no apologist for the Khmer Rouge, but an honest researcher.” Short, who has opposed a tribunal for the Khmer Rouge, considers them guilty of crimes against humanity, but not genocide because they “did not set out to exterminate a ‘national, ethnic, racial or religious group’.” As his authority for this definition, the book’s UK edition cited “Article II of the UN Genocide Convention,” but Short truncated its definition of genocide: acts committed “with the intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as such.” Quoting selectively, he substituted “exterminate” for “in whole or in part.” In the US edition, Short has failed to correct his error, but has deleted his note citing the Convention, leaving his quotation unverifiable. Short thus overlooks the case that the Khmer Rouge committed genocide against substantial “parts” of Cambodia’s majority Khmer Buddhist community and of ethnic minorities such as the Vietnamese, Chinese, and Cham Muslims. He declines to inform readers of the UN Group of Experts’ 1999 recommendation that Khmer Rouge leaders face trial for genocide, having “subjected the people of Cambodia to almost all of the acts enumerated in the Convention.” Rather, Short compares Pol Pot’s violent “dispersal” of every one of Cambodia’s 113 Muslim communities to “school bussing in the United States to achieve desegregation. That, too, involved the dispersal of pupils of one race among those of another.” In Short’s view, Pol Pot combined communist ideology not with genocidal racism but with Cambodia’s “irrational…cultural heritage.” Blaming Theravada Buddhism and its “demolition of the individual,” Short writes: “In Khmer thought, the fundamental dichotomy is not between good and evil, as in Judaeo-Christian societies.” He takes exotic essentialism way too far, implicating broad social groups in secret Khmer Rouge decisions that victimized them, and he associates Khmer Rouge leaders’ actions with “parallel” crimes of other Cambodian regimes. Cambodians may not recognize their country in this book. Short opens with a faulty guide to Khmer (Pauk is not pronounced “pock,” nor does Deuch rhyme with “book”). He confuses prahoc, Cambodia’s national fish-paste dish, with the Vietnamese condiment nuoc mam (“fish sauce”). And, while attributing much of Cambodia’s nightmare to its own culture, Short misreads the very Khmer term for customs or mores (charet), which he renders as charek (“stake, post”). A French-based British writer, Short draws heavily on recent reminiscences by Francophone Khmer Rouge leaders. He considers “so many” ex-Khmer Rouge officials to be “educated, thoughtful people” even though they still consider Pol Pot “a great patriot.” Forty times Short uses the account of former Khmer Rouge minister Thiounn Mumm as a source, without mentioning the fate of peasant children in Mumm’s care in 1979. As a witness reported: “Six of the boys died: they were so hungry that they ate toxic tubers... And Thiounn Mumm said, in front of those boys who were already sick: ‘That is what happens to undisciplined children’.” Short often treats the recollections of other Khmer Rouge equally uncritically. Appendix C. A NEW BOOK OFFERING TITLE: Facing the Khmer Rouge: A Cambodian Journey FORMAT: Historical autobiography, nonfiction LENGTH: 450 pages PUBLISHER: Rutgers University Press VISUALS: Maps and Graphics
SUMMARY:
Much has been written about the Khmer Rouge, their atrocities against their own countrymen, why they did it, and the aftermath of the genocide: an oppressed, impoverished Cambodia of today. No one, however, actually saw what they did and lived to tell the tale. But a fifteen-year-old boy survived five years of bloody civil war, three years of communist labor camp, a massacre by the Khmer Rouge, Thai prison, refugee camp, and finally became a naturalized US citizen. To heal himself from within, he recorded his memories while making a new life for himself as a district landscape architect for the USDA Forest Service. Ronnie Yimsut now lives with his wife and two children in the State of Wisconsin. This is his story. What happens when a child lives through a raging war, through severe starvation and slavery, and wakes up buried under dead family and friends? “I lost my childhood, my freedom and my dreams. I saw my family slaughtered. People ask how I did it, how I can live a normal life today,’’ Ronnie says. Here is his answer. REVIEWS: By Khmer Rouge experts, researchers, and scholars on genocide “Ronnie Yimsut’s story is the reaffirmation of the human spirit!” Brian T. Ellis, Senior producer and reporter (retired), CBS News and ABC News * * * “Ronnie Yimsut’s absorbing and passionate memoir deals with his life before, during, and after the Khmer Rouge era (1975-1979). It fits neatly into a genre of survivor narratives that have emerged from Cambodian authors since the 1970s, but it surpasses many of them in terms of its breadth of focus, its depth of feeling, and the clarity of its prose.” David P. Chandler, PhD Professor Emeritus of History Monash University, Victoria, Autralia
* * * “Compelling, riveting, and inspiring! Ronnie Yimsut's deeply moving account of his life before, during and after the genocide embodies what it means to suffer, survive, heal, forgive, but never forget. “ Wayne E. Wright, PhD Associate Professor and Editor Journal of Southeast Asian American Education and Advancement University of Texas at San Antonio * * * “I have finished reading Ronnie Yimsut’s sobering book within a night without falling asleep. I wept and laughed alone in the bed while reading it. Great, sad, emotional and good story teller!!!!” Mr. Reach Sambath Director, Public Affairs Office for the United Nation Khmer Rouge Tribunal (UNKRT) Extraordinary Chambers in the Court of Cambodia (ECCC) * * * “Heart-wrenching, tragic, and riveting—Ronnie Yimsut’s testimonial about his experiences before, during, and after Pol Pot’s Khmer Rouge regime will bring you to tears and to greater understanding of this genocidal period of history. Ronnie Yimsut guides the reader though dark and chilling moments (a brutal war, a mass execution he survived, a world of enormous cruelty and terror, the constant threat of death) into the light of his escape from, and eventual return to Cambodia. In the end, his story is one of triumph over horrors none of us should have to endure, a story that you will find difficult to stop reading and hard to forget.” Dr. Alex Hinton, Author, researcher, and professor Rutgers University * * * “Anyone who wants to know and to understand the plight of Cambodian people during the Khmer Rouge atrocities must read this extraordinary eyewitness account. He describes in depth his suffering and the inhumane treatment of innocent people by the Pol Pot regime. His remarkable story moved me tremendously because it is my story as well. I strongly recommend this book be taught in schools so the next generation will not allow genocide to ever happen again.” (The late) Dith Pran The New York Times photographer & founder of the Dith Pran Holocaust Awareness Project Inc. The man whose story is told in the 1984 movies, “The Killing Fields.” * * * “Facing the Khmer Rouge is beautifully written, informative and heartbreaking. Ronnie Yimsut’s prose reads like poetry, vivid and captivating; and chock full of crisp details and imageries. With each turn of the page, Yimsut pulls readers deeper into his emotional and spiritual journey through his years of war and horrors. Yet, his story of love, family, and country, told in a soft, meditative voice—also breathes of forgiveness and healing. Facing the Khmer Rouge is a courageous memoir, and one that undoubtedly will leave Yimsut’s readers believing in the best of man’s humanity to man.” Loung Ung Renowned Activist, Best Selling Author of “First They Killed My Father” and “Lucky Child” * * * “Facing the Khmer Rouge reflects the way many Cambodian genocide survivors feel, but are often reluctant to express. His vivid recollections are full of passion – the passion of a man who is angry at the injustices done to so many innocent people – and a longing for an idyllic childhood that has been lost to him. Mr. Yimsut, who I have been proud to call my friend for over a decade, has the courage to express his fears, anger, and love of Cambodia in this vivid biography. Young Cambodians should read his book to help them imagine what it is like to lose one’s parents and relatives to the Khmer Rouge, whose promises of equality and prosperity for all were never fulfilled. His book is a call for understanding and a bridge to reaching out to the future.” Youk Chhang Renowned Activist and one of Time Magazine’s Top 100 “Most Influential People” in the world for 2007, the Director of Documentation Center of Cambodia (DCCAM.org) * * * “Facing the Khmer Rouge addresses a topic that is both timely and immediate. Indeed, as the U.N./Khmer Rouge Tribunal (or Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia) moves toward sentencing the first Khmer Rouge official charged and convicted of crimes against humanity, Facing the Khmer Rouge speaks to both a genocidal past and its aftermath. Within the emergent field of Cambodian memoir, Yimsut’s text is unique with regard to its approach and its timeframe. Whereas most memoirs adhere to a triptych narrative (before the Khmer Rouge, during the Democratic Kampuchean regime, and then a brief retelling of experiences in refugee camps), Facing the Khmer Rouge is much more expansive. Further, Facing the Khmer Rouge is significant with regard to its geographic focus. While the majority of Cambodian/American memoirs begin in Phnom Penh, Yimsut’s story makes visible another significant site: Siem Reap. This would be an ideal text for courses focused on Southeast Asian/American Studies, Asian American Studies, and Ethnic Studies. Facing the Khmer Rouge’s engagement with migration and immigration (which is both personal and includes mention of specific procedures) makes it relevant to multiple fields. The writing is accessible, often moving, and the book would be appealing to a non-academic audience. Further, Facing the Khmer Rouge takes the reader from Cambodia to the United States, from childhood to adulthood, and from revenge to reconciliation. In so doing, Yimsut accesses a largely untold story of the Khmer Rouge era, and the book will no doubt serve as an important text within an Asian American and Cambodian American archive. In particular, the majority of memoirs are published by women, focus more on “growing up under the Khmer Rouge,” and very rarely involve extensive discussions about life in the United States and return to Cambodia. Loung Ung’s /Lucky Child/ (2005) is focused on life _after_ the Democratic Kampuchea era, but Yimsut’s text breaks away from what has become a “stock” narrative. “ Rutgers University Press Book Review and Publication Committee * * * “Some two dozen books have been published by survivors of the Khmer Rouge genocide, recounting their experiences in the catastrophic effort by Cambodian communists to build an agrarian utopia in the late 1970s. Many of those books are breathtaking feats of power and passion. None of these existing works, however, embody the immediacy, range of experience, raw emotion, and drama found in a new offering by Cambodian-American Ronnie Yimsut. In his “Facing the Khmer Rouge,” Yimsut summons from his personal darkness all of the terror that ordinary Cambodians suffered during the Khmer Rouge regime, and casts the mayhem onto the printed page before our eyes. In so doing, he reveals important new dimensions of the Khmer Rouge genocide that were beyond the experience—and the descriptive powers—of previous Cambodian memoirists. For example, Yimsut was rounded up, along with much of his extended family, and marched to the shores of Cambodia’s Great Lake for a mass execution. But by pure chance, he happened to survive the savage blows meant to kill him, waking to find himself surrounded by the corpses of his loved ones. Yimsut describes the sheer, unimaginable horror of this shocking event in spare, gut-wrenching prose that can never be forgotten. In another episode of Yimsut’s gripping saga of survival, he describes how he made common cause with other survivors of the Khmer Rouge terror, joining together in a small band to attack a heavily armed Khmer Rouge encampment with nothing more than sticks and stones, wreaking a small measure of vengeance on their tormentors. A morass of contradictory emotions washes over him as he realizes that like those who had murdered his family, he too has become a killer. Few would be willing to so candidly expose such inner anguish, and fewer yet would be capable of communicating these kinds of memories with the clarity and raw intensity brought to the challenge by Yimsut. The tale of personal quest to rehabilitate himself, make a new life in a new world, and then return to help rebuild the land of his birth, is a vividly inspiring story of struggle and redemption. There is no finer first-person account of what it means to be a survivor of the Khmer Rouge genocide.” Craig Etcheson, PhD Special Investigator, the UN Tribunal Office of Prosecutor, author, researcher, and
48. Cambodia's Hun Sen Is No Savior; In an Interview, the Vietnamese-Backed Leader Is Tough and Temperamental By Lally Weymouth The Washington Post, April 16, 1989
(Comments: this article and the next one titled ‘Hun Sen making an Impact; Cambodian Premier’s role rivals Sihanouk,’ provide a unique perspective and retrospective view on the relationship between Huns Sen and Sihanouk. Both articles dated back to 1989.
The main question in this case is whether the relationship between Sihanouk and Hun Sen, on the one hand, and the relationship between Hun Sen and the Vietnamese, have changed in any way, since those article were written, that would make Cambodia less dependent on both Hun Sen and the Vietnamese?
This important question was well-captured by the Washington Post reporter Lally Weymouth, as she wrote that: ‘Hun Sen is really a nationalist, capable of breaking away from the Vietnamese and Soviet orbit if he receives Western help, argue some Thai officials and western diplomats. They express what seems to be a growing consensus in Asia that the best way out of the Cambodia conflict is for Prince Sihanouk, the country's former leader, to make a deal with Hun Sen—leaving the ruthless Khmer Rouge faction out in the cold. But a talk with Hun Sen last week dispelled some of the myths that have grown up about his flexibility and willingness to stray from the Vietnamese orbit.’ From the question raised in the second article as to whether Hun Sen was the most powerful leader of the CPP and suggested that he is only number three, while Chea Sim and Heng Samrin main leaders, occupying number one and two, respectively. It is clear that Hun Sen is now the number one in the CPP with the full backing of the Vietnamese, and especially by Sihanouk. Here we are, fellow-Cambodians, the stark reality of today’s Cambodia, and it is not about to change anytime soon, for lack of genuinely honest, compassionate, capable, courageous leader. Naranhkiri Tith Ph.D. Washington DC. March 10, 2011) ---------------------------------------------------------------------- PHNOM PENH - Hun Sen, this country's prime minister, is the toast of Asia these days. His supporters argue that the 37-year-old leader, installed and backed by the Vietnamese, has turned out to be more than a puppet. Hun Sen is really a nationalist, capable of breaking away from the Vietnamese and Soviet orbit if he receives Western help, argue some Thai officials and western diplomats. They express what seems to be a growing consensus in Asia that the best way out of the Cambodia conflict is for Prince Sihanouk, the country's former leader, to make a deal with Hun Sen--leaving the ruthless Khmer Rouge faction out in the cold. But a talk with Hun Sen last week dispelled some of the myths that have grown up about his flexibility and willingness to stray from the Vietnamese orbit. Sitting in a large room with the curtains drawn, dressed in shirtsleeves with his favourite "555" cigarettes on the table, Hun Sen made clear during a 90-minute interview his opposition to the two ideas that would give his government the legitimacy and credibility he seeks--the presence of an international peacekeeping force to monitor Vietnamese troop withdrawal and the presence of international observers to insure a free and fair election. The Cambodian leader actually lost his temper at one point during the interview, raising his voice, waving his finger and telling me that I was free to ask questions but not to challenge his answers. Given such intransigence on Hun Sen's part, it is hard to imagine the outcome of his May 2 meeting with Prince Sihanouk. It's widely hoped that the meeting may pave the way for a diplomatic settlement, following Vietnam's announcement a week ago that it will withdraw its troops from Cambodia in September and Prince Sihanouk's claim that Hun Sen has made two important concessions. But Hun Sen dampened any such speculation about concessions. "I don't understand what concessions he thinks I made to him," Hun Sen said. "Prince Sihanouk says the French told him I had made two points of accommodation to him, but I never asked the French to tell Prince Sihanouk that I had made concessions to him. Everyone should know what are the concessions of the government of Phnom Penh...the withdrawal of Vietnamese troops without any conditions." (Hun Sen avoided mentioning two quite specific conditions he has set: cessation of foreign assistance to Cambodian resistance fighters, and a right for Hun Sen to request the return of Vietnamese troops if he deems it necessary.) There were more discouraging words from Hun Sen. Prince Sihanouk, China and the ASEAN countries have called for the replacement of Hun Sen's government (the Peoples' Republic of Kampuchea, or PRK) by a new coalition government made up of Hun Sen's faction and the three resistance groups that have been fighting the Vietnamese occupation of Cambodia, including the Khmer Rouge faction that devastated the country when it ruled during the 1970s under Pol Pot. But Hun Sen said: "In no case (will) we accept the dismantling of our government." Instead of the four-party arrangement, Hun Sen wants a coalition between himself and Sihanouk. "Prince Sihanouk will have a position in our government if he would like to join us. The position may be that of a head of state," he said. But when pressed as to whether he was willing to give real power to Sihanouk, Hun Sen hedged by answering that in his government there were no pro-forma positions. Hun Sen uses the inclusion of the Khmer Rouge in the four-party proposal to discredit the idea and to promote the alternative of his sharing power with Sihanouk. This would of course leave Hun Sen in the enviable position of being the only party in the alliance with a strong military force. "The people we cannot accept are the Khmer Rouge, and the people easily acceptable to us are people like Prince Sihanouk," said Hun Sen. Would he be willing to have a free election and give Prince Sihanouk the time to campaign against him? "If we strike a political solution, what we really desire is to have free elections," he said. "If no election has been held, there will be no sharing of power." The word "election" excites hope, but Hun Sen has very particular ideas about how it should be run. He says the elections will be supervised by a national reconciliation council that he claims will be independent of his PRK government. But he refuses to have neutral international observers of an election. He says any monitoring will be done by an international control commission, which the Vietnamese have suggested would be composed of Poland, India and Canada. When it is pointed out to Hun Sen that similar international control commissions failed to enforce peace accords in 1954 during French withdrawal from Vietnam and in 1973 during U.S. troop withdrawal, he gets mad and begins waving his finger. His display of temper is a reminder that Hun Sen himself was once a member of the Khmer Rouge. The question of an international peacekeeping force to monitor the withdrawal of Vietnamese troops meets with the same harsh rejection. Hun Sen bases his opposition to a United Nations peacekeeping force on the dubious grounds that he doesn't know whether "this body will come here to fight the war or to control the situation." Although some analysts have claimed that there are factions in the Khmer Rouge, some more acceptable than the extremists in the group, Hun Sen said he sees no cracks in "the stubborn Khmer Rouge leadership." And he downplayed the effectiveness of the resistance, claiming that their activities were "confined to the Kampuchean-Thai border or to rural areas and mostly were aimed at civilian targets." According to Hun Sen, the key to "peace"--by which he apparently means the key to his government staying in power--is for foreign countries to cut off aid to the resistance when the Vietnamese withdraw their troops from Cambodia. He says that China must drop its demand for an internal political settlement--which the United States also wants--and settle for an external settlement only, the withdrawal of the Vietnamese troops. With some reason, Hun Sen is pinning his hopes on Thai Prime Minister Chatichai Choonhavan, who seems to be emerging as the Oscar Arias of Asia. Since he came to power last August, Chatichai and his left-leaning advisors have attempted to soften the previous Thai policy of supporting resistance against the Vietnamese-backed government of Hun Sen. "I believe the main key is Thailand," said Hun Sen. "If Thailand would not allow this group (the Khmer Rouge) to stay there, that would be the end of their existence." China and Thailand have a close alliance and the scenario painted by Hun Sen is a very unlikely one, yet he claims to sense a shift in Thai policy. "I had a feeling that Thailand doesn't like the Khmer Rouge. Even the Chinese...are not going to embrace the Khmer Rouge until the end of their days.... I understand the way they used the Khmer Rouge against us. Therefore we must remove those reasons from them: That is the reason for the withdrawal of the Vietnamese troops.... If after the withdrawal they continue to help the Khmer Rouge, that would be another story." The last word belonged to an old Cambodian shopkeeper here who had lived through Sihanouk's time, then Pol Pot's and now Hun Sen's. "He is my king," he said passionately when asked about Sihanouk. In a truly free and fair election, he said, Sihanouk would win. For speaking these frank words, he added, he risked being sent to jail without a trail, forever. Perhaps Hun Sen may, as is rumoured, change the "Kampuchean" flag, its national anthem and its constitution--perhaps even change its name back to Cambodia. But it will take more than such cosmetic changes to make Hun Sen more than a Southeast Asian version of Afghanistan's Najibullah. [Lally Weymouth writes regularly about foreign affairs for The Washington Post.]
49 The ‘emperor’s clothes’ are coming into light in Vietnam The Phnom Penh Post; Monday, 17 January 2011 15:00 Roger Mitton Hits: 265 ---------------------------------------------------------------
(Comments: This is a very important article for the future of Cambodia, as it dealt with both the important issues of freedom and corruption in all Southeast Asia, especially in Vietnam, Indonesia and Cambodia based on a recent report by Random House, a democracy-rating institution.
It should be clear for those Cambodians who still believe that Hun Sen is not patriot but a traitor-dictator, and that Vietnam is increasingly facing the moment of truth regarding its internal oppression and its external aggressiveness toward Cambodia and Laos, could be unravelled by events of mass movement that is taking place now in the Middle East.
This possibility was well-captured by the author of this article when he wrote:
“Quite aptly, Vietnam gets the worst score of 7 for political freedom, but oddly is given 5 for civil liberties – which, as any journalist, lawyer or churchgoer will tell you, is an aberration. Intriguingly, Vietnam’s 7-5 rating matches exactly that of Tunisia, where an ancient dictatorship was finally overthrown last week by its long-repressed people. The gargoyles in Hanoi’s ruling Communist kleptocracy must be glancing nervously over their shoulders and wondering if such a thing could happen there.”
However, having said that, this would happen in Cambodia only and only if Cambodians can choose the right kind of leader that could bring all this happening to Cambodia. And I may add, it is not the kind of leader that Sam Rainsy is now providing. He is not a leader that Cambodia needs badly, without the basic human qualities such as, dignity, courage, perseverance, compassion, modest. These moral characteristics are all common traits present in such world greatest leaders such as; Nelson Mandela, Aung San Suu Kyi, and mahatma Gandhi. Last but not least, to have these kind of leaders, the Cambodian people must stop compromising on the criteria of choice for their leaders. Naranhkiri Tith Ph.D. Washington D.C. March 8, 2011)
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LAST Thursday, one of the world’s more respected democracy-rating institutions, Freedom House, released its annual report. The results received little play in this region, for the obvious reason that Southeast Asia is one of the least free parts of the world.
In fact, among the report’s most shocking revelations is that there is only one country in Southeast Asia that can be classified as “free”.
It is likely that if you ask most people, including scholarly experts, which country that is, their answer would be incorrect.
For it is Indonesia.
Wow! How wonderful, how amazing, how gratifying. The changes there have just been stupendously positive.
When I first visited Java in 1976, it was about a decade after the so-called ‘Year of Living Dangerously’ when one dictator, Sukarno, had been replaced by another, Suharto. Between them, these two men ruled Indonesia for more than half a century from independence in 1945 to the first stirrings of democracy in 1998.
Incredibly, it was not until the millennium eve that a basic form of democracy arrived under President Abdurrahman Wahid – and not until four years later was full liberty achieved with the election of President Susilo Bambamg Yudhyono. So this huge, sprawling, multi-ethnic, multi-religious nation has only been democratic for about six years.
Yet in the freedom stakes, it has far surpassed the likes of Cambodia, Malaysia, Singapore and Thailand, and is rated even higher than the Philippines.
As a result, Freedom House gave Indonesia a score of 2 for political rights and 3 for civil liberties. The top score is 1, the worst, 7.
Unfairly, but perhaps predictably, Myanmar gets 7 on both counts; the same as North Korea, Libya and Somalia.
Yet unlike those benighted nations, Myanmar has held elections and does permit a range of political parties to exist, and even allows a modicum – admittedly minuscule – of free speech.
Because of that, Myanmar should really be rated ahead rather than behind Laos and Vietnam.
Quite aptly, Vietnam gets the worst score of 7 for political freedom, but oddly is given 5 for civil liberties – which, as any journalist, lawyer or churchgoer will tell you, is an aberration.
Intriguingly, Vietnam’s 7-5 rating matches exactly that of Tunisia, where an ancient dictatorship was finally overthrown last week by its long-repressed people.
The gargoyles in Hanoi’s ruling Communist kleptocracy must be glancing nervously over their shoulders and wondering if such a thing could happen there. The answer is: Yes, it could – and it will, possibly sooner than expected if the regime continues to elevate mediocrity to the level of incompetence in mishandling the economy.
While it was shocking that only Indonesia made the fully free grade, it was satisfying to see the Philippines rated as ‘partly free’ and as the region’s only other ‘electoral democracy.’
Due to its comparatively peaceful and credible elections last May, Manila’s performance was deemed ‘the most positive development’ in the Asia Pacific region.
But that forward movement was negated by the downward trend in Cambodia and Thailand, where political rights and civil liberties were squeezed.
Noting the CPP government’s ‘consolidation of control over all aspects of the electoral process and its increased intimidation of civil society’, Freedom House gave Cambodia the black mark designation of a “not free” country.
That kind of regression was not uncommon as most Southeast Asian nations now mute criticism by staging parodies of the democratic process.
“A lot of states talk about democracy and say: At least we’re holding elections, it’s progress. When of course most of them are illiberal processes that just support the status quo,” said Dave Mathieson of the Asia division of Human Rights Watch.
Sadly, it recalls the late American writer John Updike noting ‘the inevitable tendency of a despot, be he king, ward boss, or dictator, to prefer loyalty to ability.’ That’s just what we see all across this region.
50. THAI, CAMBODIAN AND VIETNAMESE TIES; and spat with 'Siem', Hun Sen needs Hanoi in his corner Bangkok Post: Published: 1the high stake that Hun Sen is willing to paly /01/2010 at 12:00 AM By Pavin Chachavalpongpun Newspaper section: News ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- (Comments: this article clearly shows educated Thai people do understand the high stake that Hun Sen is willing to play in order to please his boss the Vietnamese. That is why some Thai intellectuals have come out and try to moderate the politicians to prevent an open warfare with Cambodia. They know that that what Vietnam wants and that Vietnam is more than happy to come in Cambodia to save Cambodia again. What is sad is to find so many Cambodians, especially those who are now living in Northern America and Europe, who are so naïve and believe that Hun Sen is doing all this for the sake defending Cambodia’s national interests, and that included Sam Rainsy who calculatingly support Hun Sen in this Preah Vihear issue, hoping that Hun Sen would pardon him again. As I said many times before, Sam Rainsy had shown his lack of courage and total lack of moral principles. He does not realize that Hun sen cannot pardon even if he so wishes, because the Vietnamese would not allow him to do so. To criticize Hun Sen for corruption is pardonable, but to violate the content and spirit of the 1979 so-called friendship, peace and cooperation and the 1985 border treaty is not pardonable, as it touches on the very strategy that Vietnam is using to slowly conquer Cambodia, as they had done with Kampuchea Krom a few centuries ago. We should not forget that it was Sihanouk who pushed his son king Sihamoni to sign the 2005 supplements to the border treaty thus render these imposed treaties official. It is sad to see that most Cambodians still are so disconnected and so unsophisticated not to be able to see what is wrong in this tragic affairs of Preah Vihear and to support Hun Sen in this dispute. Naranhkiri Tith Ph.D. Washington DC. March 7, 2011) -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------. Relations between Thailand and Cambodia have shown no signs of improvement. Foreign Minister Kasit Piromya has insisted that normal diplomatic ties cannot resume until Phnom Penh ends its relationship with former prime minister Thaksin Shinawatra. Keeping relations sweet: Cambodian PM Hun Sen, right, with Vietnamese Prime Minister Nguyen Tan Dung. Meanwhile, Cambodian Prime Minister Hun Sen continues to challenge the Thai leadership. On January 12, 2010 Mr Hun Sen said that ties might be restored soon because Prime Minister Abhisit Vejjajiva's embattled government would not last much longer. To understand what has been happening in Thai-Cambodian relations, one must not analyse them solely in the bilateral context. The need to consider other geopolitical factors, particularly within mainland Southeast Asia, is imperative in order to comprehend certain behaviour of political leaders and the reasons behind their policies in regard to their neighbours. Cambodia is a small state, being sandwiched between two bigger neighbours: Thailand and Vietnam. Leaders in Phnom Penh have taken the advantage of its location by playing one neighbour against the other. This is not a new tactic. Siam used the same strategy when it dealt with the British and the French during the colonial period. Some Thai historians agree that it was this strategy that helped Siam escape colonisation. For Cambodia, Vietnam has always been a powerful nation. Prior to the advent of the French colonialists, Cambodia was dominated by Vietnam and paid tribute to its rulers in Hanoi. During the Cold War, relations between Cambodia and Vietnam were shaped by conflict and mutual distrust. In 1978, Vietnamese forces began a full-scale invasion of Cambodia. Not until 1990 did Vietnam completely withdraw its troops from the country. Today, however, ties between Phnom Penh and Hanoi are at their best. Mr Hun Sen is known to have forged close relations with the Vietnamese leadership and has attempted to reduce the level of economic dependence on Thailand. In many ways, Mr Hun Sen has used his intimate relations with Hanoi to counter-balance his country's ties with Bangkok. At this critical juncture in Thai-Cambodian relations, his strong friendship with Vietnam had added a sense of confidence to his uncompromising diplomacy vis-a-vis Thailand. Ou Virak, director of the Cambodian Centre for Human Rights, interestingly explained the current state of the Thai-Cambodian conflict in the context of Cambodian-Vietnamese relations. He said that Hun Sen has to think about the Cambodian-Vietnamese border to the east as well, not just the Cambodian-Thai border to the west. Mr Ou Virak reportedly said: "The debates about the Khmer-Vietnamese border have been restricted by the government, but on the Khmer-Thai conflict, we see not only that the Cambodian government pays special attention, but incites anger against Thailand, complicit in the change of the word from "Thai" to "Siem" to describe the Thai people, using television and radio networks to attack Thailand. "But on the eastern (Vietnam) side, we have never seen the Cambodian government support border protection against Vietnam's encroachments." This observation of Mr Ou Virak has became more tangible in the recent political struggle between Hun Sen and Sam Rainsy, leader of the opposition Sam Rainsy Party (SRP). In October 2009, Mr Sam Rainsy led a number of Cambodian farmers in Svay Rieng province in removing six wooden posts that marked the border with Vietnam. A month later, he released a statement accusing the Hun Sen government of failing to protect Khmer territory. Mr Sam Rainsy said: "Vietnam has been, over the last 30 years, grabbing thousands of square kilometres of Khmer territory. This is an ongoing painful process that Hun Sen does not want us to look at. But we cannot help see the tears and hear the cries of countless Khmer farmers who are losing their rice fields to Vietnam." He also said that the farmers' land rights in the area were not respected in the border demarcation process between Cambodia and Vietnam that is currently underway and scheduled to be completed by 2012. Mr Hun Sen struck back by charging Mr Rainsy with destruction of property and racial incitement. At present, Mr Rainsy is in exile in France. Mr Hun Sen is aware that he cannot allow domestic politics to upset the Vietnamese leadership. To put it simply, he cannot fight with both Thailand and Vietnam. After all, the country has already suffered from the interruption in bilateral trade with Thailand. Cambodia cannot afford to jeopardise its economic interests with Vietnam. In recent years, Vietnam has made significant economic inroads into Cambodia. It has reportedly expressed its interests in Cambodia's agri-business, aviation, telecommunications and banking. Last month, Hanoi signed an agreement with Phnom Penh that could result in investments worth billions of dollars, including a deal in aluminium ore, known as bauxite, in Cambodia's border province of Mondokiri. But this game of politics, found inside Thailand and Cambodia, runs parallel with the local reality on both sides of the border. Local Thais and Cambodians want to keep bilateral ties "normal". The friendly boat race in Koh Kong early this month, among teams from Cambodia, Thailand and Vietnam, proved that the people at the borderlands undoubtedly prefer peace to conflict. - Pavin Chachavalpongpun is author of the forthcoming book, "Temple of Doom: Hysteria about the Preah Vihear Temple in the Thai Nationalist Discourse."
51. ASEAN flexes mediating muscle By Clifford McCoy Asia Times; March 1, 2011
(Comments: there is a hopeful sign from ASEAN that the Preah Vihear dispute may be settled through ASEAN internal negotiating framework that would enhance the image of ASEAN in the region as just a holding–hand association. This effort by the Indonesian foreign minister to mediate independently from the United Nations Security Council, is a good step forward toward a better and more credible regional stability in Southeast Asia. This progress may help Cambodia in distancing itself from Vietnam, and is cautiously captured by Asia Times in this paragraph from the newspaper, as follows;
“That said, there is still the potential for Thai and Cambodian domestic politics - widely viewed as the driving force behind the ramped up dispute - to undermine ASEAN's mediation efforts towards a permanent solution. But with ASEAN observers present and the recognition that peaceful resolution of the issue is not only in the best interest of Thailand and Cambodia, but also ASEAN as a whole, there is powerful multilateral incentive to avoid further armed conflict.”
However, even assuming that ASEAN is successful in this mediation effort between Cambodia and Thailand, it does not eliminate the deadly Vietnamese grip in Cambodia, as long as Sihanouk is under Hun Sen’s control, and both of these Cambodian so-called “leaders” remain subservient to Vietnam. Naranhkiri Tith Ph.D. Washington DC. March 03, 2011)
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Indonesian observers have arrived on the Thai-Cambodian border in a multilateral bid to monitor the implementation of a tentative ceasefire between the two sides. The fight has called into question the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) core "no-war" policy and caused the regional grouping to rethink its long held policy of non-interference in member states' internal affairs. Armed hostilities between Thailand and Cambodia in February resulted in the deaths of at least 11 and displacement of thousands of villagers in the area. Preah Vihear, the 11th century temple at the center of the territorial dispute, as well as another nearby temple, suffered significant damage from shellfire and small arms.
The fighting was the heaviest since border tensions escalated in 2008, and this time threatened to spread beyond the contested 4.6 kilometer area around the temple into a full-scale border war. Thai and Cambodian military and government officials claimed they acted only in self-defense and accused each other of starting the shooting, which involved small arms, rocket propelled grenades and exchanges of artillery fire.
A 1962 decision by the International Court of Justice (ICJ) awarded the temple to Cambodia, but did not stipulate who owns the land adjacent to the temple. The issue largely remained dormant until 2008 when Phnom Penh applied to the United Nation's Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) for World Heritage status for the temple, a move that stoked nationalist sentiment in Thailand.
ASEAN aims to settle disputes before they spiral and maintains a no war policy among its members. True to that credo, there here have been no open wars between ASEAN members since its founding in 1967 and all member countries are signatories to the 1976 Treaty of Amity and Cooperation, which has been adopted as the region's code of conduct. The grouping has in the past helped to diffuse a series of border disputes and other bilateral issues.
Some analysts believe ASEAN's mediation of the current dispute between Thailand and Cambodia could set a precedent for future conflict resolution in the region. The grouping is not known for taking proactive measures on security and political issues and has often swept nettlesome issues under the carpet in the interest of group harmony. Although this stance has helped the grouping to mature, become more cohesive and a relatively respected international player, it has failed to establish structures to deal with issues when they go beyond bilateral arrangements.
If allowed to spiral into open war, the dispute between Bangkok and Phnom Penh not only threatened to destabilize the region but could also have lead to a breakdown in ASEAN as a security community. Rather than work through ASEAN's perceived as ineffectual security mechanisms, member nations could decide to resort to force to settle issues or seek solutions outside the ASEAN framework.
On the other hand, a successful mediation of the dispute would provide ASEAN with enhanced credibility on issues that affect the peace and stability of the region. It would also further cement ASEAN as the key linchpin in several security structures, including the ASEAN Regional Forum, East Asia Summit, Asia-Europe Meeting, Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation and the ASEAN Defense Ministers Forum (ADMM) and the ADMM Plus Eight.
The United Nations gave ASEAN its implicit support following a February 14 meeting on the dispute at the UN Security Council (UNSC). While the council was willing to hear both countries' versions of the dispute and urged a bilateral ceasefire, it made no binding statements. Instead it gave its backing to the efforts of Indonesian foreign minister and current ASEAN chairman Marty Natalegawa. Closed door discussions between Thailand's and Cambodia's foreign ministers, Natalegawa and UNSC president Maria Luiza Ribiero Viotti of Brazil were held on the sidelines of the UNSC meeting.
Natalegawa had already earned praise for his quick initiative in travelling to Bangkok and Phnom Penh to push for talks between the two countries to end the conflict and his participation at the UNSC. Throughout his negotiations, Natalegawa has made clear that the issue should be settled bilaterally, but "at the same time, there is always space for ASEAN and members of ASEAN to support the bilateral effort".
Natalegawa followed up by calling a meeting of foreign ministers from all 10 ASEAN nations in Jakarta on February 22. An agreement was reached that built on a ceasefire agreed between military commanders on February 20 and acted on Thailand's suggestion the next day of embedding Indonesian observers with units on both sides to monitor the ceasefire. While no permanent ceasefire has been signed, ASEAN observers are seen as a first step and a sign of commitment to the ceasefire. It was also agreed that further bilateral talks with Indonesian participation will be held in the near future.
Up to 40 Indonesian military and civilian observers are scheduled to "embed" with Thai and Cambodian military forces stationed at the border. The arrangement does not create a buffer zone, but provides for monitors to report back to the ASEAN chairman as well as to Bangkok and Phnom Penh. Natalegawa has made it clear that the observers are "not a peace-keeping or a peace enforcement team". At the same time, he has characterized the intervention as a "seminal development in ASEAN's capacity to deal with a conflict situation."
Significantly, ASEAN's maneuvers have received the backing of both the United States and China. Beijing's Foreign Ministry spokesman Ma Zhaoxu told a regular press briefing, "China appreciates and supports Indonesia's active mediation efforts to tackle the Cambodia-Thailand border conflict under the ASEAN framework."
US State Department spokesman P J Crowley said during a regular press briefing on February 23 that the US welcomed "ASEAN's efforts under the leadership of Indonesia" and supported the call of ASEAN foreign ministers for Cambodia and Thailand to resume bilateral negotiations "at the earliest opportunity".
That said, there is still the potential for Thai and Cambodian domestic politics - widely viewed as the driving force behind the ramped up dispute - to undermine ASEAN's mediation efforts towards a permanent solution. But with ASEAN observers present and the recognition that peaceful resolution of the issue is not only in the best interest of Thailand and Cambodia, but also ASEAN as a whole, there is powerful multilateral incentive to avoid further armed conflict.
Clifford McCoy is a freelance journalist
(Copyright 2011 Asia Times Online (Holdings) Ltd. All rights reserved. Please contact us about sales, syndication and republishing.)
52. Hun Sen Making An Impact; Cambodian Premier's Role Rivals Sihanouk's By Keith B. Richburg Washington Post Foreign Service; The Washington Post, June 22, 1989
------------------------------------------------------- PHNOM PENH - To his opponents, Prime Minister Hun Sen is a "traitor" and a "puppet," a former Khmer Rouge guerrilla who collaborated with the Vietnamese troops who invaded and occupied Cambodia. To his growing number of supporters inside Cambodia and abroad, he is a patriot, committed to regaining his country's independence, unifying the four warring factions and improving the living standards of the rural peasantry. Whichever view history bears out, Cambodia's 38-year-old Hun Sen has emerged from the obscurity of his peasant-fighter background to become one of the two central figures who will determine the fate of Cambodia and its 8 million people. The other is Prince Norodom Sihanouk, former ruler of Cambodia, who has headed a tripartite guerrilla coalition fighting Hun Sen's Vietnamese-backed government. According to many analysts, Sihanouk and Hun Sen must find a political accommodation before Cambodia can end its long civil war. In recent months, Hun Sen has become the most visible and articulate salesman--in the international arena and within his own ruling Communist Party Politburo--for the economic and political revisions Phnom Penh is moving to adopt. He has increased his profile in the countryside, and frequently discusses key issues on state-run radio. For example, after his last meeting with Sihanouk in May, he went on the radio to explain the peace process. He has also been presiding at religious ceremonies, and was televised praying with leading Buddhist monks in January when a sacred relic - said to be a bone of Buddha - was returned to a blue temple in front of the Phnom Penh train station. Hun Sen travels to Cambodia's provincial villages two or three times a month "to listen to the people and to explain to the people the positions of the party," said Cham Prisit, a close adviser. On these trips, he and others said, Hun Sen often borrows a motorcycle and rides to isolated hamlets with the fervour of a Western-style politician. Said one foreign relief worker, "He's really into the hard-sell style of politics--almost to the point of kissing babies." "Everybody knows Hun Sen," said a foreign relief worker here. "I think people are really responding to the propaganda effort. Young people especially identify with Hun Sen." Several Cambodian officials, foreign diplomats and relief workers interviewed here said they believed that Hun Sen has become so popular within Cambodia that he now rivals Sihanouk, setting the stage for what some foreign residents said could be a fascinating electoral showdown if elections are held. "Sihanouk has always enjoyed the support of the peasants, but never the intellectuals," said Khieu Kanharit, editor of the weekly newspaper Kampuchean and a party member. "Hun Sen is supported by both." Diplomats and other regional analysts said Hun Sen's international stature has grown considerably since his visit earlier this year to Bangkok, where Prime Minister Chatichai Choonhavan gave him a reception fit for a head of government, including a lavish dinner. While his government is still only recognised by the East Bloc countries and India, Hun Sen emerged from his Bangkok visit as well as from his talks with Sihanouk as a key player in the Cambodian imbroglio and no longer just a client of Vietnam, these diplomats and others said. Hun Sen appears publicly to have all but eclipsed his nominal superior, Communist Party General Secretary and Cambodian President Heng Samrin, whose official portrait still graces the walls of most government buildings in Phnom Penh and in the provincial capitals. Where once foreign diplomats spoke of "the Heng Samrin regime," they now refer to "the Hun Sen government." But despite his increased visibility, some foreign analysts and Cambodian officials said they believe that within the ruling government and party circle, Hun Sen is by no means the most powerful player. Decisions are still believed to be made by a consensus of the party leadership, which is balanced between reformists and the older, hard-line ideologues. Hun Sen, they said, must always be careful not to overstep his rank--he is only number three in the Politburo hierarchy, behind Heng Samrin and National Assembly chairman Chea Sim--and must honour Asian tradition by showing the proper respect for his elder colleagues. "Hun Sen may be personalising Cambodia for the outside world, but certainly he is not the man who makes all the decisions," said a Soviet diplomat in Phnom Penh, who asked not to be quoted by name. "There is no such man .... The decision-making process is a collective effort." Chea Sim is believed to exercise considerable influence in the party. He also has been taking a higher public profile, travelling to villages and appearing at well-publicised ceremonial functions. And despite his relatively low public posture, Heng Samrin, who has close ties with the leadership in Vietnam, is believed to wield considerable influence. Relatively little is known about Hun Sen's early life. According to his official biography, he was born in April 1951, in Kompong Cham Province, the son of peasant farmers. He joined the Khmer Rouge as a guerrilla when he was 17, fighting mainly in Cambodia's Eastern Zone, the military area that borders Vietnam. His official biography says he rose to the rank of division commander in the guerrilla army and was wounded five times. He also lost his left eye. The biography says Hun Sen defected from the Khmer Rouge on June 20, 1977, after "having witnessed the barbarous policy of genocide carried out" after the Khmer Rouge came to power in April 1975. It says Hun Sen led an unspecified number of "cadres and soldiers" to form a new armed force to oppose the Khmer Rouge, which killed between 1 million and 2 million Cambodians during their nearly four-year rule of the country.
53. The ‘emperor’s clothes’ are coming into light in Vietnam The Phnom Penh Post; Monday, 17 January 2011 15:00 Roger Mitton Hits: 265 ---------------------------------------------------------------
(Comments: This is a very important article for the future of Cambodia, as it dealt with both the important issues of freedom and corruption in all Southeast Asia, especially in Vietnam, Indonesia and Cambodia based on a recent report by Random House, a democracy-rating institution.
It should be clear for those Cambodians who still believe that Hun Sen is not patriot but a traitor-dictator, and that Vietnam is increasingly facing the moment of truth regarding its internal oppression and its external aggressiveness toward Cambodia and Laos, could be unravelled by events of mass movement that is taking place now in the Middle East.
This possibility was well-captured by the author of this article when he wrote:
“Quite aptly, Vietnam gets the worst score of 7 for political freedom, but oddly is given 5 for civil liberties – which, as any journalist, lawyer or churchgoer will tell you, is an aberration. Intriguingly, Vietnam’s 7-5 rating matches exactly that of Tunisia, where an ancient dictatorship was finally overthrown last week by its long-repressed people. The gargoyles in Hanoi’s ruling Communist kleptocracy must be glancing nervously over their shoulders and wondering if such a thing could happen there.”
However, having said that, this would happen in Cambodia only and only if Cambodians can choose the right kind of leader that could bring all this happening to Cambodia. And I may add, it is not the kind of leader that Sam Rainsy is now providing. He is not a leader that Cambodia needs badly, without the basic human qualities such as, dignity, courage, perseverance, compassion, modest. These moral characteristics are all common traits present in such world greatest leaders such as; Nelson Mandela, Aung San Suu Kyi, and mahatma Gandhi. Last but not least, to have these kind of leaders, the Cambodian people must stop compromising on the criteria of choice for their leaders. Naranhkiri Tith Ph.D. Washington D.C. March 8, 2011)
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LAST Thursday, one of the world’s more respected democracy-rating institutions, Freedom House, released its annual report. The results received little play in this region, for the obvious reason that Southeast Asia is one of the least free parts of the world.
In fact, among the report’s most shocking revelations is that there is only one country in Southeast Asia that can be classified as “free”.
It is likely that if you ask most people, including scholarly experts, which country that is, their answer would be incorrect.
For it is Indonesia.
Wow! How wonderful, how amazing, how gratifying. The changes there have just been stupendously positive.
When I first visited Java in 1976, it was about a decade after the so-called ‘Year of Living Dangerously’ when one dictator, Sukarno, had been replaced by another, Suharto. Between them, these two men ruled Indonesia for more than half a century from independence in 1945 to the first stirrings of democracy in 1998.
Incredibly, it was not until the millennium eve that a basic form of democracy arrived under President Abdurrahman Wahid – and not until four years later was full liberty achieved with the election of President Susilo Bambamg Yudhyono. So this huge, sprawling, multi-ethnic, multi-religious nation has only been democratic for about six years.
Yet in the freedom stakes, it has far surpassed the likes of Cambodia, Malaysia, Singapore and Thailand, and is rated even higher than the Philippines.
As a result, Freedom House gave Indonesia a score of 2 for political rights and 3 for civil liberties. The top score is 1, the worst, 7.
Unfairly, but perhaps predictably, Myanmar gets 7 on both counts; the same as North Korea, Libya and Somalia.
Yet unlike those benighted nations, Myanmar has held elections and does permit a range of political parties to exist, and even allows a modicum – admittedly minuscule – of free speech.
Because of that, Myanmar should really be rated ahead rather than behind Laos and Vietnam.
Quite aptly, Vietnam gets the worst score of 7 for political freedom, but oddly is given 5 for civil liberties – which, as any journalist, lawyer or churchgoer will tell you, is an aberration.
Intriguingly, Vietnam’s 7-5 rating matches exactly that of Tunisia, where an ancient dictatorship was finally overthrown last week by its long-repressed people.
The gargoyles in Hanoi’s ruling Communist kleptocracy must be glancing nervously over their shoulders and wondering if such a thing could happen there. The answer is: Yes, it could – and it will, possibly sooner than expected if the regime continues to elevate mediocrity to the level of incompetence in mishandling the economy.
While it was shocking that only Indonesia made the fully free grade, it was satisfying to see the Philippines rated as ‘partly free’ and as the region’s only other ‘electoral democracy.’
Due to its comparatively peaceful and credible elections last May, Manila’s performance was deemed ‘the most positive development’ in the Asia Pacific region.
But that forward movement was negated by the downward trend in Cambodia and Thailand, where political rights and civil liberties were squeezed.
Noting the CPP government’s ‘consolidation of control over all aspects of the electoral process and its increased intimidation of civil society’, Freedom House gave Cambodia the black mark designation of a “not free” country.
That kind of regression was not uncommon as most Southeast Asian nations now mute criticism by staging parodies of the democratic process.
“A lot of states talk about democracy and say: At least we’re holding elections, it’s progress. When of course most of them are illiberal processes that just support the status quo,” said Dave Mathieson of the Asia division of Human Rights Watch.
Sadly, it recalls the late American writer John Updike noting ‘the inevitable tendency of a despot, be he king, ward boss, or dictator, to prefer loyalty to ability.’ That’s just what we see all across this region.
54. THAI, CAMBODIAN AND VIETNAMESE TIES; and spat with 'Siem', Hun Sen needs Hanoi in his corner Bangkok Post: Published: 1the high stake that Hun Sen is willing to paly /01/2010 at 12:00 AM By Pavin Chachavalpongpun Newspaper section: News ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- (Comments: this article clearly shows educated Thai people do understand the high stake that Hun Sen is willing to play in order to please his boss the Vietnamese. That is why some Thai intellectuals have come out and try to moderate the politicians to prevent an open warfare with Cambodia. They know that that what Vietnam wants and that Vietnam is more than happy to come in Cambodia to save Cambodia again. What is sad is to find so many Cambodians, especially those who are now living in Northern America and Europe, who are so naïve and believe that Hun Sen is doing all this for the sake defending Cambodia’s national interests, and that included Sam Rainsy who calculatingly support Hun Sen in this Preah Vihear issue, hoping that Hun Sen would pardon him again. As I said many times before, Sam Rainsy had shown his lack of courage and total lack of moral principles. He does not realize that Hun sen cannot pardon even if he so wishes, because the Vietnamese would not allow him to do so. To criticize Hun Sen for corruption is pardonable, but to violate the content and spirit of the 1979 so-called friendship, peace and cooperation and the 1985 border treaty is not pardonable, as it touches on the very strategy that Vietnam is using to slowly conquer Cambodia, as they had done with Kampuchea Krom a few centuries ago. We should not forget that it was Sihanouk who pushed his son king Sihamoni to sign the 2005 supplements to the border treaty thus render these imposed treaties official. It is sad to see that most Cambodians still are so disconnected and so unsophisticated not to be able to see what is wrong in this tragic affairs of Preah Vihear and to support Hun Sen in this dispute. Naranhkiri Tith Ph.D. Washington DC. March 7, 2011) -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------. Relations between Thailand and Cambodia have shown no signs of improvement. Foreign Minister Kasit Piromya has insisted that normal diplomatic ties cannot resume until Phnom Penh ends its relationship with former prime minister Thaksin Shinawatra. Keeping relations sweet: Cambodian PM Hun Sen, right, with Vietnamese Prime Minister Nguyen Tan Dung. Meanwhile, Cambodian Prime Minister Hun Sen continues to challenge the Thai leadership. On January 12, 2010 Mr Hun Sen said that ties might be restored soon because Prime Minister Abhisit Vejjajiva's embattled government would not last much longer. To understand what has been happening in Thai-Cambodian relations, one must not analyse them solely in the bilateral context. The need to consider other geopolitical factors, particularly within mainland Southeast Asia, is imperative in order to comprehend certain behaviour of political leaders and the reasons behind their policies in regard to their neighbours. Cambodia is a small state, being sandwiched between two bigger neighbours: Thailand and Vietnam. Leaders in Phnom Penh have taken the advantage of its location by playing one neighbour against the other. This is not a new tactic. Siam used the same strategy when it dealt with the British and the French during the colonial period. Some Thai historians agree that it was this strategy that helped Siam escape colonisation. For Cambodia, Vietnam has always been a powerful nation. Prior to the advent of the French colonialists, Cambodia was dominated by Vietnam and paid tribute to its rulers in Hanoi. During the Cold War, relations between Cambodia and Vietnam were shaped by conflict and mutual distrust. In 1978, Vietnamese forces began a full-scale invasion of Cambodia. Not until 1990 did Vietnam completely withdraw its troops from the country. Today, however, ties between Phnom Penh and Hanoi are at their best. Mr Hun Sen is known to have forged close relations with the Vietnamese leadership and has attempted to reduce the level of economic dependence on Thailand. In many ways, Mr Hun Sen has used his intimate relations with Hanoi to counter-balance his country's ties with Bangkok. At this critical juncture in Thai-Cambodian relations, his strong friendship with Vietnam had added a sense of confidence to his uncompromising diplomacy vis-a-vis Thailand. Ou Virak, director of the Cambodian Centre for Human Rights, interestingly explained the current state of the Thai-Cambodian conflict in the context of Cambodian-Vietnamese relations. He said that Hun Sen has to think about the Cambodian-Vietnamese border to the east as well, not just the Cambodian-Thai border to the west. Mr Ou Virak reportedly said: "The debates about the Khmer-Vietnamese border have been restricted by the government, but on the Khmer-Thai conflict, we see not only that the Cambodian government pays special attention, but incites anger against Thailand, complicit in the change of the word from "Thai" to "Siem" to describe the Thai people, using television and radio networks to attack Thailand. "But on the eastern (Vietnam) side, we have never seen the Cambodian government support border protection against Vietnam's encroachments." This observation of Mr Ou Virak has became more tangible in the recent political struggle between Hun Sen and Sam Rainsy, leader of the opposition Sam Rainsy Party (SRP). In October 2009, Mr Sam Rainsy led a number of Cambodian farmers in Svay Rieng province in removing six wooden posts that marked the border with Vietnam. A month later, he released a statement accusing the Hun Sen government of failing to protect Khmer territory. Mr Sam Rainsy said: "Vietnam has been, over the last 30 years, grabbing thousands of square kilometres of Khmer territory. This is an ongoing painful process that Hun Sen does not want us to look at. But we cannot help see the tears and hear the cries of countless Khmer farmers who are losing their rice fields to Vietnam." He also said that the farmers' land rights in the area were not respected in the border demarcation process between Cambodia and Vietnam that is currently underway and scheduled to be completed by 2012. Mr Hun Sen struck back by charging Mr Rainsy with destruction of property and racial incitement. At present, Mr Rainsy is in exile in France. Mr Hun Sen is aware that he cannot allow domestic politics to upset the Vietnamese leadership. To put it simply, he cannot fight with both Thailand and Vietnam. After all, the country has already suffered from the interruption in bilateral trade with Thailand. Cambodia cannot afford to jeopardise its economic interests with Vietnam. In recent years, Vietnam has made significant economic inroads into Cambodia. It has reportedly expressed its interests in Cambodia's agri-business, aviation, telecommunications and banking. Last month, Hanoi signed an agreement with Phnom Penh that could result in investments worth billions of dollars, including a deal in aluminium ore, known as bauxite, in Cambodia's border province of Mondokiri. But this game of politics, found inside Thailand and Cambodia, runs parallel with the local reality on both sides of the border. Local Thais and Cambodians want to keep bilateral ties "normal". The friendly boat race in Koh Kong early this month, among teams from Cambodia, Thailand and Vietnam, proved that the people at the borderlands undoubtedly prefer peace to conflict. - Pavin Chachavalpongpun is author of the forthcoming book, "Temple of Doom: Hysteria about the Preah Vihear Temple in the Thai Nationalist Discourse."
55. ASEAN flexes mediating muscle By Clifford McCoy Asia Times; March 1, 2011
(Comments: there is a hopeful sign from ASEAN that the Preah Vihear dispute may be settled through ASEAN internal negotiating framework that would enhance the image of ASEAN in the region as just a holding–hand association. This effort by the Indonesian foreign minister to mediate independently from the United Nations Security Council, is a good step forward toward a better and more credible regional stability in Southeast Asia. This progress may help Cambodia in distancing itself from Vietnam, and is cautiously captured by Asia Times in this paragraph from the newspaper, as follows;
“That said, there is still the potential for Thai and Cambodian domestic politics - widely viewed as the driving force behind the ramped up dispute - to undermine ASEAN's mediation efforts towards a permanent solution. But with ASEAN observers present and the recognition that peaceful resolution of the issue is not only in the best interest of Thailand and Cambodia, but also ASEAN as a whole, there is powerful multilateral incentive to avoid further armed conflict.”
However, even assuming that ASEAN is successful in this mediation effort between Cambodia and Thailand, it does not eliminate the deadly Vietnamese grip in Cambodia, as long as Sihanouk is under Hun Sen’s control, and both of these Cambodian so-called “leaders” remain subservient to Vietnam. Naranhkiri Tith Ph.D. Washington DC. March 03, 2011)
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Indonesian observers have arrived on the Thai-Cambodian border in a multilateral bid to monitor the implementation of a tentative ceasefire between the two sides. The fight has called into question the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) core "no-war" policy and caused the regional grouping to rethink its long held policy of non-interference in member states' internal affairs. Armed hostilities between Thailand and Cambodia in February resulted in the deaths of at least 11 and displacement of thousands of villagers in the area. Preah Vihear, the 11th century temple at the center of the territorial dispute, as well as another nearby temple, suffered significant damage from shellfire and small arms.
The fighting was the heaviest since border tensions escalated in 2008, and this time threatened to spread beyond the contested 4.6 kilometer area around the temple into a full-scale border war. Thai and Cambodian military and government officials claimed they acted only in self-defense and accused each other of starting the shooting, which involved small arms, rocket propelled grenades and exchanges of artillery fire.
A 1962 decision by the International Court of Justice (ICJ) awarded the temple to Cambodia, but did not stipulate who owns the land adjacent to the temple. The issue largely remained dormant until 2008 when Phnom Penh applied to the United Nation's Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) for World Heritage status for the temple, a move that stoked nationalist sentiment in Thailand.
ASEAN aims to settle disputes before they spiral and maintains a no war policy among its members. True to that credo, there here have been no open wars between ASEAN members since its founding in 1967 and all member countries are signatories to the 1976 Treaty of Amity and Cooperation, which has been adopted as the region's code of conduct. The grouping has in the past helped to diffuse a series of border disputes and other bilateral issues.
Some analysts believe ASEAN's mediation of the current dispute between Thailand and Cambodia could set a precedent for future conflict resolution in the region. The grouping is not known for taking proactive measures on security and political issues and has often swept nettlesome issues under the carpet in the interest of group harmony. Although this stance has helped the grouping to mature, become more cohesive and a relatively respected international player, it has failed to establish structures to deal with issues when they go beyond bilateral arrangements.
If allowed to spiral into open war, the dispute between Bangkok and Phnom Penh not only threatened to destabilize the region but could also have lead to a breakdown in ASEAN as a security community. Rather than work through ASEAN's perceived as ineffectual security mechanisms, member nations could decide to resort to force to settle issues or seek solutions outside the ASEAN framework.
On the other hand, a successful mediation of the dispute would provide ASEAN with enhanced credibility on issues that affect the peace and stability of the region. It would also further cement ASEAN as the key linchpin in several security structures, including the ASEAN Regional Forum, East Asia Summit, Asia-Europe Meeting, Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation and the ASEAN Defense Ministers Forum (ADMM) and the ADMM Plus Eight.
The United Nations gave ASEAN its implicit support following a February 14 meeting on the dispute at the UN Security Council (UNSC). While the council was willing to hear both countries' versions of the dispute and urged a bilateral ceasefire, it made no binding statements. Instead it gave its backing to the efforts of Indonesian foreign minister and current ASEAN chairman Marty Natalegawa. Closed door discussions between Thailand's and Cambodia's foreign ministers, Natalegawa and UNSC president Maria Luiza Ribiero Viotti of Brazil were held on the sidelines of the UNSC meeting.
Natalegawa had already earned praise for his quick initiative in travelling to Bangkok and Phnom Penh to push for talks between the two countries to end the conflict and his participation at the UNSC. Throughout his negotiations, Natalegawa has made clear that the issue should be settled bilaterally, but "at the same time, there is always space for ASEAN and members of ASEAN to support the bilateral effort".
Natalegawa followed up by calling a meeting of foreign ministers from all 10 ASEAN nations in Jakarta on February 22. An agreement was reached that built on a ceasefire agreed between military commanders on February 20 and acted on Thailand's suggestion the next day of embedding Indonesian observers with units on both sides to monitor the ceasefire. While no permanent ceasefire has been signed, ASEAN observers are seen as a first step and a sign of commitment to the ceasefire. It was also agreed that further bilateral talks with Indonesian participation will be held in the near future.
Up to 40 Indonesian military and civilian observers are scheduled to "embed" with Thai and Cambodian military forces stationed at the border. The arrangement does not create a buffer zone, but provides for monitors to report back to the ASEAN chairman as well as to Bangkok and Phnom Penh. Natalegawa has made it clear that the observers are "not a peace-keeping or a peace enforcement team". At the same time, he has characterized the intervention as a "seminal development in ASEAN's capacity to deal with a conflict situation."
Significantly, ASEAN's maneuvers have received the backing of both the United States and China. Beijing's Foreign Ministry spokesman Ma Zhaoxu told a regular press briefing, "China appreciates and supports Indonesia's active mediation efforts to tackle the Cambodia-Thailand border conflict under the ASEAN framework."
US State Department spokesman P J Crowley said during a regular press briefing on February 23 that the US welcomed "ASEAN's efforts under the leadership of Indonesia" and supported the call of ASEAN foreign ministers for Cambodia and Thailand to resume bilateral negotiations "at the earliest opportunity".
That said, there is still the potential for Thai and Cambodian domestic politics - widely viewed as the driving force behind the ramped up dispute - to undermine ASEAN's mediation efforts towards a permanent solution. But with ASEAN observers present and the recognition that peaceful resolution of the issue is not only in the best interest of Thailand and Cambodia, but also ASEAN as a whole, there is powerful multilateral incentive to avoid further armed conflict.
Clifford McCoy is a freelance journalist
(Copyright 2011 Asia Times Online (Holdings) Ltd. All rights reserved. Please contact us about sales, syndication and republishing.)
56. Cambodia, Vietnam re-affirm their vows By Stephen Kurczy Asia Times, April 23, 2009 http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Southeast_Asia/KD23Ae02.html
(Comments: this article is probably the most important and comprehensive piece of analysis on the recent dispute between on one hand, Cambodia and Thailand, and the other hand, the love affair between Hun Sen’s Cambodia and Vietnam. It is a good summary what I have been posting in this web site on this crucial subject for the survival of Cambodia. It is a must for all those Cambodians who seriously think that Cambodia is no longer free under Hun Sen, but, who do not know exactly why, and who are doing what to put Cambodia in this precarious and deadly situation more than ever before.
This article provides very clear, well-founded, and honest answers to all these important questions raised earlier regarding Cambodia’s uncertain and dangerous future, resulting from Vietnamese deadly intent and practice. To put this tragic trajectory of Cambodia in a historical perspective, the following quote from a Vietnamese scholar (NGUYEN THE ANH, Pierre Bernard Lafont (editeur); Les Frontieres du Vietnam, (Edition Harmattan, Paris, France, 1989) pp.121-27) is very illuminating, as it shows how Vietnam has come to devise the concept of a movable border, as follows:
““In the south of the delta of the Red River, new regional territories had been gradually added, through the ages, to the kingdom of Dai-Viet. Beyond the gate of Annam, the border had been moving in direction of the south with the territorial expansion of Vietnam at the expense of the old indianized kingdoms of Campa and Chenla. But one must speak less of border, and more of a border movement, materializing by a slow gliding towards the south, to such a degree that this phenomenon of “Nam-Tien” (progression towards the south), which had been held over several centuries, was regarded as one of the constants of the history of Vietnam. The extension had taken this clear direction, because in north and western are full of natural and political obstacles and they are almost impassible, whereas in the south which is sparsely populated and accessible land were available for rice growers. The conditions being revealed favorable to the encroachment, the Vietnamese Monarchy had ended up by giving up its policy of “Confucian persuasion” based only on the prestige of the royal “virtue” (duc), in favor of an action resolutely imperialist, by imposing its administrative and cultural practice on the recently controlled areas, in order to better integrate them into the Vietnamese space. “
To have a complete understanding of the whole deadly threat to Cambodia’s survival in historical perspective, I suggest the readers should also read the other two complementary articles, posted in this page, titled ”Thailand-Cambodia, Love-Hate Relations”, and “What is Vietnamese Nationalism?”
More importantly, it provides a very accurate and informative background as to the recent dispute between Hun Sen Cambodia, and Thailand regarding the temple of Preah Vihear. I hope those who have read this article would do me a favor to pass it on to your friends and acquaintances. Naranhkiri Tith Ph.D. Washington DC. March 01, 2011)
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ PHNOM PENH - In 1977, a low-level Khmer Rouge cadre entered Vietnam from Cambodia during a cross-border raid. He was captured, detained and interrogated by Vietnamese military intelligence. With information gleaned from the skinny, young communist, Vietnam began planning a major counterattack on Cambodia after a series of Khmer Rouge massacres on its territory.
His name was Hun Sen, and he was soon joined in Vietnam by other Khmer Rouge cadres fleeing the internal purges led by Pol Pot, then the radical Maoist group's leader. Heng Samrin, who headed the Khmer Rouge's Eastern Zone Fourth Division, defected and brought with him some 2,000 to 3,000 troops, while Chea Sim, an Eastern Zone district chief, is known to have escorted some 300 people across the Vietnamese border.
All three men assumed control of Cambodia on January 7, 1979, after Vietnamese forces sacked Phnom Penh, ousted the Khmer Rouge and installed them as the leaders of a puppet government. They ruled during a subsequent decade-long Vietnamese occupation of Cambodia that heightened the traditional animosity between the nations.
Thirty years later, Chea Sim is president of the Senate and number one in the ruling and dominant Cambodian People's Party (CPP). Hun Sen, the country's long-running prime minister, is the party's second highest-ranking member. Heng Samrin is president of the National Assembly and number three in the CPP.
Despite Cambodia's transition from a single-party Leninist state to multi-party constitutional monarchy, members of the CPP currently assume every ministerial position and control three-fourths of the National Assembly's seats. The CPP maintains close ties with Vietnam, bonds that have strengthened as Cambodia looks east for a political ally and trade partner while links to Thailand come under strain from a border conflict and political protests that have targeted Hun Sen's government.
"Politically speaking, it is a very unique, special relationship," said Cambodian political observer Chea Vannath. "Vietnam still plays big brother whenever the CPP needs it.”
In recent months there has been a flurry of bilateral exchanges. Vietnam announced its intention to strengthen ties during a January visit by Heng Samrin to Hanoi, where he met with Vietnamese Party General Secretary Nong Duc Manh and President Nguyen Minh Triet. Both Vietnamese leaders said that they prioritized relations with their smaller neighbor.
"Vietnam and Cambodia were side-by-side with each other in the past struggle for national independence, therefore it is necessary for today's generation to continue this solidarity to ensure further development," Triet said, according to the government-run Vietnam News Agency (VNA).
In February, Vietnamese Prime Minister Nguyen Tan Dung highlighted recent collaboration between the two countries across many disciplines, including politics, diplomacy, economics, trade, culture, arts, technology, security and defense. That same month, Vietnamese military-owned mobile phone company Viettel inaugurated its cell phone service in Cambodia after giving away some one million free SIM cards to Cambodia's students and armed forces. According to VietNamNet, Viettel has already signed up 500,000 subscribers, making it Cambodia's third largest mobile phone provider. On February 21, Vietnam's defense minister paid a visit to Hun Sen and pledged to continue to provide training for Cambodian soldiers in Vietnam, including over 100 in residence at Vietnam's infantry academy
Hun Sen on Sunday applauded 21 high-ranking officers of the Royal Cambodian Armed Forces, including Commander-in-Chief Pol Saroeun and Deputy Commander-in-Chief Kun Kim, for earning degrees in military science from Vietnamese military institutes. According to VietNamNet, Hun Sen also thanked Vietnam for helping to protect Cambodia's national defense and economic development.
Hun Sen in February also met twice with a Thai military delegation, but their meetings focused on the heated border dispute and Thailand's supposedly accidental firing of artillery into Cambodia earlier that month, rather than collaborative opportunities.
In early March, Cambodia and Vietnam quietly planted the 281st border marker at the edge of Cambodia's Takeo province, reflecting Hun Sen's ongoing policy to quickly demarcate the two countries' contentious eastern border. That marks a difference from the political opposition, which has frequently criticized Hun Sen as being Hanoi's puppet. In 1996, bilateral tensions flared when then-first prime minister Norodom Ranariddh said a military solution "may be found" to Vietnam's alleged annexing of Cambodia's eastern lands.
Shifting borders
Hun Sen has insisted that border problems with Vietnam would be solved through peaceful means. Controversy erupted in 2005 when under a veil of secrecy the CPP-controlled National Assembly ratified a supplement to Cambodia's 1985 border treaty with Vietnam. At the time, Hun Sen threatened to sue anyone who accused him of ceding land to Vietnam. Criticism of the treaty earned several persons, including a prominent opposition radio host, jail time on charges of defamation and incitement. Soon after the recent border agreement, Vietnam's parliamentary vice president met in mid-March with Hun Sen, Chea Sim and Heng Samrin to call for stronger economic ties. In that vein, on March 16, Hun Sen met with Vietnam's Minister of Industry and Commerce and Cambodia announced that its citizens no longer need visas to enter Vietnam and vice-versa. The next day, Vietnamese Minister of Public Security Le Hong Anh and Cambodian Minister of Interior Sar Kheng signed a 2009 cooperation accord
Anh also visited Hun Sen and laid a wreath at the Vietnam-Cambodia Friendship Monument, a prominent structure in the center of Phnom Penh that abuts Hun Sen Park. No similar Thai-Cambodia friendship monument exists in Phnom Penh. On March 30, Cambodian Information Minister Khieu Kanharith visited Vietnamese Prime Minister Nguyen Tan Dung in Hanoi, where the two pledged to "promote the dissemination of information, helping to boost bilateral cooperation and refute hostile forces' slanderous allegations".
"We are trying to strengthen the bilateral cooperation that we've had since long ago," said Koy Kuong, an undersecretary of state at the Cambodian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. "Between Cambodia and Vietnam, we have a long [history of] friendship and cooperation." Koy Kuong dismisses suggestions that Cambodia's current border dispute with Thailand over land surrounding the ancient Preah Vihear temple has prompted Cambodia to replace declining trade and diplomatic relations to Thailand with more robust ties to Vietnam. A skirmish between Thai and Cambodian troops last October at Preah Vihear temple left two Cambodian troops dead. Another flare-up in early April this year resulted in the death of one Thai soldier. Fanning those flames, Thai Foreign Minister Kasit Piromya in March referred to Hun Sen as a "gangster" in the local media. When Hun Sen demanded an apology, Kasit re-phrased his insult by calling Hun Sen "a gentleman who has the heart of a gangster", but he later issued a written formal apology.
Relations have been strained due to Hun Sen's perceived close friendship with deposed Thai prime minister Thaksin Shinawatra, who is in self-imposed exile and was instrumental in stirring the recent street chaos caused by his anti-government supporters. Asia Times Online broke the news last week that pro-Thaksin groups had for the past two years funneled arms through Cambodia to Thaksin-aligned supporters in Thailand's northeastern provinces.
Meanwhile, there are widespread rumors circulated by some Thai media outlets that Thaksin's on-the-run protest leaders have taken refuge across the border at Cambodia's Koh Kong island and that the exiled former premier earlier this week paid them a clandestine visit. Cambodian authorities have consistently denied that Thaksin has entered the country, including earlier this week.
The ongoing turmoil has made Thailand a less attractive business partner, prompting Cambodia to seek alternative diplomatic ties, some analysts say. "Since the ousting of Thaksin, Thailand has been quite unstable, resulting in a slowdown in its economic growth," Kheang Un, a visiting fellow at the Center for Asia Democracy at the University of Louisville, Kentucky, said recently by e-mail. As a result, he added, Cambodian businessmen are reluctant to invest in and trade with Thailand. Trade between Vietnam and Cambodia jumped 31% compared to the previous year in 2008, to nearly $1.7 billion. Bilateral trade with Thailand is still larger, but only increased 17% to $2 billion in 2008. Vietnamese goods dominate Cambodian markets, and in 2007 and 2008 Cambodians bought more Vietnamese consumer goods than they did products from any other country, VNA reported in early April. Sales of Vietnamese products to Cambodian consumers totaled $988 million in 2008, compared to $674 million of Thai goods.
"All the local investors here want to do business with Vietnam, and all the Vietnamese businesses want to do business here," said Cambodia Chamber of Commerce President Nguon Meng-Tech. "If relations are good from one government to another, that's better than with another government with problems at the border ... I don't think [Cambodian] businesses will do much business with Thailand.”
Opportunistic diplomacy
Vietnam is bidding to take competitive advantage of Thailand's internal political upheaval and simmering border conflict to replace it as Cambodia's primary trade partner, said parliamentarian Sam Rainsy, the leader of Cambodia's largest opposition party and a frequent critic of Hun Sen's ties to Hanoi.
"This is part of a larger geopolitical play in this region - the current tension with Thailand benefits Vietnam, as Vietnam can increase its influence over Cambodia," said Rainsy, who likens the situation to 2003 when Hun Sen's comments alleging that a Thai actress had claimed the Angkor Wat temple belonged to Thailand prompted anti-Thai riots in Phnom Penh.
Cambodians burned the Thai Embassy and vandalized Thai businesses, causing millions of dollars in damage. "Trade from Thailand declined [in 2003] and Vietnam got a stronger political influence over Cambodia ... The armed conflict at the border is having the same effect, but more prolonged," said Rainsy. He believes pro-Vietnam elements within the CPP inflamed anti-Thai sentiment to "weaken relations with Thailand, including commercial relations, and boost relations with Vietnam".
Cambodian government officials aligned with the CPP downplay those criticisms. The recent flurry of diplomatic and commercial agreements is "nothing special", said Cambodia's Council of Ministers spokesman Phay Siphan. Government spokesman Khieu Kanharith also disputes this is an unusual trend. "If there was increased cooperation with Vietnam, it would bring suspicion from China and the United States," Kanharith said.
Scholar Kheang Un counters that neither the US nor China, nor even Thailand, are particularly concerned by stronger Cambodia-Vietnam relations. "None of these three countries see Vietnam as a threat to their national security as they did during the Cold War era, during which they viewed Vietnam as Moscow's agent in Southeast Asia," he said. "[A]s soon as Thai politicians put their house in order, Thai-Khmer relations will normalize.”
Some human rights groups remain apprehensive about Cambodia's shift east, as the country's alleged mistreatment of ethnic Montagnard and Khmer Krom minorities has shown that Cambodia is willing to take instruction from its larger, wealthier neighbor. The Montagnards, ethnic hilltribe people living in the highlands of central Vietnam, have for years entered Cambodia seeking asylum with the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees only to be forced back into Vietnam by Cambodian authorities.
In addition, the six million ethnic Cambodians living in Vietnam's southern Mekong Delta area, known as the Khmer Krom, have been targeted and in some cases imprisoned by Vietnamese authorities for practicing Buddhism. They have also faced oppression from the Cambodian government for protesting their treatment in Vietnam. Human Rights Watch, a US-based rights advocacy group, said Hanoi has an active agenda to monitor, infiltrate, and silence Khmer Krom activists.
"Our government would like so much to please the Vietnamese government," said Kek Galabru, the founder of local human rights advocacy group LICADHO. She first met Hun Sen in 1983 in Angola, where her late husband was serving as the French ambassador. She invited Hun Sen to her home, and the then young foreign minister convinced her he "was not a Vietnamese puppet", she told journalist Elizabeth Becker in the book When the War was Over.
"Now, my opinion is different," Galabru recently told Asia Times Online. "Since I came to Cambodia in 1992, I can see that things are run differently.”
Rights groups point to the case of Tim Sakhorn, a Khmer Krom monk who distributed bulletins and organized protests demanding Vietnamese authorities compensate Khmer Krom for allegedly stealing their farmland. He was defrocked by Cambodian authorities in 2007 and deported to Vietnam, where he was jailed on charges of "undermining solidarity" between the two countries. He has since sought asylum in Buddhist-majority Thailand.
"Who gave the order to disrobe Tim Sakhorn? What wrong did he do but to shout when there were violations of the Khmer Krom?" said Son Soubert, a member of Cambodia's Constitutional Council and the son of former Cambodian premier Son Sann. The gag on public demonstrations against Vietnam, he said, is one clear marker of Hanoi's 30-year supervision of the CPP. "You don't see [Vietnam's] presence, but they're present ... You can accuse me of being biased or paranoid, but in the eyes of Cambodians, that's the reality.”
While the Cambodian army defends against Thai soldiers crossing into territory near Preah Vihear temple, Son Soubert said in comparison that 89,000 square kilometers of Mekong Delta land is occupied by Vietnam that arguably belonged to Cambodia until 1949, when the colonial French National Assembly formally ceded it to Vietnam. He said the current border skirmish with Thailand distracts from Vietnam's more serious border infringements, which as a matter of policy are overlooked by Hun Sen's allegedly Vietnam-aligned government
Real or imagined, Soubert contends that sentiment is spreading, evident in a joke now making the rounds in Phnom Penh. Spoken in the voice of a Vietnamese, the nationalistic jab goes: "The Thais are stupid because they try to steal a stone," referring to the Preah Vihear temple. "We are smarter, we just steal the land.”
Stephen Kurczy is an Asia Times Online contributor based in Cambodia. He may be reached at kurczy@gmail.com
(Copyright 2009 Asia Times Online (Holdings) Ltd. All rights reserved. Please contact us about sales, syndication and republishing.)
57. Opposition leader loses final appeal The Phnom Penh Post; Tuesday, 01 March 2011 20:13 Meas Sokchea (Comments: this article shows that Sam Rainsy is still under the illusion that Hun Sen may still pardon him, as in the previous case, when he asked for pardon from Hun Sen, with the help of the king. The reason why Sam Rainsy was pardoned The last time,, because the Sam Rainsy’ s sin was to criticize Hun Sen and his regime for corruption. But, in this case, it is a matter of violating the 2005 supplements to the unequal 1979 treaty Friendship, Peace, and Cooperation with Vietnam, which is in fact an open door for Vietnam to allow the free flow of illegal Vietnamese immigrants into Cambodia. Hun Sen cannot stay in power if he would allow Sam Rainsy to come back to Cambodia by giving him a pardon. And I may add that the king would not dare to pardon Sam Rainsy either. On the contrary, it was Sihanouk along with his wife, Monique, and his son, the new king who went to Hanoi, last June, to ask the Vietnamese leader to pardon Hun Sen for allowing Sam Rainsy to violate the content of that imposed 1979 treaty. Sam Rainsy should have known that in doing what he did would have not changed one iota the border situation between Cambodia and Vietnam, as Vietnam has never respect any borders with its weaker neighboring countries namely Cambodia and Laos. As a matter of fact Vietnam has a concept of movable border with these two countries. So these border markers are only temporary ones until such time when Vietnam can send more illegal Vietnamese immigrants in order to take over the Cambodian land as they did with Champa and Kampuchea Krom, only two centuries ago. Sam Rainsy would have been a hero, if he had stayed in Cambodia and fled to France, to fight Hun Sen politicized court. He shows a lack of courage and a dismal character of inciting people instead of inspiring followers. It is sad to see Cambodia and the Cambodian people not being able to have dignified and courageous leaders of the same caliber of Nelson Mandela, Aung San Suu Kyi, and Mahatma Gandhi. Naranhkiri Tith Ph.D. Washington DC. March 1, 2011) --------------------------------------------------- Sam Rainsy speaks to reporters in Phnom Penh in March 2009.The Supreme Court today upheld an Appeal Court verdict in the case of opposition leader Sam Rainsy and two villagers convicted of destroying public property and racial incitement after uprooting demarcation posts along the Vietnamese border in 2009. Supreme Court Vice President Khim Pon said border post 185, which Sam Rainsy had pulled up in protest at alleged encroachment on Cambodian land, was planted by the joint Cambodian-Vietnamese border committee according to a well-studied plan, and its position was affirmed by the National Assembly, Senate and King in 2005. “We understood that there is enough evidence against Sam Rainsy, who incited racial discrimination,” Khim Pon said. “The upholding of the Appeal Court is official.” Khim Pon also said the court had reviewed photographs showing that the two villagers, Meas Srey and Prom Chea, had in fact taken part in removing the border posts. Svay Rieng villagers said at the time that they had lost land to Vietnam because of erroneously placed border posts. The Sam Rainsy Party has repeatedly criticised the government over the issue. No official map exists, and the government has said it hopes to complete demarcation in 2012. Chan Sok Yeang, the government’s lawyer in the case, said he was content with the ruling and declined to comment further. “As people, we must respect the law,” he said. Sam Rainsy said the court was “politically subservient” in its decision and called on the government to drop its complaint. “I am sure the government will show a minimum of consistency by dropping its ridiculous complaint against me and by stopping blatantly using the politically subservient court in trying to silence me,” he said by email today from Paris, where he lives in self-imposed exile. Sam Rainsy cited a letter from Prime Minister Hun Sen to National Assembly President Heng Samrin on November 8 last year, which stated that “the joint technical group from the two countries has not planted border post #185 yet” and was still studying the territory. “Given the official recognition that there was no such thing as a legal border post #185, I cannot possibly have committed a crime by pulling out wooden posts, which were illegally planted on Cambodian farmers’ rice fields,” Sam Rainsy said. In January last year, the Svay Rieng provincial court sentenced Sam Rainsy to two years imprisonment in absentia. It delivered one-year sentences to Meas Srey and Prom Chea, and ordered all three to pay a combined 63 million riel (US$15,598) in compensation. The Appeal Court reduced the sentences of Meas Srey and Prom Chea by two months in October and ordered that they be released from Kandal provincial prison. Sam Rainsy was also sentenced to 10 years in jail in September by the Phnom Penh Municipal Court for disinformation and falsifying public documents. The charges were brought in connection with evidence he publicised criticising his conviction in this case. The SRP has said both cases against their president are politically motivated and designed to weaken the Kingdom’s largest opposition party ahead of commune and national elections in 2012 and 2013. ADDITIONAL REPORTING BY THOMAS MILLER
58. Vietnam in Cambodia tourism push The Phnom Penh Post; Monday, 28 February 2011 19:39 Soeun Say
(Comments: Normally, any country should be happy with an increase in exchange of tourists between two neighbouring countries, but, not in the case between Cambodia and Vietnam., in view of the hidden story behind Vietnam intention, past and present on Cambodia, namely, that Vietnam historically, has been considering its border with its weaker neighbours, (Laos and Cambodia) not as a fixed one but a movable one (Please, read an article on that aspect of Vietnam hidden colonialism go to this link; http://www.essortment.com/vietnamese-nationalism-20997.html). One problem is the fact that the Cambodian government is well-known for its pervasiveness in corruption. Who is going to check the entry and exit of these Vietnamese so-called tourists in and out of Cambodia. Secondly, Hun Sen has been forbidding all statistics on the number of Vietnamese residents in Cambodia invoking the fear that the Cambodians may act against the Vietnamese. But, in reality, these illegal Vietnamese can help Hun Sen in voting for him and therefore in keeping in power in Cambodia for, as long as, the Vietnamese are not satisfied with him and remains subservient to them. Naranhkiri Tith Ph.D. Washington DC. February 28, 2011) -------------------------------------------------------------------- Vietnamese tourism companies are linking up with Kingdom firms in order to attract Cambodian tourists to the country’s resorts and health care facilities, whilst boosting cross-border visitors. During 2010, while the numbers of Vietnamese tourists arriving in Cambodia surged by 48 percent to 466,695 compared with 2009, some businesses within Vietnam also spotted an opportunity for growth by forging new alliances. One such company was state-run Vietravel Co, valued at US$76 million last year, which now holds 49 percent in a joint venture called Indochina Heritage Travel (Cambodia) with Cambodian and Vietnamese partners. While its capital investment in the new company has not been detailed, after opening two months ago, it plans to lead 100,000 Vietnamese tourists to the Kingdom during 2011 and to promote cross-border tourism. Nguyen Quoc Ky, general director of Vietravel Co, said: “I feel confident about tourism sector growth in Cambodia, that’s why I decided to put capital forward.” While Tran Duc Hai, director of Indochina Heritage Travel (Cambodia), added: “We try to promote tourism for both countries and will bring tourists to both sides.” Monthly package tours are on the venture’s agenda, with trips tailored to the health tourism market also planned. Cambodia’s Minister of Tourism, Thong Khon, acknowledged today that Cambodian citizens visit Vietnam for health consultations and treatment and that at the moment “Vietnam is trying a lot to promote tourism in Cambodia”. While the ministry did not have specific visitor data for Vietnam, he stated: “We have a strong relationship and cooperate together on tourism for both sides benefit.” In Vietnam, health care providers are hoping to tap into a potential market of Cambodian nationals. Chief operation officer of Victoria Healthcare VietNam, Binh Pham Cobb, said her private clinic in Ho Chi Minh City received 200 patients a day, some of whom came from Cambodia. “We saw that Cambodian patients came to check their health a lot at the state hospital in Vietnam.” Through cooperation with firms such as Indochina Heritage she hopes to “get more and more Cambodian clients to come here”. While 25-year-old Cambodian tourist Sout Vanny, a visitor to Dam Sen theme park in Vietnam, said that while on holiday she had a health consultation as “services in Vietnam are cheaper that Cambodia and they also make me confident”. But along with health care demand, vacationing tourists are also boosting trade for Vietnam’s holiday resorts, according to businessmen. Hoafng Van Ba, deputy general director of Saigontourist, the parent company of Dam Sen Resort in Ho Chi Minh City, said that 5 percent of visitors to his resort – which includes a theme park – were now Cambodian. It has incorporated Cambodia into its future, as the company has plans to build a similar complex in the Kingdom with negotiations with its Cambodian partner underway. Dai Nam Resorts Areas, the biggest resort in Vietnam which lies on 450 hectares of land in Binh Duong province, is also looking for Cambodian visitors. Tran Thanh Hai, director of its parent company Dai Nam Joint Stock Corp, said: “Last year, 5 million tourists came to our resort, most of them were local tourists. Now, we are promoting ourselves to neighbouring countries, especially Cambodia.” According to the Ministry of Tourism, outbound Cambodian tourists increased by about 49 percent in 2010. 59. Border conflict poses more questions than answers The Bangkok Post; Published: 21/02/2011 at 12:00 AM http://www.bangkokpost.com/news/local/222642/border-conflict-poses-more-questions-than-answers (Comments: This article is surprisingly straightforward and honest regarding to the real problems that Thailand could be facing, should an all-out war between the two neighbors break out in the future. The other story is about Hun Sen and his son Hun Manet. As I have already written before in this web site that a Cambodian-American academic member had blamed me for not wanting to meet Hun Manet, when he was an intern at the World Bank, and I was a senior official at the International Monetary Fund (IMF), because he said that Hun Manet had nothing to do with his father, that I was narrow-minded for refusing to meet with him. Now, I am vindicated to read this article, in which it is clear that Hun Manet is now being groomed to replace his father, Hun Sen the great traitor. So Cambodia has changed from a dynasty of God-kings to that of God-traitors. Since Hun Manet was put in this commanding position, politically and militarily speaking, and since Hun Sen is still following order from the Vietnamese, as demonstrated by his acceptance to sign the 2005 supplements to the unequal 1979 Treaty of Peace, Friendship, and Cooperation, which, practically, had allowed Vietnam to be able to send illegal Vietnamese immigrants at will, into Cambodia so as to be able to help Hun Sen win elections again and again, and to increase the number of Vietnamese residents (Legal and Illegal) in Cambodia; this represents the real threat to Cambodia’s survival, it is impossible for any reasonable and genuine Cambodian patriot to think that Hun Manet could be free from Vietnamese control. Until today, Hun Sen had prevented the publication of any statistics on the number of Vietnamese (Legal or illegal) in Cambodia, under the false pretext that doing this may hurt the Vietnamese resident in Cambodia. Therefore the age old strategy used by Vietnam since the 17th century known as "Nam Tien" or the "Southward March" is being implemented to take over Cambodia as it did with Champa, with the help of Hun Sen and Sihanouk. (for more informaiton on how Nam tien works, please, go to thsi link ( Vietnam Tributary System with Deadly Twist). Besides technical capability, a good leader must have some strong basic moral grounding, such as; courage, honesty, patience, compassion, caring, and perseverance, and above all to be able to inspire others, to just mention only a few prerequisites. What is more important for the Cambodian people is the fact that they don’t need a new dynasty, as in the cases of Mubarak Klan in Egypt, or the Gadhafi Klan in Libya. It is time for all Cambodians, who have courage, talent, and good leadership potential, to be given an equal chance to be a leader in Cambodia in future. Naranhkiri Tith Ph.D. Washington DC. February 22, 2011) ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- The ceasefire agreement struck between Thailand and Cambodia poses the interesting question of whether it signifies the beginning of the end or the other way around. The ceasefire has been reached "pending" negotiations that many hope will bring a permanent solution to the border conflict. In other words, the truce agreed to by the two sides with immediate effect on Saturday at the Chong Sa-ngam Pass border crossing in Si Sa Ket province is only a vehicle to achieving something permanent. Opinion may be split as some might wonder if the ceasefire marks the beginning of the end of the longstanding border hostility or whether it is the end of the beginning of the rough negotiations over the bitter border dispute with peaceful resolution from further rounds of talk far from guaranteed. The fine print in the ceasefire agreement comes across as supporting the latter theory. Both sides must hold their fire and not deploy more troops. Fair enough. But all these conditions could be tossed aside if the Asean ministerial meeting tomorrow does not make headway in easing the border violence. Prime Minister Abhisit Vejjajiva and his Cambodian counterpart, Hun Sen, do not agree on some key issues, especially on a permanent ceasefire deal. Hun Sen has said Cambodia would urge Thailand to agree to a peace deal at the Asean meeting. Mr Abhisit insists Thailand did not start the fight and it is premature to talk about signing any agreement at the Asean meeting, a position reiterated by Foreign Minister Kasit Piromya yesterday. With a permanent ceasefire unlikely any time soon, a renewed border offensive could be possible. The confrontation between Thai and Cambodia is in a precarious state. Each side has deployed about 15,000 troops in the disputed area in Si Sa Ket. Heavy artillery faces heavy artillery. The fact Hun Manet, Cambodia's deputy army chief and son of Hun Sen, came to the ceasefire table in Si Sa Ket as head of the Cambodian delegation was apparently aimed at assuring Thailand the truce would materialise. The Thai side led by army chief-of-staff Daopong Rattanasuwan expected border clashes to ease but ruled out the possibility of an immediate permanent ceasefire. At 33 years old, Lt Gen Hun Manet, who holds a PhD in economics from Britain, has been thrust into the military leadership. He has not been widely accepted by the rank and file troops stationed in the forests along the border. Many Cambodian troops are termed "forest soldiers" who spend much of their lives policing the borders. They are not considered by many to be well-disciplined. Lt Gen Hun Manet may not be able to command all of them, fuelling uncertainty as to how the ceasefire agreement is practical. Lt Gen Hun Manet was in charge of the troops in the recent clashes as it was his chance to prove his worth. However, the heavy losses suffered by Cambodia bodes unfavourably for the deputy army chief. The Cambodian soldiers are eager to occupy the disputed 4.6-square-kilometre border area. They may look for an opportunity to launch a fresh attack on Thai soldiers who are abiding by the ceasefire agreement by staying in their positions. Observations were made that the Chong Sa-ngam truce may be disadvantageous to Thailand. Cambodia recognises Thailand's superior military capability. That is the reason Cambodia proposed in the ceasefire agreement that the artillery and armaments not be moved. The ban on the construction of roads stipulated in the ceasefire also means Thailand has to suspend work on a gravel road leading to the disputed area to serve as a supply route. Thailand welcomed the truce as the government feels that negotiations are the best option. If the fighting continued, the clashes would degenerate into war, which Hun Sen would use to justify his demand for intervention by United Nations peacekeeping troops in the disputed border affair. If that happens, Thailand will find it hard to defend itself in legal terms and maintain its reputation in the eyes of the world community. It is calculated that an all-out military offensive does not present a solution to the conflict. At the end of the day, the conflict will be thrashed out at the negotiating table. However, negotiations after a war has been waged and the issue "internationalised" will work against the interests of Thailand and the country might possibly be seen as bullying its smaller neighbour. The conflict would also heap even more political pressure on the government, which may not survive the crunch.
60. What Is Vietnamese Nationalism? History & Biographies http://www.essortment.com/vietnamese-nationalism-20997.html (Comments: I am pasting below, a very important article on the foundation of Vietnamese nationalism. It is important for all decent and well-meaning Cambodians and for Cambodia 's freedom to carefully read and absorb the content of this article for it explains the foundation of today's strength of Vietnam as country and nation, and its success against its neighbors to the South namely Cambodia and Champa. Because their very strong yearning for survival and their ability to choose the right leaders they have been able to defend themselves against all kind of the most powerful nations in the world, starting with China a long time ago, and to destroy all other weaker nations near them, such as Cambodia and Champa.
Most Cambodians do not know or do not care to know much about the fundamental elements of Vietnamese nationalism, and yet it is the most important requirement that the majority of Cambodians must have if Cambodia is to have any chance to remain free. Learning how the Vietnamese mind works, is the best way for the Cambodian people to be able to better defend themselves. As Sun Wu Tzu, the great 6th century B.C. Chinese military strategist (To read more on Sun Wu Tzu, please, go to this link in this website; http://cambodiana.org/Vietnamtributarysystemwithdeadlytwist.aspx) had written: "Know your enemy and know yourself, and you can fight a hundred battles without disaster." And to remember the warning of the same sage: "Strategy with tactics is the slowest route to victory; and tactics without strategy is the noise before defeat." To put the danger facing present-Cambodia in perspective and to answer the crucial question as to which of the two countries, Thailand or Vietnam, is more deadly for Cambodia's survival, please, also read the companion article posted immediately below this one, titled "Thailand-Cambodia, A Love-Hate Relationship," written by Professor Charnvit Kasetsiri, of Thammasat University, Bangkok, Thailand. Naranhkiri Tith, Ph.D. Washington DC. February 20, 2011)
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Vietnam -- in nearly every regard it was the war that failed. It is not, however, the purpose of this article to recount America's failures in that Southeast Asian country, or the reasons behind them. It is instead, to discuss the question of whether or not the United States violated common tenants of international law by committing military forces to support one side in another nation's internal civil war. In short, we will discuss whether or not the war between North and South Vietnam was strictly a civil war, or a war of aggression conducted by the North against the South. I intend to demonstrate in this article that South Vietnam possessed good and sound basis for its claim to independence from Hanoi, the capitol of North Vietnam. This being established, it will follow that the United States violated no aspect of international law in aiding Saigon, South Vietnam's capitol city. Indeed, Washington but supported one country in its efforts to repulse a foreign invasion of its borders. Doc Lap, a word used to signify the Vietnamese spirit of independence, can be traced back to approximately 500 B.C. when the Nam, a southern subgroup of the Viet tribes living south of the Yangtze River began a southward exodus in an attempt to escape the armies of an expanding Chinese empire. The attempt failed. Eventually settling in the Red River Delta, the Vietnamese were conquered by 258 B.C. and placed under the direct administration of the Chinese Court. For the next 1,000 years, the Chinese endeavored to assimilate the Vietnamese race as they had, and would, many others. In Vietnam, however, the Chinese would fail. There were a number of factors which contributed to China's failure: Geographic distance between the Red River Delta and the Chinese Court; contact, primarily through trade, which the Vietnamese enjoyed with other non-Chinese cultures, principally the Chams, the Cambodians, and with India and Indonesia. Probably, however, the greatest reason for China's failure to subdue the Vietnamese, and the one most pertinent to our subject, is that the Vietnamese had a prehistory long enough to enable them to develop their own distinctive ethnological features. In other words, the Vietnamese racial identity was strong enough to withstand a thousand years of foreign domination, suffering, in the process, only minimal cultural damage. Toward the middle of the 10th century and the decline of the T'ang Dynasty, Chinese rule became virtually nonexistent in the outlying provinces. In this vacuum, Vietnam experienced a period of chaos during which local warlords battled among themselves for domination. In 1010 A.D., the Li Dynasty was founded, becoming Vietnam's first imperial family and central government. Quartered in Hanoi, the dynasty would survive for some two hundred years. Despite its newly won independence from China, there was little change in the course of Vietnamese life. The imperial government reestablished a civil service system based on the Chinese classics and continued attempts to subdue rebellious warlords who protested the payment of any taxes and who refused to recognize any authority save their own. The peasants too, lacked any feeling of loyalty toward the dynastic government. As in most feudal and agrarian societies, the peasant knew little of the world beyond the walls of his own village, and cared even less. He paid his taxes to the local warlord because he was forced to, and occasionally engaged in insurrection when the lord pushed him beyond the point of forbearance. Vietnam, at this point, was a nation only in the lightest sense of the word. It possessed a government but no real subjects. For the Vietnamese did not recognize the Li Dynasty's right to govern. In fact, they did not even recognize themselves as a single nation. Being Vietnamese was more a racial identity than a national one. The typical Vietnamese identified with family and village and very little else. The early 10th century found the Red River Delta a prosperous and growing region, rich in farmland and advantageously positioned for trade carried on with the rest of Indochina. Before the century's end, however, the region reached a point of over population. Faced with China to the north, the sea to the east, and mountains to the west, the Vietnamese began moving south in an exodus not wholly unlike our own country's westward expansion in the 19th century. This expansion lasted until the late 1700's. Immediately to the south of the Red River Delta was the Kingdom of Champa, occupying a geographic area roughly equivalent to what the French would later call Annam. It was easily conquered by the Vietnamese who systematical set about settling the area, forcing the remnants of the Cham civilization into the mountains to the west. Further to the south lay the Mekong River Delta held, during this time frame, by the Kingdom of Cambodia. This area too, fell victim to the Vietnamese expansion. Often, in history when a people experience such a period of migration, they experience also, a compromise of their culture as it is influenced by already existing indigenous cultures, by differences between old and new methods of food gathering brought about by a different climate and geography, and as it is influenced simply by geographic distance itself, as the settlers move farther away from their original homeland. In this instance, however, none of these things occurred. The Vietnamese pioneer took with him not only his worldly possessions, but his culture and local traditions as well. When he moved south he did so not as an individual, but as just one member of an entire village or large family group moving as a whole. Rather than blending into, or being assimilated by the local cultures which the settlers encountered, or living apart from them in a peaceful relationship, the settlers violently conquered these cultures and banished their members. Nor did the settlers find any noticeably differences in either climate or geography from what they were accustomed to in the Red River Delta. We see then, no real changes occurring in Vietnamese culture as the migration continued. But there was one new development, the growth of a conscious regional antagonism between north and south. villages in the south were essentially self contained, economically and socially. Their inhabitants enjoyed a much greater degree of freedom than their brothers in the north. The southern territories were a long way from Hanoi. Roads for transportation and communication were practically nonexistent. Those which did exist were little more than trails in poor repair. Distance, the lack of viable communications and transportation and resupply routes coupled with the strong hostility of the local villagers, all made conditions for a prolonged military campaign from the dynastic government practically impossible. But try the emperor did. The further south the peasant went, the more independent he felt and the more resentful he became of Hanoi's attempts to exert control over him. The peasant was, as mention earlier, freer than his compatriots in the north. Even the warlords were fewer in number in the south, though, as a rule, were no less cruel. And the warlords too, resented the power in Hanoi. Warlord revolts were numerous, hopeful as they were of gaining almost total autonomy from the imperial family. Thus we see in the south a strong resentment towards the more populous, the more centrally organized north. As the years went by, peasants and lords alike developed a regional awareness, united in mind by their common desire to be free of the dynasty's influence. making no distinction between the northern peasant the emperor's soldiers, the southerners came to perceive all northerners as aggressive and warlike, as a people who desired to militarily force themselves where they were not wanted. In the north, the imperial court increased taxes to compensate the government's coffers for the revenues expended in the southern campaigns. More and more young men were taken from their father's farms at the point of a sword to serve in those same wars. All blamed, of course, on the lazy and rebellious subjects in the south. The inhabitants of the north then, acquired, as a region, a perception of the southerner as worthless and disloyal, who migrated south in order to avoid work and the payment of due taxes and loyalties to the royal court. This is the situation as it existed by the early 17th century. Even at this early date, there was much to lend itself to an argument that Vietnam was, psychologically and economically, two separate countries. These regional identities and the antagonisms between the two regions were intensified by a war between the Trinh family sitting on the dynastic throne in Hanoi, and the Nguyen family in Hue, the strongest of the south's provincial lords. Differing from the provincial uprising of the past, this conflict constituted a full blown civil war. It lasted fifty years, ending in 1674 with an agreement between the two belligerents roughly dividing Vietnam along the 17th parallel. Neither the war nor the subsequent division had any real effect on the peasant, north or south, or on his way of life. The southern peasant felt no real attachment to the Nguyen family. But the war did serve to aggravate the already existing regional hatreds and stereotypes. Incidental, this war marked the first occurrence of western intervention in Vietnam, with Dutch merchants sending arms shipments to the Trinh family, and Portuguese merchants supplying similar shipments to the Nguyen family. This division, as important as it was to the building of north and south regional identities, did not last long. Vietnam was again politically united in 1786 at the culmination of a war begun ten years earlier in Saigon by three brothers calling themselves the Tay-son. Upon defeating both, the Nguyen and Trinh families, the eldest brother crowned himself the Quang-Tring Emperor. Twelve years later, Quang-Tring was overthrown by Nguyen-Anh, a member of the dethroned Nguyen family, with the aid of a few hundred French troops and a French trained native Vietnamese army. By 1883 France had conquered and occupied all of Vietnam. In the north and central regions, Tonking and Annam respectively, France established protectorates where the emperor and warlords were allowed to maintain their positions under the condition that they maintain at the same time a proper attitude and decorum toward French rule. Southern Vietnam became a direct colony, Cochinchina, under the administration of a French Governor-General. French influence in Cochinchina had a direct and powerful impact on the lifestyle of many Vietnamese. The region prospered, and by the 1920's there was a thriving western educated middle class. Thus, when the winds of nationalism began to sweep across all of Vietnam, they took on a distinctively western flavor in Cochinchina. Cochinchinese were allowed, under colonial law, much greater political and organizational latitude than their ethnic brothers in Tonking and Annam. native political parties were allowed and legally formed. The French promised to grant the Cochinchinese independence, measure by measure, The promise was believed, and western ideology and a spirit of cooperation became the cornerstones of the nationalist movement in the south. Envisioned was an independent Vietnam (in the south) governed by a western styled parliamentary government. Legally, the inhabitants of Tonking and Annam were already independent, being only protectorates. It is important to note that nationalism in the south encompassed no greater an area than Cochinchina alone. For the South Vietnamese, his emerging national identity traveled no farther than the colonial boundaries. Things were viewed quite differently in the north where an imperial family supported by a French army decreed political parties illegal and dealt harshly with potential political adversaries. Denied a legal outlet for political expression, nationalists in the north joined the forcefully expanding philosophy of communism during the 1920's, while in the freer south, nationalists adopted the democratic views of Sun Yat-sin. The gulf separating north and south was now, for all practical purposes, complete and unbridgeable, made so by the radically different methods of nationalist expression adopted by the two regions. Legally, politically and philosophically, South Vietnam was, by the end of the Second World War, a sovereign nation, distinctly different in culture and national expression from the nation of North Vietnam.
61. Thailand-Cambodia A Love-Hate Relationship By: Charnvit Kasetsiri (Comments: please, read this article (Pasted below) written by a friend of mine, who is a historian and professor at Thammasat University, Bangkok, Thailand, on the love-hate relations between Thai and Khmer people. As a scholar, Professor Charnvit Kasetsiri is very straightforward in recognizing the Khmer people contribution to the foundation of the civilization of the Thai people.
Knowing this cultural background of the Thai and the Cambodians and their close relations, as recognized by Professor Charnvit Kasetsiri it is sad and tragic to see so many stupid Cambodians who still are support Hun Sen in this dispute, include the "greatest" leader. Sam Rainsy. it is unquestionable for me this Preah Vihear dispute was concocted by the Vietnamese using Hun Sen as their puppet, to allow them to come back and "save" Cambodia again.
Sad to see how naïve and gullible those Cambodians, wherever they may be, who are blindly supporting Hun Sen and the Vietnamese in this tragic dispute on Preah Vihear.
PS. This article was written in 2006, in reaction to the sacking the Thai Embassy and business establishments in Phnom Penh, in 2003, instigated and organized by Hun Sen and his goons to make vietnam the friends and the Thai the enemies of Cambodia. It worded then and it working now. Naranhkiri Tith, Ph.D. Washington DC. February 19, 2011) ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- The violence which culminated in the burning of the Royal Thai Embassy in Phnom Penh on January 29, 2003, was both shocking and unexpected. The rioting not only inflicted extensive damage to Thai-owned property (fortunately, no one was killed) but severely strained Thai-Cambodian relations. It also warrants study of the history of Thai-Cambodian relations to understand the deep-seated causes of what took place so that similar incidents can be avoided in the future. Among the neighboring countries of Southeast Asia, none seems more similar to Thailand than Cambodia (perhaps not even excluding Laos and the “Tai” people scattered throughout such countries as Burma, Vietnam, and southern China). Both nations share similar customs, traditions, beliefs, and ways of life. This is especially true of royal customs, language, writing systems, vocabulary, literature, and the dramatic arts. In light of these similarities, it seems surprising, therefore, that relations between Thailand and Cambodia should be characterized by deep-seated “ignorance, misunderstanding, and prejudice.” Indeed, the two countries have what can be termed “a love-hate relationship.” This lack of understanding is reflected in the thinking of a considerable number of educated Thais and members of the ruling class, who distinguish between the Khom and the Khmer, considering them to be two separate ethnic groups. They assert that it was the Khom, not the Khmer, who built the majestic temple complexes at Angkor Wat and Angkor Thom and who founded one of the world’s truly magnificent ancient empires. They further claim that Khmer culture, for instance its various forms of masked dance drama, is merely a “derivative” of Thai culture. (This is despite the fact that the word “Khom” is derived from the old Thai “Khmer krom,” meaning “lowland Khmer.” In spoken Thai, “Khmer” was gradually dropped, leaving only “krom,” which over time became, first, “klom” or “kalom,” and then eventually “Khom.”) The border between Thailand and Cambodia is approximately 800 kilometers long, stretching along the provinces of the lower Northeast from a point known as “Chong Bok” in Ubon Ratchathani (where the Thai, Laotian, and Cambodian borders meet and which some refer to as the “Emerald Triangle”) and ending in Had Lek sub-district of Klong Yai district, in Trat province. This long border is symbolic of the long history of relations between the Thais and the Khom-Khmer, which date from before the founding of the Sukhothai kingdom in the thirteenth century, thus starting the “love-hate relationship.” A similar relationship exists between the Japanese and the Koreans. Much of what defines Japanese culture today has been influenced by and is part of the cultural heritage of Korea. Buddhism, silkmaking, lacquerware, architecture, and sculpture – the most refined aspects of culture which the Japanese identify with China – passed to them first through Korea. But because of Japan’s successful transformation into an industrial powerhouse, that country has overlooked its debt to Korea and, in fact, treats Korea as an inferior. Those elements of Thai culture which are generally considered to have originated in India, such as Buddhism, architecture, artistic designs, and even a significant portion of the Thai lexicon, did not enter Thailand directly from India. Rather, they were all second-hand transmissions, so to speak, having first passed through the Sri Lankans (including the Tamil), the Mon, or the Khmer. Even the concept of divine kingship (devaraja) and much of the special vocabulary associated with the royal court were, as M.R. Kukrit Pramoj, a noted intellectual and former Thai prime minister, said, “derived from Cambodia.” Thai leaders in the past were filled with tremendous admiration for anything Khom-Khmer. Khun Pha Muang, who ruled the city of Muang Rad, somewhere in present-day northern Thailand, and was instrumental in the founding of the Sukhothai kingdom, was given the title “Sri Intrabodintrathit” (before it was changed to “Sri Intrathit”). This is a name taken from the lord or phee fah of the city of “muang Sri Sothonpura.” Pha Muang’s royal regalia, known as “Pra Khan Jayasri,” the Jayasri sword, and his royal consort named “Sikara Maha Devi,” were all bestowed by the King of Angkor. This is the message conveyed to us by a fourteenth-century stone inscription of Wat Srichum at Sukhothai (the authenticity of which has never been questioned, unlike that of the Ram Khamhaeng Inscription). The Thai term “phee fah” (referring to a king) and the term “Sri Sothonpura” are direct references to a Khom-Khmer king and his royal capital. The king in question was probably King Jayavarman VIII (1243-1295) and the royal capital of Sri Sothonpura is certainly Angkor Thom. In other words, the earliest royal Thai titles – King Sri Intrabodintrathit, the Pra Khan Jayasri sword, and the consort Sikara Maha Devi – were derived from the Khmer, one of the most highly advanced civilizations in Southeast Asia at the time and a source of knowledge and inspiration to the Thai people. It is possible that Sikara Maha Devi was a daughter of King Jayavarman VIII and thus the Thai leader Khun Pha Muang, one of the founders of Sukhothai, was a son-in-law of the Khmer King. The early history of the Lao Lan Xang kingdom in Luang Prabang shares distinct similarities. Fah Ngum, the founder of the kingdom, had sought refuge at Angkor, where he was given a sacred Buddha image (Phra Bang) and where he took a Khmer consort (Mahesi) before establishing his supremacy over all the Lao people (A.D. 1353). This respect and admiration for anything Khmer also characterized the Ayutthaya period from the mid-fourteenth century onward. Interestingly, the flourishing of Khmer art and culture at the Thai court was the result of war, a war in which the victors adopted elements of the superior civilization of the losing side. The glorious Khom-Khmer civilization ultimately sank into decline, as Sri Sothonpura (Angkor Thom or Sri Yasodharapura), seat of the kingdom, fell three times to invading armies – first to King U-Thong in 1369, second to King Ramesuan in 1388/9, and finally in 1431 to King Sam Phraya. The sacking of Sri Sothonpura can be compared to the fall of Ayutthaya in 1767, but Thai historians are reluctant to make this analogy as it casts Thais in the role of “villains,” a role more comfortably attributed to the Burmese. However, the Thai conquest of Sri Sothonpura led to a burgeoning of Khmer art and culture in Ayutthaya, just as the Mongol conquest of China led to the Mongol adoption of Chinese customs and culture (the founding of the Yuan dynasty at Peking). As Professor David Wyatt of Cornell University once noted, in fact, “Ayutthaya is the successor of Angkor.” Another example from the Ayutthaya period is the decision by King Prasat Thong (1630-1656) to build the principal prang at Wat Chaiyawatanaram in the Khmer style and to bestow on the Khmer-style palace he constructed on the banks of the Pasak River (located today in Nakhon Luang district of Ayutthaya province) the name “Nakhon Luang.” This is a name taken directly from Angkor Wat and Angkor Thom, as Thais at the time referred to the Khmer capital as (Phra) “Nakhon Luang” or in Pali-Sanskrit, Nagara, the City. The admiration of the Thai ruling classes for things Khmer-Khom remained in evidence even into the Ratanakosin (Bangkok) period. King Rama IV, or King Mongkut (r.1851-1868), for instance, ordered a Khmer stone temple disassembled and reconstructed on Thai soil, but “Phra Suphanphisan, after a trip to the ancient Khmer capital at Angkor, informed the King that all the stone temples were too enormous to be taken apart and transported to Siam. Hearing this, the King ordered that Prasat Ta Prohm, a relatively smaller temple, be relocated instead. Four groups of 500 men each were dispatched…to deconstruct the prasat on the ninth day of the sixth lunar month.” The account of this event, which appears in “The Royal Chronicles of King Rama IV” by Chao Phraya Thipakorawong, occurred in 1860, before the Siamese ceded “sovereignty” over Cambodia to the French in 1867. It is unclear to us precisely why King Mongkut wished to have an enormous Khmer temple reconstructed in Siam at a time when the French were gradually extending their control over much of Indochina. What is interesting, however, is that the attempt to move the temple structure failed when “some 300 Khmers came out of the forest and attacked the men who had come to disassemble the temple, killing Phra Suphanphisan, Phra Wang and one of Phra Suphanphisan’s sons. Phra Mahatthai was stabbed, and Phra Yokkrabat was injured. The phrai commoners, however, escaped injury by fleeing into the forest.” It was obvious that the Khmer were angered by the theft of their property and responded violently. The incident convinced King Mongkut to abandon the plan to “disassemble” the prasat and instead to construct a small model of the Angkor Wat temple complex. “Craftsmen constructed a model of Angkor Wat and installed it at Wat Phra Sri Ratanasasadaram (the Temple of the Emerald Buddha), where it remains to this very day.” (Prime Minister Hun Sen visited the model at the Temple of the Emerald Buddha in early 1990s during an official visit to Thailand for discussions with then-Prime Minister Chatichai Choonhavan.) Despite the Thai love and admiration for anything Khmer, the Thais have also felt considerable hatred for the Khmer, as evidenced by a ritual called the phithi pathomkam. While Ayutthaya was busy fending off Burmese incursions, the Khmer King Satha (Chetta I, r.1576-1596) took the opportunity to attack Ayutthaya from the east. In revenge, so the chronicles say, King Naresuan ordered the capture of Khmer ruler to be beheaded and washed his feet with the blood. The phithi pathomkam ritual re-enacts this story of revenge. However, Professor Kajorn Sukhapanich, a noted Thai historian, did not believe that the ritual, as recorded in the royal chronicles, ever really occurred. He claimed that Khmer King Satha fled and took refuge in Laos. In general, present-day Thai view Khmer leaders and kings as traitors and ingrates. This idea was probably started by King Vajiravudh, or Rama VI (r.1910-1925), in his official nationalism campaign. It was handed down and developed by Field Marshal Phinbun and Luang Wichit in the 1930s-1940s when Thailand, with Japanese help, seized Siemreap and Battambang from French Indochina. It was also heightened by the dictatorship of Field Marshal Sarit when the International Court of Justice ruled that the great temple of Phra Viharn on the border belonged to Cambodia. The pro-Americanism of Thailand and the neutrality of Sihanouk Cambodia during the Cold War further encouraged mutual dislike between the two countries and peoples. Thais are not particularly fond of Norodom Sihanouk, for example. A Thai riddle asks, “What color (si) do Thai people hate?” The answer is neither red (si daeng) nor black (si dam), but “Si-hanouk.” This, of course, is the Thai perspective, but how do the Khmer view their kings, such as Satha and Sihanouk? Certainly as national heroes and saviors, as men who fought to preserve their country’s independence in the face of Thai aggressors intent on seizing control of Cambodia. Much the same could be said about King Anu of Laos, r.1805-1828, considered by Lao historians as a national hero, whereas to the Thais, he was a “rebel” against the Bangkok monarch King Rama III (r.1824-1851). The history of Thailand and its neighbors, especially Cambodia, Laos, and Burma, is one with both positive and negative elements. Some events have bred hatred, for instance of the Burmese by the Thais; others have generated contempt and feelings of superiority or inferiority, as in the case of Thailand’s relations with Cambodia and Laos. These feelings have led to significant misunderstandings. Clearly, then, there is a need for an earnest and systematic study of the history of relations between these countries. This study deserves support from national and regional organizations such as ASEAN. Unfortunately, however, once the smoke clears from the Thai Embassy in Phnom Penh, all that is likely to matter is the extent of the financial damage and how and when compensation will be paid. Or if any analysis of the incident does take place, it is likely to reach the facile conclusion that the Khmers are “the villains” – they burned down Thai Embassy, after all – and the Thais are “the good guys” – we did not burn the Cambodian Embassy. It is convenient for Thais to forget that Ayutthaya rulers sacked Angkor three times. It would be far preferable, however, to examine the violent events of January 29 in order to draw lessons for solving the problems that continue to affect the neighboring countries of the Southeast Asian region. Select Bibliography The following texts shed some light for a better understanding of our Southeast Asian neighbors, especially Cambodia, its history, and the question of the Khmer legacy. Her Royal Highness Princess Maha Chakri Sirindhorn. เขมรสามยก (Khamen sam yok / Cambodia: Three Times). 1993. A travel account of three trips made in 1992 and 1993, this book provides a day-by-day account of the Princess’s experiences in Cambodia, intending to give an understanding of the country and its customs. Filled with general information, the book is easy and pleasurable reading, and, importantly, contains beautiful photographs which help clarify the descriptions of modern day Cambodia (to 1992), as well as the historical sites at Angkor. 309 pages. 500 baht. George Coedes. Angkor: An Introduction (translated into Thai by Pranee Wongthes as เมืองพระนคร นครวัด นครธม ). 1986. A popular book, currently in its seventh printing, written by an eminent French scholar from the Ecole Française d’Extrème Orient. Coedes once worked in Thailand and was the first man to read the Ramkhamhaeng Inscription Stone in its entirety. This text is a “must read” for anyone wishing to gain an understanding of the history of the ancient Khmer and the concept of divine kingship which informed the building of the great prasart. The book traces the development of the magnificent Khmer civilization and its eventual collapse. A smooth translation of the original, easy to read. 228 pages. 195 baht. David Chandler. A History of Cambodia (translated into Thai by Phanngam Ngaothamasarn, Sodsai Khantiworapong, and Wongduen Narasajja as ประวัติศาสตร์กัมพูชา / Prawatsat Kamphucha). 1997 (second printing, 2000). Chandler, an eminent American scholar, is a former professor at Monash University, Australia. The book recounts the history of Cambodia, beginning from ancient times (before and after Angkor) and continuing to the present day (before and after the Khmer Rouge). It provides the “best background” to Cambodian history currently available in Thai. The book received an award for best translation of a work of non-fiction in 1999. A valuable reference book, suitable for reports, articles and advanced study. 412 pages. 250 baht. Nikhom Musikakhama. ประวัติศาสตร์โบราณคดี กัมพูชา (Archeological History of Cambodia). 1993. A text published by the Fine Arts Department to mark the official opening of the National Museum at Phimai by Her Royal Highness Princess Maha Chakri Sirindhorn in 1993. The book is an attempt by the government to illustrate that: “Just as the two banks of the Mekhong River have not been able to separate the Thais from their Lao brothers and sisters, the Dongrak Hills have failed to separate Thailand from Cambodia.” This is a dense and fairly serious work, tracing the history of the Khmer people from before the founding of Angkor to the fall of the empire at the hands of Vietnamese and Thai invaders. The book serves as an excellent guide for determining what is “reliable” and what is “unreliable” in the study of historical “records.” Special attention should be paid to Chapter 5. 430 pages. Jit Phumisak. ตำนานแห่งนครวัด (Prawatsat Borankhadi Kamphucha / The Legend of Angkor Wat). 1982 (second printing, 2002). This book, by an important Thai thinker and writer, is in the style of a cultural travel guide. It is an attempt to clear up misunderstandings and “overcome Thai prejudice and contempt for the Khmer.” Although it is somewhat romanticized, the book is full of insightful conversations between young men and women who ask questions and look for answers to the mystery of the rise and fall of the Khmer empire. First printing B.E. 2525 (1982), second printing B.E. 2545 (2002). Beautiful illustrations. 196+ pages. 175 baht. Bernard Groslier. นี่ เสียมกุก (Syam Kuk). (Translated into English by Benedict Anderson from the French “Les Syam Kuk des bas-reliefs d’Angkor Vat” in Orients pour George-Condominas, Sud-est Asie/Privat, Paris, 1981; Thai version edited by Charnvit Kasetsiri). 2002. The book presents the debate over the identity of the figures known as “Syam” carved into the stone prasat at Angkor. “Were they Thai? Where they Siamese? Were they mercenaries? Were they primitive babarians? Precisely who were they?” The book also discusses a new theory which posits that these figures were none other than the Kuay or Kui, one of the oldest indigenous peoples of Southeast Asia, who are somewhat disparagingly referred to as the “Suay” in Thai or the “Kha”in Lao. These people inhabited remote areas between the Khmer and the ancient Champa kingdoms. (M. Groslier was the French curator who remained at Angkor until the very last moment during the Khmer Rouge period. He believed that the flourishing of the ancient Khmer civilization was due to its ability to harness waterpower. To him the Angkorian Empire was a hydraulic society.) 165 baht. Sujit Wongthes, editor. พระนเรศวรตีเมืองละแวก แต่ไม่ได้ “ฆ่า” พระยาละแวก Phra Naresuan ti muang Lawaek dai tae maikai kha Phraya Lawaek / King Naresuan Captured the City of Lovek, But Did Not “Kill” its King). A history text consisting of dense but readable academic articles by Janchai Phakatimkom, Boonteun Srivorapong, and Santi Pakdeekham, which present new information, new perspectives, and new theories which contrast with long-standing readings of “historical records.” According to these articles, King Naresuan, in 1593, did in fact attack Lovek, the capital of the Khmer empire after the fall of Angkor, but he did not kill the Cambodian monarch, and the Pathomkam ritual, in which the blood of the Khmer king was used to wash King Naresuan’s feet, did not occur. These writers contend that the Khmer King of Lovek fled to Laos where he lived out the rest of his days. This book is recommended for the way in which it opens up new perspectives on the past and for its rejection of old-fashioned “fanatical nationalism.” (The editor is a national artist and cultural treasure; Janchai is a history professor at Ramkhamhaeng University, and Santi is an instructor at Srinakarintrawirot University – see his translation of the text on differences between Thai and Cambodian perspectives.) 184 pages. 155 baht. Charnvit Kasetsiri. วิถีไทย (Withi Thai / The Thai Way). 1997. This is an historical and cultural guidebook intended to give Thai readers an understanding of and respect for their Southeast Asian neighbors. It takes the approach that by understanding “them,” we can better understand “ourselves.” The book attempts to break down the barriers imposed by borders, prejudice, and outdated nationalistic attitudes. For information on Cambodia, readers are directed to the chapters entitled “Across Cambodia from Atop Phra Viharn” and “Angkor Wat: Record of a Journey to the Celestial Palace of the Khom.” 321 pages. 230 baht. Theeraphap Lohitakul. รัก ชื่น ขื่น ชัง อุษาคเนย์ (Rak, chun, khun, chang Usakhane / Love, Admiration, Resentment and Hatred in Southeast Asia). 2002. Written in a romantic style by one of the country’s most highly regarded travel writers, this book is a cultural guide to Southeast Asia with interesting historical asides. What is most noteworthy is the writer’s obvious respect and admiration for cultures and peoples different from the Thais. At the same time, however, the book’s title and chapter headings such as “Reassessing the Past: From Bang Rachan to Suranaree” and “To Whom Does Phra Viharn Belong? A Question We Should Perhaps Stop Asking” point to elements of love and hate in relations between neighboring countries in the region. Very easy to read, with beautiful illustrations, the book is an attack on ethnocentrism. 304 pages. 200 baht. Apichart Kaweephokha. ปราสาทสด๊กก๊อกธม ประวัติศาสตร์และอารยธรรมขอม สระแก้ว บันเตีย เมียนจาย (Prasat Sdok Kok Thom prawatsat lae arayatham khom sra keo bantai mainchai / Prasat Sadok Kok Thom: Khom History and Civilization in Sra Kaew and Bantay Mian Jai). An admirable attempt to promote cross-cultural understanding at the local level. The book makes use of historical information, stone inscriptions, cultural travels, religious rituals, and other local activities to break down national barriers and promote cooperation between Sra Kaew province in Thailand (the location of the Prasat Sadok Kok Thom) and Bantia Mian Jai province in Cambodia (site of Prasat Bantay Chamar). The writer is the chief district officer in Khok Sung district, Sra Kaew. 190 pages. 100 baht.
Thai historian Charnvit Kasetsiri is senior advisor to the Southeast Asia Studies Program at Thammasat University, Bangkok, Thailand. This article was translated by Michael Crabtree, with assistance from Somjit Jirananthiporn. //original text from: http://kyotoreview.cseas.kyoto-u.ac.jp/issue/issue2/article_242.html 62. The view from Cambodia [PREAH VIHEAR TEMPLE] By Michael Hayes Phnom Penh Post, February 17, 2011 COMMENT
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(Comments: Michael Heys who is a true friend of Cambodia and a great reporter, has written in the article posted below on the tragic dispute between tahiland and Cambodia, the following paragraph: “The view from Cambodia is simple: the issue of sovereignty over the temple was decided back in 1962 when the case was submitted to the International Court of Justice in The Hague. If Thailand didn’t want to abide by the court’s ruling then why did it agree to submit the case in the first place? And why are they groaning now and firing artillery shells at the temple almost 50 years later? “ What Michael Hayes had forgotten to mention is the fact that Hun Sen previously and on numerous occasions, was involved in some provocative acts against the Thailand that led to a dangerous increase in tensions between the Thai and the Cambodia people and government; for instance: 1. by intervening in the Thai domestic affairs by appointing the former corrupt Thai prime minister, Thaksin Shinawatra, as the official economic counselor to his corrupt government. 2. by appointed the corrupt former prime minster of Thailand, Thalsin Shinawatra, as an economic adviser to his government, knowing full-well that Thaksin was already indicted for corruption by the Thai justice system. 3. finally, by orchestrating the sacking of the Thai embassy and the destruction of several Thai business establishments in Phnom Penh in 2003, and his subsequent willingness to reimburse for all those damages, resulting from Hun Sen’s deliberately provocative and incomprehensible incitement. All these provocative acts cited above, were, for no other reasons, than to incite the Thai government and people against the Cambodian people. These are historical facts that any impartial reader should take into account when judging this delicate and explosive Preah Vihear dispute. Naranhkiri Tith, Ph.D, Washington DC. February 17, 2011)
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When I was publisher and editor-in-chief of the Phnom Penh Post I was sued once by then-Second Prime Minister Hun Sen, accused of spreading disinformation and trying to create political instability. Over the years, several Cambodian government officials even accused me and my newspaper of attempting to “destroy the nation”. At the very least I’ve never been called a spin doctor for the Cambodian government. But on the issue of the current border dispute between Cambodia and Thailand surrounding Wat Preah Vihear I’m as angry as all Cambodians are at what we perceive as a Thai-initiated conflict of grossly unjust proportions. We are not alone. Since this issue flared up two years ago, I have not met one Asian or Western diplomat, one foreign aid worker or one expatriate businessman in Phnom Penh who disagrees. Even a few Thai friends have sheepishly expressed support for the Cambodian side on this spat. The nagging question that perplexes us all is why Thailand is trying to export its domestic political problems and dump them on poor Cambodia? The sentiment here is that if the Red Shirts and the Yellow Shirts want to fight it out, do so somewhere in Thailand, but don’t use Cambodia as a scapegoat. The view from Cambodia is simple: the issue of sovereignty over the temple was decided back in 1962 when the case was submitted to the International Court of Justice in The Hague. If Thailand didn’t want to abide by the court’s ruling then why did it agree to submit the case in the first place? And why are they groaning now and firing artillery shells at the temple almost 50 years later? Moreover, when Thailand says: Well, we controlled the temple in the 1800s and before, the Khmers have a simpler reply: Yeah, but WE BUILT IT! We started construction in the early 9th century, modified and improved it for 250 years and then continued to pray there and celebrate our Gods for another three centuries until you guys stole it after you sacked and looted our capital at Angkor Wat three times between 1352 and 1431. Thank you very much. End of story. Cambodia has no interest whatsoever in another protracted violent conflict with anybody. The Kingdom is still trying to recover from 30 years of civil war, Pol Pot madness and the ensuing guerilla conflict in the 80’s and 90’s that in total cost the lives of over 2.5 million Cambodians and left the country in ruins. Every dollar spent on the military conflict there is a dollar lost for building desperately needed roads, schools and hospitals. The Thai accusation that Cambodia has had some secret plot to steal Thai land along the border is also seen as ludicrous. Everybody knows that since 1970 Cambodia has been too consumed with domestic strife to take even one meter of land from any of its neighbors. In fact, foreign aid officials who worked on the Thai border in the 80s will readily admit that border creep worked in reverse. It was Thai farmers living in peace—and I’m not accusing the Thai government of some orchestrated campaign here—who took the opportunity to plant a few extra hectares in disputed border areas while internally Cambodia was in complete disarray. If there is one thing that is clear, it is that the entire border needs to be systematically surveyed and demarcated, step by step, once and for all. As for the disputed 4.5 square kms just north of temple, why not consider this: Turn the area into the Cambodian-Thai International Friendship Park and set it up as a jointly managed enterprise by both countries’ Ministries of Tourism. Invite in hawkers, entrepreneurs, whatever from both sides of the border to set up businesses to cater to the millions of tourists who will want to visit the site in the coming decades and beyond. Tax revenues could be shared by both nations equally. Everybody wins. It could also be a model for other border disputes around the globe. If the Thais want a protracted, bloody fight on their hands over the temple, they’ve got one. In the 20 years I’ve been in Cambodia the Preah Vihear issue is without question the only one I’ve seen that has united the entire nation. Cambodian TV stations have been running fundraisers off and on with donations large and small pouring in from all quarters for two years. Even the normally truculent Sam Rainsy Party and others in the opposition are fully on board. It’s clear from a visit to the temple last week that the Cambodian military has dug in for the long haul. New heavy tanks, armored personnel carriers and ammunition “donated by friendly countries” are evident all over the base of the escarpment. Battle-scarred veterans, no doubt from all of Cambodia’s four previously warring factions and including ex-Khmer Rouge who controlled the temple from 1975 to 1998, are now all operating under one flag. And yes, of course there are Cambodian soldiers with weapons bunkered around the temple. If they weren’t there the Thai military could literally walk in and take control of it in five minutes. What government in Phnom Penh could allow that? If this dispute goes real hot, relations between Cambodia and Thailand will be ruined for years, hundreds on both sides will die needlessly and the economic costs to the two countries will be astronomical. Cooler heads need to prevail but rest assured the Cambodians will never, no matter what the price, give up control of Wat Preah Vihear. Why should they? It’s theirs.
Michael Hayes co-founded the Phnom Penh Post in 1992 and was Publisher & Editor-in-Chief from 1992 to 2008.
63. Vietnam as Tunisia in waiting Asia times; January 29, 2011 By Adam Boutzan http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Southeast_Asia/MA29Ae01.html (Comments; this article is perhaps the most significant message that Cambodia can start to positively think about the feasibility of a mass movement à la Tunisia or Egypt, provided that Cambodia can come up with a capable, honest, and courageous leader. Unlike, a recent statement by Sam Rainsy who said that Cambodia can follow the example of Tunisia or Egypt without giving any prior conditions that could lead to the possibility of the birth of such a mass movement in Cambodia, as I have pointed out, such as; existence of good and brave leader, absence of Vietnamese control of Hun Sen, and Sihanouk’s independence from Hun Sen’s control. As this article had pointed out that Vietnam may face such a mass movement resulting from the existence a pervasive and corrosive corruption in Vietnam. Let’s not be naïve about the difficulties to organize such a mass movement in Cambodia. A new kind of leaders must be found. That new leader must have high human qualifications such as real courage, honesty, technical and political capability, flexibility and wisdom that Cambodia needs, which would allow that leader to be able to use this kind of once in a life time opportunity, to start the liberation movement of Cambodia from Hun Sen and the Vietnamese grip. And above all, he must be wise and believe in the philosophy of Ahimsa or non-violence. Sam Rainsy is anything but wise. Why the adherence to Ahimsa or non-violence is so important? First, the Cambodian population is already so traumatized by the Khmer Rouge mass murder they cannot take anymore additional physical and/or psychological pain, through another open or guerrilla wars. Second, besides .Hun Sen may incite his people kill a few Vietnamese residents of Cambodia, which in turn, would immediately bring the Vietnamese back into Cambodia to “save” their countrymen. To some Cambodians, this Sam Rainsy may appear very patriotic, for what he had done before by inciting the crowd to remove the so-called Cambodian-Vietnamese Friendship monument, and more recently by removing the border markers, but, to most international observers, it is an act of crowd-inciting and not one of crowd-inspiring. It is not going to be easy, what the Cambodian people should do is to stop compromising, and start to think and work hard to look for such a leader. The sooner the Cambodian people start to look for such a leader, the better the chance that the Cambodian people would be able to move the mass toward that liberation roadmap. Naranhkiri Tith Ph.D. Washington DC. February 12, 2011) --------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Successful rebellions are inherently unpredictable. The middle-class revolt that recently toppled the Zine el-Abidine Ben Ali regime in Tunisia can only be explained in retrospect; hardly anyone, apparently, saw it coming. Analysts now are pointing to the combustible mix of too many educated young people and too few jobs, a "kleptocratic elite", and the failure of the state security apparatus to defend the regime when the chips were down. Other analysts are debating whether the Tunisian example will be replicated in neighboring Arab nations, including Algeria, Egypt and Yemen, and if so, how ought the world's democracies respond to the turmoil. Foreign ministries from Washington, London, Tokyo to Paris and Berlin are trying to guess what posture is most likely to preserve their governments' ability to find common ground to work with whoever ends up on top of the heap if a revolt succeeds, yet not upset current relationships if the incumbents weather the challenge. If they are wise, they won't just look at the Arab world. The revolt in Tunisia looks a lot like the protests that rocked the mullah-cracy in Iran a little more than a year ago. It wasn't about Islam but rather about social justice and personal freedoms. And if that is true, analysts ought to be considering its relevance to all nations, Islamic or not, in awkward stages of development. In many developing nations education and digitally driven social networking have made young, urban populations aware of what they haven't got. In some places, they haven't got the stuff someone can buy if he or she had a steady job. In other places, they haven't got the right to say what they think or change their leaders, let alone their system. Vietnam falls into this second category Since 1991, the Communist Party elite has done remarkably well at putting stuff into the hands of its citizens. A population that is still haunted by the memory of the abject poverty engendered by the failure of Vietnam's attempt to build real socialism (1975-1986) is happy with what a US$1,200 per capita income brings: better housing, enough to eat, a motorbike, TV, and money to spend on occasional luxuries. The Forbes Magazine-sponsored Happiness Index survey regularly finds the Vietnamese to be among the most optimistic that life will keep getting better. Yet a handful of Vietnamese persist in complaining in blogs, on Facebook and its ilk that material wealth is not enough and that elemental political freedoms are lacking. So far, the great majority of Vietnamese regard such people quizzically, if at all, as oddballs who haven't learned to color within the lines. They shrug when these malcontents are beaten up or jailed for such crimes as "using the Internet to promote a multiparty system and democracy." The political passivity of most Vietnamese can't be explained by ignorance of the outside world. The livelier newspapers have reported frequently and without apparent censorship on the events in Tunisia and now Egypt since the Ben Ali regime was toppled in mid-month. And, just as when the riots that rocked Bangkok a year ago were daily media fare, the prevailing sentiment seems to be "thank God that doesn't happen here". In a nation that was once officially egalitarian but where ostentatious displays of new wealth are now common, a lot of young, educated city people simply aspire to achieve the same degree of vulgarity. Almost all citizens believe that with hard work and a little luck, they'll lead better, easier lives.
The Legatum Institute's "Prosperity Index", a meta-analysis published on January 26, reported that Vietnam had jumped 16 places in the last year and is now 61st of 110 nations surveyed. Tunisia ranked 48th in the same "global assessment of wealth and well-being" A Vietnamese Communist Party congress has just renewed the nation's political elite, promoting some and retiring others. Often heard through the fog of white noise that pervades such events was emphasis on the importance of continuing to deliver economic growth. Not just quantitative growth, but qualitative growth as well - the sort of investments and policies that can lift Vietnam out of the ranks of the exporters of raw materials and sweatshop goods That's a promise that the Hanoi regime may not be able to deliver. Perhaps party members understand that the legitimacy of their rule now depends intimately on delivering ever higher living standards and will act accordingly. However, it seems just as likely that reformers within the ruling party will continue to be hobbled by a sclerotic system characterized by patronage, pervasive corruption and local fiefdoms. If Vietnam's quarter-century economic advance were to stutter or stall, trouble may well follow. There are millions of youth on motorbikes, each with a 3G mobile phone - anyone who has seen celebrations of football victories by Vietnam's national squad can imagine this same energy turned to political agitation. And if as in Tunisia the mood turned decidedly ugly, if a minor clash or two produced martyrs, if tens of thousands were to challenge the powers that be, can the regime depend on its protectors, the People's Police? Vietnam, a nation of 86 million, has 1.2 million police according to an estimate by respected security analyst Carl Thayer. Collectively they are a corrupt, abusive, ubiquitous presence that ordinary people avoid insofar as possible. Individually, most police are - as reportedly is the case in Tunisia - lower middle-class people who regard a police career as a way to get ahead. Specialized police units excel in monitoring and squashing Vietnamese who share their seditious opinions with others. Internal security officials regularly warn that Vietnam's enemies aim to launch an East European-type "color revolution". The police are aided by laws that prohibit the establishment of independent advocacy groups, the sinews of civil society in most nations Vietnam's political dissidents appear to be marginalized and few in number, and as long as that's the case no match for the police. And yet, suppose economic growth did stutter or stall? And suppose a young Vietnamese with a university degree, unable to find steady work, set up a sidewalk business vending watermelons? Suppose several policemen busted him for vending without a permit and confiscated his wares? Suppose he protested to the powers that be and was ignored or humiliated? These things happen often in Vietnam. And suppose that the young educated vendor then dowsed himself with gasoline in front of a local party headquarters and lit a match? Adam Boutzan, a pseudonym, is an independent writer. (Copyright 2011 Asia Times Online (Holdings) Ltd. All rights reserved. Please contact us about sales, syndication and republishing.)
64. The Preah Vihear dispute and some misguided overseas Cambodian patriots:
(Comments; this is a set of email exchanges between some Cambodian-Canadians and Cambodian-Americans on the subject of Preah Vihear dispute between Thailand and Cambodia shows how uninformed or naïve some of these Cambodian are.
Unfortunately, some of these people have misunderstood completely the fundamental reasons behind this unfortunate and tragic dispute, namely Hun Sen and his hidden agenda on behalf of the Vietnamese.
The central questions on this issue are simply this: Since when is Hun Sen the defender of Cambodian national interests?
The second question is do you know how the Thai has been treating the Khmer minority in Thailand known as Khmer Surin, compared to the Vietnamese treatment of the Cambodian minority in Vietnam known as the Khmer Krom?
If you know the answer of these questions, then you can approach this issue with intelligence and impartiality. Otherwise, you can be considered either an ignoramus or a hidden Hun Sen’s supporter. For more information, please, read other documents on this subject in this page.
Naranhkiri Tith Ph.D. Washington DC. February 17, 2011) ------------------------------------------------------------------
February 16, 2011 Hi Pretty: Thank you for your email and your straightforward email on this important issue to that fellow Davan Long. As you know, I will continue to do whatever I can, not to allow anybody who is trying to make Hun Sen and the Vietnamese the 'saviors' of the Cambodian nation and people. I have never hesitated to go after these kinds of fake patriots, or stupid. The Thai government has been more than Vietnam and Thailand. In Thailand, the Khmers Surin are totally assimilated into the Thai society, and one of them had even become three times Prime Minister of Thailand ( Khuong Aphaiwong, a Khmer from Battambang). Did you ever see any Cambodian becoming not even prime minister of Vietnam, but just a simple official in Vietnam; not to mention the genocide committed against them as clearly shown in the videos by Rebecca Sommer, titled "Eliminated Without Bleeding"? Warm regards to you and your family. N. Tith ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- In a message dated 2/16/2011 5:22:19 P.M. Eastern Standard Time, mapretty@videotron.ca writes: Dear Lauk Om,
Thank you for your thought on the issue and the theatrical ploy of both governments for their own political gain while lives are being wasted at the same time on both sides of the border. I appreciated your analysis and direct comment on this kind of fake nationalism while many people are in fact turning a blind eye on all invasions on land, rivers and lakes from the East. This is where the real threat has been and will continue for as long as Hun Sen and the CPP remains at the steering wheel of our nation. Have a wonderful evening, Pretty
On 2011-02-16, at 3:54 PM, naranhkiritith@aol.com wrote:
February 16, 2011 Dear Kal: This is typical Cambodian fake or stupid nationalism, by supporting Hun Sen in this Preah Vihear dispute with Thailand. How do they expect anybody to understand what is the moral value for these types of Cambodia. Apparently, Sam Rainsy is also supporting Hun Sen in this case, according to this email: "Récemment, j’ai lu une communiquée de M. Sam Rainsy qui soutient publiquement l’action du gouvernement de notre pays. C’est un bon pas dans la bonne direction, et j’espère fortement que ce genre de coopération va favoriser une relation plus harmonieuse entre les partis politiques. " Translation: "Recently, I read a communiqué from Sam Rainsy, who publicly supports the decision by the government of our country. It is in the right direction, and I hope that this kind of cooperation would favor a more harmonious relation between political parties." However, as pointed out by David Chandler, when he was asked in a recent interview in the Phnom Penh Post, what is really the real reason behind this dispute; he answered that the Thai have their own internal political problems; while Hun Sen has his own agenda to show that he is a nationalist; and it works. I think this person named Davan Long is either stupid or a hidden five column for Hun Sen. Warm regards. N Tith
From: davan.long@gmail.com To: anakuoth@gmail.com CC: khmer-avenir@googlegroups.com, k_eap@hotmail.com, sacravatoons@optusnet.com.au, yanathom@yanathom.org, siphalmey@yahoo.fr, suvanna.hangs@yahoo.com, supharidh.hy@gmail.com, sattaso@free.fr, setha.douc-rasy@igr.fr, kim-ya.lim@wanadoo.fr, vandykaonn@gmail.com, kenneth.aryasatya@gmail.com, vary@khun.fr, thachtoanpr@orange.fr, perom.uch@gmail.com, munysara@aol.com, moninnath@yahoo.com, tithhuon@aol.com, hannso@gmail.com, bcham77@gmail.com, fb663380@skynet.be, lydenne@free.fr Sent: 2/16/2011 10:08:33 A.M. Eastern Standard Time Subj: Re: {K@A:12143} Fw: [CambodianAmerican] Protest against Thai Invasion // [KhmerAméricain] Manif contre l'invasion thaïlandaise Cher Lauk Ruomjati, Merci pour votre sage observation. En passant, permettez-moi de vous informer que la communauté Khmer a Montréal organise une manifestation a Ottawa ce Vendredi le 18 février a 11 :00AM, l’heure locale (voir la fiche ci-joint). Concernant le dilemme que certains organisateurs potentiels font face : « Manifester contre l’agression/invasion Thaïlandaise ou contre le parti au pouvoir », le choix n’a jamais été et ne sera jamais difficile pour moi. Cependant, je dois avouer que peut-être je ne suis pas « assez » Khmer pour comprendre certaines pensées de nos compatriotes. Puis-je rappeler a certains de nos compatriotes qu’il y aura toujours un lendemain pour manifester vos insatisfactions a l’égards du parti au pouvoir, mais la territoire perdue au envahisseur est pour toujours. On ne peut pas la récupérer le lendemain. Soyez prudent et sage dans votre choix. Récemment, j’ai lu une communiquée de M. Sam Rainsy qui soutient publiquement l’action du gouvernement de notre pays. C’est un bon pas dans la bonne direction, et j’espère fortement que ce genre de coopération va favoriser une relation plus harmonieuse entre les partis politiques. Salutations, Davan Long On Wed, Feb 16, 2011 at 5:38 AM, Ana Kouth <anakuoth@gmail.com> wrote: Cher Lauk Davan Long. Votre appel mérite d'être entendu et soutenu par toutes les communautés khmères basées dans les différents pays d'accueil du monde. En ce qui concerne celles basées en Europe, Australie, Canada, etc. malgré que cet appel suscitait avant tout de la sympathie, mais celle-ci ne se traduit pas encore en action concrète sur les places publiques, à l'instar des Communautés des Khmers-Américains. A mon humble avis, il devrait y avoir un téléscopage avec l'autre évènement (celui, comme vous le saviez, de la révolution de jasmin de Tunisie suivie de celle de la Place de Tahrir de l'Egypte) qui pourrait poser un dilemne, sinon un casse-tête, pour les organisateurs khmers potentiels, à savoir: - Pourrais-je manifester contre le régime de Hun Sèn en suivant l'exemple du duo Tunisie-Egypte? - Et tout de suite après, re-manifester pour soutenir ce même régime dictatorial archi-corrompu dans la guéguerre affairiste thaïe-khmère sur Preah Vihear? Quant à la voix de l'opposition, on l'entend pas beaucoup en ce moment ! Ruomjati ------------- 2011/2/13 Davan Long <davan.long@gmail.com>
Merci KA modérateurs pour votre compréhension et soutien. Sincères salutations, Davan Long
On Sat, Feb 12, 2011 at 12:56 PM, KA-Mod <ka.moderators@gmail.com> wrote: Note de la Rédaction de Khmer@Avenir au membre-abonné Davan Long: Cher membre-abonné, Normalement, votre article ci-dessous écrit purement en anglais sans aucune traduction n'est pas éligible pour être publié dans ce forum que vous saviez avant tout francophone. Mais exceptionnellement pour cette fois-ci, nous acceptons de le publier tel quel avec l'invitation à nos autres membres-lecteurs non anglophones de bien vouloir nous en excuser et de ne pas hésiter d'utiliser le logiciel de traduction automatique, comme par exemple le Google-Traduction suivant http://translate.google.be/?hl=fr&tab=wT#en|fr| pour bien comprendre le sens de cet appel à la manifestation publique des Khmers à travers le monde. La Rédaction de Khmer@Avenir --------- ----- Original Message ----- From: Davan Long To: CambodianAmerican@yahoogroups.com ; kiletters@gmail.com ; khmer-avenir@googlegroups.com ; infos. khmer ; (khmer.mchas.srok Sent: Saturday, February 12, 2011 2:59 PM Subject: Re: [CambodianAmerican] Protest against Thai Invasion
Dear Cambodian-American Communities and organizers, It is honourable for our fellow compatriots in America to come togther to defend our country . The protest will attract the world attention, and inform international media about the Thai agression and her continued contempt for the ICJ and UNESCO decisions. I would like to humbly urge our compatriots in Canada, Australia, Europe and every where else to mobilize and follow this commendable leadership/inititive of Cambodian-American Communities. Everyone can help and every helping hand will strengthen our position. Together, we will defeat the invaders. Thank you Cambodian-American Communities and all the organizers for your loyalty and noble cause for the country. Yours truly, Davan Long
The Mirror, Vol. 15, No. 703; February 8, 2011 By Norbert Klein (Comments: this article by Norbert Klein, and its companion article by the brunei Times, titled ‘Someone explains Why’ provide a brief but concise summary of the historical background of the current and dangerous crisis between Thailand and Cambodia resulting from the dispute on the Preah Vihear temple. It rightly pointed out the almost incomprehensible factor that led this crisis as follows: ‘This new round of gunfight will definitely not be the last armed encounter to take place in the disputed border zone, and the landmark temple will be a mute witness to many more needless bloodbaths and for what? Over a stretch of jungle? For national pride? Lives are being lost over murky reasons… National pride is indeed greatly valued in this region, but the two countries must remember that ruling and talking through the barrel of the gun is not the answer.’ It is important to note that the current crisis appeared to have started or provoked by Hun Sen that with sign that was built by the Cambodian government saying; “Here! is the place where Thai troops invaded Cambodian territory on 15 July 2008’ It appears to me that it is a pure provocation from Hun Sen’s part. It is sad that many uninformed Cambodians and bought the patriotic card that Hun Sen had used to support the great Cambodian dictator. These Cambodians never asked the pertinent question whether Hun Sen has ever been a patriot, and defending Cambodian national interests. These naïve Cambodians have forgotten that Hun Sen was put in power by the Vietnamese to serve them; and the Vietnamese have only on objective in mind, which is to take over the land from the Cambodian people and eliminating from their ancestral land, as they have been doing it since the 17th century, when king Chey Chettha II gave the right to the Vietnamese to use Prey Nokor (Saigon) as a custom house, as a gift to the Vietnamese emperor for giving a princess to him as a wife. The lack of knowledge in Cambodian history is one of the many weaknesses for the Cambodian people, not being able to defend itself against the well-organized, well-motivated and powerful Vietnamese invaders and destroyer of the Chams and the Khmer Krom people, and now what remained of once the most important but extremely autocratic and insensitive empire in Southeast Asia. Naranhkiri Tith Ph.D. Washington DC. February 11, 2011) ----------------------------------------------------------------- It’s mail dated 9 February 2011 makes two important historical documents available: a copy of then Foreign Minister Prince Norodom Kantol’s letter to the UN Security Council of 23 April 1966 on Thai attacks and the capture of the Preah Vihear Temple, and the letter of Huot Sambath, then Permanent Representative of Cambodia at the UN, addressed to the UN Security Council on 17 May 1966 on the same issue. The documents related to massive military actions of Thailand in contravention of the decision of the 1962 rulings by the International Court of Justice in The Hague, which had concluded in 1962: For these reasons, by nine votes to three, finds that the Temple of Preah Vihear is situated in territory under the sovereignty of Cambodia. This is an important part of the memory of the history behind the present conflicts at the Cambodian-Thai border. That the memory – to be accurate – is much wider is obvious from the many different, additional views brought into the discussion. Some go back as far as the 11th century, when the Temple of Preah Vihear was built – not at all at a contested border area, but in a region which was at that time part of the Khmer Empire. Others refer to Thai-French negotiations and agreements from the years 1904 and 1907, when the independent Kingdom of Siam and the French colonial power over Indo-China were engaged to clarify border issues. But then – also part of the memory, after the end of the internal war with the remnants of the Khmer Rouge – there were several years of relative peace around the Temple of Preah Vihear, with a growing number of tourists, entering mainly from the side of Thailand into the area of the temple, where around one hundred Cambodian families earned a living from services and sales to tourists. Events around and after the designation of the Temple of Preah Vihear as an UNESCO certified World Heritage Site in 2008 resulted in new conflicts and even the loss of human life, most of the time there was no ongoing armed conflict. “Someone Explain Why” requests The Brunei Times in the Asia News Network, This new round of gunfight will definitely not be the last armed encounter to take place in the disputed border zone, and the landmark temple will be a mute witness to many more needless bloodbaths and for what? Over a stretch of jungle? For national pride? Lives are being lost over murky reasons… National pride is indeed greatly valued in this region, but the two countries must remember that ruling and talking through the barrel of the gun is not the answer. To explain why is extremely difficult given that information available is partly vague, and some information is contradicting to other parts of information. The latter is true not only for expected cases, where Cambodian and Thai sources may be oriented to their own conflicting interests. Such contradictions are much more surprising when they exist between statements of different sections of the media, or even different authorities in Cambodia.
Controversial Tablet The present conflict seems to have been started with the erection of a solid stone signboard near the Keo Sekha Kiri Svarak pagoda, saying: Here! is the place where Thai troops invaded Cambodian territory on 15 July 2008 Thai authorities protested. On 25 January 2011, the Cambodian Minister of Defense communicated with Thai military commanders at the border, and he agreed to take down the tablet, “We agreed to move out the stone tablet sign. From now on, we do not permit to install any sign involving the countries’ relationship because it risks creating a problem.” Fair enough – this place, several hundred meters away from Preah Vihear, is in the disputed territory of 4.6 sqkm around Preah Vihear. But soon after the stone sign had been removed, another table was erected, creating more irritation: Here! is Cambodia Press reports are not clear who was responsible for declaring this part of the disputed are to be Cambodia. After the Thai Army commander came with 20 armed soldiers to demand that the Cambodian troops remove the new tablet – “If you don’t remove such a negative tablet, I will erect a ‘Here! is Thailand’.” – The Cambodian sign was removed, in line with what the Cambodian Minister of Defense had agreed: not to “permit to install any sign involving the countries’ relationship.” But then there was another sign, which more clearly than these tablets, state a position relating to the country’s national sovereignty, using the Cambodian flag on the pagoda – a symbol of national sovereignty in a contested territory. The risk to create a problem, which the Cambodian Minister of Defense had tried to avoid, had been made manifest. What happened since is clear: people have been killed, maybe up to ten, and thousands have fled their homes not to get hurt or killed in further fighting. What happened since is, however not clear: both sides accuse the other to have started shooting. Cambodian government agencies had report that part of the Temple of Preah Vihear – a wing, or a wall – had collapsed as a result of shelling. By now, there is reporting in the media that no structural damage was visible, but just some shrapnel scars. The Press and Quick Reaction Unit of the Office of the Council of Ministers had reported that the Thai army also used artillery gas shells. The use of gas in warfare has been prohibited by international law. My request for further clarification to this press office of the Government is without response since last Sunday. One Cambodian soldier said that another soldier, who had been stationed at the temple’s stairs, had been killed by Thai shrapnel. But the spokesperson of the Cambodian Ministry of Foreign Affairs Koy Kuong said that “there has never been and never will be Cambodian soldiers at the Temple of Preah Vihear. This has always been a place for worship and tourism.” The Cambodian Daily, however, published on 9 February 2011 a picture of a Cambodian soldier at the temple. “The Foreign Ministry also denied yesterday that Cambodian troops had ever been at the temple, even as reporters were interviewing them there.” But the spokesperson of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs confirmed his previous statement, “I don’t know exactly, but as far as I know, no presence of soldiers at the temple.” In the meantime, the Cambodian Prime Minister called for urgent intervention by the UN Security Council because of the “Thai invasion into Cambodia territory” – but the published wording was not clear whether this “invasion into Cambodia territory” related to Thai military presence in “contested Cambodian territory” – which is also “contested Thai territory” – or whether there was also Thai military presence in non-contested Cambodian territory. A first round of tentative response from the UN administration – not yet from the Security Council – is a suggestion that ASEAN might be closer by and could initiate a process of defusing the tensions. Cambodia would accept this, while Thailand prefers mutual talks. But this, too, seems to be difficult – until now, Cambodia has always upheld the principle that ASEAN should not get involved with internal affairs of a member country. At present there is again a conflict between countries which would like to see ASEAN to get involved more actively in Myanmar by sending an official envoy to this country, while Cambodia, Laos, and Vietnam had, in the past, always resisted such ASEAN involvement. The Mirror has tried, over the years, to contribute to make resources available, so that “an accurate memory of Cambodia’s own history” is more easily and publicly available. That is why we carried the text of the Memorandum of Understanding between the Government of the Kingdom of Thailand and the Government of the Kingdom of Cambodia on the Survey and Demarcation of Land Boundary, signed on 14 June 2000 – as far as we know, it has not been made widely accessible in Cambodia before. While it lays out a procedural framework, it does provide clues about how the two sides would address their common problems. And while the accurate memory surely has to include documents from 1904, 1907, and 1962, the map and text of the Joint Communique of 18 June 2008, published repeatedly in The Mirror (but again, as far as we know, nowhere else in Cambodia) merit also consideration. These documents finally paved the way for the Temple of Preah Vihear to be made a World Heritage Site – with the words that “the Temple of Preah Vihear be nominated for inscription on the World Heritage List without at this stage a buffer zone on the northern and western areas of the Temple” – the areas where most of the military conflicts happened.
Nationalism When the unsolved legal problems started to get emotional in 2008, the Bangkok Post carried a picture showing that Nationalism can lead to self-destruction. Maybe if this insight would get more attention and reflection, on both sides, new paths towards peace could become easier visible. Norbert KLEIN Have a look at the last editorial – you can access it directly from the main page of the Mirror. And please recommend The Mirror also to your colleagues and friends. 66. Someone explains why The Brunei Times/Asia News Network; Wednesday February 9, 2011 THE guns went blazing anew in the jungle near the Preah Vihear Temple as Thai and Cambodian troops clashed for the fourth straight day on Monday over the disputed border area. When silence reigned after several hours of shelling and machine gun fire, the Cambodian government said five people were killed and 45 injured on its side of the border. The deaths brought to 10 the number of those killed while the wounded now placed at 85 with thousands evacuated. The conundrum about the newest round of clashes between Cambodian and Thai troops is that there is no clear reason behind it. Both sides blame each other for starting the clashes five days ago and for breaking a shaky ceasefire agreed between the two armies on Friday night. Furthermore, the reports said the skirmishes could have occurred as a result of a misunderstanding or a breakdown in communication channels. With the deployment of more soldiers who are tensed and unfamiliar with the terrain and the situation, something as simple as a few warning shots or border patrols straying too far could have set things off. The acerbic exchange of words between Cambodian Prime Minister Hun Sen and the Thai Foreign Ministry will definitely not help to neutralise the tension. Hun Sen said his counterpart Abhisit Vejjajiva was hungry for war while the Thai officials accused Cambodia of committing an act of aggression in violation of Thai sovereignty and territorial integrity. This new round of gunfight will definitely not be the last armed encounter to take place in the disputed border zone, and the landmark temple will be a mute witness to many more needless bloodbaths and for what? Over a stretch of jungle? For national pride? Lives are being lost over murky reasons. The Asean and not the UN should put an end to this needless loss of lives. The regional body will also be the one at the losing end if the Cambodia-Thailand struggle will persist. National pride is indeed greatly valued in this region, but the two countries must remember that ruling and talking through the barrel of the gun is not the answer. -The Brunei Times/Asia News Network
67. Bombshells and rally cries By Shawn W Crispin Asia times; February 8, 2011 (Comments: this article is a well-informed one as it pointed out to the story behind each side of the conflict. On the Cambodian side, there is the close relationship between Hun Sen and Thaksin Shinawatra, and on the Thai side, there is the old conflict between the role of military and that of the civilian as leaders of the country, and also hidden behind is the role of the monarchy. Definitely, it is very difficult to separate the role of the Vietnamese in this regional dispute. It is clear that it is all to the Vietnamese to have the conflict heated up, as this will allow the Vietnamese to have more control over Hun Sen, as Hun Sen’s army is no match to the Thai army. Should this conflict grow more intense, the Cambodian dictator can always ask the Vietnamese to come and help him, while the Vietnamese would be more than happy to so comply to the Cambodian request. In this case, the war could also come when the Thai military regain the upper hand of the power in Thailand. Should the military succeed to take over the power from the current Thai Prime Minister Abhisit Vejjajiva, who has done all he could not to worsen this very sensitive and dangerous situation, as they did so many times before, this conflict could become more dangerous and incendiary, which, in turn, could bring the Vietnamese back to Cambodia in no time. Cambodians should not forget that just before carrying out a coup d’état against Ranariddh in 1997, Hun Sen went to Vietnam, for ‘vacation.’ But, in reality, in going to ‘vacation’ in Vietnam, Hun Sen wanted to be sure that he could count on his boss, the Vietnamese, should he have any problem with his war to wrestle the power from Ranariddh’s faction. As it turned out, there was no problem for Hun Sen to quickly throw Ranariddh out of power, knowing full-well that Sihanouk was firmly behind hi and against his own son. Please, also read the companion article titled ‘Nationalism behind Thai-Cambodia rift: experts’ ’Naranhkiri Tith Ph.D. Washington DC. February 10, 2011) ------------------------------------------------------------------------- BANGKOK - Clashes between Thai and Cambodian troops represent the heaviest armed exchanges since border tensions first erupted in 2008 and threaten to spiral into a wider conflict as both sides incur casualties and extend their positions beyond the original 4.6 kilometer border area in dispute. Fighting entered a fourth day on Monday, with no ceasefire in sight. Both sides have claimed the other fired first and that return salvos were launched in self-defense. The clashes were presaged by a ratcheting in tensions. Bangkok had earlier demanded Phnom Penh remove a marker claiming ownership of a patch of the contested territory and later insisted that a Buddhist temple in the area stop flying the Cambodian flag. Bangkok's assertiveness coincided with a Cambodian court decision last week to sentence on espionage charges two Thai activists to lengthy jail terms for entering a border area claimed by Cambodia. Meanwhile, anti-government protests in Bangkok have called on Prime Minister Abhisit Vejjajiva to step down for his alleged mishandling of border issues. Bilateral relations hit a nadir in 2009 after Cambodian prime minister Hun Sen invited exiled former premier Thaksin Shinawatra, who the Thai government has accused of orchestrating and financing street violence, to serve as an economic adviser to his government. Hun Sen has also provided safe haven to Thaksin-aligned protesters who Bangkok has accused of terrorism and other charges. Nonetheless, government relations were on a warming trend until Phnom Penh arrested seven Thais, including a parliamentarian, on contested turf in January. Despite the international dimension, the conflict is being driven largely by Thai domestic politics. Because Abhisit did not give the order to open fire, some see the armed exchanges and immediate breakdown of a ceasefire declared on Saturday as yet another indication that he lacks command control over the military. The hostilities and protests come at a time some believe Thailand's top military brass seek a national security-related pretense to stall Abhisit's early election plan. Abhisit insinuated recently he may dissolve parliament and call new polls as early as April, eight months earlier than he is constitutionally required. The current military leadership, including army commander General Prayuth Chan-ocha, would likely be sidelined quickly should the opposition Puea Thai party win and form a new government. Puea Thai takes its marching orders from Thaksin, who was ousted in a 2006 military putsch. The opposition holds Prayuth, then the army's deputy commander, as chiefly responsible for the killing of scores of its aligned United Front for Democracy Against Dictatorship (UDD) protesters during armed street clashes last April and May. A Puea Thai-led government would likely launch new investigations, with a focus on Prayuth's, his top level military allies and Abhisit's alleged roles in the killings. Current probes into the violence have been slow-moving. Under those pressures, the once coherent storylines that have defined Thailand's six-year-old political conflict are fast fragmenting as establishment forces once united against Thaksin now compete to steer the country's future political direction. That's most visibly apparent with the People's Alliance for Democracy (PAD) protest group, whose once potent street protests ushered Thaksin's 2006 military ouster and the collapse of two successive Thaksin-aligned governments in 2008 by occupying Government House and Bangkok's international airports. Previously supportive of Abhisit and the Democrat Party's rule, the PAD has in recent weeks mobilized around the notion that his government has ceded sovereignty of contested territory, including the symbolic Preah Viharn temple, to Cambodia. The street protest is notable for its lack of anti-Thaksin propaganda and defense of the monarchy themes, both pivotal to the yellow-garbed movement's previous ability to draw large middle class crowds. Until the border clashes, the PAD's appeals to nationalism vis-a-vis Cambodia has failed to galvanize much enthusiasm, with crowds gauged by this correspondent on different evenings hovering between 2,000-4,000 supporters. That's largely because the PAD's current incarnation is not representative of the same unified establishment forces - including Abhisit's now ruling Democrat Party - that it was previously. One government source notes that the PAD's protest and threats of stirring wider instability have coincided with a recent court ruling against 82 PAD guards, who were handed down prison sentences for their roles in raiding and shutting down a state television station's offices. The official contends that the PAD has played the nationalism card to bolster its relevance while the case against its leaders for occupying Bangkok's airports in 2008 is still pending. The bigger question for stability surrounds the status of the PAD's ties with the military and monarchy. Once viewed as a front for pro-royalist, anti-Thaksin forces - including inside the armed forces and royal advisory Privy Council - those perceptions pivoted with the April 2009 assassination attempt by heavily-armed assailants against PAD co-leader and media mogul Sondhi Limthongkul. While nobody has yet been prosecuted for the attack, police issued warrants for at least four soldiers, including from the army's Special Warfare Command. Sondhi has never publicly accused Thaksin or renegade UDD-aligned soldiers for ordering the attack. A US Embassy cable from November 2008, released by WikiLeaks, quoted an adviser to Queen Sirikit saying that the palace was "highly irritated by the PAD's occupation of Government House and other disruptions caused by the anti-government group". Still, some have speculated that the military has swung back towards the PAD with the transition from outgoing army commander General Anupong to new chief Prayuth as a way to pressure Abhisit out of his early election plan. With the reappearance of the PAD on Bangkok's streets, this time as ultra-nationalists in defense of Thai territory, local newspapers have been awash in unexplained coup rumors. (T-shirts for sale at the PAD's protest advertise for a "civil-military coup".) The foil to that reconvergence has been the simultaneous overtures the PAD and its allied Thai Patriots Network have made to the UDD to join protest forces against Abhisit. As the two protest groups flirt with what still seems an unlikely merger, it once again underscores how Thailand's conflict is more about personality than ideology. That leaves Abhisit to convince Prayuth that early polls are a better bet than backing the PAD and fomenting instability on the border. According to a source familiar with the situation, the Democrats recently hired an international election polling firm to gauge its election chances. In a recent interview with Bloomberg, Abhisit cited an unnamed poll that he said showed the Democrats were the popular frontrunners for new elections. An election win would lessen Abhisit's reliance on the military, which many believe cobbled together his coalitions, and quiet opposition charges that his administration lacks democratic legitimacy because his party placed second, not first, at the 2007 polls. Until then, however, expect more bombshells on the border and rally cries from the streets. Shawn W Crispin is Asia Times Online's Southeast Asia Editor. (Copyright 2011 Asia Times Online (Holdings) Ltd. All rights reserved. Please contact us about sales, syndication and republishing.)
68. Nationalism Behind Thai-Cambodian Rift: Experts Agence France Press; February 08, 2011 http://www.thejakartaglobe.com/world/nationalism-behind-thai-cambodian-rift-experts/421397 Nationalist fervor and political grandstanding are stoking a deadly border dispute between Thailand and Cambodia but both sides will be keen to avoid major hostilities, experts say.
Although the exact trigger for a series of armed clashes in recent days is unclear, tensions have grown since seven Thais -- including one lawmaker -- were arrested by Cambodia in December near the frontier for illegal entry.
Two of them were sentenced to lengthy jail terms for spying, outraging nationalist Thais, who have held protests in Bangkok calling on their Prime Minister Abhisit Vejjajiva to resign.
Observers say the recent cross-border fighting, focused on the area surrounding an ancient Khmer temple, is being used in both countries to stir patriotic sentiment with elections on the horizon.
Yet while Cambodia Prime Minister Hun Sen has unleashed a torrent of fiery rhetoric, accusing Thailand of being an invading aggressor and calling for UN intervention, for Abhisit the standoff is seen as another unwanted headache.
"Hun Sen is deliberately playing this to vitalise nationalist sentiment and reinvigorate support for himself," said Professor William Case, director of the Southeast Asia Research Centre at the City University of Hong Kong.
Hun Sen is "something of a tough guy ... but I don't think it will be allowed to get totally out of hand," he said.
"On the Thai side this is a confrontation that the leadership would very much like to avoid. The nationalism on the Thai side is not so much coming from the government but from the masses, to which it has to respond."
"Yellow Shirt" Thai nationalists turned out in their thousands over the weekend demanding Abhisit's resignation over the issue.
The royalist protest movement is strongly critical of Cambodia over issues such as the border row and Phnom Penh's appointment of Thailand's fugitive ex-premier Thaksin Shinawatra as an economics adviser in 2009.
Seven people, including at least two civilians, have been killed since the fighting broke out on Friday around the 11th-century Preah Vihear temple, with both sides accusing each other of firing the first shots.
Ties between the neighbors have been strained since the temple was granted UN World Heritage status in July 2008.
The World Court ruled in 1962 that Preah Vihear itself belonged to Cambodia but both countries claim ownership of a 4.6-square-kilometre (1.8-square-mile) surrounding area.
"Nationalistic fervor is fuelling both sides of the conflict," said Professor David Chandler, a Cambodia expert at Australia's Monash University.
"Kicking Cambodia around has been a Thai hobby since the 14th century; Cambodia biting back dates from the colonial era and of course from the World Court 1962 decision."
Michael Montesano of the Institute of Southeast Asia Studies in Singapore said the border issue "certainly plays well" in Cambodia.
"Cambodian efforts to protect their rights along the border and stand up to a stronger Thailand have political benefits for Hun Sen," he said.
The 59-year-old strongman -- who has ruled since 1985, vowing to remain in power until he is 90 -- is looking ahead to a general election in 2013.
In contrast in Thailand the government and military would prefer to avoid a confrontation, while nationalist activists "are determined to keep tensions with Cambodia on the boil," Montesano said.
The "Yellow Shirts" were once allies of the establishment-backed Abhisit, but relations have soured and the group's political party is eyeing elections expected some time this year.
"With elections in Thailand approaching, the country's civil society nationalists will play the Cambodia card to build up support for their parties," said Paul Chambers, a Thai expert at Germany's Heidelberg University.
"Preah Vihear has fallen victim to ultra-nationalism on both sides of the Thai-Cambodian border."
Despite the tough talk and casualties on both sides, observers believe the risk of a full-blown conflict remains slim.
"It will be a matter of bilateral negotiations with the possibility of further skirmishes," said Professor Mark Turner at the University of Canberra in Australia. "It's difficult to envisage any widening of the armed conflict."
Agence France-Presse
69. Cambodia remembers its fallen Muslims By Julie Masis
Asia times; Jan 6, 2011
(Comments: this article shows how the Hun Sen regime in collusion with their boss, the Vietnamese, are not contented with making the Khmer Rouge the mass killers but more importantly, to also make them racists. Since, all communist regimes had allowed mass killings as a means to reach the communist nirvana, which consists of a classless society, of their enemies, such the bourgeois, or the capitalists, or large land owners, they must make the Khmer Rouge a racist communist regime, as if killing en mass is not sufficient. And it works for them.
To make the Khmer Rouge racist and mass killers infers that all Cambodians are also racists. That in turn would make the Vietnamese cleaner and would allow them to come and save the Cambodian people.
It is interesting also to note that this article mentioned and now living in Cambodia, and there are only about 20,000 Chams now living in Vietnam the ancestral home of the Chams. at around 100,000 to 400,000 thousand Chams were killed by the Khmer Rouge. In fact, before the Khmer Rouge regime took over the power in 1975, the number of the Chams who were then living in Cambodia were around 300,000 to 400,000. Then, the question is if the Cambodians are so racists as this article inferred why then there are still around 400,000 Chams are still alive and freely living and practicing Islam when ancestral homeland, which was in present-day central Vietnam, was totally destroyed by Vietnam by the end of the 17th century.
This process of ‘demonizing the demons’ is a way of making the Vietnamese and their protégé, the Hun Sen regime more acceptable to the world community, and also to totally suppress all efforts by the Cambodian people to organize any resistance against Vietnam deadly system of colonialism known as ‘Nam Tien.’ Youk Chhang of DCCAM is the champion of ‘demonizing the demons.’ As he ,after all, got his start with Ben Kiernan, who is the fonder of DCCAM to help the Vietnamese and Hun Sen remain in power, by ‘demonizing the demons.’.
Sadly enough, there are so many Cambodians who have adhered to this ‘demonizing the demons’ process instigated by the Vietnamese to take over what remained of the Angkorian Empire, that is present-day Cambodia. Naranhkiri Tith Ph.D. Washington DC. February 8 2011))
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PHNOM PENH - In September 1975, 2,000 or so Cambodian Muslims picked up their swords and machetes and for several days fought off heavily armed Khmer Rouge soldiers at the village of Svay Khleang. The rebellion was sparked during the holy month of Ramadan in response to Khmer Rouge attempts to arrest Muslims for praying at their local mosque. The rebellion was defeated but won't soon be forgotten: a museum that will preserve the stories of Muslim survivors of the Khmer Rouge's genocidal reign of terror from 1975-79 is scheduled to open at the Mabarak mosque outside Phnom Penh later this year.
Between 100,000 and 400,000 Cham Muslims died under the Khmer Rouge regime, according to figures provided by the Documentation Centre of Cambodia, either from murder, starvation or disease. Most of the country's mosques were destroyed or desecrated during the Khmer Rouge's radical attempt to create a communist utopia.
After the Khmer Rouge put down the Svay Khleang rebellion, the village's women were separated from the men and the revolt's leaders were sent to prison. Other villagers were deported to live in forested areas where many eventually died from malaria or starvation.
The persecution of Muslims remains an understudied aspect of Cambodia's genocide experience - where as many as two million people perished - but the extent of that suffering is now coming to academic light. According to the Documentation Center of Cambodia (DCC), Muslims who were forcibly relocated from their communities died at a higher rate than any other ethnic or religious group.
Cambodia's population is predominantly Buddhist; Muslims currently make up around 2% of the population, according to official statistics. While Cambodia's Muslims are no longer systematically persecuted, as they were under the atheist Khmer Rouge, they remain largely segregated from the Buddhist majority and are under-represented in the country's universities and bureaucracy.
The DCC has collected 500 interviews with Cambodian Muslims about their experiences under the Khmer Rouge, testimonies that will be accessible at the new memorial museum, according to Farina So, the project's oral history leader. The museum will feature Cambodia's first genocide-related exhibit inside a mosque and will be housed in a former Islamic school that was converted to a communal cafeteria under the Khmer Rouge.
The memorial's creation coincides with the ongoing legal proceedings at the United Nations-sponsored Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia (ECCC), where former top Khmer Rouge leaders are currently on trial for their alleged roles in genocide.
In July, the ECCC convicted former Khmer Rouge prison warden, Kaing Guek Eav, alias Duch, for war crimes and crimes against humanity and sentenced him to 35 years in prison. His sentence was commuted to 19 years in compensation for the time he was ruled to have been illegally detained by a military court.
The ECCC's proceedings have brought back bitter memories among the regime's Muslim survivors. Him Soh, a Muslim survivor who lost seven family members including his parents and siblings during the Khmer Rouge period, recalls how soldiers murdered Muslim community leaders and deported Cham Muslims to other provinces where they were forced to integrate into ethnic Khmer villages.
"The Khmer Rouge did not allow Muslims to pray in the mosque or at home," he said. "They spied to see if a person prayed and if the person prayed they were taken away and killed.”
The Khmer Rouge also forced Muslim girls to cut their hair and made men shave their beards – deliberate affronts to Muslim culture. Nor did they allow Chams to cover their heads or wear traditional Muslim clothes. The Koran was confiscated and in certain instances the pages were used for toilet paper, Soh said.”
Chi Sleh, a 75-year-old survivor, was imprisoned twice during the Khmer Rouge regime but lived to tell his tale after a sympathetic Khmer Rouge soldier helped him. Sleh said he had to watch as soldiers destroyed the mosque in his home village, which he says the Khmer Rouge razed for scrap metal. "Some mosques were destroyed; others were used to store rice," he recalls.
Because of Cambodia's history of Cham-led rebellions, the Khmer Rouge were particularly suspicious of Muslim populations. "The Khmer Rouge viewed the Cham people as an internal enemy," So said. "Some people were asked if they were Cham and if they were Cham, they were killed. Some survived by hiding their identity.”
The Mabarak mosque aims to promote understanding about Cham culture. The new memorial museum will be housed in a mosque built in 1963, one of the oldest Islamic shrines in the country to survive the Khmer Rouge's demolition campaign. It was bombed and damaged in 1973 during the war between the Khmer Rouge and the government's army. The building's bullet-scarred walls still bear witness to that conflict
The memorial will contain a collection of artifacts, including Cambodian-language Korans which were buried for safekeeping during Khmer Rouge purges, as well as the swords the Chams used during their rebellion. On the lighter side, the exhibitions will introduce visitors to Cham culture and languages, as well as other minority groups which suffered under the Khmer Rouge
Many of Cambodia's Muslims are descendents of the Cham, an ethnic group which once boasted a far-reaching kingdom known as Champa that included territory in today's central and southern Vietnam. The kingdom was defeated by the Vietnamese in the early 1700s and many Chams fled to areas of modern day Cambodia, including the province now known as Kampong Cham.
Julie Masis is a Cambodia-based journalist
(Copyright 2011 Asia Times Online (Holdings) Ltd. All rights reserved. Please contact us about sales, syndication and republishing.) The Phnom Penh Post; Wednesday, 02, 2011 15:02 Meas Sokchea (Comments: this short statement by Sam Rainsy in a recent radio interview on the possibility of a Tunesian style uprising in Cambodia, is again another grand-standing statement by Rainsy, without any foundation or realistic supporting facts. There are a number of factors why this spontaneous political happening cannot take place in Cambodia. First, there is the Sihanouk factor. Since his return to Cambodia in 1991, Sihanouk has been saying that he is with Hun Sen 100 percent. Would Sam Rainsy dare to challenge Sihanouk? I doubt it very much, having seen him kowtowing to Sihanouk in the past. Secondly, there are the Vietnamese who are ready to come to “ save” Cambodia again, from “chaos.” Third, there is no real, courageous, capable, and honest leader in Cambodia to guide such a large and spontaneous popular movement. Sam Rainsy does not have any of those required qualities of leadership to be able to lead such an important mass movement. If Sam Rainsy had made this statement in Cambodia, it would make him more credible. But, unfortunately, he still is hiding in Europe. Naranhkiri Tith Ph.D. Washington DC. February 04, 2011) ------------------------------------------------------------------------ Opposition party leader Sam Rainsy said on a radio programme on Monday that corruption and joblessness could lead to a rebellion in Cambodia on par with recent protests in Tunisia and Egypt. “I see that it is not long … that there would be such a situation in Cambodia that is the same as Egypt and Tunisia, where people have ousted leaders from power,” he said during his Candle Light Radio Program. Phay Siphan, spokesman for the Council of Ministers, said Sam Rainsy was attempting to throw the country into disorder for his own personal political gains
71. New Khmer Rouge suspects investigated The Phnom Pen Post; Tuesday, 01 February 2011 21:56 Sam Rith and James O'Toole
(Comments: This article signals the turning point of the what real purpose of having this Khmer Rouge Tribunal (KRT), as rendering justice for the more than three million Cambodians and non-Cambodians, or to ‘demonize the demons,’ as intended by the Vietnamese and Hun Sen and his CPP.
It is clear that what Hun Sen and Vietnamese had wanted from the KRT, they have already obtained it, by ‘demonizing the demons,’ and to stop this judicial process after the completion of case 01 and 02. Hun Sen made it clear that they would not allow cases 03 and 04 (Involving Kiet Chhon, the current CPP finance minister, and Chea Sim, the current CPP president of the Senate) to be taken up by the KTR, invoking the fear of civil unrest.
But, under the dictatorship of Hun Sen and backed by the Vietnamese armed forces, the only group that could start civil unrest are Hun Sen and the Vietnamese. So, it is clear to those who have no ulterior motive, besides rendering real justice to the many million innocent victims of the Khmer Rouge massacre, that the real objective of Hun Sen and his boss the Vietnamese is to “demonize the Demons,’ and not to render justice to those million of victims of the Khmer Rouge massacre. We shall see which of these two contending groups views within the KRT will prevail.
But, don’t blame anybody but the Cambodian themselves, especially Sihanouk who could have said something about this dilemma, but had chosen to remain silent, in order to save his own ski, otherwise he would be brought to the KRT for being an ally and accomplice of the Khmer Rouge regime. For a complete analysis of the remaining cases of the KRT, please, read the following article by the Open Society Foundation titled ‘Khmer Rouge Tribunal Legacy Hinges on Final Cases’ posted just below Naranhkiri Tith Ph.D. Washington DC. February 01, 2011)
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The Cambodian investigating judge at the Khmer Rouge tribunal said today that he was participating in investigations in the court’s controversial third and fourth cases, proceedings to which Prime Minister Hun Sen has publicly expressed opposition. The admission from Judge You Bunleng stands in contrast to a pattern of opposition by Cambodian court officials to the cases, which feature five suspects who have yet to be arrested and whose identities remain confidential. You Bunleng himself declined to participate in the investigations when they began last year, leaving his international counterpart, Co-Investigating Judge Marcel Lemonde, to pursue them on his own. “For these cases, I am working with the foreign judge and already have a specific plan,” You Bunleng said today. “Now we are examining the cases and documents in relation to the previous cases.” Asked about Hun Sen’s stated opposition to the cases, You Bunleng said: “I’m sorry, I work together [with the foreign staff] as a working group.” During a visit to Cambodia by United Nations secretary general Ban Ki-moon in October, Hun Sen reportedly said the pending investigations in Cases 003 and 004 were a threat to the Kingdom’s stability. “Samdech [Hun Sen] clearly affirmed that Case 003 will not be allowed,” Foreign Minister Hor Namhong told reporters following the meeting. “We have to think about peace in Cambodia or the court will fail.” “The court will try the four senior leaders successfully and then finish with Case 002.” Anne Heindel, a legal adviser with the Documentation Centre of Cambodia, said You Bunleng’s participation in the new investigations was “enormously significant”. “For the legacy of the court, for the perceived fairness of the court, it’s tremendously significant,” she said. “It shows that whatever led him to [decline to participate] in the first place, there have been discussions or reconsiderations … and now there is the possibility of having the third and fourth case [and] there isn’t the government pressure that people feared would close off the possibility. “It is possible he’s doing this on his own, but that would be very surprising.” In June last year, You Bunleng and Lemonde made public letters to one another revealing that they had disagreed on the timing of investigations in Cases 003 and 004. In one communication, Lemonde called on You Bunleng to sign a rogatory letter authorising preliminary investigations. You Bunleng responded that he had initially signed the rogatory letter before changing his mind out of concern for the “current state of Cambodian society”. He suggested the matter be considered following the issuance of indictments in the court’s second case, which were handed down in September. Lemonde and other foreign staff in the co-investigating judges’ office began investigating the cases on their own following the June disagreement. As recently as late November, You Bunleng said he was still undecided on how to proceed with the matter. Lemonde announced his resignation following the Case 002 indictments in September and has been replaced by the German judge Siegfried Blunk. You Bunleng’s initial reluctance to pursue the cases was the latest in a series of disputes between Cambodian and foreign court officials on the issue. Cambodian co-prosecutor Chea Leang opposed the submissions for Cases 003 and 004 made by international prosecutor William Smith in 2009. The issue also split judges of the court’s Pre-Trial Chamber along Cambodian vs foreign lines, according to a decision issued the same year. Council of Ministers spokesman Phay Siphan declined to be drawn out today on whether the government was still opposed to additional cases at the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia, as the tribunal is formally known. “What we understand is right now, we put our utmost attention to Case 002 in terms of resources,” he said. “Case 003 and 004, we don’t pay attention that much. We want Case 002 to be the legacy of the ECCC.” Case 002, which features the four most senior surviving Khmer Rouge leaders, is expected to begin within the next six months. The defendants, including former Khmer Rouge Brother No 2 Nuon Chea and Foreign Minister Ieng Sary, face a raft of charges including genocide and crimes against humanity. United Nations court spokesman Lars Olsen said today that he had not received any official information about You Bunleng’s involvement in Cases 003 and 004. “The most recent information I have is that the investigation conducted by international investigators was limited to crime sites and crime bases,” he said. Long Panhavuth, a project officer with the Cambodia Justice Initiative, said his organisation welcomed the news of You Bunleng’s participation in the investigations. “The public needs to see a sign of cooperation and progress on Cases 003 and 004,” he said.
72. Khmer Rouge Tribunal Legacy Hinges on Final Cases Threat of Political Interference Hangs over Court Completion Strategy Press Release http://www.soros.org/initiatives/justice/focus/international_justice/news/khmer-rouge-tribunal-20101110?utm_source=Open+Society+Justice+Initiative&utm_campaign=7dcd2927a2-osji-roundup-mailing-20110201&utm_medium=email
NEW YORK/PHNOM PENH—High-level war crimes cases should be tried by the UN-backed Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia, rather than transferred to local courts, said a report released today by the Open Society Justice Initiative. Ordinary domestic courts cannot guarantee international fair trial standards, given the intense political interference of Cambodian leaders. “Cambodia’s government has made clear its determination to abort any cases it finds politically inconvenient,” said James A. Goldston, executive director of the Open Society Justice Initiative. “The United Nations and international donors must ensure that any completion plan for the court guarantees fair trials and appeals in all remaining cases on its docket.” Four cases—involving a total of ten accused persons—are currently pending before the tribunal. Case 001 is under appeal; Case 002 is set to go to trial in mid-2011. Cases 003/004, involving senior leaders of the Khmer Rouge, are currently under investigation, but Cambodian leaders have repeatedly sought to block their progress. Last month, Cambodian Prime Minister Hun Sen publicly repeated his view that the cases should not continue and vowed to stop them. “The court must keep expenses in line and bring all cases to a close, while still upholding the principle of judicial independence,” said Goldston. “In light of relentless Cambodian political interference, the best way to achieve this is through the existing hybrid tribunal.” The Justice Initiative’s report recommends conducting simultaneous trials for Cases 002 and 003/004. While more expensive in the short run, allowing the aging leaders accused in Case 002 to have a reduced trial schedule while keeping the court in operation full-time will ultimately reduce the cost and time required to complete all cases with the current hybrid court structure. The Khmer Rouge Tribunal is charged with prosecuting senior leaders and those most responsible for mass crimes committed in Cambodia during the 1970s. Its unique structure as a court formally embedded in the Cambodian domestic system but with international participation at all levels is an experiment in the development of legal accountability for mass atrocities. The PhnomPenh Post; Monday, 31 January 2011 15:02 Meas Sokchea (Comments: This article confirms my prediction (See the article posted just below, titled ‘Opposition merger talks,’ that the two opposition parties, SRP and HRP cannot merge into one opposition party, because of the ego of their respective leaders, especially, Sam Rainsy. Sadly, but that is the reality of Cambodian politics, that is to say, personal interests always prevails over national interests. Naranhkiri Tith Ph.D. Washington DC. January 31, 2011) -------------------------------------------------------------------- Sam Rainsy said a new party resulting from an opposition merger should be called the Sam Rainsy Party, according to a letter he wrote to Kem Sokha obtained by The Post yesterday.
Sam Rainsy, president of the SRP, also said that Human Rights Party President Kem Sokha could be deputy president, but not president, if a new party were formed. HRP members could fill one-fourth of party posts, he said. Kem Sokha wrote to Sam Rainsy last week to restart merger negotiations. Sam Rainsy said the new party could change its name after the 2013 national elections. He argued that the Cambodian People’s Party would find a way to force a change in party name if the party was not called SRP, citing as examples the Khmer Nation Party, the SRP’s predecessor, and the Buddhist Liberal Democratic Party, which became the Son Sann Party. Both the SRP and BLDP saw splinter groups break ranks and appropriate the original party names, creating a party registration conflict in the 1998 elections that was both encouraged and exploited by the CPP.
Tith Sothea, of the Press and Quick Reactions Unit at the Council of Ministers, said that the CPP did not influence the changes in party names. “This is the painting of the opposition party. The CPP does not disturb the internal affairs of the opposition parties.” Kem Sokha dismissed the conditions for negotiations and said the new party would need a new name.
“The HRP will not defect to the SRP by dissolving itself,” he said yesterday. Kem Sokha said the one-fourth limit for HRP members would show they were subordinate to SRP members.
Sok Touch, a political analyst, said merger talks might be stalled by leaders eager for the spotlight. “The parties cannot merge because each wants to be all-important,” he said. A merger bid between the SRP, HRP and Norodom Ranariddh Party ahead of the 2008 elections fell through.
Tith Sothea said the parties were too weak to threaten CPP control. “The weak party is making an alliance with the party that is nearly dead.”
74. Opposition merger talks The Phnom Penh Post; Thursday, 27 January 2011 20:49 Meas Sokchea
(Comments: How could Sam Rainsy Party (SRP) be merged with Kem Sokha Human Rights Party (HRP)? They can never accommodate each other for the following reasons: first, Kem Sokha has Penn Sovan as one of his senior officials; and Penn Sovan continues to thank the Vietnamese for liberating Cambodia; while Sam Rainsy’s ego is too big to be an equal to anybody. In addtion, Sam rainsy is still large, hiding in Europe. As I often reminded the visitors to this web site, that Hun Sen and the Vietnamese will never allow Sam Rainsy to be back in Cambodia, unless he is willing to go to jail. I don’t think Sam Rainsy has the courage, as Aung San Suu Kyi and Nelson Mandela did, to go to jail. So, all these talks about merging SRP and HRP is a sad farce. But, Hun Sen is smart enough to allow both parties to remain in operation, as long as they are not a challenge to his CPP, because this will allow the donor countries to continue to pour econnomic and financial aid to Hun Sen, under the pretext that Cambodia has not one but two opposition parties. That is why Cambodia is known as the ” country of the absurd.” Naranhkiri Tith Ph.D. Washington DC. January 2, 2011) ----------------------------------------------------------------- Human Rights Party president Kem Sokha urged Sam Rainsy to restart talks about a merger of the two opposition parties, according to a letter obtained by The Post today. Kem Sokha urged Sam Rainsy, president of the eponymous political party, to consider merging by July this year in a letter dated January 25. “The HRP understands that if we want a real democratic movement merger that can save our nation, we have a lot of affairs to discuss in order to build a unified alliance that will be stronger and more successful,” Kem Sokha wrote. Kem Sokha said that a merger that lacked internal democratic reforms and merely distributed power among party loyalists would fail against the ruling Cambodian People’s Party. “The HRP understands that if we want to correct them, we must correct ourselves first,” the letter said. “If there is no risk, there is also no change.” The letter gave a timeframe for merger negotiations. “The HRP wants to see the merger between our parties be successful before July,” the letter stated. Yim Sovann, SRP spokesman, declined to comment today, saying he had not yet seen the letter. Phay Siphan, spokesman at the Council of Ministers, said the suggestion that a merger between the opposition groups would help “save the nation” was an insult. “When we use this word, it is a word of attack, a word of insult,” Phay Siphan said. “We are not scared of [their merger], we are only scared of poverty.” Kem Sokha’s letter is the latest in a series of related opposition unity discussions. In November, United States Secretary of State Hillary Clinton reportedly urged the two parties during a meeting to form a united platform. Kem Sokha said at the time that he supported a merger. “The decision to form a united opposition, it is up to the Sam Rainsy Party. For me, I have always wanted to unite,” he said. Yim Sovann said following Clinton’s visit that a merger could endanger existing opposition seats in parliament. A proposal for the SRP, HRP and Norodom Ranariddh Party to merge ahead of the 2008 national elections fell through.
75. Human rights in freefall The Phnom Penh Post; Tuesday, 25 January 2011 19:29 Sebastian Strangio
(Comments: the content of the recently released human right report by Human Right Watch (HRW) – http://www.hrw.org/en/world-report-2011?tr=y&auid=7674659 en regime was criticized for its continued wholesale and unabated violations of basic human rights of the Cambodian people, can be summarized in the words of Phil Robertson, a former student of mine at SAIS, the Johns Hopkins University, now a Deputy Director for HRW Asia, as follows, when he said that: “The Cambodian government has used bluster and intimidation to push the UN and donors into silence about abuses,” Phil Robertson, HRW’s deputy Asia director, said in a statement accompanying the report’s release. “The international community needs to advocate more forcefully for the human rights of the Cambodian people.”
Most Cambodians do not understand why, the United States under Obama leadership continues to have normal relations with the Hun Sen’s corrupt regime, while advocating for human rights in the world. The answer is the fact that, like other governments in the world, until such time Cambodia can come up with a better alternative government the United States has no choice but to deal with Hun Sen. But, the right question to ask would be why did the United States push Cambodia to be closer to Vietnam and away from China, as Hillary Clinton had done during her recent visit to Cambodia late last year. The answer is the desire of the United States, rightly or wrongly, to have Vietnam, as its ally to fight the rising power of China in the region and in the world, regardless of the fact that whether Vietnam is still a rare five remaining Communist countries , in the world, which is on records, as an abuser of basic human rights of its citizens, including minorities such as the Khmer Krom. Nobody can save Cambodia until the Cambodian people can come up with a good, honest, courageous, and capable leader such as Aung San Suu Kyi, Nelson Mandela, or Mahatma Ghandi. At the moment, Cambodians have only traitors as leaders, namely Hun Sen, and Sihanouk, who sold their soul to the Vietnamese to enrich themselves, and to save their won skin. Naranhkiri Tith Ph.D. Washington DC. January 26, 2011) ----------------------------------------------- The Cambodian government has severely restricted fundamental freedoms over the past year, making it “increasingly difficult” for rights defenders, land rights protestors and unionists to operate freely in the country, according to Human Rights Watch.
In its latest global rights report, released in New York on Monday, HRW also called on the Kingdom’s foreign donors to “forcefully challenge” increased restrictions on rights in Cambodia.
The 649-page report catalogues a series of developments last year that it claimed led to a strengthening of the Cambodian government’s “chokehold” on human rights. High on the organisation’s list of concerns was the increased disregard shown by officials for United Nations representatives and other foreign diplomats.
“The Cambodian government has used bluster and intimidation to push the UN and donors into silence about abuses,” Phil Robertson, HRW’s deputy Asia director, said in a statement accompanying the report’s release.
“The international community needs to advocate more forcefully for the human rights of the Cambodian people.”
In March, Prime Minister Hun Sen threatened to expel UN resident coordinator Douglas Broderick after he criticised the swift passage of the government’s anti-graft legislation. In October, during the visit to Cambodia of UN Secretary General Ban Ki-moon, Hun Sen ordered the closure of the UN’s human rights office in Phnom Penh. The order followed an earlier warning that the head of the office, Christophe Peschoux, could face expulsion for his criticisms of the deportation of two Thai Red Shirt activists in July.
The HRW report also claims that the introduction of a new “draconian” Penal Code, in addition to the drafting of new laws regulating trade unions and the country’s large NGO sector, represent threats to the rights of freedom of association and assembly.
“Prime Minister Hun Sen’s ruling Cambodian People’s Party used the judiciary, new laws, and threats of arrest or legal action to restrict free speech, jail government critics, disperse workers and farmers peacefully protesting, and silence opposition party members,” it said.
As an example, the report cited the prosecution of opposition leader Sam Rainsy, who was sentenced in absentia to a total of 12 years in prison on “trumped-up” charges relating to his campaign to exposed alleged Vietnamese border encroachments.
It also documented the case of Seng Kunnaka, a UN World Food Programme staffer who was convicted and jailed last month on incitement charges after printing out a web article critical of the government.
In addition, the the Kingdom’s spate of land grabbing and forced evictions continued apace in 2010. During the first half of the year, more than 3,500 families – totaling around 17,000 people – were affected by land-grabbing in 13 provinces, the report states, citing figures from local rights group Licadho. Up to 60 people were also imprisoned or awaiting trial for protesting against evictions and land seizures.
The report added that about 2,000 people were “arbitrarily detained” in 11 government drug detention centers. Up to 60 cases of torture were reported in the first half of 2010 alone.
“Cambodia’s donors need to wake up and recognise that the human rights situation in Cambodia is rapidly deteriorating,” Robertson said.
“They should demand that the government abide by its human rights obligations, and they should be front-line defenders of civil society against government intimidation.”
Om Yentieng, head of the government-run Cambodian Human Rights Committee, said he was too busy to comment yesterday. But Tith Sothea, a spokesman for the Press and Quick Reaction Unit at the Council of Ministers, defended the government’s progress on Tuesday, saying HRW’s report “lacks accuracy”.
“It is the report that is poisoning the environment. It is the report that does not express the truth about the process of democracy and law implementation,” he said, adding that the government had taken actions to strengthen the rule of law.
“So the report has no value: we consider it like rubbish.”
Members of the opposition said the report reflected the reality in Cambodia. Sam Rainsy Party spokesman Yim Sovann said the party was “extremely concerned” by the erosion of freedom of expression, pointing to the legal prosecution of its parliamentarians in the country’s CPP-dominated court system.
“The international community should play a role, should do something, to put pressure on the government to respect freedom of expression. No one can curb corruption without freedom of expression,” he said.
He said the government’s increasingly bellicose attitude towards the UN and outspoken foreign officials was also a bad sign, which could eventually alienate Western governments.
“We cannot live alone, due to globalisation,” he said. “If we want to isolate ourselves, I think we will commit suicide.”
ADDITIONAL REPORTING BY SAM RITH
76. Hun Sen sounds off The Phnom Penh Post; Thursday, 20 January 2011 20:52 Cheang Sokha
(Comments: a few years ago, I was criticized by one of the young Cambodian intellectual, who was then an intern at the World Bank for being narrow-minded by not accepting his invitation to meet with Hun Manet, who was then also an interned at the World Bank. That Cambodian-American intellectual had told me that I should separate the son from his father (Hun Sen, the dictator and traitor), as his son cannot be held responsible for what his father had done. In other words, what that young Cambodian intellectual had said was that I was too narrowed-minded and too old to take that firm stand against the young Hun Manet. I told him that from my knowledge of Hun Sen and his corrupt behaviour, there was no other choice than to perpetuate his family’s grip on Cambodia to better serve the Vietnamese and himself and his family. Since, Hun Manet has good credentials, (West Point graduate, thanks to Charlie Twining, the former US Ambassador to Cambodia), it gives all supporting appearance of a perfect choice. Now, with this update of information on the likelihood that Hun Manet being groomed to be the successor of his father, Cambodian the dictator and traitor, I feel totally vindicated for taking that firm stand against meeting and accepting Hun Manet as a separate entity from his father, the dictator and traitor to the Khmer Nation and people. Am I surprised by this Cambodian-American intellectual? Absolutely not surprised at all! Unfortunately, this Cambodian habit and attitude of always making compromise on the basic moral values that a real and normal person should have, combined with the habit of relying and asking foreigners to "save" Cambodia, are constants in the Cambodian history since the fall of Angkor in 1432, and the majority of the Cambodian people that can only perpetuate Cambodia’ slow but certain disintegration and disappearance, as a nation. Naranhkiri Tith Ph.D. Washington DC. January 21, 2011) --------------------------------------------------------------------- Prime Minister Hun Sen defended his oldest son’s recent military promotion and lashed out at opponents suggesting a Tunisia-style revolution could come to the Kingdom in a characteristically wide-ranging address in Kampong Cham province today. Speaking at an inauguration ceremony for a new building at the Kampong Cham provincial hospital, the premier said 33-year-old Hun Manet, promoted to a rank of two-star general in the Royal Cambodian Armed Forces earlier this month, was well-qualified to serve in his new position. “He has been military age for 16 years already,” Hun Sen said. “The military is obliged to promote in accordance with its internal framework.” At a ceremony at the Ministry of Defence on January 3, Hun Manet became a two-star general and deputy commander-in-chief of the RCAF infantry. He is also director of the anti-terrorism department at the Ministry of Defence and was promoted in September to deputy commander of his father’s bodyguard unit. Hun Manet has long been groomed for an apparent leadership role. He graduated in 1999 from the United States Military Academy at West Point, where his education was financed by the American government, according to The Associated Press. He was reportedly granted one of the 10 spots that are reserved for foreign students at the military academy each year, later going on to earn a PhD in economics at Bristol University in the United Kingdom. “Why develop human resources if you don’t put them to good use?” Hun Sen said today. “What are we training our children for?” At the promotion ceremony this month, Defence Minister Tea Banh, too, lauded the young officer’s credentials, pointing in particular to his West Point education. “This school is recognised internationally for its distinction in political science, law and military affairs, and in his new position, Manet must use the skills he has learned,” Tea Banh said. “We have to let the younger generation take over our work and ensure that our achievements are protected and that forces of evil who want to destroy our achievements are stopped.” Hun Sen has previously stated that he does not want his son to enter politics in the future, claiming Hun Manet will instead focus on charity work and his military obligations. Some observers, however, have seen Hun Manet’s swift rise through the army ranks as a sign that he is the chosen successor of his strongman father. “Dynasties of this kind have happened,” said Son Soubert, a former member of the Constitutional Council. “As for qualifications, he may be better than any other Cambodian high-ranking military [officers],” Son Soubert added. “Of course, it can be viewed as nepotism because he is the son of the prime minister, and other Cambodian citizens should be entitled to be sent to West Point.” Another ruling party scion, Sar Sokha, is set to be promoted to the position of Phnom Penh municipal deputy police chief today in a ceremony at police headquarters in the capital, Phnom Penh deputy police chief Ben Rath said today. Sar Sokha is the son of Interior Minister Sar Kheng. Also today, Hun Sen lashed out an unnamed critic that he said had advocated a popular revolution in Cambodia on the model of Tunisia, where rioting and protests forced out long-time ruler Zine al-Abidine Ben Ali last week. “There is a guy saying that Cambodia should foment a Tunisia style-revolt. I would like to send you a message that if you provoke or foment a Tunisia style-revolt, I will close the door to beat the dog this time,” Hun Sen said, arguing that the North African nation faces “the prospect of civil war” as it attempts to hold together its fragile interim government. “This guy, if he enters Cambodia, will face arrest. This guy has a bald head. This guy says Cambodia should look to the style of Tunisia: if you dare to gather [the people] to do that please come, don’t say such silly words … I will beat you on the head.” It was not clear to whom the prime minister was referring. ADDITIIONAL REPORTING BY MEAS SOKCHEA AND JAMES O’TOOLE
77. Cambodian envoy raps BBC report The phnom Penh Post; Tuesday, 18 January 2011 15:02 Matt Lundy
(Comments: the Cambodian Ambassador to Great Britain, Mr. Hor Nambora, the son of Hor Nam Hong, the Cambodian foreign minister, (does not this sound like nepotism?), had against lashed out against BBC and global Witness, for having making false report on Cambodia and Hun Sen’s corrupt practice and exploitation of the common people of Cambodia (Please, read the BBC report titled ‘posted just below this article). As pointed out by the BBC report that this is not the first time that Hor Nambora had strongly denied any wrong-doing by Hun Sen and his CPP. And yet, other source had confirmed what BBC had reported was accurate. That is what Hun Sen’s Cambodia is all about, denial for the sake of home consumption against all existing facts. That is why Cambodia is called by some reporters, the “country of the absurd.’ By the way, did you ever hear any criticism from the god-king named Sihanouk? Nothing, but a total silence, from him and his son, Sihamoni, the new king. Naranhkiri Tith Ph.D. Washington DC. January 18, 2011) ---------------------------------------------------------- The Cambodian ambassador to the United Kingdom has lashed out at the BBC over a recent radio documentary that explored foreign investment in Cambodia and the pilfering of land from rural communities.
In a letter sent yesterday to BBC Radio 4, Ambassador Hor Nambora said the broadcast gave a “superficial appearance of being unbiased” but that its intention was to “discredit the Royal Government of Cambodia and sully its reputation”. Hor Nambora said the documentary bore an “uncomfortable similarity” to accusations levelled against the Cambodian government by Global Witness, a London-based international watchdog.
“One can only hope that the BBC has not been misled by this politically-motivated and discredited body which seems to specialise in spouting ever more irresponsible statements and misinformation,” the letter read. The radio programme, titled “Cambodia: Country for Sale,” looked at the Kingdom’s boom in foreign investment and its repercussions in rural areas. A BBC website article that accompanied the documentary said, “stories are filtering in from the country’s most impoverished farmers who tell of fear, violence and intimidation as private companies team up with armed police to force them from their land”. In his letter, Hor Nambora highlighted how the government is speeding the process of land registration, saying that “more than two million such land deeds have been dispatched”.
The Cambodian Ambassador’s comments are just the latest in a long series of attacks against Global Witness and the BBC. In 2009 he derided a BBC report on land disputes as “extremely one-sided”, and has lobbed similar criticisms at journalists from The Guardian and The Financial Times. In April, Hor Nambora issued a statement condemning Global Witness after the watchdog said a US$28 million payment made by a French oil company for exploration rights lacked transparency.
78. Cambodia: A land up for sale? By Robert Walker BBC World Service
Romam Fil is moving rapidly through a dense patch of forest. Every few metres he pauses and points to edible plants and roots that the Jarai people of north eastern Cambodia have relied on for generations.
Then suddenly the trees come to an end. In front of us is a vast clearing, the red earth churned up and dotted with tree stumps. Beyond that, stretching as far as we can see is a rubber plantation, the young trees are still thin and spindly and sway gently in the breeze. This is the scene of a battle the Jarai people of Kong Yu village have been fighting, and losing for the past five years. It started when local officials called a meeting and said they needed some of the forest. "They told us they wanted to give part of our land to disabled soldiers," said Mr Fil. "They said if you don't give us the land, we'll take it. So we agreed to give them a small area, just 50 hectares." “They cleared areas where our people had their farms, and they destroyed our burial ground ” Romam Fil The villagers say they were then invited to a party and when many of them were drunk they were asked to put their thumbprints on documents. "Most of us don't know how to read or write, and the chiefs did not explain what the thumbprints were for," said Mr Fil. The villagers later found they had signed away more than 400 hectares - and the land was not for disabled soldiers, but a private company who began making way for the rubber plantation. "They cleared areas where our people had their farms, and they destroyed our burial ground," said Mr Fil. Political connections? Lawyers for the owner of the plantation company, a powerful businesswoman called Keat Kolney, insist she bought the land legally. But groups advocating for local land rights in Cambodia say part of the reason she was able to acquire the land is because she is married to a senior official in the ministry of land management. It is not the only case where those closely connected to senior government figures are alleged to have taken land from poor Cambodians. Five years ago, in north-western Pursat province a large grazing area was turned into an economic land concession - land the government grants to private firms for investment in large-scale agriculture. It was allocated to a politically well-connected company called Pheapimex. "They just came one day with their bulldozers and started clearing the land straight away," said Chamran, a farmer in the area. "So we organised a demonstration but then a grenade was thrown among us - we don't know who by. Nine people were injured. The military police pointed a gun in my stomach and said if you hold another demonstration we will kill you." Transparent process
Under the law, land concessions granted by the government should not exceed 10,000 hectares but the Pheapimex concession, although much of it is so far inactive, covers 300,000 hectares. Global Witness, an environmental pressure group, estimates Pheapimex now controls 7% of Cambodia's land area. “ The requirement is that you have enough capital, you have the technology to develop the land ” Phay Siphan The organisation says the company's owners, a prominent senator and his wife, have strong links to Cambodian Prime Minister Hun Sen. Pheapimex did not reply to requests for a response to these allegations, but the Cambodian government maintains that the process by which private companies acquire land is both transparent and legal. "The requirement is not to be close to the prime minister," said Phay Siphan, spokesman for Cambodia's Council of Ministers. "The requirement is that you have enough capital, you have the technology to develop the land."
'Kleptocratic state'
It is not just in rural areas that people complain of losing land. Cambodia's recent stability, following decades of violence, has attracted a rapid boom in tourism and a race among foreign and local entrepreneurs for prime real estate on which to build new resorts. Many of the country's beaches have already been bought up. And rights groups estimate that 30,000 people have been forcibly evicted from their homes in the capital Phnom Penh over the past five years to make way for new developments. The roots of the problem date back to the 1970s when the brutal Khmer Rouge regime abolished private property and destroyed many title documents. A land law passed in 2001 recognises the rights of people who have lived on land without dispute for five years or more, but in many cases it is not being implemented. The UN estimates hundreds of thousands of Cambodians are now affected by land disputes. But land is not the only state asset being sold at an alarming rate. Beginning in the 1990s, large swathes of the country's rich forests were bought up by logging companies. Now sizeable mining and gas concessions are also being granted to private enterprises. Eleanor Nichol of Global Witness believes individual members of the Cambodian government, right up to the highest levels, are benefiting. "Essentially what we're dealing with here is a kleptocratic state which is using the country and its assets as their own personal slush fund," she said. The Cambodian government rejects these allegations. "They could accuse [the government of] anything they like. Cambodia operates under a modernised state of law. Everyone is together under one law,” said Phay Siphan. Back in Kong Yu village, the Jarai people are waiting to hear the result of suit filed in a local court to try to get their land back. "If the company gets the land, many of our people will starve," says Mr Fil. "If we lose the land, we have lost everything.” ------------------------------------------------------------------ Assignment is broadcast on BBC World Service on Thursday at 0906 GMT and repeated at 1406 GMT, 1906 GMT, 2306 GMT and on Saturday at 1106 GMT. You can listen or download the Story from BBC NEWS: http://news.bbc.co.uk/go/pr/fr/-/2/hi/asia-pacific/8144130.stm
Published: 2009/08/12 15:21:05 GMT
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79. China aid floods Cambodia By Marwaan Macan-Markar Asia Times; Jan 12, 2011 (Comments: in this article, China is using its age-old international relations system known as the Sino-centric tributary system. In this Chinese international relations system, China is clever enough to refrain from using hard power to conduct its foreign relations with other countries in Asia and other parts of the world. In this Sino-centric tributary system what China does is never to interfere with the domestic policies in the host country, and it hopes to have the same reciprocal treatment from it. Viewing from this angle of Sino-Cambodian relations, it is perfectly normal that China would act this way. However, this does not mean that what China is doing in Cambodia, is totally immune from any negative impact on Cambodia’s wellbeing. For instance, in terms of the negative impact on the environment in Cambodia, there are evidences from studies done by NGOs specializing in environment in Cambodia and other countries receiving China aids, that there exists sufficient negative impact on the Chinese-aid-receiving countries, as shown in this article. The Chinese are themselves well-aware of these problems. And they appear to have started to address the issues in a more open manner. Compared to the problems of the continued pouring of Vietnamese illegal immigrants, the Chinese negative impact on Cambodia environment is less serious to the survival of Cambodia. Because this environment issue is open for debate inside and outside Cambodia, whereas the issue of illegal Vietnamese immigrant is a taboo and not allowed to be discussed publicly. Naranhkiri Tith Ph.D. Washington DC. January 13, 2011) -------------------------------------------------------------------------- BANGKOK - A steady rise of new dams in Cambodia is becoming a platform for the country's prime minister to showcase where the Southeast Asian kingdom's ties with China - a late arrival among Cambodia's foreign aid and development partners - is headed. "The hydropower dam is just one of the numerous achievements under the cooperation between Cambodia and China," Premier Hun Sen said in December at a ceremony in a remote South-western province of the country where the 338 megawatt Russei Chrum Krom hydropower dam is being built. This US$500 million dam - being built by the Huadian Corp, one of China's biggest state-owned power companies - is the largest of five Chinese dams under construction in energy-poor Cambodia, where only a fifth of the population of nearly 14.5 million have access to electricity. Chinese companies are already carrying out feasibility studies for four more dams to be built, say environmentalists and grassroots activists worried about what such future hydropower projects portend. "China plays a very important role in investment and development in Cambodia. But it should take account of the importance of EIAs [environmental impact assessments] and SIAs [social impact assessments]," Chhith Sam Ath, executive director of the NGO Forum on Cambodia, said during a telephone interview from Phnom Penh, where his grassroots network for local non-governmental organizations (NGOs) is based. "At times the EIA process is not open to the public and there is little time to comment," Ath told Inter Press Service. Global environmental lobbies, such as the US-based International Rivers (IR), confirmed that a full EIA for the Kamchay Dam has still not been completed four years after construction began. "Within the EIA process, the Chinese companies have not pursued best practices," says Ame Trandem, a Southeast Asia campaigner for IR. "Public participation is limited or there is no participation. And the developer has not looked at alternatives.” The Kamchay Dam is located "within Bokor National Park and will flood two thousand hectares of protected forest," notes IR in a study titled 'Cambodia's hydropower development and China's involvement'. But Hun Sen leaves little room for such criticism leveled by environmentalists toward China. "Is there any development that happens without an impact on the environment and natural resources? Please give us a proper answer," the region's longest-serving leader said in a broadside fired at green groups during the December ceremony for the Russei Chrum Krom Dam. For their part, some Chinese funders of development projects in Cambodia have begun to engage with local activists - worried at the price a country still recovering from two decades of civil war and the Khmer Rouge genocidal regime has to pay now that China's footprint is expanding. "I told a delegation of Chinese at a meeting last month that there were few EIA being done for Chinese projects," Meas Nee, a Cambodian social development researcher, told IPS in a telephone interview. "And even when done and it looks good on paper, there are flaws because they have not been done properly.” "The prime minister always praises Chinese support and the government prefers economic assistance from China because it comes with no conditions, unlike aid from the Western donors," Nee says. In fact, Hun Sen's ability to play his newfound economic support from China against the country's long-standing development partners from the West has highlighted their contrasting aid and development practices. Until 2006, when China stepped in to help Cambodia, the aid and development agenda had been dominated by the countries that were part of a pro-free market, pro-western Washington Consensus. They entered a war-ravaged country after the 1991 peace accord to help rebuild the country. In mid-2010, Western donors assured Cambodia $1.1 billion in aid - up from the previous year's $950 million. Such largess has come despite the Cambodian government falling short of standards the Western governments were pushing for - ranging from "good governance", better laws and reducing corruption to strengthening fundamental rights. But China - which has gone from having only $45 million in investments in Cambodia in 2003 to signing 14 deals worth $850 million in December 2009 - challenged the Western donors' monopoly in the country by "dealing directly with the political decision makers only," says Shalmali Guttal, senior researcher at Focus on the Global South, a Bangkok-based regional think-tank. China is enjoy an edge over the West through its 'no-policy-conditions' approach, said Guttal, noting also that China did not follow the Western donors route of pushing for Cambodian NGOs to monitor the aid process. (Inter Press Service)
80. Don't call me a traitor: PM The Phnom Penh Post; Monday, 10 January 2011 19:25 Cheang Sokha and Rebecca Puddy
(Comments: Mr. Hun Sen do not want people to call him a traitor. Fair enough. But, you are a traitor, by your behaviour and definition. Because you came to power in Cambodia behind the Vietnamese tanks and soldiers. You and you CPP had allowed the illegal Vietnamese immigrants to flow into Cambodia freely by using Sihanouk, for force his son King Sihamoni, to sign the supplements of the unequal treaty of Peace, Friendship, and cooperation, in 2005, so that you can continue to get more votes from the Vietnamese. That is why you never want to disclose the number of illegal Vietnamese living in all over the territory of Cambodia. According to Ambassador Bindra, an Indian national and a former Chairman of the International Control Commission (ICC), that was established to supervise the withdrawal of the Viet Minh troops from Cambodia. You are where you are now, not because of your skill, because you are by definition, an ignoramus, but because you =are very obedient to the Vietnamese, that why you replaced Pen Sovann the former Prime Minister and traitor, who was not obedient enough to the Vietnamese. You and your kind, by definition and acts, are traitors, including Sihanouk, that is why Cambodia is about to disappear from the map of the world sooner than later. Cambodians cannot always the Vietnamese. They should seriously look into themselves, and see how pathetic their leaders and they are. Only by accepting this truth can the Cambodian people start to have any chance to recover from this certain death path. Please, also see an excerpt form Dr. Esmeralda Luciolli of “Medecins Sans Frontières” (Doctors without Borders) describing how the Hun Sen and the CPP had been collaborating with the Invading Vietnamese forces to use so hundreds of thousands were forced into slave labor to build a defence wall in the eastern part of Cambodia known as the Bamboo Curtain, where so many Cambodians died of malaria, mine explosion, starvation, and exhaustion. Yes, I agree with KI Media (Please, read this companion article titled ‘Hun Sen must be prosecuted for crime against humanity‘ posted just below) that Hun Sen is a traitor, and you must be tried one day as a traitor to the Khmer nation and people. Naranhkiri Tith Ph.D. Washington DC. January 11, 2011) -------------------------------------------------------------------------- Prime Minister Hun Sen has again lashed out at critics of the January 7 holiday marking the 1979 overthrow of the Khmer Rouge, warning he will arrest anyone who accuses he or other senior officials of being “traitors” to the country. “I would like to tell you not to curse as a national traitor,” Hun Sen said during a graduation ceremony in Phnom Penh on Sunday. “If you curse, it will be a problem, if you dare to use this word you will be arrested from your homes. Don’t talk about freedom of expression on this matter.” The premier also warned that any politician or parliamentarian making similar criticisms would lose their parliamentary immunity and be arrested immediately. “Whether or not you have parliamentary immunity, the father of parliamentary immunity will still arrest [you]. You can say whatever, or curse January 7, but don’t curse as a national traitor,” Hun Sen said. In his speech, the prime minister also cautioned foreign countries against interfering if the government does make any arrests. “I would like to give a message in advance, as it might happen in the future,” he added. On Friday, the ruling Cambodian People’s Party held celebrations marking the 32nd anniversary of the January 7, 1979 overthrow of the Khmer Rouge by the Vietnamese army. The January 7 holiday – known as Victory over Genocide Day – has attracted criticism, however, with some arguing the day should not be celebrated as it marks the moment Cambodia lost its national sovereignty and fell under the influence of Vietnam. Opposition Sam Rainsy Party spokesman Yim Sovann said Sunday that the day was more a celebration of the CPP’s birthday than a real symbol of national liberation. He was also critical of the premier’s warning, saying citizens have a democratic right to criticise politicians and that the party’s position on the issue of January 7 would remain firm. “If somebody has said traitor they have done nothing wrong,” Yim Sovann said. “The prime minister is a public figure and he should accept criticism from the people. In a democratic society we have to accept criticism, or we are not a democracy.”
81. HUN SEN MUST BE PROSECUTED FOR CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY KI Media; December 25, 1998
(Current Cambodian strongman Hun Sen is more and more beleaguered on the international arena. The US Senate is expected to pass a resolution in January 1999, as the US House of Representatives did on October 2, 1998, supporting judicial proceedings against the former Khmer Rouge officer and present dictator for serious violations of international laws on human rights since 1979.
The investigation of Hun Sen’s past should lead to examination of a relatively little-known period in Cambodian history: the time just after the Pol Pot regime, the Vietnamese occupation and the People’s Republic of Kampuchea (1979-1989).
Although overshadowed by the great genocide which took place between 1975 and 1978 under Pol Pot, the subsequent period also brought genocide of the same form, though of lesser scope. It was perpetrated by Pol Pot’s successors and former colleagues, among them Hun Sen.
From 1984 to 1988 the pro-Vietnamese authorities implemented a deadly plan called “K5”. This more recent bloody chapter of the history of Cambodia is opened in doctor Esmeralda Luciolli’s book “Le Mur de Bambou – Le Cambodge après Pol Pot” (The Bamboo Wall: Cambodia after Pol Pot) published in 1988 by Regine Deforges Edition – Medecins sans Frontières (Distributed by Albin Michel).
The K5 plan killed tens or hundreds of thousands of victims. Cambodians sent into forced labor died of starvation, exhaustion, disease (particularly malaria) and lost their limbs and lives to the antipersonnel mines scattered on the sites where they were sent. Many of these laborers were executed for trying to escape.
During that period Hun Sen was a member of the central committee of the communist party and was promoted from Minister of Foreign Affairs to Prime Minister. As one of the main leaders he must bear responsibility for the massacre. There are still thousands of families in Cambodia whose missing father, husband or son reminds them of the K5 plan, and there are thousands of handicapped people whose missing eye, hand or leg reminds them of the K5 plan. Will justice be rendered one day to these victims?
We have translated the most significant excerpts from “The Bamboo Wall” in the following paragraphs.
KI Media
THE BAMBOO WALL
The decision to build what would be soon called the “bamboo wall” was never publicly announced. In July 1984, mysterious rumors some bits of which reached us circulated among the Cambodians. From now on each one must go to the border for several months a year, in regions mined and highly infected by malaria, to build some new sort of Chinese Wall between Cambodia and Thailand. The idea looked so foolish that many foreigners thought they were seeing only an example of the Khmers’ supposed tendency to exaggerate. After a few weeks, they had to accept the facts: departures began and these labors soon became an obsessive fear of all Cambodians.
The Vietnamese army had started to enlist Khmer civilians to do strategic work since 1979. Early on, in the autumn of 1982, the population was made to participate in “socialist service”. This work consisted of building dams, roads and earthworks near their dwellings and proved to be useful to the inhabitants. But very quickly, this task took a strategic turn and the peasants were ordered to clear the surrounding forests and build protective barriers around the most important dwelling centers. Starting in 1983, the population was made to create fences out of two or three rows of prickly shrubs or bamboo, sometimes lined by mine fields, around the villages. The people were also forced to set up defensive barriers along the railroads, around the bridges and at strategic points of the highways. (…) However, the first chores lasted only a short time and did not require any displacement of the population.
In 1984, a new stage was reached: the population of the country was mobilized for gigantic labors officially designated as “work to defend the fatherland”. At the beginning of that year, the Vietnamese authorities decided to seal the Thai border. The dry season offensive of 1984-1985 destroyed the major camps of the resistance located in those areas. To reinforce this victory they had to tightly seal the country against infiltration by the guerrillas and prevent the population from fleeing to the border.
To this end, the decision to set up a “defense line” eight hundred kilometers long was made in Hanoi, in early 1984, by the Vietnamese Communist Party’s central committee. (See “Cambodia, a new colony for exploitation” by Marie- Alexandrine Martin, Politique nternational, July 1986 and “The military occupation of Kampuchea”, Indochina Report, September 1986). The construction of that Asian “wall” was to be implemented in several steps : first, clearing of a strip of land three to four kilometers wide along the border, through forests and mountains; then excavating trenches, setting up dams, building bamboo fences lined with barbed wires and mine fields; and finally opening a strategic road running along the “wall”, to convey troops and ammunition and monitor the frontier.
Cambodian authorities were in charge of the project implementation. Everything leads us to believe that this work was to be done as rapidly as possible, whatever the cost in human lives and the economic consequences, in order to “fight against Polpotist bandits in the forest, who since the destruction of their camps all along the Thai border infiltrate the country to steal food and please their masters in Peking or Washington” (Radio Phnom Penh, 21 September 1986). These Herculean labors recall the gigantic ones undertaken during Pol Pot’s time. Haven’t the present leaders a common past and ideology with the ones in charge of the preceding regime?
The requisitioning of civilians started in September 1984. The Cambodians often refer to the departure to the “clearing” duty as a new “April 17”. (17 April 1975 marks the entry of the Khmer Rouge in Phnom Penh and to most Cambodians the beginning of an ordeal). The work is designated by the mysterious acronym “K5”, which the Cambodians, when asked, did not know the meaning of. Each Cambodian province was assigned the task of building a section of the wall. Twice or three times a year a contingent of workers, so-called “volunteers”, were recruited for periods varying from three to six months, according to the quota set by the central government for each province in proportion to the local population. The provinces in turn determine the quotas for each district, the districts doing the same for the communes and the communes for the villages. In theory, only men aged 17 to 45 years old were requisitioned but it frequently happens that women or teenagers are designated for want of any other person available in the family. For the whole country, each departure gathered an average of 100,000 to 120,000 persons. (…)
According to an official of the Ministry of Defense who took refuge in Thailand, the work, at the national level, is placed under the responsibility of Bou Thang, Hun Sen and Heng Samrin, respectively Minister of Defense, Secretary General of the Communist Party and President of the Republic. (…)
When they arrive at the sites, nothing is planned to accommodate and shelter the workers. “When we arrived”, said Touch Saroeun (a participant), “thousands of workers had preceded us. We were maybe ten thousand coming from several provinces. There was no shelter at all. It was useless to seek to build a cabin, because we were moved every day. Some of us had hammocks, others had nothing. They slept on the ground, on bits of plastic sheets or even on the soil.” (…)
Food remains very insufficient. (…) The stocks run out quickly. “We were told that there would be every thing on the spot, tells a villager from Takeo. But once there, there was nearly nothing to eat.” (…) Thory, a young woman from Battambang, said that in her group, “several people died of starvation.
It was like under the Pol Pot regime.” (…) It was forbidden to seek food during work time. A Khmer Krom who participated in the clearing work in Non Sap area, a site renowned for its hardship, recalls: “One day, I walked away for a short while to try to fish in a pond. The soldiers saw me. I was caught and beaten for a long time. That often happens because many people were hungry.” (…) In some areas, the local authorities were unable to supply food to the workers. These starvation rations were supposed to be enough to carry out an exhausting and dangerous work: the “volunteers” have to clear mined lands, excavate trenches, build roads, carry equipment, ammunition, corpses, demine the land and put mines in it again along the “wall”.
Everywhere the testimonies are identical. The workers are dispatched in small teams and worked eight to ten hours a day. Each one is assigned a determined amount of work to be accomplished during the day, otherwise the penalties such as blows or extra chores are frequent. In Samrong, Nong Rus had to “clear the land, carry crates of ammunition and sometimes corpses of soldiers or workers blown up on a mine”. (…)
The sites were watched over by Khmer soldiers, themselves supervised by the Vietnamese army. Fleeing, practically excluded, was impossible during day time, and very risky at night time because of the mines. Several refugees told of having been herded for the night on lands surrounded by mines. “Any attempt to escape amounted to a suicide. A mine belt had been laid around the camps which were accessible only through a narrow path. A few Vietnamese soldiers were enough to watch over us”, said Chhay. In another group, “seventy people were given the order to watch over the others. They were given guns. They were themselves monitored by the Vietnamese. If anyone tried to flee, he was often shot on the spot. Others have been caught and taken to jail in Battambang.”
Sunnara, from Prey Veng, was obliged to guard the “volunteers”. “We did not have any choice, the Vietnamese were after us. The rare persons who tried to escape were recaptured and savagely beaten, then taken to jail. Some have been executed.” Sareth, from Pursat, was demining: “Often those who were blown on the mines were accused of wanting to flee. In fact, these were accidents because we did not know at all where the mines were.” (…)
Since the beginning of the work in September 1984, the K5 plan, described by some people as a “new genocide”, made tens of thousands of victims. (See “Un nouveau genocide”, Philippe Pacquet, La Libre Belgique, 26 May 1986).
Accidents caused by mines were frequent. Nobody knows where they are laid because the Khmer-Thai frontier has been successively mined for years by the Khmer Rouge, the Vietnamese, and the non-communist resistance. (…) Many died on Non Sap site during the first year of work, toward the end of 1984. “Corpses could be found in several places”, said Thory. “We had to cremate them. Sometimes I had to carry ammunition for quite long distances. Along the way, in the forest, we found corpses of the workers who preceded us and blew up on mines.” Her testimony is confirmed by that of other persons who had worked in the same area. In a group of villagers from Bavel, ten people died that way, and eight in another group.
It also happened that trucks carrying “volunteers” blew up on mines. In Sitha’s convoy, two trucks were disintegrated. Out of the hundred people carried by each truck, more than half of them died and most of the others were injured. In March 1985, on the way to Pursat, a nurse from Prey Veng saw the truck that preceded his blow up. About twenty “volunteers” were killed and another fifty wounded. (…) The victims of landmines had little chance of surviving their injuries. First- aid posts located on the sites did not have the required personnel or equipment to tend them. It took sometimes several days to evacuate a wounded person to the nearest provincial hospital. Moreover, competent surgeons are rare. Like all their colleagues they devote part of their time to political activities and are not always available. Even if they were, they did not have any blood for transfusion, or antibiotics or oxygen, or sometimes even gauze and disinfectant. The people severely injured die. (…) In 1985, in Kandal, about a hundred injured people from the first contingent died and tens of others had amputations. In Prey Veng, fifty-six workers from the second contingent died on landmines. (…)
However, mines did not take the heaviest toll on human lives, but malaria did. This is not surprising at all, when the areas where the clearing were done were known to be infested by malaria. (…) Since the beginning of the labor at the border, the same phenomenon occurred as during deportations by the Khmer Rouge regime: “volunteers” [coming from the central plains where malaria is rare in normal time] uprooted overnight to severely malaria-infested zones are very sensitive to the disease. Virtually all of them are infected in no time and the development of serious cases is furthered by malnutrition and exhaustion. All the witnesses talk about malaria as a real scourge. Moreover, once ill, the “volunteers” are forced to continue to toil to the point of exhaustion. (…)
While in the beginning the K5 plan was very secret and little mentioned on the radio, by mid-1985 reports similar to those celebrating enthusiasm on the working sites of the Khmer Rouge regime started to be heard: “Our people now live in joy. They thrive to overcome all the obstacles by voluntarily participating in the work of defense of the fatherland, at the same time building a new life on this earth they have become the master of.” (Radio Phnom Penh, 22 August 1986).
Of all of the contingents, the first one, leaving on September 1984, was hit the hardest. These first “volunteers” were decimated by malaria, starvation and landmines. During the first semester of 1985, tens of thousands of workers returned home, as well as they could. (…) During our outings in the provinces, the sight of infirmaries recalled the Thai borders during 1979: everywhere malnourished men, exhausted, often packed on the bare ground. Wherever we went, in the provinces, in the districts, 80% to 90% of the “volunteers” returned ill. The mortality rate was very high, between 5 and 10%. In Kandal province, out of 12,000 workers, there were 9,000 cases of malaria and 700 dead. In a district of Takeo, out of 1,100 who left for labor, 900 came back with malaria and 56 died. In one of Kompong Chhnang’s districts, 10% of the “volunteers” had succumbed to malaria. (See “Malaria decimates border workers”, AFP, Lucien Maillard, 27 August 1985; “Forced Human Bondage”, Far Eastern Economic Review, 22 August 1985; Marie-Alexandrine Martin, “Une nouvelle colonie d’exploitation”, Politique nternational, summer 1985). (…)
A few officials were reported to have shown some opposition to the continuation of the work notwithstanding the cost in human lives. The then- Prime Minister himself, Chan Sy, would have been one of those, which was why many Cambodians saw with suspicion his sudden demise in 1985. (…)
The toll for the first two years of the K5 plan was heavy. According to the least alarming estimates, at least one million people participated in the labor from September 1984 to end of 1986. (The ninth contingent left for the border in October 1986. Let us bear in mind that each contingent numbered an average of 120,000 persons). The mortality rate from malaria amounted to around 5%, so there would have been a minimum of 50,000 dead during this period. According to an official from the Ministry of Defense, now a refugee in Thailand, his department estimated in March 1986 that 30,000 people died since the beginning of the labor. This assessment does not take into account tens of thousands of sick, wounded and crippled people. (…)
In Phnom Penh, at the orphanage for “juniors”, the number of abandoned children has considerately increased since the beginning of the work . The death of the husband at the clearing work constitutes the main reason given by the mothers who can no longer work and take care of the child a the same time. (…)
During our outings in the provinces, it was rarer and rarer to see men tilling the fields and most of the time women planted, bedded plants or harvested, on their own. In each home, the departure of a person, most of the time a man, for many months, lowers the family production and even after their returns, the men often lack the strength to work again for many weeks. (…)
(In 1985, according to an official of the Ministry of Agriculture), only 60 to 70% of the rice fields cultivated the preceding year were being sown, because the workforce was considerably decreased by the requisitions for clearing, armed forces and the defense militia of the villages. (…) At the end of 1985, the Ministry of Agriculture forecast a deficit of 250,000 tons of paddy for the harvest to come. (…) General mobilization of the population for labor at the border was responsible for a great deal of the agricultural deficit. (…)
Of all the aspects of the Vietnamese occupation, the K5 plan is no doubt the most worrying. Officially, the construction of the wall was to meet the need to defend the country against infiltration by the resistance forces based at the Khmer-Thai border. (…) Even if we suppose that the resistance constitutes a real threat to Phnom Penh, all the military experts, all the observers agree to say that the “wall”, a mere bamboo fence, is incapable of stopping infiltration. Besides, no defense line is efficient unless it is guarded all along its length. The construction itself went more slowly than planned, and, three years after the work started, only a few sections were completed. (…) The defense line could not benefit from any strategic credibility in so far as infiltration from outside was concerned. Under these conditions, it would be wise to look elsewhere for the reason for this murderous extravaganza. The “defense line”, if it did not hamper the resistance, constitutes a real obstacle for the population to escape to Thailand. (…)
Among the Cambodians, a few people believe the Vietnamese intended by this means to insidiously eliminate one part of the life force in Cambodia. This premise can be questioned all the more by the reminiscence of Khmer Rouge methods in the construction of this wall. But adversely, it is undoubtedly true that through this undertaking the regime was able to maintain the population in a permanent state of mobilization and maybe this is where we should find the main justification of this undertaking.
Whatever it was meant for, the K5 plan looks like a strategically absurd undertaking, triggered mainly by internal political reasons, hard to explain, for which the Khmer people have already paid the tribute in tens of thousands of human lives. (See “A fence to be tested”, Jacques Beckaert, Bangkok Post, 15 May 1986, and “The military occupation of Kampuchea”, Indochina Report, September 1986). Maybe the rationale behind the K5 plan was one of the self- contradictions of this regime, which leads many Cambodians to compare it to the Khmer Rouge.
In 1986, thousands of refugees arrived at the Khmer-Thai border. Fear of returning to the labor of “defense of the fatherland” came first among the reasons that made them flee. (…) Despite the testimonies of these refugees, the K5 plan raised little interest abroad. A few rare journalists have described the work without triggering any international reaction to this new tragedy of the Khmer people. (The first journalist to have mentioned it at length in a French daily was Jean-Claude Pomonti, in an article entitled “Le mur vietnamien” (the Vietnamese Wall) published in Le Monde, 5-6 May 1986). Shortly before my departure from Phnom Penh, a Cambodian bitterly confided to me: “Nobody did anything for us during Pol Pot era, the same now, you can bet!”.
Source: KI.
82. January 7 reignites debate The Phnom Penh Post; Friday, 07 January 2011 15:00 Vong Sokheng and Sam Rith
(Comments: it is not a surprise to see that there is a controversy regarding whether January 7, is or is not a liberation day or a day of infamy for Cambodia and the Cambodian people. Understandably, some of those who had directly been inflicted horrible harm to themselves and their loved ones by the bloody hands of the monstrous Khmer Rouge to view January 7, as a day of liberation.
However, there are those of us who had also been inflicted the same kind of horrible punishment to ourselves and to our loved ones, think that January 7 is a day of infamy not just for ourselves, but for our people and country.
To better understand the meaning of January 7, one has to analyze this January 7 fatidic day within the historical and ideological context.
First and foremost, one must look at Vietnam as a country from the historical and ideological context, to see what kind of a country Vietnam was and is.
Historically, Vietnam had suffered a great deal from the hands of the Chinese. In order to escape and survive that constant threat to their way of life, people, and land, the Vietnamese had devised an ingenuous but deadly strategy to escape that constant Chinese threat due to the close proximity of their country to the Chinese might and influence, they came up with an ingenious strategy known as “Nam Tien” or “Southern March.”. Being part of the Sinic civilization, Vietnam had adopted many of the Chinese methods of governance, namely the “Mandate of Heaven” for internal governance, and the “Tributary System” as a framework for its international relations with other countries.
Although they Vietnam had retained the “mandate of Heaven” as its internal system of governance, they had drastically modified the “Tributary system” as a method of governance of its international relations with other neighbouring countries.
The main modification of the Sino centric tributary system by the Vietnamese resides in making the Vietnamese system based on hard power as apposed to the Chinese one based on soft power. Unlike the Chinese system where the Chinese were not interested in conquering the land of other neighbouring countries, but simply requested that they send tribute in the forms of special gifts, and visits by the representatives of the neighbouring countries, the Vietnamese tributary system was drastically to include the conquest of the land and enslave or eliminated the life and the culture of the people of the land they had conquered, in other words committing genocide, according to the definition of genocide of the 1948 convention on Genocide (For more details on this transformation of Sino - tributary system by the Vietnamese, please, see, Bauer College studies titled “Vietnam’s External Expansion and Colonial Diasporas (1471 - 1859), authored Bauer College“ and also "Nam Tien from Vietnamese Texts," by Nguyen The Anh, a Vietnamese-French scholar).
It was not without great difficulties that the modification the Sino-centric tributary system was accepted and implemented by the Vietnamese. Only after a long and costly civil war between the Trinh lords of the north, who still believed in the sanctity of the Sino-centric tributary system and the Nguyen lords of the south, who firmly believed that only by modifying the Sino-centric tributary system can the Vietnamese people survive the Chinese constant deadly threat. Finally, after about two hundred years of civil did the Nguyen triumph over the Trinh, and the modified Sino-centric tributary system was accepted by the Vietnamese as a method of conquest fo secure the land form their weaker neighbours in the south, namely Champa and Kampuchea Krom or Lower Cambodia, also known as Cochinchina.
Armed with this new mandate, the Nguyen lords completed their conquest and obliteration of Champa, an indianized kingdom located in what is now known as central Vietnam, and whose people were of Malay descents.
After the completion of the conquest and total obliteration of the people and land of the Chams, the Nguyen lords started their conquest of Kampuchea Krom, using the combination sex, military force, and illegal immigrants consisting of ex-soldiers and prisoners as colonizers of the newly land from the Chams and the Khmers.
This strategy of conquest the land of their weaker neighbours did not stop even when a new system of international relations was created to give a better defense of nation –states with the birth of the United Nations Organization (UNO).
Within the ideological context, Vietnam has been able to manipulate the existing ideologies to continue its conquest of Cambodia.
For instance, under French colonialism, because of their historical mutually respectful relations with the French, the Vietnamese were able to continue their penetration into Cambodia by serving French colonialism as second-tiers administrators in the French administration in Cambodia and as plantation workers in the French-owned rubber plantations. That is why, they never hesitated to grant the ownership of Cochinchina to Vietnam and not back to Cambodia.
After independence, Vietnam became one of the most ardent members and even founders of international Communism, under Ho Chi Minh leadership. Since 1945, Ho Chi Minh saw himself and his Communist government as the successor of the French colonial regime. His dream was to make French Indochina the greater Vietnam.
To keep firm control of the Cambodia, Ho Chi Minh created the Communist party of Cambodia under a Vietnamese national masked as Cambodian known as Son Ngoc Minh rumoured to be the brother of Son Ngoc Thanh, the then well-known Cambodian leader and Prime Minister after World War II. It is in this context, that Vietnam had been intervening in Cambodian affairs on numerous occasions starting with the invasion of Cambodia by the Viet Minh, under the pretext to save Cambodia from French colonialism. Only after the 1954 Geneva conference, did the Vietnamese armed leave Cambodia.
Again, in during the second Vietnam War, with the massive American armed involvement, and again, the Vietnamese Communist armed forces known as Viet Cong invaded again Cambodia, this time to pretend to save Cambodia from American imperialism.
After the defeat and the exit of the Americans from Vietnam, which led to the triumph of the Khmer Rouge in Cambodia, and the North Vietnamese in Vietnam, the Vietnamese were surprised by the belligerent attitude of the Khmer Rouge ked by the murderous Pol Pot.
During this period, the Vietnamese Communists attempted to regain control of Pol Pot and his Khmer Rouge. Only after having realized that there is no chance that they could again control the Khmer Rouge, did they decide to invade Cambodia. The question is whether Vietnam decided to invade to defend itself or to liberate Cambodia from Pol Pot? The other connecting question is whether the Vietnamese already knew about the genocide that Pol Pot had committed against the Cambodian people. It is impossible for the Vietnamese not to know about the massacre of the wholesale Cambodian people by the Khmer Rouge, Knowing that the Vietnamese had and has such a vast network on informants and residents in Cambodia.
Communism is not known for its respect and love for freedom and democratic principles. Perhaps the haunting question contained in this excerpt from a review of a very important book on the foundation and practice of Communism around the world, titled "The Black Book of Communism" edited by a former French Communist intellectual, Stephane Courtois, and published by Robert Lafont, 1997, Paris, France, provides a good summary of the cruelty engendered by Communism devastated so many lives and societies in the world ;
"The book ends with a 30-page conclusion by Stephane Courtois, "Pourquois?," which tries to come to grips with the destruction and terror that have been extensively cataloged in the previous 800 pages. Courtois maintains that "[despite] the availability of rich new sources of information, which until recently had been completely off-limits [and which have led to] a better and more sophisticated understanding of events, . . . the fundamental question remains: Why? Why did modern Communism, when it appeared in 1917, turn almost immediately into a system of bloody dictatorship, and a criminal regime? Was it really the case that its aims could be attained only through extreme violence?"
Therefore, it is disingenuous for the Vietnamese to say that they came to save the Cambodian people while allowing the massacre to have gone on.
I will leave the answer the readers of your great newspaper to answer the question as to whether Vietnam is a liberator or an invader of Cambodia. Naranhkiri Tith Ph.D. Former professor at SAIS, The Johns Hopkins University, Washington DC. January 7, 2011)
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MORE THAN 10,000 members of the ruling Cambodian People’s Party are expected to gather at the party’s headquarters today to mark the 32nd anniversary of the day the Khmer Rouge regime was toppled by Vietnamese troops in 1979. Senate president Chea Sim is scheduled to give a speech at today’s event, to express the party’s gratitude to the Cambodian and Vietnamese soldiers “who sacrificed their lives to save the Cambodian people”, according to a copy of a prepared statement obtained by The Post yesterday.
“On this occasion, I would like to appeal to all patriots to maintain the precious spirit of January 7 and keep continuing to strengthen the unity of the government under the umbrella of the King, in order to take Cambodia toward glory,” the statement reads.
The January 7 anniversary – known as Victory over Genocide Day – remains a divisive issue, however, with some commentators claiming yesterday that the day marks the moment the country fell under the influence of Hanoi.
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It is time for our leaders to wake up and take notice of the general fear ... of losing national independence.
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In a statement yesterday, political observer Son Soubert argued that January 7 had initiated a period of domination by Vietnam.
“It is time for our leaders to wake up and take notice of the general fear, felt by the great majority of the Cambodian people, of losing national independence and sovereignty,” the statement reads.
Former Prime Minister Pen Sovan, who was dismissed from office in December 1981 and imprisoned for 10 years after criticising the extent of the Vietnamese presence in Cambodia, said the CPP had “betrayed” him and was “manipulated by Vietnam”.
“It is bad for the ruling CPP, which not only conceded territorial sovereignty to Vietnam, but has also brought a lot of illegal immigrants into Cambodia and provided a lot of economic land concessions, leased for 99 years, to Vietnam,” he said.
“I think they are a group of extremists.”
On Wednesday, Prime Minister Hun Sen lashed out at critics of the January 7 holiday, emphasising the importance of the day in Cambodian history.
Speaking at a high school inauguration in Kampong Cham province, the premier said all criticisms of the event were politically motivated.
“I would like to say that January 7 liberated everything, including ghosts and evil spirits and even liberated the heads of those who are cursing January 7,” he said. Yesterday, police in Siem Reap reported the discovery of an antigovernment leaflet released in advance of January 7, which described Hun Sen as a “second Pol Pot” and blamed his government for a host of ills, including the Diamond Island stampede. “We have not yet identified the people who threw the leaflet,” said Keo Sambath, Siem Reap’s deputy provincial police chief. “We are investigating.” In August, Takeo provincial court convicted four people on disinformation charges after they were accused of distributing antigovernment leaflets in advance of last year’s January 7 celebrations.
The leaflets, which were found scattered in three Takeo districts, asserted that the day should not be viewed as one of liberation, but as the day Cambodia became “abused and occupied” by Vietnam.
The plot’s alleged mastermind was convicted in absentia and sentenced to three years in prison and fined 6 million riels (US$1,430).
The three other convicts were sentenced to two years in prison and fined 2 million riels (US$476).
83. PM takes aim at Liberation Day critics
The Phnom Post; Wednesday, 05 January 2011 19:03 Cheang Sokha (Please, see my comments on this article that I wrote to the Phnom Penh Post, posted just below. Naranhkiri Tith Ph.D. Washington DC. January 6, 2011) Prime Minister Hun Sen yesterday lashed out at opposition figures who criticised the country’s celebration of January 7 as a day of liberation from the Khmer Rouge, again emphasising the importance of the day in Cambodian history.Speaking at a high school inauguration in Kampong Cham’s Memot district two days ahead of the national holiday, the premier claimed all criticisms of the event were motivated by politics. “I would like to say that January 7 liberated everything, including ghosts and evil spirits and even liberated the heads of those who are cursing January 7,” Hun Sen said. The holiday, commemorating the anniversary of the overthrow of the Khmer Rouge by the Vietnamese army in 1979, prompts an annual debate in Cambodia about the extent of Vietnamese influence that was ushered in by the event. After Pol Pot’s overthrow, Vietnamese troops remained in Cambodia, battling resistance factions including remnants of the Khmer Rouge, until their withdrawal in September 1989. But Hun Sen said that if there was no January 7, there would be no Khmer Rouge tribunal and the country would not have made any progress. “Those who consider January 7 as their enemy, would they dare say if there was a genocidal regime of Pol Pot or not?” Hun Sen said. Ke Sovannroth, secretary general of the opposition Sam Rainsy Party, said that the SRP did not consider the day as one of liberation, seeing it rather as the birthday of the ruling Cambodian People’s Party – the successor of the communist People’s Revolutionary Party of Kampuchea that took power in 1979. She said the country should instead mark the anniversary of the 1991 Paris Peace Accords as the day of the country’s liberation. “We do not welcome this celebration,” Ke Sovannroth said. We consider only the October 23, 1991 peace agreement as the day that brought an end to the country’s disputes and brought development.” Hun Sen said, however, that without the toppling of the Khmer Rouge, the Paris Peace Accords would never have been signed. “I would like to put the question at this point: If Pol Pot had continued to have power until 1991, would Pol Pot [have] agreed to sign it?” he said. Trackback(0) TrackBack URI for this entry Comments Show/hide comments
"the question asked by Hun Sen to the effect that, “If Pol Pot had continued to have power until 1991, would Pol Pot [have] agreed to sign it?” My answer is, “because the Khmer Rouge had no choice but to sign it.” My question to Hun Sen is; “Who created the Khmer Rouge movement, and did the Vietnamese ever save Cambodia, as they have pretended so many times before throughout history and under different ideological backgrounds?” The answer to this question can be found in the writing of one of the most knowledgeable historian on Vietnamese affairs, Bernard Fall who wrote as follows: “It is interesting to compare the Vietnamese colonization process with the corresponding process of state-building going on in Europe at that time; for too many well-intentioned writers (particularly those in the United States who feel that Europe must continually make amends for her colonial performance) tend to gloss over the non-European colonial processes that were going on simultaneously. In Europe, the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries witnessed what could be called a national "regroupment" process: Spain left the Low Countries; non-German states lost their influence in Germany; and the Turks, after a high tide that had brought them to the gates of Vienna in 1529 and 1683, returned to the lower reaches of the Balkans. In Europe outside Russia, only Austria-Hungary was to survive as a major multinational state until 1918, and no new state rose to power by ethnic assimilation of alien areas. Viet-Nam was obviously doing exactly the opposite: It carved out its territory through military conquest over states whose level of indigenous culture was at least equal, if not superior, to its own. In other words, it did not invoke the moralistic rationale of "Manifest Destiny," "la Mission Civilisatrice," or "the White Man's Burden"; its action, like the German Drang nach Osten, was simply a manifestation of the vitality of its people. It was simply and purely a process of colonial conquest for material gains, no more, no less. The fact that it took place on contiguous territory does not make it any more respectable than, say, the Russian conquest of Hungary. Source; “The Two Viet-Nams: A Political and Military Analysis”, Chapter 2: A Glimpse of the Past By Bernard B. Fall (Praeger Publishers, New York, 1971), pp 10-19” And also I wish to also ask the following question; “who put Hun Sen in power in Cambodia, and why did the Vietnamese took Pen Sovann out of power and replaced him by Hun Sen?” The answer to this last question is; “Because Pen Sovann, who like Hun Sen, continues to say that Vietnam did liberated Cambodia. Thus, Pen Sovann was removed from power, because he was not obedient enough for the Vietnamese to be able to continue to implement their well-known strategy of colonization of Champa and Cambodia known as ‘Nam Tien.’ Therefore, I am not surprised that Hun Sen would ask such a question. What this Hun Sen question shows is the fact that Hun Sen is an ignoramus and a real stooge of Vietnam. Naranhkiri Tith Ph.D. Washington DC. January 5, 2011) ,
84. 2010 Alternative Prizes - Opinion by Ung Bun Ang 2010 ALTERNATIVE PRIZES
Alternatives Watch – 31xii10 – Special Edition Friday, December 31, 2010 (Comments: this special edition titled “2010 Alternative Prizes” posted and written by Ung Bun Ang, a former SRP senator as a summary of what the main Cambodian political actors were doing in 2010, and what they might do or be in 2011, needs no comments except to say that it is right on the dot. Naranhkiri Tith Ph.D. Washington DC. January 5, 2011) -------------------------------------------------------------- It is time again for the well-deserved in Cambodian politics to receive awards for their remarkable actions in 2010. No doubt, the “Collective Irresponsibility Prize” goes to premier Hun Sen for coming up with a nifty conclusion – after a quick official inquiry – that absolves everyone for the 353 deaths at the 22/11 Spean Koh Pich stampede. He admits the biggest mistake is carelessness and inept assessment of the situation. However, he says it is a joint responsibility, so no one is going to be responsible, which gives much comfort to those who are careless and inept. Effectively, the Cambodian buck has nowhere to stop. Rubbing salt in the wound, the premier claims the death toll would be higher if he were not in charge, which means Cambodians are small potatoes who ought to be thankful that only 353 of them are dead. Prince Ranariddh grabs the “Will The Royal Soufflé Rise Twice? Prize”. After suffering two years of being busy with what his father describes as doing nothing in the Palace, the prince relies on drug addiction metaphor to seek limelight again. After reducing his 56 seat party to a mere 2, he says he comes out of the oblivion to reunite all royalists under a brand new Funcinpec 81. He says he will not aim to oppose – but solely to cooperate with – premier Hun Sen, which indicates he is looking for wealth and glory again. It is immediately rejected by leader of the prince’s target group royalist Funcinpec Nhiek Bun Chhay, who needs the proposed unification like a bullet in his head. Funcinpec has always been cooperating with the premier, and enjoying all perks. There is no need to rock the boat, which could only spoil its fortunes. While the prince re-emerges to amass fund for his eventual retirement, opposition leader Sam Rainsy secures the “Potential Early Departure Prize”. He appears to have found some quantum of solace in exile with a forced retirement staring at his face. He no longer seems to know what he wants; he lately contents himself with a wait-and-see strategy. When asked how he will return to the ring when he wants to, he simply replies, “you just wait and see”. He may have an ace up his sleeve, but it is clear his frantic lobbying with foreign friends and sympathisers outside the ring is not as effective as he wishes. The light at the end of the tunnel he keeps on promising his supporters may just be an incoming train. Sam Rainsy is stuck between the devil and the deep blue sea, which points to his imminent departure from politics. If he remains in exile, his SRP leadership role will become totally ineffectual; premier Hun Sen often claims – and SRP does not even bother to deny – that there are elements in the SRP top leadership working for him. However, if Sam Rainsy is allowed to return, he will have to make colossal concessions to premier Hun Sen that will end his political ambition. Happy New Year, anyhow. Alternative Watch; Ung Bun Ang
85. To live and die with Hun Sen By Paul Vrieze
Asia Times; Southeast Asia, Jan 22, 2010 |
(Comments: as a covering page for 2011 Recent News and Analyses, this article can provide a good summary as to where Cambodia is at the end of 2010. In one word, Hun Sen is in full control of Cambodian affairs internally, while the Vietnamese are in full control of Cambodia internally and externally.
Additionally, it should be pointed out that there is no well-managed and no well-morganized opposition party or parties in Cambodia, while Hun Sen’s CPP is the only real political party that is well-organized, well-financed, and well-managed in Cambodia. The opposition parties are being tolerated by Hun Sen, because, he can say to the international community that Cambodia is a democratic country as it allows political opposition.
Externally, the major powers in the world are happy to deal with Hun Sen, as long as he does keep in peace, at list on the surface. As mentioned earlier, the fact that Hun Sen has been tolerating the presene of the opposition parties and NGOs defending and promoting civil liberty and human right, the international community is willingness to close their eyes on almost any abuses of the rights of Cambodian people, as long as it does not lead to major civil upheavals.
In summary, one can say that Cambodia is going deeper into dictatorship under Hun Sen's control, and Vietnam is more and more in full control of Cambodia’s destiny. The estimated four million (estimated by Ambassador Bindra, a former chairman of the ICC resulting from 1954 Geneva conference) of Illegal Vietnamese immigrants now living in Cambodia is the most threatening aspect of Cambodia’s future and survival.
Finally, it should be pointed out, that Sihanouk is now under full control of Hun Sen and the Vietnamese. Sihanouk’s recent visit to Hanoi to ask forgiveness from the Vietnamese president (See the picture at another page of this web site), for Hun Sen as a result of Sam Rainsy’ s violation of the 1979 Treaty of Friendship, Peace, and Cooperation, by removing temporary border markers in Svay Rieng province last June, how Sihanouk is now under the full control of Hun Sen and the Vietnamese.
Year 2011 does not appear to have started on the right footing for Cambodia. Cambodia appears to continue its free fall which began in 1432 AD, when the Khmer Empire fell under the Siamese siege. Naranhkiri Tith, Ph.D. Washington DC. January 3, 2011)
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PHNOM PENH - Cambodian Prime Minister Hun Sen recently marked his 25th anniversary as the Southeast Asian nation's leader. First appointed by the Cambodian National Assembly on January 14, 1985, he became at 33 years old the youngest prime minister in the world Hun Sen's journey from a communist leader to an elected head of government spans a quarter of a century of civil war, domestic and international upheaval, a negotiated peace and transition to democracy through which he and his Cambodia's People's Party (CPP) have imposed themselves as the country's deliverers of stability and order.
By retaining the helm in Cambodia's fractious politics for 25 years, he now stands among a unique category of leaders, ranking as the 11th-longest ruling leader in the world. In Southeast Asia, only the Sultan of Brunei, the number one longest-serving government leader since assuming office in 1967, has been in power longer than Hun Sen. Of the other nine longer-serving leaders, five are heads of governments in Africa and four are from the Middle East.
Hun Sen reflected on his long political career and humble beginnings in a speech at the National Institute for Education in Phnom Penh on January 12. "I became [foreign] minister when I was 27 years old, deputy prime minister when I was 29 years old and prime minister at 33 years old," Hun Sen said of his appointments in the People's Republic of Kampuchea - the communist state set up by Vietnam in 1979 after it toppled the Khmer Rouge, whose bloody regime caused the death of about 1.7 million Cambodians.
He recalled how he joined the anti-republican maquis, a movement which consisted of several resistance groups including the Khmer Rouge, in April 1970, explaining his move was "based on an appeal from King [Norodom] Sihanouk", Cambodia's monarch who had been ousted in a coup d'etat earlier that year. "Throughout 40 years, I have known all kinds of tastes. I knew how my commander commanded the troops and I knew how to make tea for him. I knew how to wash clothes for him," Hun Sen said in his now trademark plain-speaking public-address style
The prime minister went on to talk about his political future, confirming his intention to run in the next election in 2013. "The party conference announced my candidacy for the future prime minister and ... last week Chea Sim [president of the CPP] also reconfirmed my nomination for the premiership," Hun Sen said before taking aim at opposition parties
"Please do not try to limit the mandate of the premiership. You want the mandate limited because you are worrying you will lose to me," he said, while also reminding the audience he still had another three-and-a-half years in office under the mandate of the 2008 election, which his party, the CPP, won with a two-thirds legislative majority.
Hun Sen started on his political path in 1978, when he became a founding member of the Kampuchean United Front for National Salvation after fleeing to Vietnam in 1977 to avoid Khmer Rouge purges in the Eastern Zone, where he had been a Khmer Rouge regimental commander. The Front consisted of former Khmer Rouge cadres who were prepared by Vietnamese officials to become Cambodia's new leadership after the removal of the Khmer Rouge government.
The Vietnamese army and the Front brought down the Democratic Kampuchea regime on January 7, 1979, in reaction to bloody raids by Khmer Rouge forces into Vietnamese territory in 1978. As the Front's leaders assumed their positions in the new PRK government after the Khmer Rouge regime was toppled, Hun Sen became foreign minister.
The early years
Current and former government officials and people who knew Hun Sen in his youth or as a budding young communist leader said his rhetorical talents and ability to lead, learn, adapt and survive the changing political and ideological terrain in Cambodia were apparent from the start in his personality. Hun Sen was born as Hun Bunnal on August 5, 1952, in Peam Koh Snar in Kompong Cham province, a village of tobacco farmers located on the banks of the Mekong River. Local villager Chhe Noeun, 61, who claimed to be a childhood friend of the premier, said during a visit to the village that he spent much time listening to his younger friend talk. "He was one of the kids who was smarter than the others. His speaking, his rhetoric, was very good. During farm work, he liked to chat a lot, he made a lot of jokes," he said.
Noeun said Hun Sen left the village to stay in a Buddhist pagoda in the capital when he was about 16 years old. The Hun family, he said, had left the village in about 1963 to move to Memot district, located on the Vietnamese border, but they returned in 1969 after the start of the American bombing campaign in east Cambodia.
After Hun Sen left the village, Noeun said, he did not see him again until 1974 when he showed up on a motorbike at a local primary school as a Khmer Rouge cadre carrying an AK-47 rifle. Hun Sen told his friend, "I just came again today and I don't know when I will come back or if I will die.”
Veteran CPP lawmaker Cheam Yeap said during an interview last week that he remembered Hun Sen exhibited leadership qualities and a capacity to learn quickly early in his career. These skills, Yeap said, allowed Hun Sen to gain loyalty from his staff, to impress officials from Vietnam, whose military remained in Cambodia from 1979 to 1989, and to sway members of the Khmer People's Revolutionary Party - the previous name of the CPP.
"I met him in 1979 ... He was the youngest foreign minister in the world," Yeap recounted. "Even though he was five years younger than me, I saw he was hard working," he said. "[Hun Sen] only finished grade 3 or 4, before joining the resistance movement. Even though he studied a little bit, he learned very fast," Yeap said. "He liked to communicate with people, especially with those with more experience.”
One man who takes a darker view of the young Hun Sen and his rise to power is Pen Sovann, the first prime minister of the PRK, who served as premier for only a few months in 1981 before being arrested and held under house arrest in Hanoi for nine years by the Vietnamese government. "Vietnam ordered me to be arrested by 12 armed soldiers. Hun Sen was there to read the charges against me," Sovann said during an interview at his Takeo province home. Sovann said he was purged by the Vietnamese authorities because of his independent political leadership and his opposition to a number of government policies proposed by Vietnam.
He claimed Hun Sen was appointed prime minister in 1985 because "[Vietnamese authorities] believed and depended on Hun Sen as they believed he would do everything for Vietnam." The former prime minister, who knew Hun Sen from the time he joined the Front in Vietnam, characterized him as smart and a talented public speaker, but also as an authoritarian with few scruples
"He learns very fast and then he can lecture [on a topic] later on," he said. "Hun Sen has outstanding capacities. His intellect is strong, but he has no morals to go along with it." Sovann said he was "not surprised" by Hun Sen's world-beating political longevity. "Hun Sen likes power; he wants to increase his power. He doesn't listen to anyone ... If anyone criticizes him, he will do anything to defend his power.”
Following the Paris Peace Agreements in the early 1990s and the subsequent United Nations-supervised transition from a Vietnamese-backed communist government to a fledgling democracy, Hun Sen quickly showed he was a clever politician who could woo Cambodia's largely rural and uneducated electorate. By the end of the decade, he had also managed to disband the Khmer Rouge step by step by offering amnesty to defectors.
Despite his political skills, Hun Sen did not shy away from using violence against political opposition. In 1997, he took over the government by force and the ensuing fighting killed about 100 people, mostly from the rival Funcinpec Party, according to a 2008 US Congressional Research Service (CRS) report, which referred to the takeover as an "unlawful seizure of power." Before the military takeover, a grenade attack hit a peaceful opposition rally in Phnom Penh, which killed 16 children, men and women and wounded more than 100 others. Recent disclosures of the US Federal Bureau of Investigation's (FBI) probe into the attack, which was conducted because an American citizen was injured in the blast, were made under a Freedom of Information Act request filed by The Cambodia Daily, a local English-language newspaper.
The investigation, which was cut short due to intensifying threats to the FBI agent, found evidence that directly implicated Hun Sen's bodyguard unit and the CPP, while highly placed witnesses declined to cooperate with the FBI, according to the records disclosed to the newspaper. The US government reacted to the violent events of 1997 by banning direct aid to Cambodia for a decade. As the US Congressional Research Service noted, "The autocratic tendencies of Prime Minister Hun Sen have discouraged foreign investment and strained US-Cambodian relations.”
Mixed reviews
Although opinions vary among researchers and observers on Hun Sen's accomplishments during his 25-year reign, most acknowledged the transformation of war-torn Cambodia into a stable, peaceful country with an open and growing economy as his principal achievement. Before economic growth came to a halt last year due to the global economic crisis, Cambodia's economy grew an average 9.5% per year from 2002 to 2008, according to a recent World Bank report. However, human-rights abuses, land evictions, rampant corruption among government officials, a lack of an independent judiciary and intimidation of political opponents have also been part of life in Cambodia under Hun Sen, local and international human-rights groups have said. Last year saw a rise in court cases against political opponents and other critics of Hun Sen.
However, human-rights abuses, land evictions, rampant corruption among government officials, a lack of an independent judiciary and intimidation of political opponents have also been part of life in Cambodia under Hun Sen, local and international human-rights groups have said. Last year saw a rise in court cases against political opponents and other critics of Hun Sen. Opposition leader Sam Rainsy, of the eponymous political party, is currently in France but facing criminal charges in Cambodia over the removal of boundary posts along the border with Vietnam. Rainsy said Hun Sen had shown during his long premiership that his objectives were personal and did not serve ordinary Cambodians. "It is obvious that Hun Sen's only or predominant.
goal is to remain in power, to survive politically ... Power is everything for him. But above all, power means impunity for him and his clan," Rainsy wrote in an e-mail. "But when survival is your life goal you cannot have any vision. This is why Cambodia under Hun Sen is going nowhere, if not down the drain, [through] corruption, poverty, human-rights abuses, in spite of competent civil servants, dedicated civil society and abundant natural resources," he wrote. "Hun Sen has had only two ways in dealing with his political opponents: Buy them or eliminate them either physically, [through] grenade attack, military coup [...] or politically, [through] sham lawsuits ... There is no example in the whole world of any country being a democratic and prosperous one with the same top leader for decades," Rainsy added.
According to historian Evan Gottesman, author of the 2003 book Cambodia After the Khmer Rouge, Hun Sen's durability is in itself exceptional. "The fact that the same man who led Cambodia in 1985 could also run the Cambodia of 2010 is remarkable," Gottesman said via e-mail. "Hun Sen's most impressive achievement was his ability to lead Cambodia from being an isolated communist country to economic and political integration with the non-communist countries of the region," he said.
"Hun Sen's greatest failure is his failure to promote, in fact, his willingness to undermine democratic institutions such as an independent judiciary, accountable security forces and a professional civil service," he added. According to Gottesman, three qualities are central to Hun Sen's hold on power: The first is ideological flexibility, which he said became apparent when Hun Sen decided to quickly abandon communist orthodox ideas in the late 1980s when it suited the situation.
"The second is a willingness to be absolutely ruthless with his opponents when he feels it necessary. The third is his cultivation of a patronage system that supports him," Gottesman wrote. "[A] lack of an independent judiciary or accountability for human-rights abuses persist because these hallmarks of modern democracies do not serve the interests of leaders who intend to remain in power indefinitely," he added. Reflecting on how the character of the 1980s communist PRK regime, many of whose officials are still in the government, influences Cambodia today, Gottesman said, "Cambodia's government is still built on patronage systems that support top officials, with Hun Sen at the top.”
Rights and wrongs
International environmental watchdog Global Witness said in a February 2009 report entitled "Country for Sale" that its research indicated revenues from Cambodia's growing oil and mining industries were being siphoned off by a network of corrupt officials. "Rather than using these millions to lift its people out of poverty, Cambodia's government could instead continue to follow the example of neighboring Burma [Myanmar], where an autocratic elite uses money generated from the country's natural resource wealth to rule over an impoverished majority," the report warned.
Janice Beanland from rights group Amnesty International's Southeast Asia Team said in an e-mail that the protection of human rights in Cambodia under Hun Sen had come "a very long way" since the 1985 communist regime. However, she added that his government had often failed to undertake serious attempts to further improve the country's human-rights record, which remains poor. "[T]he lack of accountability and the culture of impunity that held sway [in the 1980s] remains in place to quite a degree. Judicial reform remains a plan, rule of law is not yet in place and for most Cambodians, there is very limited protection for human rights," Beanland said.
"[I]f the prime minister had wanted to institutionalize human-rights protection - through the legal system, the government administrative structures and independent institutions - he would have had the power to do so," she said. "The continued lack of integrity and independence within the court system, for instance, testifies to the limited human-rights commitment of the government.”
Chea Vannath, a local independent political analyst, said Hun Sen's most important accomplishment was restoring peace in Cambodia, while adding that his premiership had lacked in economic management and improving child and maternal health. "His achievement is that he was able to bring peace to Cambodia, a very valuable achievement. His shortcoming is the economy, it moves but it stumbles ... It seems the economy could have done better, maternal and child health should also be better," she said.
Vannath said Hun Sen's strengths included his ability to cope and navigate a changing political climate and system, his ability to equitably share political power with others and his vigilance to not rest on his laurels."So far, another blessing is [his] good health," she added.
According to historian Henri Locard, who has taught at the Royal University of Phnom Penh since the early 1990s, one of Hun Sen's primary skills is his ability to fascinate the Cambodian public. "Hun Sen is a past-master in the control of rhetoric ... He is sure to hold the majority of the population by the invisible thread and the fascination of his words," Locard said. After the dark days of the Khmer Rouge and the communist government, Cambodians now "relish all their newly-acquired freedoms", he said, adding, "With one major exception: the freedom to challenge his all-embracing power ... there is a great deal of self-censorship exerted in this country.”
Indeed, many civil society members and researchers consulted for this article, foreign and local, declined to comment directly on Hun Sen's premiership. CPP lawmaker Cheam Yeap contested Hun Sen's record of human-rights abuses, tolerance of corruption and intimidation of political opponents. "Fighting corruption is not easy. Europe and the US have these problems too," he said. "Sam Rainsy breaks the law and then he says his rights are violated when he gets charged.”
Yeap contended that Hun Sen and other CPP members had built up the country after its near-complete destruction by the Khmer Rouge. "I would like to ask you who could do it? [Opposition leaders] Sam Rainsy, Ranariddh, Kem Sokha couldn't do it ... They came later on, then they demanded this, they demanded that. They want freedom to attack everyone, everything. The CPP cannot allow them to do that.”
On December 27, the 25th anniversary of his appointment as acting prime minister, Hun Sen met with members of his family at a hotel in Phnom Penh and contemplated a time when he no longer ruled Cambodia. Should that day come, according to Hun Sen, members of his powerful extended family could find the tables turned against them if they alienated ordinary Cambodians. "If Hun Sen loses power, you will become a target for attacks if you do not follow my advice," he said during his televised remarks, advising his family that they should show charity and concern for the less fortunate. It was a rare reflection by the strongman leader on the eventual limits of his rule.
Paul Vrieze is a reporter with the Phnom Penh-based The Cambodia Daily. Phann Ana, also a reporter at the newspaper, contributed to the reporting
(Copyright 2010 Asia Times Online (Holdings) Ltd. All rights reserved. Please contact us about sales, syndication and republishing.)
86. The Prince of ploys The Guar6ian, Monday 15 November 2010 Article history; Originally published in the Guardian on 15 November 1991 (Comments: this article is one of the most accurate depiction of Sihanouk well-known mercurial and self-centered behavior. He is very clever and had always uses his royal status internally and externally, to promote his selfish and personal agenda. The author had captured precisely the specific bad character of Sihanouk in this following sentence; “In the very specific mix of shifting global and regional politics which have made the new Cambodian settlement possible, Prince Norodom Sihanouk may have a very important role to play: but his previous stage parts have been deeply equivocal. As President of the Supreme National Council, he will exercise his all too familiar skills in balancing off pressures from one side against the other whilst ensuring that his own person remains at the fulcrum. The pomp and ceremony also serves a purpose for older Cambodians who hunger dimly for the past, and younger Cambodians who think it is all good fun.” Cambodia’s future will depend on whether the Cambodian people will understand the extremely deadly and selfish role of Sihanouk, as a modern god-king that brought much death, destruction, and calamity to the Cambodian people during his long tenure in different capacities, as the sole leader of modern day Cambodia. Naranhkiri Tith Ph.D. Washington DC. January 4, 2011) --------------------------------------------- So the saviour of Cambodia has returned to revive his people. Or, put a slightly different way, the old rascal has finally made it home again. In the very specific mix of shifting global and regional politics which have made the new Cambodian settlement possible, Prince Norodom Sihanouk may have a very important role to play: but his previous stage parts have been deeply equivocal. As President of the Supreme National Council, he will exercise his all too familiar skills in balancing off pressures from one side against the other whilst ensuring that his own person remains at the fulcrum. The pomp and ceremony also serves a purpose for older Cambodians who hunger dimly for the past, and younger Cambodians who think it is all good fun. But for the sake of those who have died unnecessarily since Vietnam drove out the Khmer Rouge, let us pause and remember one simple historical fact. Sihanouk acknowledged that his people were better off under Vietnamese tutelage than under Khmer Rouge tyranny. But he found it expedient to fall in with Chinese plans (plus some US prodding) and join the bogus "Coalition Government" set up to revive the fortunes of Pol Pot. True, long-held rivalry with Vietnam also influenced the choice. "We have to choose between being eaten by Khmer or being eaten by Vietnamese. We prefer the Khmer because we are nationalists." But the Vietnamese would have withdrawn if Sihanouk had instead returned to Phnom Penh and revived the neutrality destroyed by the US during the Vietnam war. The greater responsibility attaches to the perverse Washington-Beijing entente which sponsored the coalition, with supine support from Britain. The coalition conveyed international legitimacy for eight years of murderous war which hit the civilian population hardest, while thousands of refugees were denied the chance to go home and the Phnom Penh government was starved of foreign aid. Only when the international net began to unravel with Sino-Soviet rapprochement, while the US relaxed its Hanoi vendetta, was Cambodia allowed an escape route. With the Khmer Rouge now permitted a legitimate political future, it is still a very shaky way forward, but better than war. Sihanouk commuted between desirable residences in Beijing, Pyongyang and France, issuing his interminable hand-written reproaches and textual commentaries with an obsessive concern for anything said about him. The cute old operator still fancies his royal role. But the royal touch will not cure the severed limbs and shattered lives which, in his own delightful and mercurial way, Prince Sihanouk helped bequeath to Cambodia. guardian.co.uk © Guardian News and Media Limited 2011
87. PRINCE SIHANOUK AND THE NEW ORDER IN SOUTHEAST ASIA (Comments: The summary of the CIA secret report that was released in 2007 under the freedom of information act of the US Congress, shed a great deal of light on Sihnaouk mercurial and self-cenered life. Sihanouk has often invoked as his main reason to be so elusive and mercurial that he has to survive first, before he can save Cambodia. However, one should ask the curcial question whether Sihanouk by flip flopping from one end of the political spectrum to the opposite end, saved or harmed Cambodia; for instance, he went from being against the Khmer Rouge, then to be their main ally; then from being against the Vietnamese as invaders, to thank them for "liberating" Cambodia; finally, to accused Hun Sen as a traitor to the Cambodia people, now to thank him for liberating Cambodia from the Khmer Rouge. thanks to Sihanouk 's alliance with the khmer Rouge, more than 2 milbrutally massacred. His current alliance with Hun Sen, had allowed the Vietnamese to remain in full control of Cambodia, indiectly through Hun Sen, by allowing more than an estimated 4 million illegal Vietnamese immigrants to move freely into Cambodia after 1979. (According to Ambassador Bindra, a former chairman of ICC of the 1954 Geneva Conference). to see ow Sihanouk had switched his alliances, please click this link; Sihanouk and his Tragic Role in Contemporary Cambodia To read the full content of the secret CIA report, please, click this link; (CIA report on Sihanouk and Son Ngoc Thanh.pdf ). Naranhkiri Tith Ph.D. Washngton DC. January 4, 2011) --------------------------------------------- Summary Prince Norodom Sihanouk, onetime King and now Chief of State of Cambodia, is the undisputed father of his country to most Cambodians. He was initially installed as King in 1941, following some sleight of hand by the French, who believed that the 19-year-old Sihanouk would prove a pliable figurehead for their Cambodian protectorate. In the general surge of nationalism following World War II, however, Sihanouk became active in urging independence for Cambodia, contending to the French that only complete independence would undercut the appeal of Communism to his countrymen. Various French cabinets, viewing Cambodia as part of the Indo-China whole, feared that an "independent" Cambodia would be quickly absorbed by the Viet Minh, and were dubious concerning the quality of Cambodia's political leadership. Early experiments with parliamentary democracy-.-were unpromising, and corruption was endemic among Cambodian officialdom. Politically-aware Cambodians tended to divide in their allegiance, with some supporting Sihanouk and others favoring Son Ngoc Thanh, an ex-premier whose underground independence movement tended to attract leftist and anti-royalist elements. In June 1952, Sihanouk discharged the incumbent premier and assumed personal power for a period limited to three years. The years of the "royal mandate" were fruitful ones: grants of amnesty depleted the ranks of Thanh's Khmer Issarak (Free Cambodia) adherents, and threats of drastic action by Sihanouk led France to grant full independence in November 1953, Sihanouk succeeded in discrediting the once-popular Son Ngoc Thanh to most of his five million countrymen, and in so doing reinforced the prestige of the throne. The Geneva Conference of July 1954, which brought about the partition of Vietnam, was crucial in defining Cambodia's re1ations with neighboring countries. At Geneva, the Cambodian delegation successfully resisted Communist efforts to establish a regroupment area within Cambodia for the Issarak, and secured acceptance of Cambodia's right to seek foreign military aid. Cambodia agreed not to join any military pact, or to permit foreign bases. In March 1955, Sihanouk, dissatisfied with the throne as a vehicle for political leadership, abdicated as King in favor of his father, He set about organizing the Sangkum (People's Socialist Community) as his own political movement, and through it urged a program of economic improvement and welfare. In 1955, the United States initiated a program of direct economic and military aid, though on a smaller scale than that provided Thailand and South Vietnam. Although Cambodia never suffered from internal cleavages comparable to those which afflicted Laos and Vietnam, politics tended to be chaotic. There were few trained administrators, and Sihanouk's vanity was such that he often failed to make effective use of those he had. Capable officials were easily discredited by rivals, who found in Sihanouk a receptive ear to rumors and gossip. The Prince's own behavior was erratic: in the two years following his abdication, he resigned the premiership three times, generally over minor issues which he felt reflected criticism of himself. ''Interim" premiers, however, were always approved by Sihanouk and most often were handpicked by him. At approximately the time of the Bandung conference in April 1955, Sihanouk began to demonstrate a greater interest in foreign affairs, Whereas' the previous three years had been devoted to obtaining and consolidating Cambodia's independence, he now sought to participate in international affairs as a neutralist of the Nehru school. Sihanouk emulated Nehru as an apologist for Communist China, and lectured the West on the necessity of coexistence. Sihanouk held off recognizing Peiping for a time, probably out of reluctance to take any action which might stimulate political activity among overseas Chinese in Cambodia. In February 1956, however, Sihanouk undertook the first of four visits to Communist China which have brought him into close rapport with Chou En-Lai. The ensuing honeymoon with Communist China did not prevent Sihanouk from taking action when necessary against Cambodian leftists, including the small crypto Communist Pracheachon (People's Party). It encouraged him, however, to take a hard line in his relations with Thailand and South Vietnam and to spurn any association with SEATO. When, in 1958, Sihanouk was angered by the reception accorded him on a visit to Bangkok, he vented his pique by recognizing Communist China and endorsing Peiping's position on issues such as UN recognition and Taiwan. As time went on, Sihanouk came increasingly to link the United States with the unfriendly attitude of Thailand and South Vietnam, who distrusted Cambodia's neutrality and with whom Cambodia had outstanding territorial disputes. In February 1959, Sihanouk--warned by the Chinese and French--crushed the abortive Dap Chhuon revolt, which had been financed and supported by Thailand and South Vietnam. The incident occurred at a time when Sihanouk was already seething over alleged protocol slights during a visit to the United States; when interrogation of the plotters uncovered evidence of CIA contact with Chhuon, Sihanouk's anger against the United States grew into active hostility. To this day, Sihanouk's speeches ring with outrage at CIAOs alleged support of Dap Chhuon. When, in the wake of the revolt, clandestine transmitters began broadcasting anti-Sihanouk propaganda from the jungle, Sihanouk became convinced that his overthrow was an objective of U.S, policy. Over a period of years Sihanouk had come to the conclusion--unenthusiastically--that a Communist triumph in Southeast Asia was a foregone conclusion. His thinking on this matter is unclear; although he was clearly impressed by what he had seen of China', it was the DRV which he appeared most to fear. Nevertheless, his attitude since 1960 has been shaped by two key assumptions: the hostility of the United States, and the inevitability of a Communist victory. On several occasions Sihanouk has argued that there are worse fates than that of a Communist satellite, and he has cited Poland as a nation which has preserved its identity even though absorbed in the bloc, Sihanouk's very real fear that Cambodia may once again be partitioned between Vietnam and Thailand helps explain his fetish on the subject of territorial guarantees, and his willingness to accept satellite status if the Khmer nation can be preserved by no other means. Cambodia's foreign policy, although overshadowed by Sihanouk's outbursts, has been marked since 1960 by his organized persistent efforts to convene an international conference to guarantee Cambodia's neutrality and territorial integrity. Although there is reason to believe that Sihanouk genuinely desires such a conference, he has made no effort to make such a conference palatable to the Thais and the South Vietnamese, and the Thais. Apart from the question of the neutrality conference, there is other evidence that Sihanouk has lost his sure touch in international affairs. In the early 1950s, he had demonstrated considerable acumen in pressuring France into a grant of full independence, and in uniting his countrymen behind the Sangkum. In 1963, however, he succumbed to his emotions in a series of incidents which served to isolate Cambodia further from the Free World. In January-February 1963, Sihanouk visited both India and Communist China in a mission to attempt to resolve the border dispute. Notwithstanding his pro-Peiping bias, he at first regarded China as legally at fault, a view which prompted him to charge that the West had "incited India to provoke China," In a night-long brainwashing at Kunming, however, Chou En-Lai converted Sihanouk to a position which was, on balance, favorable to China. His doubts concerning China's ultimate objectives regarding Cambodia appear to have been resolved when, as in 1959, his hosts provided him with accurate and timely information concerning opposition elements at home. In April 1963, the Franco-American monopoly on military assistance to Cambodia was broken when Sihanouk accepted an offer of MIG aircraft and antiaircraft guns from the USSR. Later in the year, he accepted additional equipment from Communist China. On 27 August 1963, Sihanouk broke relations with South Vietnam following a series of border incidents and the beginning of anti-Diem demonstrations by Vietnamese Buddhists since Cambodia had broken relations with Thailand the previous fall, Cambodia's relations with its neighbors had reached a point where Sihanouk had reason to fear a new attempt to overthrow him. A wild month in November-December 1963 was triggered by an ultimatum by Sihanouk on 5 November, in which he warned that he would terminate U.S, aid to Cambodia if Son Ngoc Thanh's Khmer Serei (Free Khmer) broadcasts were not halted by 31 December. On the domestic front Sihanouk announced the imminent nationalization of all banks, and named one of his sons--then a student in Communist China--= his heir to leadership of the Sangkum. On 10 November broadcast he underscored the significance of his actions, remarking that "As people sing 'Goodbye, Hawaii,' I say 'Goodbye, Free World, I must tell them goodbye. The Khmer Serei radio was silent for more than a week following Sihanouk*s 5 November speech and the Prince appeared to have second thoughts concerning the desirability of ending the United States $30 million annual assistance. On 16 November, however, he again lost his temper, this time over information provided by two captured Khmer Serei. A public interrogation brought out only that the clandestine transmitters had been provided to the Vietnamese by the Americans, who had turned them over to the Khmer Serei. Sihanouk, however, seized upon this latest 'proof' of U. S. perfidy to announce the immediate termination of US aid. In a statement of 21 November, Peiping promised full support for Cambodia in the event of armed invasion by the United States or its "vassals"--a limited commitment which is as far. as the Chinese have gone in pledging assistance to 'their erratic supporter Sihanouk, however, appeared satisfied with Peiping's reaction, and outwardly unconcerned over Cambodia's unprecedented isolation from the West. Sihanouk's relations with the West continued to deteriorate, In December, a slur against the late President Kennedy--whom Sihanouk publicly characterized as an enemy of Cambodia--brought a protest from the United States, which was rejected. In March 1964, a government-sponsored demonstration against US and British diplomatic missions degenerated into a riot which caused heavy damage. The only Western nation with whom Sihanouk continued to maintain cordial relations was France. In January 1964, a French military mission agreed to provide Cambodia with some of the military equipment no longer available from the United States. Barring a deterioration in relations between Cambodia and Communist China, prospects for a significant improvement in Cambodian-American relations are not bright. Sihanouk's hatred for the United States is deep-rooted and seemingly implaccable. If his commitment to Peiping is less than total, and unsupported by any devotion to Marxist ideology, it nonetheless stems from a firm belief that Cambodia requires a champion and that China is the only one available. In view of the recent changes of government in Thailand and South Vietnam, some improvement in Cambodia's relations with these countries cannot be ruled out. Any meaningful rapprochement, however, is unlikely in the absence of a change in the balance of power in Southeast Asia, Sihanouk has alluded frequently to the inevitability of a Communist triumph, and he is unlikely to offend Communist China, or even the DRV, in the interest of any transitory improvement in his relations with Thailand or South Vietnam. Moreover, having seen' into the future with such clarity, Sihanouk will be most reluctant to recognize a trend favorable to the West should one develop. Should Sihanouk be overthrown, become incapacitated, or die, almost any successor would be more easy for the United States to deal with than the incumbent. The facts of geopolitics, however, are unlikely "to dictate any dramatic reversal of Sihanouk's policies Although a successor regime would probably take a more tolerant view of U.S. aid, it would be no more desirous of antagonizing China than is Sihanouk, and not necessarily more accommodating towards Thailand and South Vietnam. The most reasonable hope is for an eventual return by Cambodia to more of a "true" neutrality. | |
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